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Abstract
The decline in the number of operating public companies in Canada over the past decade
is startling and the trend shows no sign of reversing. Since robust public markets are
widely understood as serving a critical role in a healthy economy, the decline is
particularly concerning for Canadian policy makers. Moreover, the Canadian trend is
reflective of similar declines in the United States and Western Europe.
Many possible contributing factors have been posited to explain public company decline
based on speculation and anecdotal evidence. Amongst the factors most frequently cited
as contributing to public company decline is regulatory overreach. As such, participants
in the public company ecosphere have been advocating for regulatory reform to
streamline the IPO process and reduce the cost and complexity of ongoing public
company compliance. To this end, Canadian securities regulators have recently
undertaken an analysis of public company burden reduction through CSA Consultation
Paper 51-404, spawning the ongoing Ontario regulatory reform process under OSC
Notice 11-784.
Yet, no significant effort has been as of yet undertaken to empirically validate whether
regulatory overreach is indeed the primary factor in the public company decline
phenomenon or to determine which of the other potential factors are, in fact, most
influential for key decision-makers in making the go-public / stay-private decision. The
research project underpinning this dissertation addresses this critical knowledge gap,
comprising an extensive survey of senior business decision-makers and other key public
markets influencers in Canada. Using both qualitative and quantitative survey
methodologies, the study evidences that the phenomenon of public company decline is
complex and multi-factorial. Although regulatory overreach is certainly a relevant factor
in the mind of business decision-makers, it is only one of a number of interrelated factors.
Moreover, many of these factors are unrelated to increased costs and regulatory
complexity and therefore cannot be addressed directly through regulatory reform at the
securities commission level. As such, it is naïve to expect that regulatory streamlining
and cost reduction initiatives alone will be successful in stemming the further decline of
i

operating public companies. Rather, preservation of robust public markets in Canada
requires an integrated and aggressive multi-pronged intervention supported by federal
and provincial governments, securities regulators and other key players in the public
markets ecosphere.
Keywords:
securities regulation, public company decline, operating public companies, regulatory
complexity, regulatory streamlining, regulatory overreach, burden reduction, shorttermism, private capital proliferation, public markets ecosphere, systemic market change,
CSA Consultation Policy 51-404, OSC Notice 11-784
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Lay Abstract
The number of operating public companies listed in Canada has been declining
significantly for more than a decade. This trend shows no sign of reversing. Similar
trends have been observed in the United States and Western Europe. As maintenance of a
robust public markets is understood as being important to the broader economy, this trend
has been particularly concerning to public markets observers, governments and securities
regulators.
Participants in the public company ecosphere have been advocating for regulatory reform
to streamline the IPO process and reduce the cost and complexity of ongoing public
company compliance. To this end, Canadian securities regulators have recently
undertaken an analysis of public company burden reduction through CSA Consultation
Paper 51-404, spawning the ongoing Ontario regulatory reform process under OSC
Notice 11-784.
Many potential contributing factors have been suggested by academics and industry
experts to explain why public company decline is happening. However, empirical
evidence has been notably absent in studying the phenomenon.
The research project underpinning this dissertation focuses on addressing this critical
knowledge gap, comprising an extensive survey of senior business decision-makers and
other key public markets influencers in Canada. Using both qualitative and quantitative
survey methodologies, the study evidences that the phenomenon of public company
decline is complex and multi-factorial.
Although regulatory overreach is certainly a relevant factor in the mind of business
decision-makers, it is only one of a number of interrelated factors. Moreover, many of the
factors contributing to public company decline are unrelated to increased costs and
regulatory complexity and therefore cannot be addressed directly through regulatory
reform at the securities commission level. As such, it is naïve to expect that regulatory
streamlining and cost reduction initiatives alone will be successful in stemming the
further decline of operating public companies.
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The study demonstrates that preserving robust public markets in Canada will require an
integrated and aggressive multi-pronged intervention supported by federal and provincial
governments, securities regulators and other key players in the public markets ecosphere.
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Introduction
1.1- The Disappearing Public Company
A recent headline discloses that only a single initial public offering ("IPO") was
completed on Canada's sole senior stock exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange (the
"TSX"), during the first three quarters of fiscal 2019. 1 The Canadian business media
notes the lack of IPO activity, blaming a variety of potential causes. 2 In short, Canada's
recent IPO market has been abysmal. Is this terrible IPO market in Canada simply a blip
or the latest headline evidencing a disturbing long-term trend of public company decline?
Sadly, a quick look beyond the headlines to the underlying data demonstrates that it is the
latter.
The number of Operating Companies 3 listed and traded on the public markets in Canada
has declined significantly over the past dozen years. 4 Fewer initial public offerings
(“IPOs”) are being completed on Canadian stock exchanges. Existing public companies
are pursuing going-private transactions or being acquired by other companies at a

1

PriceWaterhouseCoopersLLP, "Quarterly Report on IPOs in Canada" (2 October 2019), online:<
https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/media/release/third-quarter-canadian-ipo-market-falls-further-behind2018.html >. On the junior Canadian stock exchanges, six new listings were added to the TSX Venture
Exchange (the "TSXV") and 22 new listings were added to the Canadian Stock Exchange (the "CSE") over
the same six-month period. However, the total funds raised in conjunction with those 28 new junior
exchange listings totaled less than $20 million (Cdn.), an average of less than $ 1million in capital raised
per new listing.
2

Sean Silcoff, “Private is the new public: The problem with tech starts chasing private money as they
don’t file IPOs” The Globe and Mail (10 January 2020) online:< https://www.theglobeandmail.com/
business/technology/article-private-is-the-new-public-the-problem-with-tech-stars-chasing-private/>.
3

“Operating Companies” as used in this Dissertation references companies which make products or deliver
services; ie, companies that generate economic value added to the underlying economy. Operating
Companies excludes entities that are investment vehicles and merely hold passive minority investments in
operating entities. These non-operating entities include mutual funds, exchange traded funds and closedend funds, are often described as “Frankenstocks”, and are proliferating at a rapid rate in Canada. See J.
Ari Pandes, “Are the Canadian Public Markets Broken?” (Presentation delivered at the CIRANO
Conference in Montreal, Quebec on 25 October 2016), online: <https://cirano.qc.ca/actualite/2016-1025/pdf/20161025_Are-the-Canadian-Public-Markets-Broken_J-Ari-Pandes.pdf>.
4

Bryce Tingle, J. Ari Pandes & Michael J. Robinson, “The IPO Market in Canada: What a Comparison
with the United States Tells Us About a Global Problem” (2013) 54 CBLJ 321.

2

significant rate. 5 Excluding closed-end funds (“CEF’s), exchange-traded funds (“ETF’s)
and real estate investment trusts (“REIT’s), there were 751 public Operating Companies
listed on the TSX as of November 18, 2019. 6 By comparison, there were 1,292 operating
public entities listed on the TSX on January 1, 2008, 7 evidencing that the number of
Operating Companies listed on Canada’s senior exchange has declined by nearly 42% in
the past dozen years. In fact, the average yearly drop in the number of Operating
Company listings on the TSX has held steady at approximately 3% on an annualized
basis. If this trend continues, one does not have to extrapolate too far into the future to
envision a hollowed-out public markets landscape with little relevance to the broader
economy.
The precipitous nature of the decline of Canadian public companies has been alarming
for many capital markets observers, with several commentaries recently published in the
Canada business news media. 8 Yet, the decline in the number of Operating Companies
listed and traded in the public capital markets is not a phenomenon unique to Canada. A
similarly concerning trend in the United States has been documented in numerous

5

Ibid at 334.

6

TSX Market Intelligence Group Report, November 30, 2019, TMX Group, online< https://www.tsx.
com/resource/en/2030/mig-report.pdf>.
7

Source: Ari Pandes and Bryce Tingle, “The Decline of Canadian Public Capital Markets”, upcoming in
University of Calgary Public Policy Journal; Also, Number of Listed Issuers by year, provided by TSX
Market Intelligence Group and Bloomberg Markets company listings.
8

See, for example: (i) Drew Hasselback, “The Amazing Disappearance of the Canadian Public Company”
The Financial Post (30 May 2016) online:< https://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/the-amazingdisappearance-of-the-canadian-public-company>; (ii) Jason Kirby “Public Companies in Canada Are
Going the Way of the Dodo”, Macleans (25 August 2016), online: https://www.macleans.ca/economy/
economicanalysis/public-companies-in-canada-are-going-the-way-of-the-dodo>; and (iii) Tim Shufelt and
Christian Pellegrini, “The Incredible Shrinking Stock Market, The Globe and Mail (12 November 2017),
online:< ttps://www. theglobeandmailcom/report-on-business/invisible-ipos-whats-to-blame-for-theexodus-from-publicmarkets/article 34910200>.
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academic studies 9 and in the business media, 10 with Western Europe also evidencing
significant reductions in the number of public Operating Companies during the same
interval. 11 In fact, it is widely recognized that the number of Operating Companies listed
and traded on public exchanges has been declining from its peak in the early years of this
millennium in all industrialized western democracies with mature capital markets. This
decline is particularly acute amongst small and medium sized enterprises (“SME's”) 12,
where the percentage drop of public Operating Companies is even greater than for larger
public enterprises. 13

1.2- Relevance and Possible Causes of the Decline
Understanding that this trend of public company decline is happening throughout the
industrialized western world, two critical follow-on questions immediately arise: (i) Does
the decline in the number of Operating Companies in the public markets actually matter?
and (ii) What factors are most important in relation to the decline in the number of public
Operating Companies?

9

See, for example: Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi and Rene M. Stulz, “The U.S. Listing Gap” (2017)
123 Journal of Financial Economics 464; and Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter and Zhongyan Zhu, “Where Have
All the IPOs Gone?” (2013) 48:6 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1663.
10

See, for example: Bloomberg Editorial Board, “Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?”
Editorial, Bloomberg Opinion (9 April 2018) online: <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-0409/where-have-all-the-u-s-public-companies-gone>.
11

Kate Burgess, “IPOs Are Going Downhill Fast” Financial Times (22 November 2015) online:< https://
www.ft.com/content/08779c32-ce57-11e4-86fc-00144feab7de>; and Adrian Rollins, “The Disappearing
Public Company: Why Firms Don’t Want to List” (1 November 2017) Australian CPA Society Website,
online:< https://www.intheblack.com/articles/2017/11/01/disappearing-public-companies>.
12

“SME” is a term used in many countries throughout the world, although the definition of an SME varies
from industry to industry and country to country. In this Dissertation, the definition of “SME's” utilized is
the one adopted by Statistics Canada in its ongoing research, which defines SME’s as companies that (i)
have fewer than 500 employees; and (ii) have less than $50 million ($Cdn) in revenue. Susan Ward “SME
Definition (Small to Medium Enterprise) The Balance Small Business Website (10 December 2018),
online:< https://www.thebalancesmb.com/sme-small-to-medium-enterprise-definition-2947962>.
13

Marshall Lux and Jack Pead, “Hunting High and Low: The Decline of the Small IPO and What to Do
About It” Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government: Associate Working Paper Series No.
86 (April 2018), online:< https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files
/centers/mrcbg/working.papers/86_final.pdf> at 8.
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With respect to the first question, there are certainly differing opinions in legal and
business academia circles as to the degree of concern that the declining public markets
should engender. Yet, there is an overriding consensus amongst observers that having
robust public capital markets with a strong cross-section of Operating Companies from a
variety of industries is an important part of a healthy economic ecosystem. 14
Among the arguments most commonly advanced as to why the decline in Operating
Public companies is an important public issue are the following: (i) Operating Companies
play an important role in the public markets as drivers of employment growth; 15 (ii)
access to the public markets reduces the cost of capital for Operating Companies, creating
capital that drives innovation and productivity across the economy; (iii) having robust
IPO markets as eventual outlets for private-stage investor liquidity encourages early-stage
investment; (iv) public capital markets often place a greater value on corporate social
responsibility than private markets, thereby facilitating greater investment in sociallydesirable innovation; (v) public markets provide an opportunity for direct participation of
the middle class in Operating Companies, as smaller investors lack equal access to
private company investment vehicles compared to high net worth investors or
institutional investors; 16 (vi) more public Operating Companies creates better overall
corporate governance as evolving best practices are adopted more quickly in public
entities and eventually filter through to private companies; and (vii) the information
derived from public company filings is important for both government and private
analysts to assess economic trends, performance and pricing data that drive policy
formulation and economic planning (which information is simply not accessible to the
same degree from private entities).

14

Supra note 4 at 323.

15

Jay R. Ritter, “Reenergizing the IPO Market” (17 December 2012) online at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2184961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2172332 at 7.
16

As articulated by Mike Silagdaze, CEO of Canadian technology company Tophatmonocle Corp., “[t]he
reallocation of capital to private markets from public really sucks for the average retail investor because
now the only people that are getting access to these hyper-growth businesses are basically rich dudes”.
Supra note 2.
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Even Dr. Jay Ritter, who is amongst the least alarmist of the academics writing on the
decline of public markets, states that “ensuring a viable IPO market, alongside venture
capital and commercial bank financing, is an important part of a well-functioning
ecosystem to fund investment”. 17
Further validation of the significant public importance of this issue for long term
economic health is underscored by the fact that both the United States and the European
Union governments have established taskforces to better understand and respond to the
challenge of public company decline. 18
In Canada specifically, an additional argument can be advanced as to the heightened
importance of public company decline by virtue of the fact that the proportion of SME's
in the Canadian public markets has always been significantly higher than in the United
States. With the public markets decline phenomenon more concentrated amongst SME's
than larger enterprises, the situation is a matter of significant concern with respect to the
overall growth and trajectory of the economy.
Turning to the second question, a review of the academic and media analysis of the trend
evidences that the focus of the literature thus far has been on quantifying the extent of the
decline in the public markets and then simply hypothesizing as to the root causes. 19
Although there is a significant volume of analysis positing a variety of factors as
potentially contributing to the decline in public Operating Companies, nobody thus far
has published any empirical research to validate the actual relevance of those factors to

17

L.D Wilson interview with Dr. Jay Ritter, Joseph B. Cordell Eminent Scholar in Finance, University of
Florida; interview held at Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary (September 15, 2018)
18

U.S. IPO Task Force, “Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and the Job Market
Back on the Road to Growth” Presented to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (20 October 2011),
online:< https://www. sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf >; and European IPO
Task Force, “Rebuilding IPOs in Europe: Creating Jobs and Growth in European Capital Markets” EU
Task Force Report, posted by Federation of European Securities Exchanges (23 March 2015), online:<
http:// www.fese.eu/images/documents/speeches-reports/2015/Final_IPO_Task_Force_ 20150323.pdf>
19

The academic and business media commentary on this topic are reviewed in Chapter 2- Literature
Review on Public Company Decline hereafter.
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the decision-making process at the critical inflection point in a private company’s growth
cycle where a path to pursuing an eventual IPO or alternative private financing source is
determined.
The broad categories of factors most frequently cited in the academic literature as
potentially contributing to the decline in the number of public Operating Companies are
the following:
(i) Regulatory Overreach and Resulting Cost Increases- the belief that a string of
regulatory amendments by securities regulators beginning in the early-2000’s has made
ongoing compliance too costly and time-consuming for public companies;
(ii) Private Capital Proliferation- the belief that there has been a significant increase in
availability of private capital (private equity or private debt financing) to fund anticipated
development and growth, thereby allowing more Operating Companies to choose to
remain private for longer periods, even in perpetuity;
(iii) Litigation Risk- the belief that increased litigation risk for public companies from
securities class action lawsuits is a public market deterrent;
(iv) Lack of SME Analyst Coverage- the belief that a combination of changes to the
public markets trading structure reducing tick sizes for market makers, and new rules
prohibiting mutual support between the research and investment functions at investment
banks, disincentivizes support of IPOs and smaller public company research, thereby
reducing valuations and liquidity for SME public companies;
(v) Shareholder Short-Termism- the belief that shifting economics in the trading
ecosystem away from long-term value investing to short-term high-frequency
computerized share trading programs by institutions and day-traders, along with the
decline in the number of value investors actively managing their own portfolios
(choosing to delegate to fund managers), collectively deters public markets (which
include the proliferation of short-sellers);
(vi) Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis- the belief that the increasing rate of

7

technological change has made it more advantageous for smaller companies to be
acquired at an earlier stage in order to compete effectively in the market, thereby pushing
companies to pursue strategic sales instead of IPOs.
To this list of six factors highlighted in the academic literature, four additional potential
factors can be crystallized from business media analysis and conversations with senior
business executives and professional service providers on the topic of public company
decline: 20
(i) General Public Company Distraction Fatigue- reflecting the belief that lost
productivity resulting from the demands of continual interface with public company
shareholders, proxy advisors, analysts and investment bankers deters senior executives
from public markets;
(ii) Quarterly Target Perseveration- referring to the ongoing tension in public entities
between managing for long-term shareholder value creation versus managing towards
analyst targets on a revolving quarterly basis; 21
(iii) Public Disclosure Disadvantage- referring to the belief that there are material and
inherent disadvantages facing public companies as a result of mandatory disclosure of
critical information to competitors, customers and suppliers as well as the aversion of
senior management to the breadth and universal accessibility of contemporary executive
compensation disclosure; and
(iv) Social Agenda Weaponization- referring to the evolution of the corporate social
responsibility movement and the increased willingness and capacity of secondary
stakeholders to exert pressure on public companies through means only available in the

20

The academic and business media sources consulted are discussed later in this Dissertation under
Chapter 2- Literature Review.
21

This factor is another manifestation of market short-termism generally, but is distinguished from
shareholder short-termism in that the impetus for this form of short-termism is driven by analyst
expectations and the reporting cycle rather than the investment horizon of shareholders.
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public markets.

22

Amongst the preceding list of the ten categories of factors posited as being likely
contributors to the decline in the number of public Operating Companies, which ones are
actually most important to the senior business decision-makers determining whether to
take a particular company down a public or private path?
Where academic and media commentators have frequently endeavored to articulate the
likely factors contributing to the capital markets decline, the explanations are thus far
derived solely from anecdotal evidence gleaned from a limited number of industry
experts (often senior securities regulators) who are relaying opinions influenced by their
personal experiences and observation. While certainly well-informed, individual
opinions from observers do not equate to empirical data. In the very few instances where
academics have attempted to apply empirical research methodology to the problem thus
far, such studies have been limited to utilizing available listing, trading and other
financial data to test the relevant author’s hypotheses that a particular factor included in
the preceding list can be empirically validated as contributing to the phenomenon based
on the hard data. 23
Prior to this Dissertation, no research project has yet been published which attempts to
empirically validate the degree to which the categories of potential contributing factors
outlined above are considered as important in the decision-making process by the specific
individuals who are responsible for making the ultimate decision to take a company
public.
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An 11th category of factors can also be added, not heretofore discussed in any of the literature: Systemic
Portfolio Shift- referring to the migration of investment capital away from actively-managed funds willing
to invest in IPOs into passively-managed funds (such as ETF's) that only invest in benchmark stocks tied to
indexes. This factor was brought up exclusively by investment bankers in the open text response questions
and in live presentations.
23

For example: Gao, et al, Supra note 9; and Michael Ewens and Joan Farre-Mensas, “The Deregulation
of the Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs” (2018) Cornerstone Research, Working Paper,
online:< https:// westernfinance-portal.org/viewp.php?n=546476>.
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1.3- Seeking to Arrest Public Company Decline Through
Regulatory Reform
Notwithstanding the lack of empirical data as to which of the possible contributing
factors are most important in contributing to public company decline, there has been an
overriding assumption made throughout developed western democratic nations that
regulatory overreach is, at the very least, one of the major factors. Following from this
assumption is the belief that implementing securities sector regulatory reforms reducing
the time, complexity and cost of public company compliance is an important step to
arresting the further erosion of the number of public Operating Companies.
The United States was the first country to bring in a regulatory reform package directed
at reducing perceived regulatory overreach and thereby reversing the decline in IPOs with
the April 2012 passage of the Jump-Start our Business Start-Ups (“JOBS”) Act. 24 Early
academic analysis of the impact of the JOBS Act evidenced a belief that it was having a
significant positive effect in the IPO market, 25 but subsequent years’ performance have
demonstrated that any gains were temporary and insufficient to arrest the overall decline
of the number of public Operating Companies in the United States. 26
More recently, the Trump administration has announced its intent to support further
regulatory streamlining to reduce the compliance burden on listed companies by asking
the Securities and Exchange Commission to consider biannual financial reporting
amongst other reform ideas. 27 This is an obvious indication of the belief by the President
that the problem of public company decline can be addressed by ad hoc securities
regulatory reform.

24

The JOBS Act: Public Law 112-105, House Bill Number H.R. 3606, Signed into law on April 5, 2012.

25

Michael Dambra, Laura Casares Field & Matthew T. Gustafson, “The JOBS Act and IPO Volume:
Evidence that Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO Decision” (2015) 116 Journal of Financial Economics 121.
26
27

Supra note 13 at 6.

Michael J. de la Merced and Matt Phillips, “Trump Asks S.E.C. to Study Quarterly Requirements for
Public Firms” New York Times (17 August 2018) online:< https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/business
/dealbook/trump-quarterly-earnings.html>.
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The current United States administration is not alone in this belief. In Europe, the first
recommendation of the European IPO Taskforce was the creation of a more streamlined
regulatory environment for small and medium size listed companies to lower the costs
and complexity of ongoing compliance. 28
In Canada, the Canadian Securities Administrators (the “CSA”), an umbrella organization
for collaboration between the provincial and territorial securities regulators, recently
undertook a year-long analysis and consultation process pursuant to CSA Consultation
Paper 51-404 (“CP 51-404) which was specifically focused on reducing the regulatory
burden for public Operating Companies. 29 The CSA consultation process involved a
request for public comment which resulted in responses being submitted from various
constituencies within the public markets ecosystem that will be discussed later in this
Dissertation. At the end of the CSA consultation process, each of the provincial and
territorial securities regulatory bodies were tasked by the CSA with initiating their own
internal processes to consider whether, and how, to implement the regulatory
streamlining proposals that were identified through the CSA initiative. 30
The Ontario Securities Commission (the “OSC”) represents the first securities
commission in Canada to follow through on implementing a formal streamlining process,
issuing OSC Staff Notice 11-784 (“OSC 11-784”) on January 14, 2019 announcing the
creation of the OSC Burden Reduction Taskforce. 31 In conjunction with OSC Notice 11784, the OSC published a document entitled “Burden Reduction Survey” and held a

28

E.U. IPO Taskforce, supra note 18 at 10.

29

CSA Consultation Paper 51-404, “Considerations for Reducing Regulatory Burden for Non-Investment
Fund Reporting Issuers” (6 April 2017), online:< http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_
20170405_51-404_considerations-for-reducing-regulatory-burden.htm>.

30

CSA Staff Notice 51-353 “Update on CSA Consultation Paper 51-404 Considerations for Reducing
Regulatory Burden for Non-Investment Fund Reporting Issuers” (17 March 2018), online:
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca /en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20180327_51-353_fund-reporting-issuers.htm>.
Hereinafter referred to as “CSA 51-353”.
31

OSC Staff Notice 11-784 “Burden Reduction” (14 January 2019), online: <https://www.osc.gov.on.ca
/en/SecuritiesLaw_sn_20190114_11-784_burden-reduction.htm>.
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series of roundtable discussions between March and May 2019. Recently, the OSC gave
a detailed update on the history, current status and future priorities for its burden
reduction initiative in a report entitled “Reducing Regulatory Burden in Ontario’s Capital
Markets” (hereinafter referred to as the OSC Burden Reduction Report”). 32 It is unclear
as to what degree the OSC Burden Reduction Taskforce was created in response to the
mandate handed to the OSC as a result of the CSA CP 51-404 as opposed to a change in
focus directed by the new conservative provincial government in Ontario. However, it
appears that the latter factor was the more important driving force, but the OSC is
nevertheless now clearly focused on a mandate of burden reduction.
One of the key elements of this Dissertation is consideration of the specific details of the
CSA and OSC burden reduction processes, assessing whether the existing regulatory
reform initiatives appear to be on a path that is likely to be successful in stemming further
public company decline in Canada. As part of that analysis, the CSA CP 51-404 and
OSC Notice 11-784 processes, priorities and outcomes thus far will be discussed in
greater detail later in this Dissertation in Chapter 4, followed by analysis of the
implications of the observations and conclusions in this Dissertation for those regulatory
processes in Chapter 10.
In summary, the research problem that is the focus of this Dissertation is properly
summarized as follows: (i) a precipitous decline in the number of public Operating
Companies has been validated across industrialized western democracies and is
particularly acute in Canada; (ii) the decline is widely acknowledged as being both
important and concerning, given that a robust market for public Operating Companies is
an integral component of a healthy financial ecosystem; (iii) several countries, including
Canada, have initiated regulatory reform initiatives designed to streamline ongoing
compliance requirements on the assumption that regulatory overreach is an important
contributing factor to public Operating Company decline; (iv) there has been significant

32

Ontario Securities Commission, “Reducing Regulatory Burden in Ontario’s Capital markets”, OSC
report (19 November 2019) online:< https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/20191119_reducingregulatory-burden-in-ontario-capital-markets.pdf>.
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academic and business media speculation on the underlying causes of the decline in
public Operating Companies based on anecdotal evidence, but the empirical research on
the topic to date has been limited to analysis of listing and financial data; and (v) there is,
thus far, no empirical evidence of the significance of factors relevant in the go public /
stay private decision for senior business decision makers and public markets influencers
that would make it possible to assess whether the type of regulatory reforms currently
being pursued are likely to be successful in stemming the further decline of public
Operating Companies.

1.4- Research Study Objectives
The principal objective of the survey-based empirical research study conducted on public
company decline in Canada (referred to herein as the “PCD Study”) underpinning this
Dissertation is to address the critical gap in the existing academic canon on the following
two key questions:
(i) Which, of the numerous categories of factors posited as potentially contributing to
public Operating Company decline in Canada, are actually most important to Canadian
senior business decision-makers and key public markets influencers in making the
decision as to whether to take a company public or pursue private financing alternatives?
(ii) What are the implications of the conclusions reached from analysis of the empirical
data generated in study of the first question for ongoing Canadian securities regulatory
reform initiatives focused on public company burden reduction?
Understanding which of the various factors can be empirically validated as being the
most influential in the decision-making process is critically important as a reference tool
instructing future regulatory initiatives. Certain factors can be directly addressed and
remediated by regulatory streamlining or other regulatory initiatives. Other factors are
endemic to public companies by their nature, reflect the evolution of our economic
system over time or are reflections of the adoption of new technologies. These particular
factors cannot be easily addressed by securities regulatory reform and intuitively require
more broad-based and aggressive forms of governmental intervention in order to
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overcome.
The PCD Study, and the accompanying analysis in this Dissertation, seeks to provide an
empirical foundation on which to assess the need, scope and priorities for future
regulatory reform initiatives specifically designed to stimulate new listings for public
Operating Companies. In Canada, the PCD Study research project is particularly timely
as the provincial and territorial securities regulators beyond Ontario are only now
beginning to frame their individual responses to the CSA 51-504 initiative. It is hoped
that the Canadian securities regulators will consider the conclusions of the PCD Study in
prioritizing and framing their final regulatory responses.
It is further hoped that the provincial and federal governments will realize the scope and
significance of the public company decline phenomenon to the future of the Canadian
capital markets, and begin to consider what roles they can and should play in broader
policy initiatives to ensure the future viability of the Canadian public markets. As is
discussed later in this Dissertation at several points, the securities regulators simply do
not have the tools in their toolbox to single-handedly stem the tide of public company
decline in Canada. Only federal and provincial governments can access the necessary
reforms and policy initiatives that could reasonably be expected to sustainably stimulate
IPO volume to the extent necessary to see a growth in the number of Operating
Companies.
Prior to execution of the PCD Study, it was anticipated that the study data would confirm
the evolving consensus in the academic literature that the key contributing factors related
to public company decline are multi-factorial and not dominated by a particular category
of factors. It was, however, completely unknown which particular factors would be
proven to be most important in the analysis, and what the relative influence of the factors
would be in terms of their importance in the decision-making process by corporate
leadership to pursue private versus public alternatives. In this area, the PCD Study
results have proven to be illuminative.
Ultimately, the PCD Study strongly supports the conclusion that the key elements
contributing to public company decline in Canada are indeed multi-factorial. In fact, the
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PCD Study data evidences that there are a number of different categories of factors with
similar degrees of importance to the overall phenomenon, such that no single factor, or
even a single category of factors, can be distinguished from the others and designated as
the primary culprit responsible for public company decline in Canada. The more data
that is considered from the PCD Study, the greater that the complexity associated with
public company decline becomes apparent. By extension, that knowledge also dictates
that the solutions to arresting public company decline are complex and costly.

1.5- An Important Assumption of the PCD Study
How can one pursue a course of research to empirically determine the degree of
relevance of the various categories of factors posited as contributing to operating public
company decline? First, one must consider that there is an important assumption
underpinning the design and execution of the PCD Study; i.e., that the decision on
whether to go or remain public is a conscious decision made by corporate leaders based
on their perception of the relative advantages and disadvantages of going public versus
the non-public financing options available to the company.
This critical “conscious decision” assumption is not expressly articulated at length in any
of the academic literature addressing public Operating Company decline. Does this lack
of analysis in the literature mean that the critical assumption is at risk of being exposed as
inaccurate, thereby undermining the focus and methodology of the PCD Study research?
In other words, has a fundamental systemic change occurred in the public markets
ecosystem that has removed, or materially reduced, the opportunity for Operating
Companies to pursue a public listing, such that the decline in IPO volume is not
principally the result of conscious choice of senior company leadership, but rather a
business imperative? The simple answer to that complex question is “no”. There is
nothing in the literature or the PCD Study data that suggests that the decline in the
number of public Operating Companies to date reflects anything other than an evolution
over time in the conscious preference of corporate decision-makers towards private
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financing alternatives. 33
The principal advantages of pursuing an IPO have been well articulated and understood
for decades: lower ultimate cost of capital (i.e., higher trading multiples), speed of
follow-on financings for public entities, liquidity for shareholders, increased ability to
attract talent by using equity incentives and the prestige and credibility associated with
public company status. Throughout the industrialized western world, and in Canada in
particular, it is apparent that there remains a significant demand amongst investment
banks and public shareholders for new IPO inventory. Public companies in North
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Of the 10 categories of factors posited in the literature as being potentially responsible for the decline in
public Operating Companies discussed above, only one does not clearly engage a conscious decision by
corporate leadership, namely the Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis. The co-originator of the
Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis (Dr. Jay Ritter) has clearly articulated that the decision to
pursue strategic acquisitions of their companies instead of pursuing IPO alternatives remains a conscious
decision by corporate leadership as a function of value optimization strategy. As such, the opportunity to
pursue IPOs is not impacted by the Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis. See Jay Ritter, supra note
17.
A second factor that does not clearly support the conscious decision assumption is the Systemic Portfolio
Shift factor which is described as representing an “11th” category of potential contributing factors in note
22, supra. Notably, this particular factor is not identified anywhere in the literature on public company
decline or by any participants in the PCD Study outside the investment banking community. Yet, it was
brought up repeatedly in the qualitative analysis responses to Q17 and also during live presentations made
to the investment banking community. The quick answer (with more detail in note 22) is that Systemic
Portfolio Shift has the potential to act as a constraint on IPO volume in Canada in the future, but has not
been a limiting factor that has contributed in depressed IPO volume up to this point. Therefore, it does not
undermine the proposed methodology of the PCD Study research. The investment banker subgroup alone in
the PCD Study noted that there has been a significant shift over the past decade in investment capital in
Canada away from actively-managed mutual funds and into passively-managed ETF’s. The investment
bankers advised that ETF’s generally purchase stocks based on indexes and do not participate as part of the
buying group in individual IPOs. Notably, mutual funds have historically been some of the largest buyers
of IPOs in Canada.
The implication of this shift of funds from actively-managed investment vehicles to passively-managed
investment vehicles is that the pool of capital available to participate in Canadian IPOs by mutual funds is
shrinking annually. This systemic shift in capital within the investment fund market has the potential to
impact the IPO market in the future if the trendline continues, and therefore is one more factor that
highlights future risk of further degradation of the public capital markets in Canada.
However, in reference to the validity of the “conscious decision” assumption underpinning the course of
research in the PCD Study, the investment bankers clearly stated that the depressed IPO market in Canada
over the past several years has meant that this shift in investment capital has not yet impacted their ability
to fill their IPO allotments or their desire to pursue IPOs for strong IPO candidates in Canada. As such,
there is no question, as of yet, that the shift from actively-managed investment vehicles to passivelymanaged investment vehicles in Canada has contributed to the phenomenon of public company decline that
has occurred thus far. As such, this factor also does not challenge the “conscious decision” assumption.
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America and Europe are trading at some of the highest multiples of earnings in history.
As such, none of the authorities writing in this area seriously challenge that the
opportunity for companies to pursue public listings has fundamentally changed; 34 rather,
it understood that it is the collective preference of the corporate decision-makers that has
evolved to favour non-public alternatives.
Any strong growth-stage private company requiring significant equity capital to fund
further expansion that is currently considering an IPO in Canada will certainly have other
forms of private financing available to it, and the ultimate decision to undertake the cost
and distractions of an IPO will only occur if the corporate decision-makers determine that
the net benefit to the company of going public outweighs the net benefit of pursuing
private alternatives. The decline in the number of the Operating Companies pursuing
IPOs and remaining public over the long term must, therefore, necessarily represent a
fundamental shift in perception by corporate decision-makers in Canada and other
industrialized western democracies on the relative merits, costs and opportunities
associated with being public versus pursuing available private options.

1.6- Potential Study Application Outside of Canada
With respect to potential applicability of the PCD Study outside of Canada, it is
acknowledged that each country’s public market contains its own nuances and
peculiarities and that the inferences drawn from a Canadian study cannot be universally
applied without additional consideration.
However, the fact that the decline in the number of Operating Companies has occurred
throughout industrialized western countries at similar rates over similar periods of time is
certainly suggestive of the fact that significant overlap exists in the major contributing
factors. A general consistency of proposed explanations for public company decline
throughout the academic literature from different countries also supports the belief that a
significant degree of commonality exists amongst the contributing factors, even if the
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Supra note 4 at 353.
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relative weight of the contributing factors is not determined to be identical in each
country. As such, the findings and analysis developed through the PCD Study may well
serve as a starting point for further empirical analysis of a similar stream in other
industrialized western democracies, subject to testing for the impact of the unique
elements of each country’s capital markets ecosystem on the relative weighting of the
criteria examined in this study.

1.7- Researching Where Others Have Not Yet Tread
It has been mentioned previously that a complete void in empirical research currently
exists with respect to any attempt to assess the relative importance of the principal factors
contributing to public company decline in Canada, the United States and elsewhere. This
lack of empirical research output is clearly not a result of the fact that few people have
identified the existence of public company decline or fail to recognize it as a topic worthy
of analysis. This fact is evidenced by the volume of academic literature discussed in
Chapter 2 hereafter hypothesizing as to the possible causes of public company decline
and decrying the lack of empirical data. Why, then, has this void in empirical research
continued to persist? There are three explanations, all of which have likely played a role.
First, there is no existing database or other empirical source that can be accessed, mined,
or manipulated to generate the source data required to analyze this topic. The existing
data only allows academics to quantify the nature and extent of public company decline,
not to clarify the relevance of categories of factors potentially contributing to the
phenomenon. Existing data also allows academics to define trends related to certain of
the potential contributing factors, such as determining the change in size of total pool of
available private equity capital for investment in private companies at various points in
time. However, none of this existing data clarifies the extent to which the posited
categories of contributing factors actually impact the ultimate decision-making process of
the key decision-makers and influencers as to whether to pursue public or private
alternatives for their business. Therefore, any researcher seeking to empirically study this
area must generate the foundational data through their own efforts. This is a timeconsuming and often expensive process, resulting in fewer researchers willing to invest in
the generation of new data from the source.
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Second, securing the engagement of senior decision-makers and key public markets
influencers on the topic of public company decline in sufficient numbers is extremely
challenging. The groups of target participants in the PCD Study all are extremely busy,
balancing multiple demands on their time, working long hours, and having been
successful in highly competitive environments. These are not the groups in society who
are easily convinced to devote additional time to research projects for which they receive
no direct reward. As such, most academics simply choose to focus their research efforts
in areas where data collection is perceived to attract fewer hurdles than are apparent in
the PCD Study. Indeed, the Research Methodology chapter later in this Dissertation
discloses the degree of effort that was directed towards enrollment of PCD Study
participants.
Third, this is an area of research that overlaps the academic fields of corporate law and
business / finance. From the corporate law perspective in Canada, the use of survey
methodology to generate empirical data is a foreign concept. From the business
perspective, there is a dichotomy in academia between the relatively small group of
academic researchers who are familiar and comfortable with the proper use, interpretation
and limitations of survey data and the majority of academic researchers who are not.
Most of the academics who have a deep knowledge of survey methodology in the
business arena are from the marketing discipline. Notably, this is not the particular
discipline within business academia that has traditionally focused on the public company
decline issue.
Indeed, the primary academic focus on public company decline from business scholarship
has come from the finance discipline. Academics coming from a finance background are
often historically suspicious of survey data that they frequently denigrate as constituting
“soft” data. The finance-focused academics prefer to base their research pursuits on
“hard” forms of data that they recognize and can easily verify from independent sources.
This does not include perceptions of individuals that are generated through survey data.
Yet, nobody has yet identified a research methodology to generate the type of “hard” data
that would be familiar to a finance academic in terms of assessing the relative import of
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the factors posited as contributing to public company decline. Consequently, for over a
decade, the academic analysis on the topic of public company decline has failed to
materially advance, with writers in this space continuing to lament the lack of empirical
data.
The genesis of the PCD Study was the observation that public company decline is
certainly an issue of significant importance to the Canadian economy in need of some
form of empirical analysis to better inform the ongoing regulatory reform initiatives. All
realistic empirical methodologies for studying this phenomenon were evaluated, resulting
in the chosen study design utilizing survey methodology by process of elimination.
Certainly, the limitations of the data generated from the PCD Study must be understood
and acknowledged at the outset. The qualitative and quantitative data that has been
collected from the respondents is descriptive in nature, not designed to establish
statistical causation. However, it is submitted that the data gathered in the PCD Study is
rich in its breadth and depth, and valuable in offering a previously unavailable snapshot
of the perceptions of the decision-makers and influencers on the key topics embedded in
the phenomenon of public company decline. The PCD Study data discloses which of the
numerous categories of factors posited as contributing to public decline are perceived as
most important by the specific individuals who are making (and influencing) the critical
decision as to whether to take companies public in Canada.
The PCD Study also generates the type of data that can be used to predict behavior based
on the opinions expressed. The correlation between perception on a particular issue, as
expressed by participants in surveys, and the ultimate outcome of future decisions
relating to that same issue has been repeatedly verified and is widely accepted in business
marketing academic circles. 35
While it is understood why nobody has undertaken this type of survey-based research
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project to generate empirical data on public company decline thus far, it is submitted that
there is significant value in doing so. Although certainly difficult to obtain and subject to
limitations with respect to its inability to prove causality, the specific insights that can be
gleaned from PCD Study data justify the significant effort expended to generate that data.
Particularly given the vacuum in empirical data that existed prior to the PCD Study, it
provides industry participants, regulators and academics studying the topic multiple
empirical reference points that previously did not exist.

1.8- A Brief Aside on the Nature of Recent Bursts of Activity in
the Canadian Public Markets
As a final element of the introductory chapter of this Dissertation, it is worth questioning
why Canada has been so slow to identify, and respond to, the critical issue of the decline
of Operating Companies in its public markets.
One obvious reason, as mentioned above, is that the Operating Company decline has
been masked by an accompanying increase in the number of ETF’s and closed-end funds
listed on the TSX. This shift in investment capital into these new vehicles has given the
illusion of a relatively robust capital market as a result of the significant corporate finance
transactions and trading volume generated at the senior exchange level, providing some
replacement revenue to the TSX and to the public markets ecosystem which would have
otherwise starved on the lack of Operating Company IPOs. The total listing numbers of
these non-operating entity stocks has also obscured the extent and speed of Operating
Company decline in Canada at a headline level, as the TSX does not distinguish between
operating and non-operating businesses in its summary listing numbers.
Yet, a decline in the volume of new non-operating companies being listed must also be
on the horizon as the saturation level for ETF’s and closed-end funds approaches. The
pool of Operating Companies that those non-operating entities invest in continues to
shrink, and it is inevitable that the shrinking pool of Operating Companies will ultimately
have a negative impact on the sustainability of the non-operating funds.
Even more concerning at a macro level, though, for those who desire to see a healthy and
sustainable public capital markets ecosystem in Canada is the nature of the IPO market in
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Canada over the past few years. The depressed overall nature of the Canadian IPO
market generally has been discussed, but it is also important to note that a material
portion of the IPO volume that has occurred in Canada in recent times, during short-lived
and frenzied bursts of activity, is attributable to the blockchain and cannabis industries.
With due respect to the participants and investors in those industries, these two industries
are classic examples of what may be the single worst character trait of the public markets;
namely, its perseveration on, and susceptibility to, irrationality surrounding whatever
industry is currently being portrayed as representing the “next big thing”. With respect to
both blockchain and cannabis, the recent IPO and trading frenzies were demonstrably not
based on any traditional metrics of long-term business valuation. The inevitable results
are public market bubbles, and the resulting boom and bust cycles.
That the only signs of significant life in the IPO market in Canada in the past few years
are attributable to blockchain and cannabis may be as disturbing as the overall decline in
Operating Company volume generally. If the Canadian public markets are relegated to
representing a sphere of overly-optimistic exuberance for high-risk nascent industries
such as blockchain and cannabis, the implications are dire. If the only viable IPOs over a
period to time arise in industries that are viewed as too inherently risky or overvalued
such that they are shunned by traditional private equity, then the blockchain and cannabis
booms may be considered further evidence of an underlying malaise in the public
markets.
Unless and until the public markets see a sustainable resurgence in Operating Company
IPOs relating to businesses that are profitable and economically sustainable over the
long-term, the phenomenon of ongoing public company decline will inevitably continue.
These short periods of market irrationality and the gold-rush mentality that has
accompanied both the blockchain and cannabis bubbles are certainly evidence of
something, but not a broader return to health of the public markets.
With due respect to the authors of the PWC quarterly report on IPOs in Canada
referenced earlier, any analysis of the actual health of the Canadian public markets needs
to look behind the headline statistics on total IPO volume and dollars raised, and
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seriously assess the nature, profitability and long-term sustainability of the companies
that are going public. Otherwise, the IPO volume that is reported and celebrated as
evidencing temporary signs of life in the capital market may in reality be further evidence
of the relegation of Canadian public markets to the fringes of the economy where private
capital sources are unwilling to participate at inflated values. To resort to a popular
metaphor, the “light” that blockchain and cannabis have represented to the Canadian
capital markets over the past few years may, instead of being a ray of hope that the end of
public company decline is in sight, actually be more evidence of an oncoming train. 36
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Literature Review
2.1- Introduction- Literature on Public Company Decline
The first significant challenge in crafting this literature review chapter is determining
how broadly to cast the net in terms of coverage of the subject area. The general subject
of IPOs is one of the most widely studied topics in the field of business law and also in
finance throughout the academic world. Thousands of articles have been published on
various IPO issues over the past few decades. Clearly, the net cannot be cast so widely in
this chapter so as to encompass all of the historical academic analysis of IPOs.
To restrict the material included in this literature review to a manageable size, the focus is
directed towards that body of academic literature that deals with the specific subject of
contemporary public company decline in the industrialized west. As such, the majority
of the works discussed in this chapter are from 2006 (i.e., the time at which the current
market trend in public company decline was first identified in the United States) and
later. The material covered also largely originates from the United States, Europe and
Canada (i.e., the specific jurisdictions primarily impacted by the phenomenon).
However, in order to place this topic within recognized frameworks of legal analysis, it is
important to include in the analysis a brief overview of two streams of academic literature
that significantly influenced modern theory with respect to public companies. These
influential works played a role in informing the contemporary regulatory regimes that are
now being impugned as potentially contributing to public company demise. As such, this
literature review also includes selected articles on these two streams of literature that predate the discovery of the public company decline phenomenon in the industrialized west
in 2006, yet were still influential in informing contemporary theory and regulatory
treatment of the public company.
Also relating to the proper extent of coverage in this literature review, the topic of public
company decline is a subject area in which it is sometimes difficult to draw a bright-line
distinction between classic academic literature and the coverage of the topic in the
business media. Serious academics have published pieces on public company decline in
the business media, and many business media articles extensively quote academics as
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their primary authorities. On occasion, the quotes from academics included in the
business media articles supplement, extend or clarify the academics’ previous analysis
from more traditional academic forums.
Yet, public company decline is a subject area in which the opinions and perceptions of
business experts outside of the traditional academic sphere can be of critical importance.
Securities regulators, government ministers, investment bankers, venture capitalists,
private equity financiers, securities lawyers and accountants all have opinions and
perceptions formed by their ongoing engagement on the front lines of the public company
ecosphere. These opinions and perceptions are often largely ignored or minimized by
academics as being self-interested as a result of the obvious financial incentives of these
participants to ensure the continuity of robust public markets in driving fee revenue for
their businesses. Nevertheless, the degree to which perspectives from outside of
academia align or diverge from the academic literature should be considered.
Consequently, a representative sample of opinions on public company decline in the
business media from non-traditional academic voices is included in this literature review.
The second critical question faced in framing this literature review is determining how
best to present the relevant literature as a logical and coherent narrative. A single method
of categorizing the relevant literature without being confusingly circular and repetitive is
elusive, so the narrative in this chapter is organized based on a combination of categories
in terms of subject matter, sphere of origin and geography.
The first section of this literature review covers the few foundational pieces that have had
the greatest influence on the modern theory of the public company, introducing the
notions of agency costs and the role of legal frameworks in creating the preconditions for
robust capital markets.
The second section highlights key academic pieces analyzing the decision to go public,
including the motivations and timing of the business decision-makers. In this section, we
introduce two research studies that are discussed at greater length later in this
Dissertation in the “Research Methodologies” and “Analysis of Quantitative Data in PCD
Study” chapters. These two articles reflect the two previous instances in which an
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attempt has been made to assess the motivations of key decision-makers in the goingpublic process through the use of survey methodology, thereby providing significant
instruction and comparisons for the research efforts in the PCD Study.
The third section of this literature review covers the extensive body of literature
addressing public company decline in the United States, broken down into four
subsections: (i) business media articles; (ii) government and industry-sponsored
literature; (iii) academic literature focusing specifically on the impact of SarbanesOxley 37 on public company decline; and (iv) academic literature that goes beyond
Sarbanes-Oxley in searching for explanations for the phenomenon of public company
decline.
The fourth section of this literature review covers European literature on public company
decline broken into two sections: (i) business media; and (ii) government and industrysponsored literature. Analysis on this topic is notably absent in the European academic
sphere.
The fifth section covers Canadian literature on public company decline, broken into three
sections: (i) business media; (ii) government and industry-sponsored literature; and (iii)
academic literature.
The sixth section briefly covers other western democratic countries likely impacted by
the phenomenon of public company decline.
A final section considers the critical literature relating to an ongoing academic dispute as
to the relevance of one of the particular factors posited as potentially contributing to
public company decline: shareholder short-termism.
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2.2- Theory of the Firm & the Impact of Regulation
American Business Media
The phenomenon of public company decline in the U.S. capital markets has been widely
covered in the American business media. There are dozens of articles that outline the
extent of the decline and hypothesize as to its causes. The Wall Street Journal alone has
published more than 10 articles on the topic. 38 Although the reported number of public
companies listed at the peak of the U.S. market in 1997 varies depending on the source
(and whether foreign listings in the U.S. are included or not), there is broad agreement
that the number of domestic U.S. issuers listed today is approximately half of the number
listed at the peak. Notably, there are no recent business news articles suggesting that the
phenomenon of public company decline is temporary or is expected to reverse at a future
point. Nor are there any business media articles that propose to have any definitive
explanations for the decline. Most business media articles conclude that the underlying
causes are indeterminate and then proceed to outline a few of the potential causes from
the factors that are outlined previously in this Dissertation. The Wall Street Journal
points out the irony that a well-known index, the “Wilshire 5,000”, has become a
perpetual misnomer because there haven’t been 5,000 companies listed in the U.S. for
more than a decade. 39 The U.S. business media reports also demonstrate that this issue
remains on the radar for the current administration, advising in August 2018 that
President Trump has directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to
evaluate the ramifications of reducing public company financial reporting to twice per
year. 40
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Where a fundamental disagreement arises in the business media is on the key issue of
whether the phenomenon of public company decline is particularly worrisome for the
economy and what it portends for the future of the U.S. capital markets. Two articles
will be discussed as examples, each supporting a different position on this critical issue,
both of which were published in credible business media forums.
The first article was co-written by four professors, two from Ivy League business schools
(Dartmouth and Columbia) and two from Canadian business schools (Calgary and
Victoria). 41 In this article, the group of professors contend that the decline in the number
of public companies is not particularly worrisome. They build their argument on the fact
that most capital-intensive industries have been transferred from the U.S. to Asia. They
also point out that the American economy is now based largely on technological
innovation. They further posit that the biggest contributing factor leading to public
company decline is that “digital strategies and rapid technological obsolescence”
combine to decrease the lifespans of U.S. public companies without creating any
increased demands for IPOs. 42 The most controversial portion of their analysis is the
concluding paragraph:
So, what can be done to increase the number of listed companies in the
U.S. exchanges — and is that even a worthwhile objective? Although we
often treat the stock market as a barometer of economic activity and a
healthy IPO market as the hallmark of successful entrepreneurial pursuits,
there is no evidence that the recent decline in number of listed firms has
adversely affected the U.S. economy. The aggregate market capitalization
of listed companies keeps increasing, unemployment remains manageable,
and U.S. retains its leadership in technological progress. The only change
is that more deals are done with private funds and more companies come
to [the] IPO market having been initially financed by venture capitalists
than ever before. Public investors do not miss out [on] the action either.
Institutional investors now channel more and more of common investors’
savings towards digital companies, by taking stakes in private equity
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funds. In sum, the decline in the number of listing companies is a sign of
successful adaptation of organizational structures by U.S. corporations,
keeping up with their changing business strategies. It should be applauded,
not considered a cause for concern. 43
This is a very bold statement and, if proved to be true, could be argued to undermine one
of the fundamental premises of this Dissertation and the accompanying research project;
i.e., that retaining a robust capital markets environment is of significant public concern
and that public company decline matters.
However, the view of Govindarjan et al is very much a minority position in academia at
this point in time. Govindarjan et al also fundamentally overstate the access to private
deals available to the average retail investor through traditional mutual funds. Although
the recent increase in availability of alternative mutual funds willing to invest in private
transactions has changed the investment landscape to a degree, investing in companies
through a mutual fund does not provide the same opportunity to investors as investing in
those same companies if they had gone public. First, the best private equity deals are not
currently available to the average retail investors through mutual funds to the degree
suggested by this article. The most attractive private equity investments continue to be
controlled by the traditional private equity funds available only to high net worth
investors. Second, the layers of management fees and success-based participation fees
charged for participation in private equity through mutual funds is significant, thereby
reducing the ultimate return on investment to investors. Third, investing in a private
company through a mutual fund requires the investor to purchase the entire basket of
private company investments owned by the mutual fund, depriving the investor of the
opportunity to pick and choose their own ultimate investee companies.
Further, the authors’ view of digitization and increased speed of obsolescence being the
primary cause of public company decline is overly simplistic in describing the
phenomenon. The PCD Study outcomes, discussed in the ensuing chapters of this
Dissertation, demonstrate that the factors proposed by Govindarjan et al as being the

43

Ibid.

29

most significant contributing factors to the public company decline phenomenon are not
supported by the empirical findings.
A counterpoint against the position of Govindarjan et al is an article published in The
Atlantic in November 2018 entitled “The Death of the IPO” written by Frank Partnoy.
Partnoy is now a Berkeley full professor in business law who previously spent time as an
investment banker with Morgan Stanley and CS First Boston. After noting the decline of
more than half of the number of companies listed in the U.S. since the 1997 peak,
Partnoy develops the following argument in favor of the importance of the public
company decline issue:
Stock-exchange officials certainly are [concerned]. Last year, Thomas
Farley, then the head of the NYSE Group, said the drop “may severely
limit [companies’ opportunities] for economic growth, hiring, and wealth
creation.” Earlier this year, in her introduction to a white paper, Nasdaq’s
CEO, Adena Friedman, warned that if the trend continues, “job creation
and economic growth could suffer, and income inequality could worsen as
average investors become increasingly shut out of the most attractive
offerings.”
Of course, Farley and Friedman have a financial stake in the health of the
exchanges. But there is a broader logic to their professed concerns.
Traditionally, promising young companies turned to the public markets to
raise capital in order to expand their operations; this gave individual
investors a shot at owning a piece of those companies’ hoped-for success,
either by buying their stocks directly or, more commonly, by holding them
in a mutual fund or index fund. Today, more and more start-up companies
secure funding from private investors, cutting most Americans out of the
equation.
Robert J. Jackson Jr., a commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission who previously worked at Bear Stearns underwriting IPOs,
told me there can be real distributive consequences when the highestgrowth companies are private. If many of the economy’s greatest success
stories aren’t included in the funds that ordinary Americans hold, only the
wealthiest members of society will enjoy the gains, intensifying
inequality. “It’s a good enough argument for me to care about wanting
more companies to be public,” Jackson said. SEC Chair Jay Clayton
agrees. In his first major speech, he warned: “The potential lasting effects
of such an outcome to the economy and society are, in two words, not
good.”
The conclusions of Partnoy stand in direct opposition to the position of Govindarjan et al.
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Only time will tell which position is more accurate, but the Partnoy analysis resonates
specifically for the reasons stated in the quote of Robert J. Jackson, Jr. above. The U.S.
already has a significant wealth distribution problem, as evidenced by the fact that the
U.S. demonstrates the greatest concentration of wealth in the hands of the top 10%, top
5% and top 1% of its population amongst 28 member nations of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation Development (the “OECD”) analyzed in a recent white paper. 44
Moreover, the degree of wealth distribution inequality has increased in the U.S. during
the period of public company decline. 45 It follows logically that the U.S. should be
seeking to mitigate any further long-term systemic changes in its public capital markets
structure that increase wealth inequality by limiting the most attractive investment
opportunities to its wealthiest investors. As such, Partnoy’s argument (reflective of the
majority position in the U.S. business media at the current time) is more convincing and
will likely be borne out as being more accurate over the upcoming years. 46
The Concept of Agency Cost and Its Implications
The analysis of the modern theory of the firm relating to public companies starts with
former Harvard economics professor Michael C. Jensen, who along with William H.
Meckling, in 1976 published the seminal paper that brought the concept of agency costs
in public companies into the general consciousness. 47 Jensen and Meckling here
articulate their theory that, in situations in which equity of a company is held by nonmanagement shareholders, there is an inherent divergence in interest between
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management and the non-management equity-holders. Jensen views owner-managers
(i.e., managers holding less than 100% of the equity of the firm) as rational self-interested
economic actors seeking to maximize their personal outcomes in all situations, which
causes the owner-managers to seek benefits from their companies that are misaligned
with the pure maximization of shareholder value. Jensen summarizes the core of his
theory as follows:
As the owner-manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his fractional claim on
the outcomes falls and this will tend to encourage him to appropriate
larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites. This
also makes it desirable for the minority shareholders to expend more
resources in monitoring his behavior. Thus, the wealth costs to the owner
of obtaining additional cash in the equity markets rise as his fractional
ownership falls. 48
Jensen formulates the cost to residual equity shareholders of the self-interested behaviour
of managers in economic terms, and that cost has become widely known throughout
academic literature as “agency cost”. 49
Jensen’s theory on the misalignment of interests between management and shareholders
of companies quickly became widely accepted and has played a critical role in instructing
public company regulatory theory over the past 40 years. Ever since “Theory of the
Firm” gained prominence, the general arc of public company regulation in North
America has seen the adoption of a steady stream of initiatives designed to minimize
agency costs associated with the management of public companies, thereby maximizing
the value of equity acquired by non-management shareholders.
More than a decade later, Jensen further prognosticates as to the long-term implications
of his theory of agency conflict on public companies as the dominant form of capital
market enterprise. 50 Here, Jensen articulates his belief that public companies are
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inefficient structures to resolve agency conflicts, and that this conflict resolution can be
better achieved by direct negotiation amongst stakeholders in private companies.
Ultimately, Jensen predicts that the inability to efficiently address agency costs will lead
to the decline of public entities:
New organizations are emerging in [the place of public entities]—
organizations that are corporate in form but have no public shareholders
and are not listed or traded on organized exchanges. These organizations
use public and private debt, rather than public equity, as their major source
of capital. Their primary owners are not households but large institutions
and entrepreneurs that designate agents to manage and monitor on their
behalf and bind those agents with large equity interests and contracts
governing the use and distribution of cash.
Takeovers, corporate breakups, divisional spin-offs, leveraged buyouts,
and going-private transactions are the most visible manifestations of a
massive organizational change in the economy. These transactions have
inspired criticism, even outrage, among many business leaders and
government officials, who have called for regulatory and legislative
restrictions. The backlash is understandable. Change is threatening; in this
case, the threat is aimed at the senior executives of many of our largest
companies. 51
Jensen goes on to state his belief that this evolution away from the public company form
reflects a positive development for the economy as a whole. 52 This belief is predicated
on Jensen’s opinion that private entities are better positioned structurally to resolve what
he perceives as the fundamental weakness of public companies, namely the ongoing
tension relating to control of corporate resources between management and shareholders,
thereby leading to greater efficiency and productivity. 53 Jensen concludes that public
companies will ultimately retain an important role in the economy, but only with respect
to companies that cannot self-fund growth with internally-generated cash-flow. 54
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Companies that can self-fund their growth targets from internal sources are, in Jensen’s
opinion, better off pursuing private ownership structures. 55
Jensen’s analysis on the impact of the evolution of capital sources away from direct
investment by entrepreneurs and towards an increasing concentration of investment
capital, and accompanying power in the investment-making decision, in the hands of
institutional investors evokes the earlier analysis of another Harvard academic, law
professor Robert C. Clark, on the stages of the capitalism. 56 In Clark’s categorization,
the third and fourth stages of capitalism involve the transfer of capital and delegation of
investment-making discretion to investment professionals (in the third stage) and,
eventually, the underlying savings decision itself to collectivized interests of pension
fund managers (in the fourth stage). However, Clark does not continue to consider the
likely impact of the evolution of capital on the position and role of the public company as
an institution. Jensen takes Clark’s observations on the continuing evolution of capital
towards greater institutionalized control (and less direct investment by the ultimate
individual beneficiaries of the capital) further, considering the likely impact of this
evolution in capital deployment on the position of the public company in the future
economy.
Jensen’s prediction was met with significant academic skepticism at the time of its
release in 1989, particularly as the number of public companies in the U.S. continued to
rise through much of the 1990’s. However, the subsequent decline in public companies
in the U.S. beginning in 1997 has caused academia to reappraise Jensen’s 1989 article
and has enhanced Jensen’s legacy as the oracle who first predicted the public company
decline phenomenon. 57
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Certainly, Jensen was ahead of his time in predicting public company decline and his
theory of agency costs continues to retain its primacy as a descriptor of the relationship
between firm managers and equity holders. However, Jensen’s rationale in predicting
public company decline back in 1989 is not necessarily explanatory of the phenomenon
that has transpired in the U.S. over the past 20 years. Jensen’s predictions on the
inevitability of public company decline are founded on his belief that sources of capital
become increasingly frustrated by their inability to effectively limit agency costs in the
public company environment in the U.S. where the minority equity holders have no
effective voice in governance. As such, in Jensen’s theory, the equity investors
inevitably and intentionally direct their investments away from the public sphere and into
private transactions in which they can contractually impose the necessary agency-cost
restraining mechanisms necessary to protect their equity interests. Jensen believed that
this affinity for the private markets would have the effect of siphoning off the funding
sources of public entities and forcing firms towards private transactions.
In fact, the phenomenon of public company decline that we have witnessed is somewhat
different from what Jensen expected. Ironically, some of the most important causes of
public company decline may well be directly linked to the universal acceptance of
Jensen’s observations on agency costs and the corresponding implications for securities
regulatory reform over the past four decades. In Jensen’s view, companies would be
forced towards the private markets in order to access capital that had moved away from
the public markets and was accessible only through private investment alternatives.
Rather than a lack of capital willing to invest in IPOs and secondary offerings of public
entities, the phenomenon of the public company decline that we have experienced
appears to be driven by a shift in the preference of senior management away from the
public markets and towards private financing opportunities. Who are these business
decision-makers that avoid the public markets? The same owner-managers identified by
Jensen as being the individuals who directly benefit from the lack of control mechanisms
in the public market to maximize their share of the agency costs.
In reality, we have witnessed four decades in which securities regulators and shareholder
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rights interest groups have relentlessly rooted out and legislated every perceived
opportunity for self-dealing managers in the public markets. In fact, some of the most
insightful academic analysis surrounding public company decline is focused on the
question of whether the securities regulatory authorities have overshot the goal and
reduced public company agency costs to such a level that managers no longer have the
appetite for the hassles of being engaged in the public markets. 58 The question now has
to be asked as to whether some minimal level of agency costs must be preserved in the
public market in order to protect the existence of the public company as a viable
institution. In fact, eminent legal academics have argued in an analogous area that the
optimal level of private benefits that can be extracted from a public company is not
necessarily zero, expressing their belief that value of private benefit extraction from a
public company in some instances may be greater than the cost to the entity. 59 This
illustrates the irony that Jensen’s prediction on public company decline may have come
to fruition, not for the reasons foreseen by Jensen in 1989, but at least partially as a result
of the influence of Jensen’s earlier analysis relating to public company agency costs on
the past four decades of securities regulatory reform.
The Theory of Investor Legal Protection as a Determinant of Robust
Capital Markets
Turning now to a second stream of literature written by three finance professors from
Harvard (at the time of the publication of the relevant articles) along with the
collaboration of one finance professor from the University of Chicago. The group,
comprised of Rafael LaPorta, Florenico Lopez-de-Silanes, Andei Shleifer and Robert
Vishy (referred to herein as “LLSV” as they self-stylize themselves in their later
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writings), focuses on the nature and quality of legal protection of shareholder rights as a
critical determining factor in creating robust public capital markets. The three main
LLSV papers are from 1997, 601998 61 and 1999, 62 and all claim to build upon the
foundation established by Jensen. The 1997 LLSV paper begins with the following
foundational question: “Why do some countries have so much bigger capital markets than
others”. 63
After considering the legal frameworks of 49 different countries, the 1997 LLSV paper
states the main LLSV hypothesis:
[t]he results of this article confirm that the legal environment (as described
by both legal rules and their enforcement) matters for the size and extent
of a country's capital markets. Because a good legal environment protects
the potential financiers against expropriation by entrepreneurs, it raises
their willingness to surrender funds in exchange for securities, and hence
expands the scope of capital markets.
The 1998 LLSV paper builds on empirical data obtained from the earlier analysis of the
49 countries previously considered, furthering the proposition that the nature of the legal
rights inherently associated with a particular country’s legal system is of paramount
importance in determining the nature and success of that country’s capital markets:
The rights attached to securities become critical when managers of
companies act in their own interest. These rights give investors the power
to extract from managers the returns on their investment. Shareholders
receive dividends because they can vote out the directors who do not pay
them, and creditors are paid because they have the power to repossess
collateral. Without these rights, investors would not be able to get paid,
and therefore firms would find it harder to raise external finance.
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But the view that securities are inherently characterized by some intrinsic
rights is incomplete as well. It ignores the obvious point that these rights
depend on the legal rules of the jurisdictions where these securities are
issued. […] Law and the quality of its enforcement are potentially
important determinants of what rights security holders have and how well
these rights are protected. Since the protection investors receive
determines their readiness to finance firms, corporate finance may
critically turn on these legal rules and their enforcement. 64
The analysis in the 1998 LLSV paper starts with the observation that the origin of most
commercial laws internationally can either be traced to the sources of English common
law or Roman civil law. Within civil law, LLSV identifies three major civil code
traditions that account for all civilian-based systems: French, German and
Scandinavian. 65
Ultimately, based on their assessment of the legal regimes in the 49 countries studied,
LLSV concludes that countries whose legal systems are based on the British common law
system have both the greatest degree of protection of investor rights in public companies
and the most robust capital markets. On the other end of the spectrum, LLSV singles out
countries utilizing the French civil code structure as having the weakest protection of
investor rights, which they posit directly impacts the willingness of investors to invest as
minority shareholders in public entities. In French civil code jurisdictions, LLSV point
out that other “adaptive” legal mechanisms necessarily evolve to serve as surrogates for
strong legal protection of investors. A prime example is the increased concentration of
ownership in public entities facilitating direct control by shareholders through voting
mechanisms and thereby circumventing the shortcomings of the legal regimes in
protecting minority shareholders. 66 These adaptive mechanisms can exist inside or
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outside of the law. 67
In the LLSV analysis, German and Scandinavian-based legal systems are ranked
somewhere in the middle between British common law and French civil code systems in
terms of the degree of investor protections that they provide. 68
The 1998 LLSV paper states four conclusions: (i) there is a marked difference in laws
around the world in terms of the bundle of rights that are given to investors; (ii) there is a
marked difference in the quality of law enforcement between countries as well, and better
enforcement is linked with better economic outcomes; (iii) countries with poor investor
protections develop “substitute mechanisms” inside or outside of law to compensate; and
(iv) countries with poorer investor protection have less robust capital markets. 69
In the 1999 LLSV paper, LLSV move on to the analysis of why they believe that the
British common law tradition is a better protector of investors than the civil code
traditions. First, they consider an explanation based on differences in the judiciary,
which they ultimately discount as being sufficiently explanatory. They then move on to
their hypothesis that the explanation is rooted in which particular institutions in society
held the greatest influence in the formation of the law. LLSV point out that, during the
critical formative years of the 18th and 19th centuries, the British crown’s influence
declines significantly compared to the relative influence of parliament in the development
of the common law. British parliament during this era is dominated by property owners,
who evolve into the investor class in the capital markets as the 18th and 19th century
progressed. Therefore, the state in Great Britain (represented by the Crown) had
relatively lesser influence on the development of the common law than the property
owners. As such, LLSV believe that the common law evolved to favour the interests of
property owners and, ultimately, investors. This serves as a defence by property owners /
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investors against “attempts by the sovereign to regulate and expropriate them”. 70
In contrast, the state had a greater degree of power in the civil code countries during this
era and property owners did not have an equivalent voice in government as that held by
the British property owners as a result of their influence through parliament. As such,
LLSV contend that the civil law developed “as an instrument used by the sovereign for
state building and controlling economic life”. 71
LLSV further extend their analysis of what they categorize as their “legal approach” to
economic analysis to the topic of corporate governance and the capital markets in their
fourth collaboration in 2000. 72 In the 2000 article, LLSV state that:
[t]he most basic prediction of the legal approach is that investor protection
encourages the development of financial markets. When investors are
protected from expropriation, they pay more for securities, making it more
attractive for entrepreneurs to issue these securities. This applies to both
creditors and shareholders. Creditor rights encourage the development of
lending, and the exact structure of these rights may alternatively favor
bank lending or market lending. Shareholder rights encourage the
development of equity markets, as measured by the valuation of firms, the
number of listed firms (market breadth), and the rate at which firms go
public. For both shareholders and creditors, protection includes not only
the rights written into the laws and regulations but also the effectiveness of
their enforcement. Consistent with these predictions, La Porta et al. (1997)
show that countries that protect shareholders have more valuable stock
markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, and a higher rate of
IPO activity than do the unprotective countries. 73
A critical conclusion of LLSV to be drawn from these four papers is that heightened
investor protection does not equate with increased government intervention in the
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economy. Heightened investor protection in the British common law tradition in fact is
derived from the historical ability of the property owner / investor class to push back
against the Crown and direct the development of the common law towards enhanced
property and investor rights, protecting against the risk of expropriation by the state and
by corporate insiders. In contrast, in the civil law countries the state was historically able
to push back against the property owner / investor class during the 18th and 19th century
and “did not surrender its power of economic decisions to the courts”. 74
The civil code countries kept their direct influence in economic matters through
legislation. As a result, LLSV are generally cited as standing for the proposition that a
lower degree of direct legislative intervention, consistent with the British common law
tradition, is generally associated with a higher degree of protection of investor rights and,
by extension, better economic outcomes and more robust capital markets. Conversely, a
higher degree of direct government intervention in the economy through increased
financial legislation is associated with the civil code tradition which generally evidences
lesser protections for investors and, by extension, poorer economic outcomes and smaller
capital markets.
Notwithstanding their general support of market mechanisms as representing a superior
forum for improving investor protections than government legislation, LLSV conclude
this article with a statement that makes it apparent that they are not supporting a fully
laissez-faire approach to capital markets regulation. After reiterating that they view
strong legal protection of investors as the foundation of strong corporate governance,
they state that:
[a]n important implication of this approach is that leaving financial
markets alone is not a good way to encourage them. Financial markets
need some protection of outside investors, whether by courts, government
agencies, or market participants themselves. Improving such protection is
a difficult task. In part, the nature of investor protection, and more
generally of regulation of financial markets, is deeply rooted in the legal
structure of each country and in the origin of its laws. Marginal reform
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may not successfully achieve the reformer's goals. In part, the existing
corporate governance arrangements benefit both the politicians and the
entrenched economic interests, including the families that manage the
largest firms in most countries in the world. Corporate governance reform
must circumvent the opposition by these interests. Despite these
difficulties, reform of investor protection is politically feasible in some
circumstances, and can bring significant benefits. It can take the form of
opting into more protective legal regimes or introducing more radical
changes in the legal structure. 75
As with Jensen, the work of LLSV has been taken by some as supporting the arc of
increasing securities regulation over the past twenty years based on the following
rationale: (i) LLSV conclude that common law countries providing the highest level of
shareholder protection in limiting agency costs are also the countries with the most robust
capital markets; (ii) LLSV advise that leaving financial markets alone is not a good way
to encourage them; (iii) securities regulators have therefore been willing to accept the
LLSV analysis as support for the view that expanded securities regulation can lead to
further reductions in agency costs in the public capital markets. However, such an
interpretation represents an imperfect interpretation of LLSV. LLSV spend much more
time making the point that the increased direct government regulation in the capital
markets, evidenced by the experience of the civil code countries, has resulted in poorer
economic outcomes. LLSV may bear some blame for the confusion themselves, as the
concluding paragraph in the 2000 LLSV paper may be taken out of context as
contradicting the core themes they developed throughout the four papers.
Possibly realizing the confusion created by their conclusion in the 2000 LLSV paper,
LLS (minus “V” this time) revisited their 1997, 1998 and 1999 papers in 2008. 76 The
2008 paper advises that, although their earlier works “have taken some bumps”, 77 their
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contribution to capital markets theory “appears to us to still be standing, perhaps even
taller than a decade ago”. 78 Notably, LLS do not reference the 2000 paper whatsoever in
the 2008 paper. One wonders whether this omission results from LLSV’s recognizing the
confusion resulting from the 2008 paper with respect to government intervention in
reducing agency cost. One also wonders whether LLSV were beginning to understand
that their claim from the 2000 paper that “shareholder rights encourage the development
of equity markets, as measured by the valuation of firms, the number of listed firms
(market breadth), and the rate at which firms go public” no longer matched the trendlines
of the U.S. public capital markets. Does swinging the pendulum too far in favour of
investor protection in the public markets (i.e., creating a sufficiently large delta between
investor rights in the public capital markets compared to what is available in the private
capital markets) ultimately work against the arguments that LLSV carefully construct?
As such, can too much investor protection contribute to the phenomenon of public
company decline?
At this date, LLSV have not published anything further addressing the phenomenon of
public company decline that is now evident in the major common-law based legal
systems. How history will treat LLSV’s legal approach to analysis of capital markets is
yet to be determined, but it is suggested that their legacy is not assured, particularly if
regulatory overreach ultimately proves to be a significant contributing factor to public
company decline. Their failure to contemplate that too much investor protection in the
capital markets context might serve as a public markets constraint may complicate their
ultimate legacy. Indeed, one wonders whether the breadth of the academic criticism
already directed at LLSV serves to undermine their assertion about their work standing
taller than when it was written. 79
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Analysis of the IPO Decision-Making Process
One of the core assumptions of the research project undertaken for this Dissertation is
that firms go public as the result of the conscious choice of senior decision-makers. As
previously stated in this Dissertation, this assumption is generally taken as an obviosity in
capital markets academia and has not been the subject of significant discussion.
However, there are a few notable exceptions where the issue of the conscious decision to
pursue an IPO versus other available alternatives has been analyzed doctrinally and
empirically.
The first empirical analysis of the topic appears to have been undertaken by R.D. Ransley
of the London Business School in 1984, who completed a short survey of executives
taking their companies public in the U.K. to determine their motivations. 80 Ransley
concludes that prospects for growth by acquisition are the primary motivating factor in
British IPOs, followed in priority by securing funds for organic growth and repayment of
debt. 81
An ambitious empirical analysis on Italian IPOs was completed in 1998 by Marco
Pagano, Fabio Panetta and Luigi Zingales (referred to herein as “Pagano”). 82 This team
takes advantage of their access to a unique database containing financial statements and
credit costs for a large number of public and private Italian companies going back several
years. This unique dataset allows Pagano to conduct analysis of the financial positions of
firms that complete an IPO going back several years before the IPO. In their article,
Pagano outlines the various factors that have been posited in the academic literature as
being costs of going public and benefits of going public, and apply statistical models to
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ascertain which can be demonstrated as accurate through analysis of their dataset.
Pagano concludes that the most important factor in predicting the likelihood of an IPO is
the “market-to-book ratio at which firms in the same industry trade: a one standard
deviation increase in the market-to-book ratio raises the odds of an IPO by 25%”. 83 In
other words, the more frothy the public market for a particular industry, the more likely
that additional companies in the industry will choose to go public to take advantage of the
attractive valuations. Additionally, maturity of the firm is found to increase IPO
probability (older firms are more likely to go public in the Italian context). On the costs
side, the fixed costs of going public are found to be a significant deterrent, especially for
smaller companies.
Although Pagano acknowledges the significant limitations in extrapolating general
principles for international application from the Italian data due to the unusual nuances of
the Italian IPO market, this article has been extensively cited in the past two decades and
clearly remains influential in IPO analysis. One wonders whether the continuing
popularity of the Pagano study is indicative of how difficult it is to generate empirical
evidence on the factors influencing the IPO decision. It also may reflect the inherent bias
of finance academics in favor of “hard” empirical evidence generated from financial
datasets compared to the “soft” data gleaned from surveys of decision-makers.
Two additional studies focus specifically on the timing element of the IPO decision,
considering the impact of the particular market conditions. 84 Both studies conclude that
firms indicate strong preferences to time their IPOs in relatively hot markets, leading to
clusters of IPO offerings offset by periods of diminished activity. These conclusions are
intuitive to market observers, and certainly support the underlying position that both the
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occurrence and the timing of the IPO are conscious decisions made by the senior
decision-makers in the firms. Because the participants have flexibility, they will logically
choose to complete the IPO during market periods that are most advantageous to the firm
to secure the highest possible valuation and minimize IPO dilution.
In 2003 James Brau, Bill Francis and Ninon Kohers undertook an American study that
was similar to Pagano in its scope of coverage (i.e., evaluated data from nearly 10,000
private companies), but focused on the specific issue of factors that affect the choice of
company decision-makers to pursue an IPO versus selling out to another firm. 85 The
summary of the findings is as follows:
Our results show that four factors— industry, market-timing, dealspecific, and to a lesser degree demand for funds—play a role in the IPO
versus takeover choice. Specifically, the concentration of the industry, the
high-tech industry status of the private firm, the “hotness” of the IPO
market relative to the private target takeover market, the current cost of
debt, the percentage of insider ownership maintained in the firm, and the
size of the firm are all positively related to the probability that a firm will
conduct an IPO. In contrast, firms in high market-to-book industries,
financial service firms, firms in high debt industries, and deals involving
greater liquidity for selling insiders show a stronger likelihood for
takeovers. 86
The most notable element of the Brau study is that it seems to contradict one of the main
conclusions of Pagano on the motivation for going public. Pagano concluded that high
market-to-book valuations increased the likelihood of going public, while Brau states that
firms in industries that have high market-to-book valuations are more likely to exhibit a
preference for selling out to third parties rather than conducting their own IPOs.
Although making multiple references to Pagano in terms of comparing their
methodologies, Brau does not devote much analysis to explaining the difference in
conclusions between the two studies. Nevertheless, it is clear that Brau does not dispute
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Pagano’s data or results, but rather is asking a fundamentally different question than
Pagano that is not obvious at first glance. Pagano’s research essentially asks the question
“what factors increase the likelihood of an IPO for all companies in Italy”? Brau’s
research asks the question “what factors push a company towards an IPO versus a
takeover”? Pagano concludes that having a relatively high industry market-to-book ratio
increases the probabilities that a company will pursue an IPO transaction compared to
companies in low market-to-book industries. However, having a high market-to-book
ratio also increases the chance of a company selling out in a takeover to an even greater
degree according to Brau. As such, Brau’s conclusions do not necessarily contradict
Pagano’s conclusions, although Brau’s methodology and scope of coverage are more
illuminative and are clearly more relevant to the topic of public company decline.
This portion of the literature review ends with consideration of two different research
projects that have studied motivations for going public, one in the U.S. and the other in
Europe. The research project in the U.S. was undertaken once again by James Brau, this
time in collaboration with Stanley Fawcett. 87 This research project involves initiating
and analyzing a survey of Chief Financial Officers (“CFO’s”) of U.S. companies, seeking
to compare theory to practice on the following IPO-related topics: “motivation, timing,
underwriter selection, underpricing, signaling and the decision to remain private”. 88
Brau \ Fawcett focused their survey on three different types of companies: (1) those that
completed an IPO; (2) those that initiated and then withdrew an IPO; and (3) those that
never contemplated an IPO. With respect to the substantive portion of the analysis, the
two elements of the Brau \ Fawcett research project that are particularly relevant to the
topic of public company decline are IPO motivation and the decision to remain private.
Brau/Fawcett conclude that the primary motivation for completing an IPO is the desire to
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grow through acquisitions using company stock as a currency 89. The primary motivation
to withdraw or not to pursue an IPO is the desire to retain control of the company, both
with respect to decision-making authority and equity ownership. 90
A similar study was undertaken and published in 2009 by Franck Bancel and Usha
Mitoo, this time focusing on the motivations of the CFO’s of European companies in
going public. 91 This work was later reprised as a chapter, along with a summary of the
Brau \ Fawcett research, in the compendium of academic articles on IPO theory published
as Handbook of Research on IPOs. 92 Bancel \ Mitoo focus almost exclusively on reasons
for going public and do not repeat Brau \ Fawcett’s survey question on the reasons for
avoiding IPOs or pulling IPOs, other than a single open-ended text question on the
perceived costs of the IPO. However, Bancel \ Mitoo’s survey questions on the reasons
for going public are significantly more comprehensive than what is asked by Brau \
Fawcett’s survey, which was achievable because Bancel \ Mitoo focus primarily on the
IPO motivation question whereas Brau \ Fawcett also were seeking input from survey
participants on multiple other issues relating to IPO theory. Bancel \ Mitoo conclude
that:
the motivations for an IPO differ significantly across firms, countries, and
legal systems. Large firms consider the enhanced external monitoring to
be the most important benefit; small firms value the ability to raise capital
for growth, and family-controlled firms view the IPO as a vehicle to
strengthen their bargaining power with creditors without relinquishing
control. The English system firms value the ability of the pre-IPO
investors to exit and enhanced stock liquidity as the most important
benefits of an IPO whereas the Italian firms identify the reduction in the
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cost of financing as most valuable. The European and US CFOs have
similar views on most benefits of an IPO but disagree strongly on the costs
(both direct and indirect) of an IPO.
Our evidence suggests that the decision to go public is a complex one that
cannot be explained by one single theory because firms seek multiple
benefits in going public. We find strong support for the IPO theories that
focus on financial and strategic considerations, such as increased
credibility and reputation, and financial flexibility for growth, moderate
support for theories that emphasize exit strategy, balance of power,
monitoring, or mergers and acquisitions as a major benefit, and less
support for the asymmetric information and cost of capital theories. 93
As mentioned in the introduction to this literature review chapter, both the Brau \ Fawcett
and the Bancel \ Mitoo research projects are discussed at length later in this Dissertation
in the “Research Methodologies” and “Analysis of Results” chapters.

2.3- American Literature on Public Company Decline
American Government & Industry-Sponsored Literature
Dealing with this topic chronologically, the starting point of the analysis for government
and industry-sponsored literature on the phenomenon of public company decline in the
U.S. is a 2006 report authored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 94 This report is
critical of what the Chamber of Commerce argues is an anti-business environment
created as a result of SOX and other regulatory reforms adopted in response to the string
of major corporate accounting scandals (Worldcom, Enron, etc.) at the start of the
century. The Chamber of Commerce report is particularly critical of Sarbanes-Oxley,
stating that “just because something has the corporate governance label doesn’t mean that
it really helps corporate governance—or that the costs imposed provide corresponding
benefits. The best example is Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley.” 95 The Chamber of
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Commerce concludes by warning that the dominant position of the U.S. capital markets is
at risk and advises that “we must ensure that our system is one of high standards—legal,
ethical, and regulatory—but not one of duplicative, unnecessary, or ineffective
regulation. Unless we are very careful to nurture the competitiveness of our economy at
all levels, we will find our nation poorer and less powerful as a result.” 96 The Chamber
of Commerce report is also markedly critical of what they classify as union activism to
advance their own agendas, but instead is couched as shareholder rights initiatives.
The second source to consider is the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation issued in 2006. 97 This committee is popularly known as the “Paulson
Committee”, as it was created with the backing of Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson
Jr. The Paulson Committee was comprised of a blue-ribbon panel of American business,
financial, investor and corporate governance, legal, accounting and academic leaders to
study ideas to enhance the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets.
At the time of its creation, there was a growing consensus that the U.S. was losing its
dominant position as the preferred locus for foreign IPOs, but the full extent of the
trendline of public company decline for domestic listings in the U.S. was not yet
understood. The Paulson Committee ultimately identifies four areas in which it makes
recommendations to approve U.S. capital market competitiveness: (1) Regulatory
Process: the Paulson Committee recommends that the SEC should focus its regulations as
more of a “risk-based process, focusing on the costs and benefits of regulation” compared
to its existing “regime of detailed prescriptive rules”; 98 (2) Private and Public
Enforcement System: the Committee recommends litigation reform with caps and safe
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harbors; 99 (3) Shareholder Rights: the Committee states its belief that the U.S. is falling
behind other countries with respect to protection of shareholder rights, recommending
shareholder approval of poison pills, majority voting requirements and alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms for shareholder disputes; 100 and (4) Sarbanes-Oxley: the
Committee supports the retention of SOX in its current form, with minor tweaks in
implementation to allow rational compliance on a multi-year basis to reduce costs of
annual attestation.
The third report to consider is a 2007 McKinsey & Company report commissioned jointly
by New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer. 101 The
McKinsey report is similar in mandate to the Paulson Committee report in that it is
designed to assess the risks to the U.S. dominant position in international public equity
markets, although the McKinsey report is focused specifically on protecting New York’s
position as the preeminent global financial hub. Notably, the McKinsey report is
significantly more critical of the chilling effects of SOX implementation on the capital
markets than the Paulson Committee report. The McKinsey report concludes by stating
that providing clearer guidance on SOX implementation and implementing immediate
litigation reform to stem securities class-action suits are “critical national short-term
priorities”. 102
The next item of relevance in time sequence is the report of the U.S. IPO Task Force in
2011 entitled “Rebuilding the On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and the Job
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Market Back on the Road to Growth”. 103 The title of the document demonstrates that the
IPO Task Force draws an inextricable line between job growth and a robust IPO market,
relying heavily on the work of Weild and Kim that is discussed later in this chapter. The
IPO Task Force report states that “[d]uring the past 15 years, the number of emerging
growth companies entering the capital markets through IPOs has plummeted relative to
historical norms. This trend has transcended economic cycles during that period and has
hobbled U.S. job creation.” 104 The report goes on to summarize its findings on factors
contributing to public company decline:
In summary, the IPO Task Force has concluded that the cumulative effect
of a sequence of regulatory actions, rather than one single event, lies at the
heart of the crisis. While mostly aimed at protecting investors from
behaviors and risks presented by the largest companies, these regulations
and related market practices have:
1. driven up costs for emerging growth companies looking to go public,
thus reducing the supply of such companies,
2. constrained the amount of information available to investors about such
companies, thus making emerging growth stocks more difficult to
understand and invest in, and
3. shifted the economics of the trading of public shares of stock away from
long-term investing in emerging growth companies and toward highfrequency trading of large-cap stocks, thus making the IPO process less
attractive to, and more difficult for, emerging growth companies. 105
Ultimately, the IPO Task Force makes three key recommendations to stimulate IPO
activity: (i) provide an exemption of five years to allow new public companies to get up
to speed before full compliance is required on financial certification (i.e., establish an
“on-ramp” for newly public companies); (ii) improve information flow on private and
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public companies using updated methods of communication; and (iii) lower the capital
gains rate for profits made on long-term holders of IPO shares.
The first recommendation of the IPO Task Force with respect to the five year “on-ramp”
was ultimately adopted as a core component of the U.S. JOBS Act in 2012. 106 The JOBS
Act was specifically introduced as a regulatory measure to stimulate the number of IPOs
in the U.S. as a driver of job creation. Other measures adopted in the JOBS Act are
amendments lifting the ban on solicitations for exempt offerings, creation of crowdfunding exemptions, an increase in exempt capital limits and an increase in the threshold
of shareholders of record allowed before registration becomes mandatory. The impact of
the JOBS Act is assessed by academic commentators discussed hereafter.
The next industry report of relevance is a white paper released in 2014 by Oliver Wyman
Financial Services. 107 This white paper contains novel ideas on measures to increase
small and medium enterprise (“SME”) financing and growth. These recommendations
include the creation of an international electronic trading platform exclusively for SME’s
with reduced regulation and lower compliance costs, along with the idea of a mutualized
guarantee network amongst all SME’s traded on the electronic platform to enhance
access to credit. While interesting, there is no evidence that these particular
recommendations ever made it beyond the proposal stage due to the inherent
complexities associated with developing a trans-national SME trading platform.
The final industry document discussed here is the most recent major report on public
company decline issued by the U.S. Committee on Capital Markets Regulation in
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2017. 108 This follow-up to the Paulson Committee Report states that the U.S. public
markets situation has further deteriorated in the intervening decade as the U.S. has
continued to lose ground to foreign equity markets. As for the prime culprit specifically
responsible for this situation, the 2017 Report points the finger at “excessive regulation
and litigation risk”. 109 As a proposal to move forward, the U.S. Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation recommends the following:
As a first step towards reinvigorating U.S. public equity markets, the
Committee recommends that the SEC work with private U.S. companies
to better understand why they are not going public and whether specific
regulatory changes could incentivize them to do so. As a second step, the
SEC should empower U.S. shareholders of public companies to adopt a
mandatory system of individual arbitration to replace securities class
actions that are costing public companies and investors billions of dollars
each year. 110
The first recommendation specifically instructs the type of empirically-based research
project that has been executed in this Dissertation. It will be interesting to see whether
the publication of this Dissertation receives any notice in the U.S., or whether American
scholars believe that there are too many differences in the public markets ecosystem and
regulatory structure between the U.S. and Canada to draw any inferences from this
Dissertation that would be relevant to the U.S. situation. Given the degree to which
finance academics have cited the Italian study of Pagano et al over the years, there is
some hope that there will be American scholars (and maybe regulators as well) who see
value in considering the analysis and conclusions of this Dissertation.
American Public Company Literature Focused on Sarbarnes-Oxley
One of the earliest and most influential critiques of SOX was published in 2002 by a
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George Mason University law professor, the late Larry Ribstein. 111 Ribstein notes that
the SOX provisions allowing courts to establish personal liability on the basis of “ex post
judgement that the executive certified controls proved to be inadequate” may actually
increase agency costs by incentivizing management “to act more conservatively than the
owners would prefer”. 112 Ribstein further hypothesizes that SOX will increase the
relative benefits of being private compared to being public, and could result in a reduced
number of public companies available for investors. Ribstein concludes by stating that
“this effect would be ironic in light of the law’s intent to lure investors back into the
market”. 113
Corporate lawyers Marc Morgenstern and Peter Nealis are the authors of a 2004 paper in
which the increase in going-private transactions post-SOX adoption is noted, but the
authors question the effectiveness of going-private transactions in ultimately avoiding
SOX compliance. 114 They point out that many of the going-private processes rely on
institutional debt, and that institutional debt is increasingly demanding contractual rights
forcing management to continue to report on the SOX certification standards, thereby
making SOX avoidance a poor reason for pursuing a going-private transaction. The same
argument is made in greater depth by Georgia law professor Robert Bartlett in 2009, who
determines that companies going private after SOX are even more likely to subject
themselves to SEC reporting obligations through contractual provision than prior to the
adoption of SOX. 115
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In 2007, Ellen Engel, Rachel Hayes and Xue Wang published a study indicating that the
likelihood of smaller firms going private after the adoption of SOX has increased, and
that the market reaction to smaller firms announcing their intention to go private is more
positive than when larger firms announce their intention to go private. 116
One of the most interesting academic articles (in terms of its applicability to the core
topics covered by this Dissertation) focusing on the impact of increased compliance costs
associated with SOX in the U.S. public markets is a 2004 study published by Stanley
Block. Block’s study involves a survey of former public companies who went private in
the U.S. between January 2001 and July 2003 (which overlays the 2002 adoption of
Sarbanes-Oxley ). 117 Block was able to secure survey responses from representatives of
110 out of 236 companies who went private in the U.S. during this interval. Based on his
data, Block squarely blames the increased compliance costs associated with SOX as one
of the main reasons why an increasing number of companies have gone private,
particularly focusing on SOX’s disproportionate effect on smaller issuers. 118 However,
Block also identifies other factors cited by the management of the companies as
motivations for their decisions to go private, including the pressures and time constraints
for senior management, lack of analyst coverage and insufficient liquidity for their
shares. 119 Each of these factors is, as discussed later in this Dissertation, amongst the
factors ultimately tested in the PCD Study.120
In his 2010 work, Penn State finance professor Peter Iliev determines that SOX
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compliance essentially doubles audit fees of firms that are forced to certify financial
statements. 121 He further concludes that the evidence indicates that some companies
deliberately manage their market capitalizations to stay below the $75 million public float
threshold for SOX compliance and that SOX has the effect of reducing the overall value
of smaller public companies. 122
In his 2010 PhD thesis, Kim Jaehoon analyzes recent going-private transactions in the
U.S. to determine whether the high compliance costs associated with SOX caused the
going-private boom or a private equity fundraising boom. 123 He concludes that the
evidence is insufficient to establish a causal link between SOX and the increase in goingprivate transactions across all categories of transactions. However, there are certain subcategories of going-private transactions for which a causal link to SOX compliance costs
can be established.
Finally, in a 2014 article, two Harvard professors, law professor John Coates and
accounting professor Suraj Srinivasan, undertook an extensive review of over 120 studies
completed on SOX in the fields of accounting, law and finance. 124 Coates / Srinivasan
summarize the paradox of their conclusion as follows:
[T]he law continues to be fiercely and relentlessly attacked in the US,
particularly in political election battles and during legislative debates,
reflected in part in provisions of the Dodd- Frank Act and the JOBS Act,
which can be seen as a partial legislative rollback of the Act. On the other
hand, survey evidence… suggests that informed observers, including
corporate officers and investors, do not believe that the Act – as
implemented, taking into account significant relaxations of its most
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criticized provision (section 404(b) internal control attestation) – has been
a significant problem, and may well have produced net benefits, and the
law has been copied at least in part by other countries. What explains this
puzzle of continued hostility amid acquiescence or even mild praise by
those most directly affected by the Act? 125
Notwithstanding that many of the affected parties reported a net benefit to SOX
compliance, Coates / Srinivasan acknowledge that there is a general perception that SOX
has increased “the risk of personal liability facing managers and directors and in the risk
of reputational harms and opportunity costs created by litigation.” 126 They conclude by
conceding that, if this is true, then “difficult-to-explain and legitimate business risks may
be foregone, firms may decline to go public or otherwise avoid the burdens of the
law”. 127
American Public Company Decline Literature Positing Other Causes
The first body of literature that is noteworthy in the timeline of academic articles
considering public company decline in the U.S. beyond analysis of the impacts of SOX is
a series of three white papers published by accounting firm Grant Thornton, LLP. These
white papers are written by David Weild and Edward Kim, two former high-level
investment bankers and, subsequently, senior officers of NASDAQ who now lead the
Capital Markets Practice Group at Grant Thornton LLP.
The categorization of the Weild / Kim series of white papers in terms of their proper fit
within this literature review chapter is a challenge, resulting from uncertainty as to
whether they should be included in this sub-section as academic literature or relegated to
the earlier sub-section on government and industry-sponsored literature on public
company decline. Clearly, these white papers were written under a corporate mandate
from Grant Thorton LLP, a commercial entity with a significant interest in ensuring the
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maintenance of robust capital markets to support their public audit practice. Therefore,
one might assume that the Weild / Kims series papers are commercially-influenced and
should not be discussed alongside the academic materials which have the benefit of
academic independence.
However, the Weild / Kim analysis of public company decline in the U.S. represents the
first analysis in any form of literature to identify the full extent of the phenomenon in the
U.S. They are also the first commenters to allege that the trend is caused by something
more fundamental and complex than the increased compliance costs associated with SOX
implementation. The theories espoused by Weild / Kim have proven to be extremely
influential throughout all the subsequent academic literature and are cited as key
authorities in every academic article of note on public company decline. There is little
doubt that Weild / Kim are properly considered as constituting some of the foundational
research on public company decline in the academic world. As such, the decision was
reached that analysis of the Weild / Kim stream of literature should occur in this core
section of the literature review.
The first paper by Weild / Kim entitled “Why are IPOs in the ICU” was released in
2008. 128 In this ground-breaking work, Weild / Kim advise that they consider the
increase in compliance costs of SOX to be a lesser contributing factor to public company
decline: “[W]hile Sarbanes-Oxley did increase the costs and time required to go public, it
is a bit of a red herring in that it is only one factor, and probably not the major factor, in
the demise of the IPO market.” 129 Instead, Weild / Kim point to another regulatory
reform initiative, also designed with the intention of helping retail investors, as the main
culprit:
Barreling down the track in 2001 was the death star of decimalization.
While it’s difficult to argue in theory with the change from fractional to

128

D. Weild and E. Kim, “Why Are IPOs in the ICU?” (2008) White Paper, Chicago, IL, Grant Thornton
LLP.

129

Ibid at 7.

59

decimal increments, in hindsight the markets would have been better
served by a reduction of increments to just 10 cents, rather than the penny
increments for which the SEC pushed. The resultant loss of 96 percent of
the economics from the trading spread of most small cap stocks — from
$0.25 per share to $0.01 per share — was too much of a shock for the
system to bear. Trade execution had to be automated. Market makers no
longer exchanged information over the phone scrambling to match buyers
with sellers on the other side of a trade. Liquidity, supported by capital
commitment, was quickly a thing of the past in the NASDAQ system. In
the name of championing consumers, the damage was done. […]
Generally speaking, economists and regulators have maintained that
competition and reduced transaction costs are of great benefit to
consumers. This is only true to a point. When it comes to investments,
higher front-end or transaction costs and tax structures that penalize
speculative (short-term) behavior can act as disincentives to speculative
behavior and create incentives for investment (buy-and-hold) behavior that
may be essential to avoiding boom-and-bust cycles and maintaining the
infrastructure necessary to support a healthy investment culture. As
markets become frictionless (i.e., when there is little cost to entering into a
transaction), it becomes easier for massive numbers of investors to engage
in speculative activity. […]
Regulators may have unwittingly done a real disservice to mom and pop
investors by enabling traders to hijack the markets for speculation. 130
To remedy the phenomenon of public market decline, Weild / Kim propose an alternative
market structure that they suggest firms can opt into on a voluntary basis. The key
features of this alternative market are suggested to include: (i) investment open to all
investors (distinguishing it from the Rule 144A exempt market); (ii) firms complying
with the same SEC regulatory disclosure obligations as the primary market; (iii) a quotedriven market supported by market makers who commit capital to the market-making
enterprise; (iv) investors having the ability to execute trades only through brokers,
ensuring higher commission rates; and (v) tick sizes between $0.10 and $0.20 depending
on share price. 131 Based on their proposed solutions, it is clear that Weild / Kim blame
decimalization for destroying the IPO ecosystem of brokerage support that provided
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trading liquidity and analyst coverage of public companies. Their solution is essentially
an alternative system in which we return to the past through a voluntary alternative
market structure that eliminates the speculators, high volume electronic trading systems
and day-traders and advantages the investment bankers.
Weild / Kim follow up their 2008 paper a year later with a sequel entitled “A Wake-Up
Call for America”. 132 In this paper, they reiterate all of their arguments from the earlier
paper, but also go the extra step of quantifying what they claim is the loss in job creation
resulting from the ongoing public company decline. Clearly, they don’t feel that they
have received sufficient academic and popular traction from their 2008 paper, so the 2009
paper utilizes more emotional language to ensure that the depth of the crisis cannot be
misunderstood by the readers. In particular, Weild / Kim describe the phenomenon of
public company decline as the “The Great Depression in Listings” and the rise of
speculators, day-traders and high-volume electronic institutional trading as “Casino
Capitalism”. Critically, they also calculate that the total number of jobs lost in the U.S.
as a result of public company decline at 22 million between 1997 and 2009. It is this
calculation that garners all of the subsequent headlines, and grabs the attention of both
the capital markets industry and the regulators.
It cannot be stated for certain that the Weild / Kim papers were the immediate impetus for
the creation of the U.S. IPO Taskforce, but it is clear that the Taskforce is deeply
impacted by the Weild / Kim articles. The headline statistic of 22 million jobs lost in the
U.S. due to IPO decline is cited on the first page of U.S. IPO Taskforce report. 133
Clearly, the 2009 paper by Weild / Kim brought the reality of public company decline
into the public consciousness, leading to academics finally beginning to pick up the
thread and undertake their own analysis in the area. The 2008 and 2009 Weild / Kim
papers are amongst the most influential pieces in all of the academic literature, and not a
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single article has been subsequently written on the topic without acknowledging the 2008
and 2009 contributions of Weild / Kim.
Weild / Kim return again in 2012 134 with their third white paper on public company
decline, this time in direct response to the implementation of the U.S. JOBS Act. 135
Weild / Kim argue in the 2012 paper that the JOBS Act got two-thirds of the way to
correcting the problem by providing “(1) a framework to lower costs for small companies
accessing the public markets, and (2) a framework to improve company communication
with investors in the public and private markets.” 136
However, they also point out that the JOBS Act completely fails to provide the third leg
of the “stool required to revive the U.S. IPO market”. 137 This time, instead of arguing for
an alternative market where issuers can contract to enrich investment banks in exchange
for providing liquidity and research coverage, Weild / Kim propose two new alternatives
to solve the tick size dilemma. The first alternative allows issuers to set their own tick
size in consultation with advisors “in order to arrive at an optimal increment for its shares
that would address both the needs of the ecosystem and the liquidity in its shares”. 138
The second alternative is to allow the SEC to set algorithmic customization of tick size at
50% of the average bid/ask spread over a specified period (they suggest 12 months). 139
Both of these alternatives proposed by Weild / Kim are interesting and likely to be more
palatable to regulators than their earlier alternative market suggestion, which was an
obvious non-starter from a public policy perspective.
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It is apparent that Weild / Kim received a significant degree of traction at high levels of
government on this argument. In 2014, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bipartisan vote directing the SEC to initiate a pilot program testing the impact of increased
tick sizes in the market. Under this congressional directive, the SEC pushed the U.S.
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) to implement a two-year pilot
program in the public markets. FINRA implemented the program on October 3, 2016,
increasing tick sizes from $0.01 to $0.05 for a sample of small capitalization stocks. 140
The SEC pilot program expired in October 2018 with little fanfare or business media
notice. It has generally been regarded as a failed experiment by the SEC and other
business media for failing to materially enhance liquidity. 141 FINRA’s own official
analysis of the pilot program reports that both liquidity and pricing did improve for the
listed companies in the experimental group, but not by a high enough amount to offset the
cost associated with the program. Also, FINRA reports that the number of market
makers did not increase for the experimental stocks. The conclusion is obvious: this
particular regulatory initiative, designed specifically to address one of the factors
believed to contribute to public company decline, did not deliver the hoped-for gains.
This experimental failure does not necessarily undermine the core analysis and
conclusions of Weild / Kim, but it does call into question the degree to which tick sizes
contribute to the overall phenomenon of public company decline. In fairness to Weild /
Kim, though, a two-year pilot of a limited number of companies may not be a sufficiently
large data sample to disprove their theory, and the experiment clearly did not control for
the countervailing effects of other contributing factors of public company decline that
could well have served as a drag on the companies included in the experiment. Perhaps
most telling is the Barron’s article on the topic which reported that the SEC, FINRA and
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the two congressmen who sponsored the initial vote that led to the SEC pilot study all
declined to provide any comment on the pilot study’s demise, evidencing that few in
government currently want to associate with the SEC pilot program at this point. 142 As
such, we are unlikely to see another regulatory attempt to legislate tick sizes in the U.S.
any time soon, and the implications of this experiment will be discussed later in this
Dissertation under the “Implications of PCD Study for Regulatory Reform Initiatives”
chapter.
The analysis now turns to the stream of U.S.-based academic literature published in the
traditional peer-reviewed journals and on which there is no question of independence of
the authors. This portion of the analysis starts with a series of articles written by
University of Florida finance professor Jay Ritter and his collaborators. The analysis of
the Ritter articles starts with an article entitled “Where Have All the IPOs Gone?”
published in 2013. 143 Preliminary versions of this article circulated on the internet for a
year before publication and served as the foundation for a 2012 presentation made by Jay
Ritter to the SEC Advisory Committee on SME’s. 144 In both the 2012 presentation and
the 2013 article, Ritter, Gao and Zhu (referred to herein as “Ritter”) state that
conventional wisdom on the causes of IPO decline continues to be that increased
compliance costs associated with Sarbanes-Oxley, along with the reductions of tick sizes,
are primarily to blame. 145 Ritter refers to the combination of these two factors as the
“regulatory overreach hypothesis”. 146 While not discounting the relevance of the
regulatory overreach hypothesis completely, Ritter advance their own unique theory that
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they believe are more important in explaining the regulatory decline phenomenon:
We posit that the advantages of selling out to a larger organization, which
can speed a product to market and realize economies of scope, have
increased relative to the benefits of operating as an independent firm.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we document that small company IPOs
have had declining profitability, consistently low returns for public market
investors, and an increasing likelihood of being involved in
acquisitions. 147
In a follow-up article in 2014, Ritter further expounds on the theory which is
characterized as “the fundamental economic change hypothesis”:
[G]etting big fast is more important than it used to be, at least in some
industries such as the technology industry, and globalization and
improvements in communication technology are behind the change. The
implication is that being a small independent company and growing
organically (that is, internally) is increasingly an inferior business strategy
compared to an alternative strategy of getting big fast, which frequently
can be accomplished most efficiently through mergers and acquisitions.
This hypothesis implies that young firms are now more likely to make
acquisitions or sell out in a trade sale than to go public. 148
Under Ritter’s hypothesis, the fundamental economic change leading to public company
decline is irreversible and there are unlikely to be any regulatory panaceas identified that
can single-handedly reverse the trendline of decline in public companies. However,
Ritter believes that maintaining functioning (if not robust) equity markets is worthwhile
and that public companies continue to play an important role in the U.S. economy. 149
Ritter does provide the following recommendations for limiting the further decline of
U.S. public markets: (1) lowering the costs associated with IPOs by allowing auctions
rather than book-building; (2) reforming the legal system to discourage poorly grounded
class-action lawsuits; and (3) reforming the U.S. copyright system. The limited scope of
these proposed reforms demonstrates that Ritter is somewhat pessimistic about the ability
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for large-scale regulatory intervention to be successful in arresting the continuing decline
of the U.S. public company.
The next article meriting discussion is an analysis of the impact of the JOBS Act by
Michael Dambra, Laura Casares-Field and Matthew Gustafson (collectively referred to as
“Dambra” herein). 150 The Dambra article finds a statistically significant increase in IPO
activity after the JOBS Act implementation compared to the baseline activity prior to the
JOBS Act, but the positive impact is restricted primarily to biotechnology and
pharmaceutical-based industries. The uptick is also determined not to be of sufficient size
to offset the rate of attrition of public companies. As such, Dambra does not predict that
the JOBS Act impact will be sufficient to offset ongoing public company decline, 151 a
fact which has been borne out by continued decline in the number of listed public
companies over the four-year interval since the Dambra article was published.
We now turn to a series of six related articles, most of which are written as collaborations
by a group of finance professors whose common background is that they all were on
faculty or completed their PhD’s at Ohio State University over the same time period in
the early 2000’s. This series of articles is referred to herein as the “Stulz” papers for
convenience, as Rene Stulz is the most senior academic in the group and is the only
author that is common to all five papers.
The Stulz papers commence in 2013 with the publication of “The US Left Behind?
Financial Globalization and the Rise of IPOs Outside the US”. 152 In this article, the
authors focus on the decline of the American public markets in comparison to global
public markets, blaming financial globalization for the decline in U.S. dominance of
public equity markets since 1997 and painting a rosy picture of the status of public
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companies in the rest of the world. Beyond globalization, the authors do not have any
firm beliefs as to the causes of the decline in the U.S. They do, however, advise that the
regulatory changes in general, and SOX in particular, cannot explain U.S. public
company decline. 153
In the next paper in the Stulz timeline, published in 2017, the authors continue to
expound on the views previously stated in the 2013 paper. 154 Once again, the authors
point out that the popular bogey-man of SOX compliance costs does not properly explain
the timeline of U.S. public company decline. The authors discuss the theories of Weild /
Kim and Ritter as well as alternative explanations of the decline, but do not posit any
specific theories of their own or take any position as to what they believe are the principal
contributing factors.
Two more Stulz papers were published in 2017, once again reiterating the same themes:
(i) the U.S. is getting left behind the rest of the world; (ii) the IPO market and public
company health are far better everywhere outside of the U.S.; and (iii) nobody is sure as
to the actual causes of public company decline, but the popular culprits of regulatory
overreach associated with Sarbanes-Oxley and decimalization can be demonstrably
proven to not be the major contributing factors. 155 Here, the authors refer to “the US
Listing Gap” to describe the difference in what the U.S. IPO activity should be compared
to the rest of the world based on historical market share.
The fifth Stulz paper was released in 2018, this time as a solo effort from Rene Stulz. 156
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This paper does provide some new insights beyond the themes that are repeatedly
recycled in the first four Stulz papers, principally in analysis of the increasing relevance
of research & development and the resulting increase in balance sheet intangible assets in
the modern U.S. economy. On this point, Stulz points out the following:
The fact that GAAP accounting is less instructive about the economic
value of firms with more intangibles works especially against young firms.
An established firm with high intangibles will have an easier time
convincing markets of its economic value. As a result, the growth in the
importance of intangibles makes it less likely that young firms will want to
join the exchanges and more likely that they will seek private funding or
be acquired. […]
The fact that young firms investing in intangibles tend to have GAAP
losses even though they are creating economic value provides another
reason why many firms may want to stay away from public markets. 157
Later on, Stulz deepens his analysis to include consideration of the ramifications of the
technology-based economy on the competitive positions of companies pursuing public
offerings. Stulz expresses the belief that the public markets are inherently less attractive
for firms that invest in development of intangible assets given the competitive risk of
public company disclosure obligations. 158
This fifth paper in the Stulz series offers more insights than the earlier four articles,
which all get hung up on the issue of the unique American nature of public company
decline with little else to add to the academic canon on the topic. The two key points that
Stulz makes in the last article with respect to the challenges of technology companies
dealing with public company reporting and the potentially chilling effects of disclosure
on their competitive position are both suggestions that merit further analysis. As a
counterpoint, however, the PCD Study results discussed later in this Dissertation do not
support the public disclosure disadvantage as being in the class of most critical factors in
public company decline.
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The sixth Stulz paper is a further collaboration of the co-authors of the first four Stulz
papers discussed above. 159 In this last Stulz paper, the authors look back at Jensen’s
1989 article, “The Eclipse of the Public Corporation”, which was discussed earlier in this
literature review. With respect to Jensen’s predictions in 1989 on public company
decline, it is noted that only some of the important predictions have come to fruition.
They reiterate their previously-stated belief that public markets in the U.S. remain wellsuited for companies with mostly tangible assets, but have been eclipsed by the private
markets for companies with primarily intangible assets looking for growth funding. The
authors also note that this evolution is problematic in that individual investors are often
prevented from gaining access to potentially high-growth investments in companies with
intangible asset bases, along with a reduction in transparency as fewer firms go public.
From a Canadian perspective, it is imperative to point that there is no consideration in the
Stulz papers of the nature of public company decline outside of the United States. In fact,
public company decline is presented in these articles as a uniquely American
phenomenon.

It is uncertain why the Stulz articles fail to pick up on the occurrence of

this phenomenon in other western industrialized democracies, particularly since the key
Canadian and European sources discussed later in this literature review pre-date the
publication of all but the first paper in the Stulz series. 160
The analysis now turns to consideration of another group of articles that propose a
different factor as being the principal contributing cause of U.S. public company decline:
namely, the effect of the deregulation of private equity markets as a result of the National
Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”). 161 NSMIA increased the
ability of private companies to raise significant equity by adding an additional exemption
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for sale of securities to qualified purchasers, and also increased the number of qualified
investors who could participate in hedge funds.
The first article to be considered in this stream was published by Duke corporate law
professor Elizabeth de Fontenay in 2016. 162 Fontenay’s theory is succinctly summarized
in the following excerpt:
From its inception, the federal securities law regime created and enforced
a major divide between public and private capital raising. Firms that chose
to "go public" took on substantial disclosure burdens, but in exchange
were given the exclusive right to raise capital from the general public.
Over time, however, the disclosure quid pro quo has been subverted:
Public companies are still asked to disclose, yet capital is flooding into
private companies with regulators' blessing. 163
De Fontenay goes on to state her opinion that private companies have essentially become
free riders in the capital markets, taking advantage of the public company disclosure for
pricing and other critical information, which effectively operates as a subsidy from the
public companies to their private market competitors. 164

The same theory is advanced in a recent paper co-written by CalTech finance professor
Michael Ewens and Northeastern finance professor Joan Farre-Mensas. 165 This article
specifically points the finger at NSMIA and demonstrates the significant increase in
private equity placements completed in the immediate aftermath of its passage. The
thesis of both de Fontenay and Ewens / Farre-Mensas is that private companies will
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generally choose private alternatives of financing if they are readily available in order to
avoid the disclosure obligations and costs of being a public company, and that the series
of regulatory reforms increasing the ability to raise capital through private sources is the
single biggest contributing factor to U.S. public company decline since the 1996 passage
of NMSIA. Notably, this is the theory that maps most directly on the timeline with the
actual beginning of the decline of the U.S. public markets starting in 1997.
The final item to be considered in this section is a 2018 article co-authored by two
fellows of the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at Harvard,
Marshall Lux and Jack Pead. 166 Lux / Pead review the decline of the U.S. IPO market
and the number of listed companies, and then turn to discussing the importance of
retaining robust public markets in the U.S.
On the issue of relevance of the decline, Lux / Pead come down firmly on the side of
believing that public company decline does matter and that there is value in seeking to
find ways to combat the decline. They also conclude that the causes of the decline are
multi-factorial and intertwined, concluding that five factors are the major drivers of
public company decline: “(1) analyst coverage trends, (2) buy-side trends, (3) a shift
from active to passive investment strategies, (4) the growth in private capital and (5)
increasingly burdensome regulation.” 167 Lux / Pead are also the first writers to point the
finger at a new culprit embedded within the analyst coverage trends, Elliott Spitzer:
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s crusade against research
conflicts in the early 2000s led to the Global Analyst Research Settlements
in April 2003 that banned any quid pro quo between research and
investment banking—meaning the promise of future business for a
recommendation. While this eliminated a conflict, it undermined the
economics of equity research, forcing a restructuring and rethinking of
many research units. The settlement set off a chain of consequences.
Investment banks had generally subsidized small-cap coverage with
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profits from large-cap stocks. Now the economic model of most
investment banks focused more tightly on large-cap companies. Smaller
companies found themselves in the cold. 168
Lux / Pead conclude by providing their recommendations for combatting public company
decline, including: (1) increasing the threshold of small company reporting to $250
million; (2) extending the length of the IPO on-ramp in the JOBS Act from 5 years to 10
years; (3) increasing the value of shareholdings required to table a shareholder proposal;
(4) allowing mandatory shareholder mediation to replace securities class action litigation;
and (5) simplifying the ongoing disclosure requirements.

2.4- European Literature on Public Company Decline
European Business Media
European business media have certainly picked up on the trend of declining public
companies in the European capital markets, although not to the same degree as Canadian
and American business media. The first business writer to pick up the thread is Kate
Burgess of the Financial Times, who writes a 2015 article documenting the decline in the
number of IPOs being completed in both Europe and the U.S. Her article focuses on
European IPO decline, noting that the rate of companies going public has gone down by
half over the past decade. 169
Another article written by Duncan Lamont has recently been published in the Financial
News. 170 Lamont confirms that public company decline has indeed taken hold in the U.K
and other Western European countries:
[O]ur analysis finds a similar collapse in the UK and parts of Western
Europe. This trend has not been reflected in emerging markets, especially,
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Asia, where they have grown in prominence. In developed markets
however, there is clearly a declining appetite for IPOs and consistently
higher numbers of companies delisting (mainly due to mergers and
acquisitions) are to blame. 171
What is apparent from Lamont’s analysis is that the phenomenon of public company
decline is evidenced throughout developed Western democratic countries, but not Eastern
European countries. That this trend does not exist in Eastern Europe is not surprising, as
the decline intuitively appears to be a function of mature markets that have had a long
period to reach the optimal number of public companies listed before the confluence of
events that combine to create the decline began to take hold in the late 1990’s.
With respect to Asian countries, developing countries elsewhere in the world, and the
former communist countries of Eastern Europe, it is logical to infer that these economies
have sufficient latent demand for public companies that the impact of the factors
contributing to Western democratic public decline can be more than offset by the growth
required to reach maturity. This does not suggest that the factors contributing to public
company decline in Western industrialized democracies do not also exist in these other
markets; rather, one can hypothesize that the effects of these factors may only become
observable in terms of total companies listed once the developing economies finally
achieve a state of stasis where the number of public companies reaches a “mature” level.
Again, only time will tell whether this prognostication is accurate and further analysis of
the difference in IPO trends between mature western democracies and other nations is
beyond the scope of this Dissertation.
European Government and Industry-Sponsored Publications
The first piece of literature to consider under this heading is the report of the European
IPO Task Force. 172 The European IPO Task Force consists of representatives of three
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different industry associations: (1) European Issuers Association; (2) Invest Europe
(formerly European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association); and (3) the
Federation of European Securities Exchanges. The rationale for the creation of the Task
Force is summarized as follows:
The European IPO markets need to work better for the real economy. In
the last ten years, capital raised through IPOs was only around half of
what was raised in the 1990s. This decline comes at the worst possible
time for European businesses, coinciding with declining availability on
bank lending. Although Europe continues to build and grow businesses
with the potential to be world class, the failure of the IPO market to
facilitate their access to capital markets hampers their growth and lowers
potential employment. According to OECD analysis, a properly
functioning IPO market could deliver thousands of extra jobs in Europe. A
survey, conducted in 2007, also finds out that 92% of job growth in a
company occurs post-IPO. This is an opportunity we cannot afford to
miss. 173
Pointing to recent regulatory changes in Europe, the Task Force claims that regulations
have had the effect of: (1) creating intractable legislation for all sizes of companies; (2)
increasing regulatory compliance costs; (3) eliminating incentives to invest in equity; and
(4) shifting trading economics away from value investing toward high-volume program
trading. 174
The Task Force report makes five recommendations for reversing public company
decline, although only two of the recommendations reflect concrete action items. The
first recommendation mirrors the on-ramp provision of the JOBS Act. The second
tangible recommendation is granting tax incentives to investors who buy IPOs and hold
them long term, reflecting a key recommendation of the Paulson Committee.
The second piece of literature to consider is the NASDAQ report from 2016 advocating
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for capital markets union throughout Europe. 175 This report points out some unique
elements of the European financial system, particularly its disproportionately high
reliance on debt financing as a tool for financing growing ventures. The NASDAQ
report repeats the call for tax incentives for long-term investment in IPOs, along with the
streamlining of the ongoing compliance for SME’s that are public to reduce reporting
costs.
European Academic Analysis of Public Company Decline
This is the shortest subsection of this literature review chapter, simply because there are
no notable European-based academic analyses of public company decline published to
date in the English language as of the date of this literature review. This fact is in and of
itself somewhat surprising, and the reasons why are unclear. Possibly, the academics
writing on the public markets in Europe are so focused on securing capital markets union
and understanding the consequences of Brexit that this topic has not made it onto their
radar to the same degree as their American counterparts. Certainly, the statistics
demonstrate that the European IPO decline is not yet as acute as the American version.
However, European IPO decline nevertheless appears to be a real phenomenon, as
evidenced by the European business media articles and the European IPO task-force. It is
certainly only a matter of time until European academics pick up the scent and begin to
write on the unique elements of their own IPO decline. As of this point, there has been
no significant analysis undertaken on why the European experience in public company
decline appears to lag the U.S. experience on a timeline basis.

2.5- Canadian Literature on Public Company Decline
Canadian Business Media
The phenomenon of public company decline has been widely reported on in the Canadian
business media, with nearly every major newspaper and magazine having published at
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least one article on the topic in the past two years. 176 In each instance, the business
media writers identify the extent of decline in the number of operating public companies
listed in Canada, and point out that the headline numbers on IPO listings in Canada are
obscured by the proliferation of closed-end funds and ETF’s. Another common theme
amongst the articles is the understanding that public company decline cannot be
attributed to any single factor, and that there is a lack of agreement as to what the relative
degree of contributions of the various potential factors actually are to the phenomenon.
Consistently reported in all of the articles is that Canadian executives are wearied by the
excessive time that they spend dealing with various stakeholders of the public entity,
which they view as a distraction from focusing on growth of the core business. In
summary, the Financial Post article quotes Calgary law professor Bryce Tingle, who
states that the securities regulators should be “surveying public company executives on
which rules they find most burdensome and then determine whether they can be
fixed.” 177 This admonition by Bryce Tingle has specifically informed this Dissertation
and the formulation of the PCD Study.
The most recent major article on the topic is a January 2020 analysis written by Sean
Silcoff, technology reporter for The Globe and Mail. 178 In this article, the ready
availability of private financing alternatives for Canadian technology companies is
posited as the main culprit of public company decline. Silcoff concludes that the easy

176

See, for example: (i) Drew Hasselback, “The Amazing Disappearance of the Canadian Public
Company” The Financial Post (30 May 2016) online:< https://business.financialpost.com/news/fpstreet/the-amazing-disappearance-of-the-canadian-public-company>; (ii) Jason Kirby, “Public Companies
in Canada Are Going the Way of the Dodo”, Macleans (25 August 2016), online: https://www.macleans.ca
/economy/economicanalysis /public-companies-in-canada-are-going-the-way-of-the-dodo>; (iii) Barry
Critchley, “Burdens Placed on Public Companies Behind Dearth of IPOs, Professor Suggests” Financial
Post (13 January 2017), online< https://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/burdens-placed-onpublic-companies-behind-dearth-of-ipos-professor-suggests>; and (iv) Tim Shufelt and Christian
Pellegrini, “The Incredible Shrinking Stock Market”, The Globe and Mail (12 November 2017), online:<
ttps://www. theglobeandmailcom/report-on-business/invisible-ipos-whats-to-blame-for-the-exodus-frompublicmarkets/article34910200>.
177

Ibid, Hasselback.

178

Supra note 2.

76

availability of private equity is “enabling fast-growing companies to stay private much
longer, raising as much as they could by going public, but without the hassle, cost,
disclosure requirements and scrutiny”. 179 However, multiple other contributing factors
are also cited throughout this article as potentially having some role in public company
decline.
Canadian Government and Industry-Sponsored Literature
The analysis of Canadian government and industry-sponsored literature starts and ends
with the Canadian Securities Administrators and the initiative launched in CSA
Consultation Paper 51-404. As these documents have been covered extensively
elsewhere in this Dissertation in Chapter 4 “Analysis of the CSA and OSC Streamlining
Initiatives”, there is no need to repeat that portion of the analysis in this literature review
chapter.
Canadian Academic Analysis of Public Company Decline
There exists only a single stream of academic literature in Canada that deals specifically
with the subject of Canadian public company decline, namely originating with University
of Calgary law professor Bryce Tingle (mentioned in the previous subsection) and two
finance professors at the University of Calgary. However, before turning to that stream
of literature, there are a few other Canadian pieces that should be discussed briefly.
Although they were written before the phenomenon of Canadian public company decline
became apparent, these pieces anticipate the possibility that public company decline
could happen and warn about becoming complacent in terms of regulatory overreach
continually increasing the burden on capital public issuers.
The first piece to consider is a research study written by Western University corporate
law professor Chris Nicholls in 2006 entitled “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital
Markets and the Illustrative Case of Canada’s Legislative Response to Sarbanes-
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Oxley”. 180 In this report commissioned by the Task Force to Modernize Securities
Legislation in Canada, Nicholls considers the unique elements of Canada’s public
markets, including the small number of large issuers and the large number of small
issuers that make up Canada’s public company base. Nicholls highlights the tension that
developed between various stakeholders in response to the U.S. adoption of SOX, with
factions who believed whole-sale adoption of the SOX certification procedures was
necessary to protect Canada’s reputation as a serious regulatory jurisdiction, in opposition
to other factions who argued that the unique elements of Canada’s public capital markets
dictated a more nuanced and bespoke legislative response. Clearly, Nicholls comes down
on the side of supporting a more nuanced regulatory response that he believes will be
appropriate for the smaller enterprises that make up the majority of Canadian public
listings. Of particular note for the topic of this Dissertation, Nicholls draws a lesson from
U.S. corporate history in which (then N.J. governor) Woodrow Wilson decimated the
market for incorporations in New Jersey by bringing in new anti-trust legislation.
Nicholls concludes by stating that
“[i]t would be impertinent and misleading to suggest that SOX might
prove as disastrous for America’s capital markets as Wilson’s anti-trust
legislation proved for New Jersey’s corporate tax coffers. Access to the
enviably deep and liquid U.S. capital markets offers far too many
advantages to corporations (and their investors) to be outweighed by a
single legislative initiative, especially one as well-meaning as SOX. But
features of Canada’s markets suggest that they may well be more fragile.
Accordingly, Canada’s regulators do not have the luxury of crafting
regulation secure in the knowledge that the lure of Canada’s markets will
ensure that modest regulatory burdens will not dampen the interest of
issuers and investors. Rather, Canadian securities regulation may need to
be crafted with much greater concern for its perceived impact on investors
and issuing corporations, and with much more sensitivity to the
international competition for listings of small-cap firms. 181
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Certainly, Nicholls recognizes the inherent fragility of the Canadian capital markets
compared to its U.S. neighbours and the risk that regulatory overreach has the potential to
irreparably damage the Canadian public markets ecosystem.
Nicholls is followed in his analysis of the SOX implementation in Canada by Stephen
Sibbold, a securities lawyer and former Chairman of the Alberta Securities Commission.
Sibbold authored a 2009 article in which he points out that the dominant position of the
U.S. in the IPO market has begun to erode since the adoption of SOX. 182 Noting the
erosion of the U.S.’s position in capital markets, Sibbold warns that, “rather than
continue to emulate a regulatory regime which is apparently in competitive decline
internationally, Canada should strive to forge for itself a distinct regulatory regime based
on sound regulatory principles and practical, cost-effective, and enforceable rules.” 183
Sibbold concludes by stating his position that one such area in which Canadian regulation
is trending in the wrong direction is in the Canadian Securities Administrators adoption
of policies supporting greater board independence.
Turning back now to the University of Calgary trio who have written on the specific topic
of Canadian public company decline, the key article co-authored by Bryce Tingle, J. Ari
Pandes and Michael J. Robinson (collectively referred to as “Tingle” herein) is published
in 2013. 184 This article compares the Canadian capital markets to the U.S. capital
markets and reviews the key literature from American academics positing various causes
of regulatory decline. Tingle groups the various posited causes of public company
decline from the American sources into four categories (regulatory over-reach, litigation
climate, changes in market structure and fundamental economic change) and proceeds to
then explain why none of these possible explanations seems to be properly descriptive of

182

Stephen P. Sibbold, “Assessing Canada’s Regulator Response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:
Lessons for Canadian Policy Makers” (2009) 46 Alberta Law Review 769.
183
184

Ibid at 786.

Bryce C. Tingle, J. Ari Pandes & Michael J. Robinson, “The IPO Market in Canada: What a
Comparison with the United States Tells Us About a Global Problem” (2013) 54 Canadian Business Law
Journal 321.

79

the Canadian experience.
With respect to the unique nuances of the Canadian market, Tingle provides a number of
statistics to demonstrate that the ready access to private equity capital that is often cited
in the U.S. sources simply is not reflective of the Canadian reality. Tingle argues that
Canadian venture capital and private equity markets are nowhere near as robust as their
American counterparts. Notably, Tingle’s discussion of the differences in access to
private financing between the U.S. and Canada seriously brings into question whether the
belief expressed in the most recent U.S. articles (i.e., that easier access to private capital
is a major cause of U.S. public company decline) published after Tingle’s article have
any validity in explaining the Canadian version of public company decline. 185
After eliminating each of the four groups of potential cause as being descriptive of the
Canadian public company decline phenomenon, Tingle concludes by advancing the
following:
[S]omething else must be keeping small businesses (and some big firms as
well) out of the IPO market. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
provide our full explanation for the decline of public markets, we can
recommend an examination of the traditional approach scholars take to
corporate governance questions: look at the alignment of incentives. The
decision to take a company public, finance it privately or allow it to be
acquired falls squarely within the ambit of corporate governance. It isn't
necessary to discover some particular feature of the IPO market that has
changed so as to alter the economics of small public firms. It is sufficient
to ask whether the public markets and the legal and regulatory apparatus
surrounding them have evolved in a way that provides strong disincentives
to managers to take their businesses public.
It is this particular challenge in the Tingle article that formed the seeds of the PCD Study
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underpinning this Dissertation. The Tingle article remains the last word on the subject
academically in Canada, and it is appropriate that the academic discourse be jump-started
to provide our provincial regulators with updated guidance and analysis as they each
evaluate the appropriate regulatory response to CSA Consultation Paper 51-404.
An updated article from Tingle on public company decline entitled “The Decline of
Canadian Capital Markets” is forthcoming and will be published by the University of
Calgary Institute of Public Policy. 186 This article confirms that the phenomenon has not
abated and remains very much a critical public issue to be addressed to ensure the
continued health of Canadian capital markets.

2.6- Other Western Democratic Countries Impacted by Public
Company Decline
As noted in the introductory chapter of this Dissertation, the phenomenon of public
company decline has been reported as being endemic throughout western democratic
industrialized countries. If this statement is accurate, what other countries beyond the
U.S., Canada and the countries in Western Europe should be experiencing a similar
decline? The obvious answers are New Zealand and Australia.
A search for recognition of this phenomenon in New Zealand does not turn up any
academic sources, but there is an insightful analysis arising in Australia. 187 An article,
posted on the Australian CPA website indicates that Australia is likely in the early phases
of the decline, a recognition which has perhaps been delayed by the fact that Australia’s
capital markets have benefitted significantly from their close physical proximity to Asia.
Asian public markets are continuing to experience a boom in new listings and these
Asian-linked listings may well obscure the imminence of an Australian public markets
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decline mirroring what has happened in Canada. Certainly, Australian finance professor
Adam Steen of Charles Stuart University, quoted in the article, believes that the
phenomenon is inevitable and in fact is already occurring. 188 Once again, time will tell if
the anticipated decline in Australia has yet reached an inflection point where it will
become more obvious and receive more public recognition in the upcoming years.

2.7- A Brief Consideration of the Relevance of the Ongoing
Academic Debate on Shareholder Short-Termism to the
Topic of Public Company Decline
As a final element to consider in this Literature Review chapter, it is worth discussing
briefly an ongoing debate within legal academia as to the ultimate relevance of the rise of
shareholder short-termism on the issue of public company decline. Short-termism
generally refers to pressures from external forces placed on public companies to deliver
results in the short-term, with the assumption made that focusing on short-term results
may not necessarily be consistent with maximizing profitability of the company over the
long-term. Shareholder short-termism (i.e., the unwillingness to hold onto shares for
longer periods of time) is one of several different elements of overall short-termism
tested as potential contributing factors to public company decline in the PCD Study,
along with analyst short-termism and the impact of short-sellers in the marketplace.
There is no serious debate within legal academia as to whether increasing shareholder
short-termism is a real phenomenon in the capital markets. Since 1980, the average
length that a public shareholder holds a share on the New York Stock Exchange has
dropped from three years to under one year. 189 With a shorter horizon for liquidity,
shareholders demand tangible results more quickly so that their share value appreciates.
However, there is a significant divergence of opinion as to whether increasing
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shareholder short-termism is an issue that actually prevents public companies from
investing for the long-term at the expense of pursuing tactics that maximize short-term
shareholder value. As such, there is an ongoing academic dispute as to how much
shareholder short-termism matters.
One of the leading advocates of the position that shareholder short-termism does not
necessarily prevent public companies from successfully pursuing long-term strategies by
under-investing for the future is Mark J. Roe, the David Berg Professor of Law at
Harvard Law School. Roe underpins his analysis largely on empirical evidence
demonstrating that the largest and fastest-growing public companies in the U.S. continue
to be technology companies that also have the highest level of investment in ongoing
research and development. Therefore, Roe concludes that these enterprises are
succeeding and clearly not focusing only on maximizing short term operating results. 190
Roe’s analysis builds on similar observations previously undertaken by others,
particularly another Harvard Law School professor, Lucian Bebchuk. 191 In each of these
instances, the authors build the case that increasing shareholder short-termism does not
necessarily negatively impact the ability of public companies to invest for the long-term.
They also argue that shareholder short-termism may have benefits for improved corporate
governance.
However, none of these arguments claiming that shareholder short-termism is not as big
of a problem for long-term corporate performance as has been widely claimed by
contemporary business leaders is particularly relevant to the fundamental analysis
undertaken by this Dissertation. This Dissertation is agnostic towards the question of
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whether shareholder short-termism is inherently a positive development or a negative
development for corporate governance, and also as to whether shareholder short-termism
innately limits the ability of contemporary public companies to maximize long-term
value creation. Rather, this Dissertation is focused on the potential impact of various
factors that have recently developed in the capital markets that may impact the trajectory
of the decline in the number of public Operating Companies.
As argued in the introductory chapter and again later in this Dissertation, the
phenomenon of public company decline is inevitably defined by the evolution of the
conscious preference of senior business decision-makers away from the public markets
and towards private financing alternatives. As such, the critical question with respect to
the intersection of the shareholder short-termism debate and this Dissertation is not
whether the increasing trend towards short-termism actually prevents public companies
from achieving their goal of long-term value maximization. Rather, the critical question
is whether the issue of increasing shareholder short-termism is perceived by senior
business decision-makers as being an issue of concern and frustration to the extent that it
may ultimately influence their decision as to whether to pursue an IPO or an alternative
private financing.
With respect to this particular calculation, the same group of legal academics referenced
previously who argue most strenuously that short-termism is not as big of a problem as
perceived by public companies in reality assist in making the underlying case as to the
importance of shareholder short-termism as a matter of concern for public company
decline. To wit, Mark Roe begins an abstract for his seminal paper on short-termism
with the following summary:
Stock-market-driven short-termism is crippling the American economy,
according to legal, judicial, and media analyses. Firms forgo the R&D
they need, cut capital spending, and buy back their own stock so feverishly
that they starve themselves of cash. The stock market is the primary cause:
directors and executives cannot manage for the long-term when their
shareholders furiously trade their company’s stock, they cannot make
long-term investments when stockholders demand to see profits on this
quarter’s financial statements, they cannot even strategize about the longterm when shareholder activists demand immediate results, and they
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cannot keep the cash to invest in their future when stock market pressure
drains away that cash in stock buybacks.
This doomsday version of the stock-market-driven short-termism
argument entails economy-wide predictions that have not been wellexamined for their severity and accuracy. 192
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is this perception itself, and the potential implications of
that perception on the phenomenon of public company decline, that the PCD Study is
concerned with. Considering the preceding quote from Mark Roe, there is no question
that the perception, on the part of senior business decision-makers, of short-termism as a
negative factor is sufficiently widely held that it is imperative that it be included as a
factor to be considered in the PCD Study.
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An Overview and Brief History of Public Company
Regulation in Canada
The rise of public companies as a major force in western industrialized nations since the
beginning of the sixteenth century is inextricably linked to the growth and diversification
of the overall economy during this unprecedented era of wealth creation. In Chapter 1 of
this Dissertation, a variety of reasons were articulated explaining why the maintenance of
robust public capital markets remains a national economic priority Canada and elsewhere.
For as long as publicly-held corporations have existed, governments have wrestled with
the challenge of how best to regulate them: i.e., how can the interests of vulnerable public
investors be adequately protected without stifling continued growth of the underlying
markets themselves? It is readily apparent to capital markets observers that the period of
public company decline in Canada overlays an era of ever-increasing regulatory
complexity and compliance cost. It is unsurprising, therefore, that so many casual
observers of the Canadian public markets assume that regulatory overreach is the
principal cause of public company decline. Clearly, an assumption that overregulation
has hampered the Canadian capital markets in recent years is embedded in the recent
mandate delivered by the current Ontario provincial government to the OSC to prioritize
public company burden reduction. To what degree can this assumption be validated
empirically? Addressing that question is at the core of this Dissertation.
Before turning to an overview of contemporary Canadian securities regulatory reform
initiatives in Chapter 4, and then continuing on to a detailed analysis of the empirical
study underpinning this Dissertation beginning in Chapter 5, this chapter provides
additional historical context on the evolution of both the public company form and public
company regulation in Canada. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the historical
development of the modern public company form starting in the U.K. and tracing its
evolution through the U.S. and into Canada. Next, the historical development of the
regulatory regimes that have evolved to govern public companies in Canada are outlined.
Thereafter, major changes in the regulation of public Operating Companies in Canada
occurring specifically over the past 25 years are summarized, tracking the period
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immediately preceding the beginning of the public company decline phenomenon in
Canada up to the present day. Finally, this chapter concludes with a brief consideration
of the key elements of effective securities regulation generally, and regulatory reform
specifically.

3.1- Legal Origins of the Public Company Form in Canada
Corporate theory and practice throughout Canadian history has developed primarily with
reference to the dual precedents of U.S. and British experience, drawing significantly
from each of these two key influences at various points in time. 193 The direct ancestor of
the modern public corporation, the joint stock company, 194 originated in both England
and the Netherlands during the sixteenth century. 195 Joint stock companies, which were
the first commercial entities offering limited liability to investors, were initially
established by royal charter, and later also through special acts of Parliament, for special
purposes strategically aligned with the interests of government. 196 Initially, joint stock
companies were primarily engaged in shipping, international trade and colonization
activities. The capital-intensive nature of these particular activities required that large
amounts of risk capital be secured from a variety of individual high net worth investors in
order to diversify the significant risk associated with these commercial ventures.
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While the joint stock company form provided the legal vehicle necessary for securing
investment from disparate investors, it also uncovered a fundamental tension between the
priorities of individual investors supplying capital and the promoters of sixteenth century
commercial enterprises. 197 The promoters of the commercial enterprises required surety
of stable investment capital for a specified duration to finance the ventures, while the
individuals supplying the capital desired liquidity that would allow them to convert their
investments back to cash at the time of their choosing. 198 The demand for a mechanism
providing investor liquidity without negatively impacting the company’s capital base was
solved by the creation of stock exchanges in London and Amsterdam, whereby the
interests of the individual investors could be traded freely and converted to cash without
requiring repayment of capital from the company itself.
The Dutch East India Company, in particular, represented the first joint stock company
with a permanent charter, whose shares were tradeable through the facilities of a stock
exchange. 199 A robust trading market developed in Amsterdam in the early years of the
seventeenth century, which also allowed investors to secure credit against their
investments and trade on margin. 200 The Dutch experience in corporate finance with
publicly-traded joint stock companies was quickly adopted in England, particularly with
the ascension of the House of Orange to the English throne in 1688. 201
Several notable joint stock companies, including such famous enterprises as the British
East India Company, grew rapidly to become massive widely-held and publicly-traded
corporate entities with significant international political and economic influence on the
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world stage during the eighteenth century. Among the specific characteristics of the joint
stock company that allowed it to flourish were the “means of concentrating substantial
capital […] supported by a permanent core of transferable equity shares” that served to
provide the entity with “sufficient financial flexibility to be able to exploit the economies
deriving from an increased scope of trading activities”. 202 Ultimately, these joint stock
companies were able to achieve economies of scale previously unseen by concentrating
capital in a single entity. 203 By providing liquidity through the stock markets, the joint
stock companies with permanent capital avoided the costly and disruptive cycle of
liquidation, distribution and re-formation that had previously reflected the normal course
of business in trading enterprises. 204
As discussed in more detail hereafter in the ensuing section covering the history of
securities regulation, however, the evolution of the joint stock company did not occur
without attracting notable criticism from certain constituencies 205 and facing major
setbacks that disrupted the emergence of the public company form. In particular, the
South Sea Bubble of 1720 and the contemporaneous passage by the British Parliament of
the Bubble Act of 1720 (the “Bubble Act”) 206 effectively served to prevent new joint
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stock companies with transferable shares from being formed in the United Kingdom (the
“U.K.”), except through royal charter or act of Parliament, for a century until its eventual
repeal. 207
Notwithstanding the legal prohibitions of the Bubble Act, by the latter portion of the
eighteenth century it was increasingly recognized by business and governmental interests
that the joint stock company form was a useful tool in developing areas of the domestic
economy beyond the traditional roots of international trade, shipping and colonization. In
particular, a number of physical infrastructure projects in bridges, canals and railroads,
which all also required large infusions of investment capital, secured joint stock company
charters. 208 Also, the British government issued a number of joint stock charters during
the eighteenth century for banks and insurance companies. 209 However, beyond these
specific commercial applications of the joint stock company form favored by the
contemporary British governments, securing corporate charters for other business
enterprises remained difficult, expensive and rare throughout the balance of the
eighteenth century. 210
The inability to secure joint stock company charters was particularly acute for businesses
operating in the industrial sector. 211 The industrial revolution in the U.K. (starting in
approximately 1760) created a significant demand for access to joint stock companies or

for restraining several extravagant and unwarrantable Practices therein mentioned. 6 Geo. I, c. 18
[Bubble Act]
207

Ron Harris, “Political Economy, Interest Groups, Legal Institutions and the Repeal of the Bubble Act
in 1825” (1997) 50:4 The Economic History Review 675.

208

Hansmann, supra note 205 at 958.

209

Alceste Santuari, “The Joint Stock Company in Nineteenth Century England and France: King v. Dodd
and the Code de Commerce” (1993) 14 Journal of Legal History 39 at 40.
210

Philip I. Blumberg, “Limited Liability and Corporate Groups” (1986) 11 Journal of Corporate Law 573
at 581.

211

Ibid.

90

facsimiles thereof. 212 The invention of new means of capital-intensive large-scale
production during the industrial revolution required that businesses secure investment
capital from large groups of individual investors to finance the construction and
equipping of factories. 213
Unable to secure formal charters to form joint stock companies, industrial revolution-era
capitalists in the U.K. developed their own pragmatic alternatives. Predominantly,
British industrial companies originating in the second half of the eighteenth century
adopted the alternative form of unincorporated companies (a.k.a. “joint stock
associations”), which were officially treated as partnerships under the law, but operated
as pseudo-corporations in practice. 214 This proliferation of unincorporated companies
during the second half of the eighteenth century created a variety of challenges in
commercial law during the industrial revolution, as it proved impractical for creditors to
secure and enforce individual legal judgments against the hundreds, or even thousands, of
individual investors who had invested in an unincorporated company. 215 As such, it
eventually became clear that the widespread adoption of the joint stock association form
throughout the U.K. was effectively subverting the Bubble Act’s key purpose of
preventing the unfettered proliferation of corporate entities raising large amounts of
capital from public investors and the inevitable speculation resulting therefrom. 216 Even
more problematic, the explosion of grey-market joint stock associations operating in the
U.K. resulted in a significant portion of the British economy operating in a highly
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uncertain legal environment. 217 Ultimately, the British government implicitly
acknowledged that the commercial reality of the proliferation of joint stock associations
through the U.K. had effectively emasculated the Bubble Act while increasing legal
uncertainty in the economy, leading to its repeal in 1825. 218
The development of the corporate form in the American colonies followed the British
precedent closely up until U.S. independence in 1776. After independence, the ability to
grant corporate charters devolved from the British crown to the governments of the
thirteen new states. The American states in the last quarter of the eighteenth century
were less reluctant than the British government to grant corporate charters for
infrastructure projects. 219 The joint stock association form that had become so
ubiquitous in the U.K. during this period also existed in the U.S. to a degree, but these
associations were much less prevalent in the U.S. due to the easier access to corporate
charters. 220
Still, the new U.S. states evidenced a degree of aversion to granting widespread corporate
charters to support manufacturing enterprises for the first 30 years after independence.
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However, by the first decade of the nineteenth century, American demand for
domestically-manufactured goods increased rapidly as relations between the U.S. and
U.K. deteriorated. 222 This political impetus eliminated American legislative reluctance
to issuing corporate charters for manufacturing purposes, resulting in a significant
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increase in the number of corporate charters issued throughout the northern states. 223
Ultimately, the trend towards increased use of the joint stock company form in the U.S.
culminated with the adoption by New York of the first statute allowing for general
incorporation without the necessity of a special charter issued by the government in
1811. 224 A number of other northeastern American states followed the lead of New York
with similar general incorporation statutes within the next decade. 225
As previously discussed, the repeal of the Bubble Act in the U.K. in 1825 was an implicit
acknowledgment by Parliament of the legal superiority of the joint stock company form
over the unincorporated company alternatives (principally the joint stock association)
which had become prevalent in the British economy over the century while the Bubble
Act remained in effect. 226 In the years following the Bubble Act repeal, an increasing
number of corporate charters were granted by Parliament for domestic business
ventures. 227 Eventually, in 1844 the U.K. ultimately followed the earlier American
precedent with the passage of the Joint Stock Companies Act. 228 This legislation finally
allowed for the establishment in the U.K. of joint stock companies without Crown charter
or special act of Parliament, although it notably did not extend limited liability to all
shareholders. The Limited Liability Act, 1855 229 and an updated version of the Joint
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Stock Companies Act passed in 1856 ultimately extended limited liability to all joint
stock companies and further liberalized the ability to incorporate. 230
In colonial-era Canada, general incorporation statutes were initially adopted in 1849, but
were limited to companies engaged in bridges and road construction. 231 Just prior to the
enactment of the British North American Act (now the Constitution Act, 1867), 232 Canada
took a step back from the contemporary trends towards general incorporation in the U.K.
and the U.S. by reverting to a form of incorporation through letters patent under seal of
the Governor in Council, thereby reflecting the earlier British process of incorporation
through royal prerogative. 233 This antiquated method of incorporation remained in place
in Canada for over a hundred years, until the first modern provincial incorporation statute
providing unrestricted rights of general incorporation was adopted by Ontario in 1970,
followed soon after by the majority of other Canadian provinces. 234 The modern
Canadian corporate statutes are largely based on the American model statute precedents,
with certain elements of British influence also reflected. 235
In summary, the origin of the public company form in Canada is traced directly through
the strong precedence of the British and American experience. As discussed above, the
direct ancestor of the modern public company form in Canada is the British joint stock
company form that originated through royal charter or act of Parliament. Prior to the
evolution of alternative structures of significant private investment capital, the public
company form was the primary source of large-scale investment capital. By allowing for
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capital to be pooled in a separate legal structure with its own independent legal status,
perpetual existence and limited liability, the joint stock companies in the U.K., U.S. and
Canada were able to engage in enterprises that were far beyond the scope of individuals
and partnerships.
It is apparent from the preceding summary that the direct descendant of the joint stock
company form is the modern public company; specifically, companies which have broad
shareholder bases and have relied on the advantages of the corporate legal structure to
raise large amounts of capital from disparate groups of investors. Notably, the modern
concept of a private company eventually developed as derivative of the joint stock
company form that was not originally envisioned by the governments during the period
of modernization of corporate statutes in the U.K. and U.S in the mid-nineteenth
century. 236 In fact, it was only in the last decade of the nineteenth century that the
modern private company form came into broader commercial use, and not until 1907 that
the private company form was legally recognized as distinct in Britain. 237 The private
company distinction was first adopted in Canada by the province of Ontario in 1912, with
other jurisdictions soon following suit. 238
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Private equity funds, meanwhile, did not come into existence in a form recognizable by
modern standards until the early 1900’s, and did not gain significant scale in the economy
until after the creation of the Small Business Investment Company Program by the U.S.
Congress in 1958. 239 As such, accessing large-scale capital throughout the latter portion
of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century required, by necessity,
that companies secure investment from a number of different individual investors. This
period coincides with the period of rapid growth and entrenchment of the public capital
markets as a major factor in economic development throughout the western industrialized
world. 240 The public company form, therefore, had a decades-long head-start over the
private equity financing alternatives, and the public company became a significant
institution in the Canadian economy long before private equity became a realistic funding
alternative at any scale.

3.2- Brief History of Securities Regulation Impacting Canada
From the earliest days of the joint stock company’s existence, stock market bubbles and
major occurrences of fraud or other malfeasance against independent investor interests by
promoters and managers, followed by the inevitably-resulting public outcry, have largely
motivated and defined the process and scope of public company securities regulation. 241
The inherently risky nature of the joint stock company commercial efforts, rampant
speculation and the lack of effective regulation relating to promotional activities and
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continuous disclosure led to several notorious failures of joint stock companies during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 242 The first significant bubble in joint stock
companies occurred in the early eighteenth century in England, with the creation of
numerous companies raising funds for speculative ventures abroad in an overheated
investment climate. 243 Most prominent amongst the bubble companies was the South
Sea Company, a joint stock company granted monopoly rights over British trade in South
America. 244 Shortly in advance of a massive price run-up on South Sea Company shares
in 1720, speculation was rampant about the role that the company would play in British
government debt reorganization. 245 The South Sea Company was heavily promoted by
insiders, stockjobbers and stockbrokers, many of whom sold their interests at significant
profits at the peak of the company’s trading value in the summer of 1720 (i.e., £1050 per
share). 246 Many buyers of the South Sea Company stock during the frenzy purchased on
margin. 247 By the end of 1721, the price of the shares of the South Sea Company
retreated back to £128, leaving public investors who had borrowed to buy shares in
desperate financial situations and casting a pall over the entire British economy. 248
The Bubble Act was enacted by the British parliament prior to the collapse of the South
Sea Company shares, principally at the instigation of the directors of the South Sea
Company who sought to preserve their advantaged position in attracting new investment
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capital through the stock market. 249 The Bubble Act essentially prevented the creation of
new companies that could compete on the British stock market and also mandated that
the raising of capital by existing companies must be undertaken directly by the company,
effectively banning intermediaries acting as stockbrokers or stockjobbers. 250 Although
the impetus for the Bubble Act adoption had nothing to do with the South Sea Company
share collapse, the subsequent collapse of the South Sea Company share price created
such a panic amongst the general investing population at the time that the British
government began to enforce the Bubble Act provisions strictly to prevent a repeat of the
stock market bubble. 251
The Bubble Act was immediately controversial, and academics continue to debate the
degree of damage that it inflicted on the British economy prior to its eventual repeal a
century later in 1825. 252 The Bubble Act, reflecting (in the opinion of several corporate
historians) modern history’s first attempt at securities regulation, 253 therefore presages
the arc of securities regulation in the past three hundred years in the U.K., U.S. and
Canada as a sphere of regulation occasionally engaging dubious legislative motives,
interest group lobbying, unintended consequences and overly-broad politically-motivated
reactions to market bubbles and executive chicanery. As discussed in the previous
section, British industry during the Industrial Revolution developed the mechanism of the
unincorporated joint stock association to effectively structure around the prohibitions of
the Bubble Act, but at the cost of creating a significant level of legal uncertainty on the
regulation of companies during this interval.
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The repeal of the Bubble Act represented a pragmatic acknowledgement by the
government of the U.K. that the joint stock company form reflected a necessary legal
construct in the British economy. 254 Having been unable, or at least unwilling, to stem
the proliferation of the joint stock associations during the period that the Bubble Act was
in force, the British government turned its focus instead on developing legislation that
prevented the worst excesses and abuses associated with joint stock companies in order to
protect public investors, while simultaneously seeking to ensure that compliance with the
regulations is not so overly burdensome that it serves as a barrier to economic growth.
After the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825, a number of subsequent reforms were
introduced in a series of British statutes over a two-decade interval, commencing with the
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844 255 and ending with The Companies Act, 1867. 256 The
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844 required that promoters file, as a condition of
incorporation, a return including a copy of any prospectus or advertisement that they
intended to use to market their shares. 257 Several acts between 1844 and 1867 gradually
abrogated the disclosure requirements originally established in the Joint Stock Companies
Act, 1844 until The Companies Act, 1867 once again created new disclosure obligations
by requiring the identification of all parties to company contracts in any prospectus
raising new funds and establishing civil liability for failure to comply. 258
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In 1890, Parliament once again turned its focus back towards securities regulation issues
by legislatively overturning the outcome of a politically unpopular House of Lords
decision, 259 thereby establishing personal liability of directors for misrepresentations in
prospectuses unless the directors held an actual and reasonable belief in the truth of the
impugned statements. 260 Following the release of a government report on reforms
necessary for regulating joint stock companies in 1895, 261 a new Companies Act, 1900
was passed by the U.K Parliament, increasing the breadth and depth of prospectus
disclosure requirements. 262 Further evolutionary changes occurred in English securities
regulation over the next three decades, leading up to the 1929 consolidation of the
Companies Act, which served as an influential precedent for the ongoing development of
contemporary Canadian securities laws. 263
In the U.S., the historical development of securities legislation is generally traced back to
the adoption in Kansas of the first “blue sky” legislation in 1911. 264 Similar statutes
were passed by states throughout the U.S. over the next two decades. 265 Blue sky
regulations in the U.S. were premised on having governmental agencies approve the
merit of a particular share offering, a fundamentally different regulation model from the
focus on mandated disclosure requirements that were stipulated by the U.K. securities
legislation of the era. 266
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The entry of the American federal government into the securities regulation arena, with
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 and the subsequent Securities Exchange Act of
1934, was precipitated by the stock market crash of 1929 and a variety of
contemporaneous stock market scandals. 267 Notably, the U.S. federal government model
of regulation was based on the mandated disclosure precedent of the U.K., and not the
merit-review model associated with the blue sky laws adopted by the U.S. states. 268
Turning now to Canada, securities regulation in this country has historically developed
within the purview of the provincial governments under their constitutional authority to
legislate in the areas of property and civil rights. 269 Any uncertainty as to the extent of
the Canadian federal government ability to legislate on securities matters under the
general branch of the federal trade and commerce powers was eliminated by the Supreme
Court of Canada in a 2011 decision, which confirmed that jurisdiction over the core
components of securities regulation lie within areas of exclusive provincial legislative
authority. 270 This ruling thwarted an attempt by the federal government to create a
national securities regulator and determined that any attempt to establish a national
securities regulator would have to be secured through co-operation between the provinces
and the federal government.
In the field of company regulation, Ontario was the first province in Canada to follow the
1890 English precedent of the Directors Liability Act, adopting its own version 1891. 271
Ontario continued trailblazing in Canadian company regulation with the adoption in 1897
of the first Canadian statute requiring mandatory disclosure to shareholders and, again in
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1907, by mandating the contents of a prospectus and granting rights of rescission for oral
representations based again on the English model. 272
It was Manitoba, however, that took the lead in 1912 to become the first province in
Canada to adopt an American-style blue sky law based on merit review, 273 followed soon
after by three other provinces. 274 Manitoba was again the first province to introduce a
fraud prevention act in 1926, followed by Ontario in 1928. 275 These fraud prevention
statutes focused principally on licensing of brokers and securities fraud investigations. 276
The Ontario Securities Commission, the first dedicated provincial securities regulatory
body in Canada, traces its origins back to the 1928 fraud prevention statute. 277, 278 This
statute introduced mandatory registration of brokers and also required registration for
trading. 279 The first chair of the Ontario Security Frauds Prevention Board, the
governmental body responsible for enforcing the act, was appointed in 1931. 280 In 1932,
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the Ontario fraud prevention statute was renamed as the Securities Act, and the board was
soon thereafter renamed as the Ontario Securities Commission in 1933. 281
The Ontario Securities Act underwent a major overhaul in 1945 and again in 1947,
mandating prospectus contents, delivery and rescission rights. 282 Other Canadian
provinces adopted similar statutes over the course of the next decade. 283 One of the key
impetuses for the reforms in 1945 and 1947 was the unlicensed marketing of speculative
mining stocks by Canadian-based brokers into the U.S. without proper registration or
disclosure. 284
A series of public markets scandals in the 1960’s led to another round of major securities
reforms based on the Kimber Report and the Kelly Report, both issued in 1965. 285 The
most famous of these scandals (which was the specific focus of the Kelly Report) was
related to a TSX-listed reporting issuer named Windfall Oils and Mines Limited, which
perpetuated inaccurate rumors that it owned mining claims of significant value. 286 These
reforms included establishing the OSC as an independent administrative body and the
adoption of the Ontario Securities Act (1966), “the first modern Canadian securities
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statute”. 287 The changes to securities regulation instituted under the 1966 version of the
Ontario Securities Act were sufficiently impactful that a 1966 supplement to
Williamson’s 1960 edition of Securities Regulations in Canada, covering only the
content and impact of the changes from the 1966 amendments, is 100 pages longer than
the original work. 288 In 1978, Ontario adopted a “closed system” of securities regulation
that extended to the resale of securities previously acquired in exempt distributions. 289
Finally, in 1995 the OSC was the first provincial securities commission given the ability
to make its own rules relating to securities regulation, thereby increasing its ability to
respond to market challenges rapidly and avoid the tedious process of getting onto the
provincial government’s agenda to secure amendments to the Securities Act. 290 Since
that time, most of the critical elements of securities law and policy have migrated beyond
the riverbanks of the provincial securities act themselves and have been promulgated
through rules, policy statements and, when collaborating with other provinces, in national
or multilateral instruments and national policies.
Each of the major developments in securities law in Ontario discussed above were
eventually replicated in similar forms by most other Canadian provinces. 291 Supporting
harmonization between the provinces has been the work of the Canadian Securities
Administrators, the council of the thirteen different provincial and territorial securities
regulators established in 1937 that works to coordinate securities regulatory initiatives,
analyze new policy initiatives, and minimize the regulatory inconsistencies between the
jurisdictions. 292 Over the course of its history, the CSA’s effectiveness in harmonizing
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securities regulation nationally has waxed and waned, depending on the legislative
priorities of the specific provincial governments in power at the particular time and the
predilections of the governments, along with individuals in senior roles within the
regulators, to work towards consistency between jurisdictions versus going it alone on
securities matters of local priority.
Of significant note, Canada remains the only country in the OECD without a national
securities regulator. This fact has been noted on occasion by the OECD, which has stated
its belief that the inconsistency arising from having 13 securities regulators in a country
with a relatively small population is problematic and inefficient. 293 Significant effort has
been directed towards establishing a consensus-based national securities regulator known
as the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulatory Authority (“CCMRA”), with seven out of
thirteen jurisdictions having thus far agreed to join the initiative. 294 However, four
provinces and two territories, including the key provinces of Alberta and Quebec,
continue to be hold-outs; while one or more of these jurisdictions will likely join the
CCMRA initiative in due course, it appears that Alberta and Quebec continue to prefer
retention of their local securities commissions to protect local interests. The continuing
hold-out of Alberta and Quebec are particularly noteworthy, as these provinces represent
the second and third largest provincial capital markets in Canada. 295 As such, the
CCMRA has repeatedly delayed its formal launch and the prospects for securing an
effective national securities regulator in Canada remain highly uncertain at this point in
time.
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3.3- The Recent Arc of Securities Regulation in Canada
This Dissertation has previously discussed that the zenith of public companies, in terms
of the number of Operating Company listings, was in 2007 in Canada and in 1998 in the
United States. It is apparent from the Literature Review in the previous chapter that no
one seriously suggests that any single event in Canadian securities regulation is solely
responsible for the phenomenon of public company decline. However, it is helpful, as
further context in understanding the form and content of the PCD Study later in this
Dissertation, to understand the major arc of securities regulation in Canada going back 25
years. This covers the period of public company decline, plus the era immediately before
the public company decline phenomenon became apparent. To the extent that increasing
securities regulation is a contributing factor to public company decline, at least some of
the regulatory changes contributing to the phenomenon must presumably be traced back
in time prior to the peak of public company listings.
One of the most important developments in Canadian securities law in the past century
has been the devolution of rule-making power from the provincial governments to the
provincial securities commissions. Prior to 1995, securities regulation in Canada was
largely contained within the provincial securities acts and required the intervention of the
provincial governments in order to make significant changes. Securing amendments to
the provincial securities acts represented a laborious process, as the securities regulators
had to compete with other bodies to secure priority on the government’s legislative
agenda. As a result, provincial securities commissions frequently passed policies that
endeavored to clarify and add depth to the formal securities act provisions, which the
securities commissions deemed critical to the proper functioning of the capital markets.
However, a 1993 court decision in Ontario cast doubt on the enforceability of the policy
statements published by the securities commissions, as these policy statements were
viewed by the court as attempts to effectively impose legislation in the capital markets
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outside of the authority of the securities commissions. 296 Ultimately, the Ontario
government granted specific rule-making authority to the Ontario Securities Commission
in 1995, with other provinces soon following suit. While the devolution of rule-making
authority to the securities commissions in 1995 certainly reduced the significant
bottleneck previously associated with the process of pushing changes to formal securities
regulation through the provincial legislatures, it also significantly increased the autonomy
of the securities commissions and enabled the securities commissions to pursue
significant securities regulatory reform on their own authority through the use of their
new rule-making power.
Until the June 2018 election of the Doug Ford-led conservative government in Ontario,
which triggered the current impetus for the regulatory streamlining and public company
burden reduction initiative discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 of this Dissertation, the
general arc of securities regulation in Canada over the past two decades, and in Ontario in
particular, has between towards ever-increasing public company regulation and the
adoption of new and more complex continuous disclosure obligations. A simple wordcount comparison of the consolidated Ontario securities legislation published in 1996 and
2020 evidences that the total length of the securities regulations has increased by more
than 300% during that interval. However, as a counterpoint in defense of provincial
securities commissions, former OSC Vice-Chair and current Osgoode Hall Law School
Dean, Mary Condon, points out that the landscape of securities regulation in Canada
continues to become increasingly complex as technology and market evolution bring new
challenges to securities regulators that were hitherto unknown. 297
Summarizing all of the detailed, and often technical, changes to securities regulation in
Canada over the past two decades period is beyond the scope of this Dissertation. The
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focus here instead will be on briefly reviewing the most impactful securities regulation
changes in terms of their influence on, and cost to, Canadian public Operating
Companies.
As discussed in the previous section of this Dissertation, the primary impetuses for eras
of significant securities regulatory reform throughout British, American and Canadian
history have often been major stock market meltdowns and clusters of notorious public
company scandals. The recent arc of securities regulation in Canada over the past two
decades reflects a continuation of this cause-and-effect relationship between public
outcry over notorious corporate misdeeds or stock market collapses and the passage of
new securities regulation.
Although the development of Canadian public companies was heavily influenced by both
the U.K. and U.S. precedents, the impact of events in the U.S. has represented the greater
influence on Canadian securities regulation in the past 20 years. The increased influence
of the U.S. events on Canada is inevitable due to geographic proximity between the
countries, and the increased integration of the American and Canadian economies under a
succession of free trade agreements. The U.S. domestic market currently accounts for
approximately 76% of all Canadian exports, 298 and many of the larger Canadian public
Operating Companies are also inter-listed on U.S stock exchanges. 299 As such, major
capital markets events originating in the U.S. resulting in new trajectories in American
securities regulation inevitably have a significant impact in Canada.
The infamous American corporate scandals in the early 2000’s, particularly Enron
(2001), Worldcom (2002), Tyco (2002) and Adelphia Communications (2002), and the
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American regulatory responses thereto (particularly Sarbanes-Oxley 300), reverberated
throughout the Canadian capital markets and eventually resulted in the adoption of a
significantly-modified Canadian version of Sarbanes-Oxley, encompassed in a variety of
legislative and securities regulatory initiatives. 301 Although the Canadian responses to
Sarbanes-Oxley are certainly much less onerous in terms of compliance cost than the
American version, MI 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim
Filings particularly represents a material increase in both the time and cost associated
with financial statement certification and internal evaluation of the effectiveness of
financial controls for Canadian public companies compared to the pre-existing rules.
The sub-prime mortgage crisis originating in the U.S. in 2008, which quickly expanded
into a global financial crisis, was likewise strongly felt in Canada. However, the more
cautious Canadian banking system was less traumatized than its American counterpart,
and there was not the same degree of impetus to extend the most notorious elements of
the Dodd-Frank Act 302 to Canada. Still, specific elements of the Dodd-Frank Act did
find their way into Canadian securities legislation in the form of new rules for derivative
trading under National Instrument 93-101 Derivatives- Business Conduct, and in Ontario
specifically with respect to the adoption of whistleblowing bounties under OSC Policy
15-601 Whistleblower Program. 303
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Although the major American scandals of the early 2000’s certainly reverberated into
Canada, the U.S. has not had the market cornered on public company scandals during this
interval. Rather, some of the most impactful changes to securities regulation in Canada
over the past two decades are attributable to homegrown Canadian scandals. In
particular, the notorious Canadian public company scandals of Bre-X (1997), Livent
(1998), YBM Magnex (1999), Nortel (2004) and Sino-Forest Products (2011) all created
a hue and cry from certain constituencies within Canada for new regulation to prevent
repeats of these public company collapses.
Directly attributable to the Bre-X fraud, NI 43-101- Standards of Disclosure for Mineral
Projects was adopted by securities regulators across Canada in 2001, standardizing
reporting on mineral reserves by mining issuers and mandating outside verification by
qualified geologists. A similar regime for oil & gas issuers was adopted across Canada in
2003, with the implementation of NI 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas
Activities.
One of the early regulatory initiatives adopted after securities commissions secured rulemaking power was NI 33-106- Year 2000 Preparation Reporting adopted in 1998. This
regulatory instrument required reporting issuers to assess their vulnerability to potential
Y2K computer issues and advise in their formal disclosure documents as to the
preparations that the company was undertaking to mitigate the risk. 304 Although this
issue was time-limited and the associated regulatory instruments were withdrawn after
the turn of the millennium, NI 33-106 offered a glimpse into the future arc of securities
regulation in Canada as it evidenced how the securities commissions would utilize their
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new rule-making authority to respond to topical issues associated with perceived
reporting risks.
Another major regulatory initiative that arrived in the early 2000’s and was influenced by
the embarrassment caused by Bre-X, Livent and YBM Magnex is NI 51-102 Continuous
Disclosure Obligations. This instrument, adopted in 2004, harmonized continuous
disclosure obligations for public companies across Canada, but also introduced a number
of more stringent disclosure requirements. Included in NI 51-102 was a shortening of
annual financial statement filing deadlines (Part 4, section 4.2), significant expansion of
the MD&A content requirements (Part 5, section 5.3, section 5.4 and Companion Policy
51-102- Part 5), expansion of Annual Information Form content requirements
(Companion Policy 51-102- Part 6), expansion of required executive compensation
disclosure (which had already been materially expanded only a few years earlier),
expansion of the disclosure requirements for Information Circulars, and the introduction
of the requirement to file a Business Acquisition Report ( “BAR”) for all significant
acquisitions by a public company (NI 51-102 Part 6 and Companion Policy 51-102- Part
6). 305 The net effect of NI 51-102 was a material increase in the time and cost associated
with public company compliance for all TSX-listed companies in Canada. The new BAR
requirements were particularly unpopular with a number of public company executives,
as they included a requirement to file audited financial statements for acquired companies
and, thereby, made it difficult to acquire private companies that did not have the requisite
audited statements. Prior to NI 51-102, public companies only had to file financial
statements for material acquisitions in conjunction with prospectus offerings.
Another new continuous disclosure requirement implemented for the first time under NI
51-102 was the requirement for public companies to begin to file all material contracts on
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an ongoing basis. 306 Previously, material contracts only had to be filed publicly by
companies in conjunction with a prospectus offering. This amendment was again
unpopular with certain public company executives who viewed it as a privacy intrusion
for their businesses and required them to put information in the public domain that they
desired to keep private for competitive purposes.
Ultimately, NI 51-102, along with its companion policy and associated forms, has been
amended on multiple occasions over the 15 years since its initial adoption. In most
instances, the amendments have added new filing requirements, thereby further
increasing the cost and complexity of continuous disclosure obligations.
Also adopted by the major provincial securities commission in 2004 was MI 58-101
Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices. This regulatory instrument initiated the
obligation on public companies to publicly report, as part of their continuous disclosure,
on a number of corporate governance items, including board attendance, qualifications
and board independence. Over the course of time, a number of amendments to MI 58101 were implemented that mandated further changes in Board committee composition
and operation. For example, securities regulation during the past two decades has
changed from allowing block voting on entire Board slates to mandating individual
voting for each individual Board member.
Recently, further changes were adopted to MI 58-101 that require reporting issuers to
report on a number of elements of their diversity policies and practices. This new
requirement in MI 58-101 is but one example of a recent trend by securities regulators to
use their rule-making power to move proactively towards advancing positions on social
issues. Professor Chris Nicholls, of Western University Faculty of Law, notes this trend
in his text on Canadian securities law:
In recent years, Canadian securities commissions have occasionally fixed
their sights on a number of issues that, historically, might have been
regarded as matters of corporate law rather than securities regulation, or in
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some cases issues of broader social policy not necessarily linked, at least
directly, to the goals of investor protection or enhancing confidence in
capital markets. The regulators’ foray into such matters reflects a
recognition that certain matters that could, theoretically be addressed
through amendments to corporate or other laws may, in fact, simply
languish if not diligently pursued by securities regulators, the one
investor-protection body that boasts not only substantial financial and
human resources but also significant leverage over business corporationsregardless of their particular jurisdiction of incorporation. Such public
policy initiatives, then, may be considered not as necessary adjuncts of
traditional securities regulation per se, but as significant by-products of the
establishment of substantial agencies with a mandate to regulate issuers
and markets with a view to protection of the public interest. 307
However, the securities regulatory authorities are not alone in Canada in terms of
targeting new public company regulations in areas historically viewed as coming within
the purview of social policy. The federal government in Canada has recently enacted
changes to its version of corporate legislation that, as of January 1, 2020, requires all
publicly traded companies that are federally incorporated to file mandatory diversity
disclosure. These particular amendments were part of a number of new statutory
requirements relating to corporate governance procedures for federally incorporated
companies enacted through the mechanism of federal corporate legislation. 308
A related development in securities regulation that is perceived by certain constituencies
(particularly companies operating in the oil & gas sphere) as crossing into the realm of
social policy regulation is the recent promulgation by the Canadian Securities
Administrators of CSA Staff Notice 51-358- Reporting of Climate Change-related Risk
(“CSA 51-358”) in August 2019. Although 51-358 expressly disavows that it is seeking
to impose any new legal obligations on reporting issuers, this notice does provide clear
guidance indicating that the risk disclosure of reporting issuers will be considered
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inadequate unless the disclosure incorporates CSA 51-358’s extensive guidelines for
reporting on climate change-related risk.
Another significant change that has occurred in Canadian securities law is the increase in
legal liability associated with being a public company, particularly as a result of
amendments to Canadian securities laws establishing secondary market liability and
facilitating securities class actions against public companies. Historically, Canadian
public companies that were not inter-listed in the U.S. faced a much lower overall
litigation risk than their U.S. counterparts. Securities-based class actions have been
available in Canada since 1992, but Canada did not at that time have statutory civil
liability for secondary market continuous disclosure violations. 309 Without a statutory
civil liability for misrepresentations in the secondary market, statutory remedies were
only available to purchasers who acquired treasury shares directly from the issuers.
Investors purchasing shares on the open market in Canada, as such, only had recourse to
common law actions, usually for negligent misrepresentation. 310 The common law tort
of negligent misrepresentation requires proof of detrimental reliance at the individual
plaintiff level, which made it extremely difficult to establish reliance in a securities class
action. 311 Between 1992 and 2005, only a single securities class action case in Canada
proceeded to final judgment. 312
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However, in 2005 Ontario became the first jurisdiction in Canada to entrench secondary
market liability for securities violations in its securities legislation, 313 followed quickly
by the other key provinces. 314 From 2006 to 2017, 74 securities class action cases were
filed in Canada against 47 different public companies. 315 In many of these cases,
individual directors and officers have been named as defendants alongside their
corporations. 316 Of these 74 cases, none have yet proceeded to final judgment, but
approximately 40% of the claims have been settled with an average settlement value of
$12.2 million.317 While certainly not yet approaching American levels of class action
activity, the prospect of secondary market liability clearly is a development that
materially increases both corporate and personal legal liability for Canadian public
companies compared to the situation existing before 2005.
Another major regulatory change impacting Canadian public companies was the adoption
of MI 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions, a
regulatory initiative which was initially adopted by Ontario and Quebec in 2008. This
particular instrument significantly increased the processes, timing and costs associated
with the approval of non-arms’ length transactions for public companies in Canada.
Although it replaced similar regulations previously in place in Quebec and Ontario, MI
61-101 further tightened the procedures associated with securing minority approval and
extended the requirements of obtaining independent fairness opinions on specific
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transactions. Also, MI 61-101 was adopted beyond Quebec and Ontario in a number of
other key jurisdictions.
A further area of Canadian corporate governance closely related to the topic of increasing
securities regulation is the rising prominence of the roles of the proxy advisory services
in Canada over the past two decades, principally Institutional Shareholder Services
(“ISS”) and Glass Lewis. Proxy advisory services, which provide institutional clients
with voting recommendations for their portfolio public companies with respect to annual
meetings, special meetings and corporate transactions, have gained increasing influence
and play an ever-larger role in the Canadian corporate governance landscape.
Beginning in 2012, both ISS and Glass Lewis began publishing annual proxy guidelines
for public issuers at the end of the calendar year, advising which specific elements of
corporate governance would be focused on by the proxy advisors in the upcoming annual
meeting season. In particular, these annual reports outline specific requirements the proxy
advisors have determined will be pre-conditions to them issuing positive voting
recommendations for the upcoming meetings. Each year, new and more restrictive
corporate governance requirements are foisted on the Canadian public companies through
the annual guidelines of the proxy advisors.
In this regard, an argument can be advanced that ISS and Glass Lewis have stepped into a
quasi-regulatory function in the Canadian capital markets. Although compliance with the
proxy guidelines is not mandated by any securities law, any Canadian public company
disregards the mandates of the proxy advisory firms at their peril, risking a significant
percentage of their shares being withheld from voting or voted against management
proxy recommendations for failure to comply with the recommendations.
Executives of Canadian public companies have long been at odds with the proxy advisory
firms, viewing them as meddlesome and unaccountable, and arguing that the proxy
advisory firms are inherently subject to significant conflicts of interest and have no
accountability or visible process for determining what new corporate governance
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standards they will require in a particular year. 318 However, unlike the U.S., where
legislation has recently been proposed to regulate proxy advisory firms, 319 Canadian
securities regulators assessed the situation and decided not to formally regulate the proxy
advisory firms. Instead, a national policy was adopted by Canadian securities regulators
which provides discretionary guidance. 320 Paradoxically, the decision of the Canadian
securities regulators not to regulate the proxy advisory firms effectively serves to
increase the ability of the proxy advisory firms to continue to act in a quasi-regulatory
role with respect to Canadian public companies and thereby increase the public company
compliance burden. 321 Moreover, like the Canadian securities regulators, the proxy
advisory firms have extended their area of focus to topics that would traditionally be
understood as relating to social policy rather than corporate regulation. 322
As mentioned at the start of this subsection, a more detailed discussion of all of the
changes in securities regulation in Canada over the past two decades that have increased
the costs and complexity of becoming a public company, or continuing to operate as a
public company, is beyond the scope of this Dissertation. The items discussed above
provide a representative sample of several of the most important regulatory changes that

318

David Milstead, “Canadian firms object to influence of proxy advisors” The Globe and Mail (26
November 2018) online:< https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-canadian-firms-object-toinfluence-of-proxy-advisers/>.
319

New York Stock Exchange, “New Bipartisan Bill Advances Reform of Proxy Advisory Firms”,
online:< https://www.nyse.com/article/bipartisan-bill-advances-reform-of-proxy-advisory-firms>.

320

National Policy 25-201 Guidance for Proxy Advisory Firms, April 30, 2015, available on OSC website,
online: <https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20150430_25-201-proxy-advisory.htm>.
321

For example, the gender diversity requirements stipulated by both ISS and Glass Lewis in their most
recent proxy voting guidelines are significantly more onerous than the requirements under National
Instrument 58-101. See ISS, Canada Proxy Voting Guidelines for TSX-Listed Companies, Benchmark
Policy Recommendations, online:< https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/CanadaTSX-Voting-Guidelines.pdf> at 14; Also, Glass Lewis, 2020 Proxy Paper- Guidelines: An Overview of the
Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy Advice, online: https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
Guidelines_Canada.pdf> at 18.
322

Ibid.

117

are of particular relevance to the design and analysis of the PCD Study, but are not
intended to be exhaustive.

3.4- The Key Elements of Effective Securities Regulatory Reform
Having now briefly reviewed the historical development and the recent arc of securities
regulation in Canada, and before turning to an analysis and critique of the ongoing
regulatory streamlining / public company burden reduction initiatives in Canada, it is
helpful to consider one final, yet critical, question: What should proper securities
regulation and regulatory reform processes look like?
At the core of all securities regulation is the dynamic tension between ensuring that
adequate securities regulation exists to sufficiently protect investor interests without overregulating to the extent that capital markets growth is stifled:
Capital markets could exist without government regulation, but
unregulated markets are frequently hampered by exploitive practices that
can hurt some investors and shake the confidence of other investors,
making them reluctant to participate. Thoughtful and balanced regulation
can address both problems, protecting investors and shielding them from
misconduct while lowering the cost of capital for businesses and
governments by helping to restore confidence in securities markets. But
all regulation comes at a cost. Over-regulation can be at least as harmful
as under-regulation. Finding the optimal level of regulation, in any field,
is the perennial and often elusive, goal of wise policy makers. 323
Similar sentiments are expressed in a securities text co-written by former Canadian
Governor General David Johnston, who summarizes the three assumptions on which
Canadian securities regulation is founded:
First, regulation should not impose excessive cost or intervention (note
that the reality is different from the theory). Second, investors and issuers
cannot escape some level of risk- ranging from minimal to severe. Not all
investors understand this point. Third, experience demonstrates a proven
correlation between risk and return. […] Thus, regulation cannot, and
should not, eliminate risk. 324
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Johnston and co-author Kathleen Rockwell continue on to note that securities regulators
have often missed the mark by focusing excessively on the protection of “naïve,
unsophisticated” investors and failing to sufficiently consider the competing interests of
“all other actors in the securities market”. 325
The securities reform process that has evolved across Canada since the provincial
securities commissions were initially granted rule-making authority, beginning with
Ontario in 1995, is defined by the provisions of the applicable provincial securities
legislation. The provincial securities acts each mandate a public consultation process in
which the proposed new rules, or amendments to rules, are published with a minimum
period (usually 90 days) during which the public is invited to provide written comments.
The Ontario Securities Act specifically requires the following:
Publication of proposed rules
143.2 (1) The Commission shall publish in its Bulletin notice of every rule
that it proposes to make under section 143.
Notice
(2) The notice must include the following:
1. The proposed rule.
2. A statement of the substance and purpose of the proposed rule.
3. A summary of the proposed rule.
4. A reference to the authority under which the rule is proposed or a
statement that the Commission is seeking legislative amendments to
provide the requisite rule-making authority.
5. A discussion of all alternatives to the proposed rule that were
considered by the Commission and the reasons for not proposing the
adoption of the alternatives considered.
6. A reference to any significant unpublished study, report or other written
materials on which the Commission relies in proposing the rule.
7. A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the anticipated costs and
benefits of the proposed rule.
8. A reference to every regulation or provision in a regulation to be
amended or revoked under subsection 143(3). 326
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The regulatory reform process that the securities commissions have adopted over the past
two decades usually follows the provisions of their enabling legislation strictly. On
matters deemed to be of significant importance, the securities commissions will
occasionally schedule round-table discussions in which subject matter experts, along with
members of the public who have participated in the process by voluntarily submitting
comments, are invited to participate in discussions.
Notably, however, the securities commissions rarely rely on any unpublished studies or
reports in their analysis. Only on rare occasions have the regulators commissioned
external experts to undertake empirical research on specific topics. Moreover, the
securities commissions have not historically undertaken any internal original empirical
research to serve as additional data points in order to support, verify or contradict, based
on empirical evidence, the opinions expressed by commission staff and the members of
the public who provide comments on any particular regulatory reform initiative.
With approximately 500 staff in place at the OSC alone, the decision not to routinely
support original empirical research as a part of the regulatory process cannot be explained
as being the result of a lack of financial resources. In fact, the bounties paid by the OSC
earlier this year to Canadian whistleblowers represents a budgetary number sufficient to
support more than 50 man-years worth of empirical research effort. 327 The inescapable
conclusion, therefore, is that the securities commissions in Canada have not frequently
used empirical research to support their regulatory reform initiatives because they do not
value empirical research as a significant contributor to maximizing regulatory reform
outcomes. Is this an appropriate perception?
In answer to this question, consider the position of two leading U.S. legal academics in
corporate law on the topic of what constitutes effective securities law reform: Roberta
Romano and Robert C. Clark. Roberta Romano pointedly addresses the issue of what
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constitutes effective securities reform in a 2005 article in which she famously refers to
the history of crisis-response securities regulation in the U.S. as “quack corporate
governance”. 328 In this piece, Romano discusses how periods of securities reform often
result from shifts in the public mood against companies as a result of corporate scandals
and/or significant stock market declines causing financial distress, sometimes coupled
with changes in government. Romano further articulates how these particular moments
in time open up “policy windows for policy entrepreneurs to link their proposed solution
to a problem”. 329 Romano concludes that “legislating in the immediate aftermath of a
public scandal or crisis is a formula for poor public policymaking” in the securities
regulation arena. 330 Throughout her analysis, Romano discusses the importance of
regulators properly understanding the empirical data underpinning the particular issue
and proposed reforms, and advocates for any crisis-linked regulatory reform proposals to
have built-in sunset clauses that lead to a natural termination of the reform initiative at
such time as the crisis has passed, thereby eliminating the problematic requirement of
being forced to proactively rescind the legislation. 331 Romano continues with the same
themes a decade later, advising that regulation in the financial area “tends to be enacted
in a crisis setting” 332 and reaffirming her core belief that securities legislation enacted
during periods of crisis should routinely include sunset clauses to ensure that they are reassessed for efficacy and unintended consequences once empirical data are available as to
the impacts of the legislation, and cooler heads have ultimately prevailed once the crisis
has passed. 333
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Robert Clark similarly undertakes an analysis of the implications and unintended
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley, ultimately arriving at three criteria that he states should
be applied as preconditions to regulatory reform in securities matters: (i) serious
empirical analysis; (ii) periodic reassessment of reforms considering the empirical
evidence; and (iii) commitment to affirm or alter the regulations in light of the empirical
evidence. 334 Clearly, Robert Clark believes that consideration of empirical evidence
(compared to anecdotal evidence or the perceptions of the regulators) represents the
single most critical element of ensuring effective regulatory reform in the securities
arena. The importance of considering potential securities regulation with specific
reference to empirical evidence is discussed by several other legal scholars in the U.S. as
well. 335
In consequence, therefore, there is an influential body of academic opinion holding to the
position that consideration of empirical data at the outset, along with built-in sunset
provisions ensuring continued evaluation as new empirical data are available, should be
the consistent foundation of effective regulatory reform initiatives. Yet, the securities
regulation reform processes in both the U.S. and Canada do not yet enshrine any formal
role for the gathering or consideration of empirical data. In Canada, the legislated
process for securities reform does not mandate any role for fundamental empirical
analysis of reform proposals, nor have the securities commissions thus far elected to
prioritize the application of empirical analysis within the discretionary elements of their
securities reform processes.
Ultimately, the omission of any form of empirical analysis in the course of executing
securities reform initiatives by Canadian securities regulators, which is viewed by the
author of this Dissertation as a significant process deficiency, has served as a primary
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impetus for undertaking the major empirical research project underpinning this
Dissertation.

123

Analysis of the CSA and OSC Regulatory
Streamlining Initiatives
4.1- Ongoing CSA Burden Reduction Process
In this chapter, the details of the recent CP 51-404 burden reduction initiative will be
discussed in more detail, followed by a review of the ongoing OSC 11-784 burden
reduction initiative. As the OSC 11-784 initiative represents the first formal attempt by a
provincial securities regulator to take up the mantle passed onto the securities
commissions by the CSA after the conclusion of the CP 51-404 process, it is of clear
relevance to the subject of public company decline. The recent release of the OSC
Burden Reduction Report provides an excellent window into the OSC’s thought process
and future plans on the OSC burden reduction initiative at this point in time.
The underlying question to consider is the following: how effective is the OSC 11-784
process likely to be in following up the CSA burden reduction initiative based on the
process and developments that have occurred thus far? Unfortunately, it appears that the
OSC has already deviated significantly from the most important elements of the CP 51404 burden reduction initiative, evidencing an unpromising start to the provincial
implementation phase of the CP 51-404 initiative.
The CP 51-404 and OSC 11-784 initiatives are classic examples evidencing how the
machinery of securities regulatory reform typically moves in Canada. The regulatory
reform processes are generally initiated by a notice published either by the CSA (on a
multi-jurisdictional initiative) or directly by a provincial securities commission (on a
single-provincial initiative) advising the capital markets of a particular issue identified
with respect to existing securities regulation that is believed to be in need of reform. The
published notices set forth the initial thoughts of the regulatory body as to the nature of
the reform that the CSA or securities commission is contemplating, and then request
comments from interested parties on the specific topic. The open solicitation for written
comments is, as discussed in the previous chapter, mandated in the securities acts of the
various provinces. It also remains as the primary methodology chosen by the CSA and
commissions to obtain input on the proposed reform package, notwithstanding that other
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alternatives for engagement and analysis of potential regulatory reforms, such as directly
conducting empirical research, are not precluded by the enabling statutes. On broader
reform initiatives, roundtable discussions are also held by the regulators in which
representative voices of the groups who submitted written comments, or are considered
by the regulators as subject matter experts, are invited to discuss the issue in an open
forum.
CP 51-404 opens with the following summary of its mandate and intent:
The purpose of this CSA Consultation Paper (the Consultation Paper) is to
identify and consider areas of securities legislation applicable to noninvestment fund reporting issuers that could benefit from a reduction of
undue regulatory burden, without compromising investor protection or the
efficiency of the capital market. Part 2 of this Consultation Paper is
focused on considering options to reduce the regulatory burden associated
with both capital raising in the public markets (i.e., prospectus related
requirements) and the ongoing costs of remaining a reporting issuer (i.e.,
continuous disclosure requirements). 336
This summary positions the CP 51-404 initiative squarely within the realm of
burden reduction for Operating Companies in the Canadian public markets. The
mandate is further clarified on the next page of CP 51-404 where the five specific
categories to support reporting issuer burden reduction are outlined:
We set out below some potential regulatory options which may reduce
regulatory burden for reporting issuers:
2.1 Extending the application of streamlined rules to smaller reporting
issuers
2.2 Reducing the regulatory burdens associated with the prospectus rules
and offering process
(a) Reducing the audited financial statement requirements in an
initial public offering (IPO) prospectus
(b) Streamlining other prospectus requirements
(c) Streamlining public offerings for reporting issuers
(d) Other potential areas
2.3 Reducing ongoing disclosure requirements
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(a) Removing or modifying the criteria to file a business
acquisition report (BAR)
(b) Reducing disclosure requirements in annual and interim filings
(c) Permitting semi-annual reporting
2.4 Eliminating overlap in regulatory requirements
2.5 Enhancing electronic delivery of documents 337
CP 51-404 then goes on to propose 33 specific consultation questions providing greater
detail on the nature of the reforms that are being considered by the CSA within the five
categories of reforms outlined above. Excerpts of the 33 consultation questions are
appended to this Dissertation at Appendix 2. Embedded within the 33 CP51-404
consultation questions are a number of thought-provoking questions and comments
relating to specific public Operating Company proposals to reduce the regulatory burden
associated with being public. These proposals get right to the core of seeking to strike a
more favorable balance, from the perspective of Operating Companies, between reducing
the time, costs and complexity of IPOs and continuous disclosure and the overreaching
securities commission mandate of maintaining the integrity of the capital markets and
protecting public investors.
Amongst the most significant of the list of reforms proposed for consideration in CP 51404 are the following:
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•

Modifying the two existing categories of reporting issuers that determine
eligibility for lesser continuous reporting standards from the current TSX /
venture issuer dichotomy to a new size-based based distinction;

•

Extending certain of the existing lesser continuous reporting standards to all
reporting issuers;

•

Extending the ability to use two years of historical audited financial statements as
the foundation for an IPO to all reporting issuers;

•

Eliminating the requirement for auditors to review interim financial statements in
a prospectus;
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•

Streamlining short form prospectuses and expanding the list of reporting issuers
who have access to them;

•

Considering alternative prospectus models;

•

Codifying the existing securities commission internal approval process for
exemptive relief for At-the-Market (“ATM”) offerings into a regulatory policy to
limit the need for exemptive relief;

•

Liberalization of pre-marketing and marketing rules for offerings;

•

Modifying the Business Acquisition Report (“BAR”) requirements;

•

Streamlining quarterly filing requirements, including looking at consolidating
management’s discussion & analysis (“MD&A”), the annual information forms
(“AIF”) and financial statements into a single reporting document;

•

Consideration of moving from quarterly to semi-annual reporting; and

•

Expanding the ability of issuers to use electronic document delivery under
National Policy 11-201 and also expanding “notice and access” scope under
National Instruments 54-101 and 51-102.

After extension of the initial consultation period from July 7, 2017 to July 28, 2017, a
total of 57 written submissions were received on CP 51-404, of which 14 (i.e., 25%) were
filed by representatives of Operating Companies. The remaining 75% of the written
submissions were filed by various groups of public markets influencers; namely, stock
exchanges, law firms, accounting & audit firms, investment dealers, advocacy groups,
professional bodies, industry organizations and individual investors. Having reviewed
each of the 57 written submissions, it is apparent that the majority of the submissions
made comments at a very general level or commented only on certain proposed
regulatory changes of particular interest to them.
Eight months after closing of the consultation period, the CSA released CSA Staff Notice
51-353 (“CSA 51-353”). 338 The summary of the process of consultation in CSA 51-353
states that the individual securities commissions also directly consulted various advisory
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committees, industry groups and “other commenters”. 339 Appendix A to CSA 51-353
summarizes the responses received from the 57 written submissions on the 33 specific
consultation questions, breaking the responses on each area into three categories:
supportive, supportive in certain circumstances and not supportive. The total number of
responses that expressed opinions on the particular reform proposal are tallied and
allocated to those three categories. However, there is no distinguishing between the
source of the comments, or any evidence that the CSA tracked which categories of the
specific commenters fit within each group on each particular question.
Evident from the demographic make-up of the commenters and the summary analysis of
comments in CSA 51-353 (which is reflective of similar regulatory initiatives in Canada
in recent years) is that, while the ultimate public/private determination is made by
corporate decision-makers, input on prospective regulatory responses is heavily weighted
in favour of various subgroups who collectively make up the universe of public markets
influencers in Canada (which is a broader group of influencers than the four categories
targeted for participation in the PCD Study). In similar securities reform consultations
across Canada, the same list of industry and shareholder associations frequently shows up
with comments offering predictable input on the proposed amendments based on their
pre-existing biases and mandate to voice the concerns of their various constituencies.
Ultimately, from the initial list of 33 different proposals for reform outlined in CP 51404, the CSA collectively decided to pursue reform in six different areas: 340
1.

considering alternative prospectus models with more concise and
focused disclosure;

2.

initiating a process to modify and streamline the rules for ATM
offerings;

3.

eliminating discrepancy in interpretation of Item 32 of Form 41101F1 Information Required in a Prospectus (i.e., what
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information is required in historical financial statements) between
various securities provincial commissions;
4.

modifying the requirements of filing a BAR;

5.

initiating a general continuous disclosure streamlining process to
limit duplication in filings; and

6.

initiating a process to further facilitate the delivery of electronic
documents to shareholders by reporting issuers.

Individually, each of these six regulatory reform initiatives are positive steps. However,
this list of six initiatives does not come close to constituting a comprehensive reform
package that will meaningfully reduce the overall regulatory burden for Canadian public
Operating Companies. As such, it is disappointing that many of the initial 33 proposals
that offered the prospect of more significant reductions in regulatory burden were
dropped at such an early stage of the reform process with the CSA.
It should be noted that Item #3 in the list of six reform proposals above was not even
included in original CSA 51-404 proposals. While certainly uncontroversial (i.e., it is
difficult to imagine circumstances in which anyone would object to consistency in
interpretation of provisions across provincial jurisdictions), this proposal represents an
obviosity and not a meaningful burden reduction reform. Other inclusions on the list
such as Item #5 and Item #6 are also certainly worthwhile. However, these reform
proposals are also non-controversial and it is self-evident that they should form part of
the CSA’s ongoing analysis, and certainly did not require a formal consultation process in
order to identify.
Item #4 above, relating to proposed changes to the BAR requirements, 341 has been
followed up on by the CSA with a subsequent CSA Notice and Request for Comment. 342
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The proposals include increasing the significance test triggering a BAR filing for nonventure issuers from 20% to 30% of the market value of the issuer as well as requiring
that two of the three significance tests be met before a BAR filing is required. While
certainly representing a positive step forward, it is again disappointing that the first
concrete reform proposal to come out of the CSA 51-404 process relates to an issue that,
as disclosed later in this Dissertation, ranks near the bottom of the list of factors assessed
in the PCD Study as likely contributing to public company decline in Canada. 343
Contemporaneous with the announcement of the comment period for the proposed
modifications to the BAR filing requirements, the CSA issued another notice and request
for comment specifically relating to reducing regulatory burden for investment fund
issuers. 344 Once again, the proposals reflected in this notice represent positive
streamlining changes for investment fund issuers. However, there is nothing whatsoever
in these proposals to streamline the regulatory processes of Operating Companies in
Canada that are the focus of this Dissertation. While investment fund issuers in Canada
may also be critically in need of burden reduction, it is disappointing that the interests of
public Operating Companies, which are so critical to the Canadian capital markets, have
been deferred once again in the regulatory reform process.
On the whole, therefore, the outcome of the CSA 51-353 process must be considered to
be highly disappointing for advocates of meaningful capital markets reform for Operating
Company reporting issuers in Canada. CSA 51-404 originally included a number of bold
and significant reform proposals for consideration that offered the prospect of meaningful
burden reduction for reporting issuers in Canada. However, none of the boldest
proposals from the original list of 33 reform ideas, offering the prospect for significant
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burden reduction in CSA 51-404, made it to the final list of initiatives for further
consideration and development in CSA 51-353.
Why? One can only speculate, but it is clear that any impetus for broad reform was once
again overwhelmed by the nature of the customary regulatory reform process and the
dissident voices arguing against meaningful burden reduction for reporting issuers under
the guise of protection of public shareholders.
As mentioned above, there is a standard cast of characters who can be counted on to
regularly submit written responses on any material securities reform initiatives in Canada.
Most of these participants are associations and interest groups, each of which has an
embedded bias on regulatory topics, either for or against burden reduction, arising from
the interests of their particular constituencies. The fact that the CSA summary analysis of
the CSA 51-404 responses simply tallied the voices expressed for or against the
proposals, and failed to openly distinguish between the nature of the commenters on each
topic, is worrisome. In the regulatory reform process, one cannot simply assume that all
voices should be weighted equally. Without access to the internal deliberations of the
CSA between the time of the publication of CSA 51-404 and the publication of CSA 51353, it is impossible to hypothesize as to what particular impediments and objections led
the CSA to abandon the most promising and boldest of the reform packages from CSA
51-404. The explanation and construction of CSA 51-353 makes one question whether
the fact that a particular proposal faced any significant opposition during the consultation
was sufficient to result in it being abandoned. It appears that only those reform proposals
on which a strong consensus was evident from the commenters were included in the final
six recommendations.
If so, this is an unfortunate outcome. There will always be dissenting voices to any
meaningful proposals for securities regulatory reform on burden reduction and regulatory
streamlining. The voices of the shareholder rights associations have historically opposed
most attempts to reduce the costs and complexity of continuous disclosure, particularly if
they feel that it will deprive them of any existing information.
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Yet, with due respect, the shareholder rights groups also do not necessarily appreciate
sufficient context on the broader topic of public company decline to understand that the
Canadian capital markets are on the precipice of sliding towards irrelevancy at an
alarming rate. These shareholder rights groups continue fighting the battle to push everincreasing disclosure onto the reporting issuers, often failing to realize that, in doing so,
they may be complicit contributors to overall public markets decline.
In discharging their prime mandate to protect the integrity of the capital markets, it is
submitted that the evidence presented in this Dissertation as to the extent of the public
company decline phenomenon and the underlying complexity of subject matter
demonstrates that the Canadian securities regulators need to exhibit strong and visionary
leadership that is willing to adopt meaningful reform packages. In so doing, it is
apparent, from review of the comments submitted to the CSA during the recent
consultation processes, that regulatory initiatives with sufficient teeth to offer the
prospect of meaningfully influencing public company decline will inevitably be
unpopular amongst certain constituencies, particularly the shareholder rights lobby.
However, the argument is advanced throughout this Dissertation that the extent of
Canadian capital markets decline at this point in time is past the stage where regulatory
reform by consensus is a feasible option.
The breadth and depth of the 33 initiatives proposed in CP 51-404 represent a positive
first step towards a meaningful package of regulatory reform that would collectively
operate to materially reduce the burden on Canadian public companies. The final six
initiatives that ultimately were advanced in CSA 51-353 do not offer the same hope. If
the typical securities regulatory reform process of initial proposals followed by public
consultation leads us inevitably to such watered-down initiatives as is reflected in CSA
51-353, then it is incumbent on governmental authorities at a higher level to intervene in
the burden reduction initiatives in order to provide leadership that offers an increased
prospect of meaningful burden reduction.
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4.2- Ongoing OSC Burden Reduction Process
The final paragraph of CSA 51-353 advises that the CSA is passing the mantle of burden
reduction on to the provincial securities regulators to pursue their own processes on the
six initiatives discussed above. Now, a year-and-a-half after the release of CSA 51-353,
only the OSC has announced a formal process to follow up on the CSA burden reduction
initiative. The OSC response is encompassed in OSC 11-784 Burden Reduction,
published on January 14, 2019, which also announced the creation of a Burden Reduction
Taskforce. 345
Notably, OSC 11-784 refers in its mandate to both CSA CP 51-404 and to another CSA
initiative focused specifically on investment funds, CSA Staff Notice 81-329 Reducing
Regulatory Burden for Investment Fund Issuers. 346 OSC 11-784 announces an initial
consultation process in which interested parties are invited to submit comments on a wide
variety of areas relating to overall burden reduction. The following statement is made,
evidently anticipating objections from the investors’ rights lobby:
Strong investor protections are the underpinnings of fair and efficient
capital markets. Reducing unnecessary regulatory burden for issuers,
registrants and other market participants will benefit investors, because
investors ultimately bear the costs of unnecessary or outdated
regulations. 347
The OSC issued a survey form for the consultation element of OSC 11-784 that included
the following substantive questions:
Do you have any general comments on the topic of regulatory burden
reduction related to securities regulation?
Are there operational or procedural changes that would make market
participants' day-to-day interaction with the OSC easier or less costly?
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Are there ways in which we can provide greater certainty regarding
regulatory requirements or outcomes to market participants?
Are there forms and filings that issuers, registrants or other market
participants are required to submit that should be streamlined or required
less frequently?
Are there particular filings with the OSC that are unnecessary or unduly
burdensome?
Is there information that the OSC provides to market participants that
could be provided more efficiently?
Are there requirements under the OSC rules that are inconsistent with the
rules of other jurisdictions and that could be harmonized?
Are there specific requirements that no longer serve a valid purpose?
Are there ways to enhance and improve how investors experience
disclosure provided: (i) before they invest; (ii) as part of ongoing public
disclosure; and (iii) by registrants? 348
In addition to the written consultation, the OSC held three roundtable panels
between March and May, 2019, transcripts of which were posted to the OSC
website. The participants in the roundtables were selected from the pool of
individuals and groups who had provided written submissions and requested the
opportunity to be heard in the roundtable.
Ultimately, the OSC received 69 written responses on OSC 11-784 during the
consultation period. 349 A review of all of these written responses demonstrates that
only four responses of the 69 submissions were from Operating Company issuers
who were concerned with general issues of public company burden reduction. All
other reporting issuers who filed comments were concerned almost exclusively
with issues specific to investment fund registrants. The remainder of the comments
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came from public markets influencers, such as law firms, exchanges, and the
standard list of industry associations and the investor rights associations. The
transcripts of the roundtable discussions also evidence that the participants during
the discussions were primarily focused on the issues of streamlining the
requirements for investment funds, and not at all on burden reduction for public
Operating Companies generally.
The OSC recently published its follow-up summary report on the entire
consultation process thus far in a document entitled OSC Burden Reduction
Report. 350 This report is an extensive document that provides a clear picture into
the process, current status and future plans of the OSC on the topic of burden
reduction. The OSC Burden Reduction Report states that the OSC received a total
of 199 suggestions on how to do things better, which it grouped into 38 underlying
concerns relating to rules, processes and interactions between the OSC and public
markets constituents. 351 Ultimately, the OSC came up with 107 decisions and
recommendations to streamline processes and reduce the ultimate regulatory
burden. However, of the 107 decisions and recommendations, only 14 applied to
all markets participants and another 13 applied to public Operating Companies.
The other 80 items relate only to investment funds, registrants, derivative
participants and markets, trading and clearing topics (i.e., trading mechanics). 352
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The break-down is summarized visually by the OSC as follows: 353

On each of the 107 decisions and recommendations, the OSC provides a description
of the proposed change, status update, timetable and a summary of the perceived
benefits of the item. The OSC summaries of the 14 decisions and recommendations
applicable to all public markets participants and the 13 decisions and
recommendations applicable to Operating Companies are included in Appendix 1
of this Dissertation.
Ultimately, the OSC states that “the initiatives outlined in our decisions and
recommendations will make it easier for businesses to operate in our capital
markets by helping to minimize regulatory delays, reduce the cost of capital and
free up resources to focus on growth”. 354 More specifically, the OSC outlines the
following items as expected tangible benefits of the regulatory reform process:
■
■
■
■
■
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Enhanced service levels
New tools and use of technology to assist with navigating the
regulatory process
More transparency around our processes
Clearer communication from staff
More manageable timelines for certain filings
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■
■
■
■
■
■
■

Greater clarity and flexibility on what is required to fulfill
regulatory requirements
Less duplication of requirements and form filings
Improved coordination between the OSC and our regulatory
partners
Rules and guidance that are easier to read and understand
Information that will be easier to find and better organized on our
website
Improved coordination of reviews
A more tailored regulatory approach that takes into account the
size and type of businesses. 355

There is no question that the OSC burden reduction process is a positive initiative,
and is one that should be emulated by every other provincial securities regulator in
Canada. Every small step towards burden reduction and regulatory streamlining is
a step forward. However, the critical question in analyzing the effectiveness of the
process thus far is whether the plans outlined in the OSC Burden Reduction Report
go far enough to offer any meaningful prospect of stemming the tide of public
company decline in the future. The answer to this question is discussed later in
Chapter 10 of this Dissertation.
Clearly, what is most concerning about the OSC consultation process is the lack of
participation by representatives of Canadian Operating Companies. Certainly, the
opportunity for this group to participate was clear, as evidenced by the broad nature
of the particular questions that the OSC framed in its survey questionnaire. The
questionnaire included many topics of concern for operating company issuers. It is
unclear why so few Operating Companies executives chose to voice their opinions
on this important consultation from the OSC, but it is unfortunately clear from the
record that the OSC is forced to operate with a paucity of valuable input from the
Operating Company constituency in its deliberations as to the next steps that should
be taken on the burden reduction initiative.
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Certainly, there is a risk that the lack of meaningful input during the consultation
period from public Operating Companies impacted the focus of the OSC in
selecting the reform proposals that are ultimately being pursued, as outlined in the
OSC Burden Reduction Report. Only 25% of the decisions and recommendations
of the OSC deal in any meaningful way with the issues that are faced by Canadian
public Operating Companies. The other 75% of the decisions and recommendations
relate specifically to issues faced by financial markets participants. As such, much
greater focus and attention in the OSC Burden Reduction Report is given to
financial industry participants and market registrants. This prioritization of the
issues of the financial markets participants is unsurprising because of the much
greater level of participation by representatives of these industries in the
consultation process.
In no way should any element of this Dissertation be interpreted as arguing that the
concerns of the investment bankers and brokers in the Canadian public markets are
not important, or that the reforms proposed to support streamlining in those sectors
are undeserved. It is widely understood that those critical members of the public
company ecosphere are also going through difficult financial times in Canada and
many smaller firms are struggling to survive. It is also clear that the overall health
of the public markets in Canada depends on having a robust infrastructure of
investment banks, market makers and other financial markets participants available
to service the needs of public Operating Companies.
However, it is also clear that the consultation methodologies implemented by the
CSA, and subsequently by the OSC, have been largely ineffective in securing
sufficient levels of participation from representatives of Operating Companies. In
fact, the participation of Operating Companies in the OSC burden reduction process
is so limited that it is doubtful the OSC can claim to have completed any type of
consultation leading to a fulsome understanding of the burden reduction issues that
are unique to Operating Companies.
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This unfortunate result brings into sharp focus the severe limitations of the
traditional model of securing industry input for securities regulatory reform in
Canada. For whatever reason or combination of reasons, the consultation process
that was implemented on OSC 11-784 has fundamentally failed in its goal of
bringing a strong representation of voices from a cross-section of public Operating
Companies across multiple industry sectors on the critical topic of burden
reduction.
As mentioned in the earlier discussion on the various CSA burden reduction
initiatives, it is clear that the voices of the investment fund industry have been the
loudest thus far in the consultation process. One can infer that the clarity of the
message received from the investment fund industry has pushed the prioritization
for burden reduction relating to investment funds to the top of the legislative
agenda, reflected by the most recent CSA initiative kicking off Phase 2 of the
reform agenda directed specifically at investment fund issuers. The voices of the
public Operating Companies in Canada have been comparatively muted during the
consultation processes run by the CSA and OSC. The danger associated with this
relative silence from the Operating Companies is that the burden reduction
initiatives for Operating Companies will continue to be subordinated to the
concerns expressed by the more vocal proponents of reform from the investment
fund community.
Why are the investment fund issuers so vocal compared to the Operating
Companies in the consultation process? It is likely because the investment fund
industry views their very survival as being at stake; for the Operating Company
senior decision-makers, there are many private options that can be pursued as
alternatives to the public markets. Public company decline is not a matter of life
and death for Canadian companies at this stage; they perceive that they can always
choose private financing alternatives if the public market is not attractive.
Unless the consultation processes of the securities regulators are fundamentally
altered, there is every indication that the number of Operating Companies listed in
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Canada will continue to decline unabated. Hopefully, the securities regulators
understand that the lack of a coordinated response from leaders of Canadian
Operating Companies in response to the requests for comment from the CSA and
OSC should not be interpreted to mean that Operating Company burden reduction
is unimportant.
The failure of Operating Company business executives to respond in the same
numbers as their investment fund counterparts should, rather, be considered as
being reflective of the fact that, as discussed in detail later in this Dissertation,
Operating Companies in Canada currently have robust financing alternatives in the
private financing markets. The lack of a hue and cry from Operating Companies
demanding immediate regulatory reform does not in any way diminish the reality
of the phenomenon of public company decline or its importance to the underlying
Canadian economy. The lack of participation in the securities reform consultation
process by representatives of this group does not change the fact that stemming the
decline of public Operating Companies in Canada should be a top priority for
Canadian securities regulators for the reasons outlined in Chapter 1 of this
Dissertation. However, the lack of Operating Company participation in these recent
processes does demonstrate that the securities regulators should look at
fundamentally altering their consultation processes to include other sources of data
if they aspire to secure more meaningful input from this critical group. These
additional data sources could include empirical studies. However, it could also
simply include dedicating the resources necessary at the CSA or provincial
securities commissions to individually contact the senior business decision-makers
of each public Operating Company in Canada and request their opinions on critical
reform initiatives. In the present environment, simply publishing an open invitation
to participate in a consultation process is not adequate to secure the participation of
this business cohort of Canadian businesspersons.
Despite the deficiencies in its consultation processes, the OSC must be commended
for the significant effort that it has undertaken on burden reduction throughout the
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public markets. Each improvement that comes from the process is a small step
forward.
As for the other provinces outside of Ontario, one wonders why they have moved
so slowly in responding to the mandate for regulatory burden reduction. Clearly, it
is not a priority item for the provincial securities commissions outside of Ontario
at this time. Possibly, the individual regulators realized that the watered-down
recommendations resulting from CSA 51-353 were so uninspiring in scope that
pushing the initiative internally at this point in time offers little value in meaningful
burden reduction. Possibly, the release of the recent OSC Burden Reduction Report
will spur them into some form of further action.
Regardless, it is also hoped that the warnings sounded in this Dissertation on the
extent of public company decline in Canada will provide some additional impetus
for the Canadian securities commissions to revisit the 33 reforms proposed for
consideration in CP 51-404, possibly revisiting the boldest of the recommendations
for significant regulatory reform contained therein in order to do what they can to
stem the tide of further public company decline.

141

Research Methodologies
5.1- Introduction to Research Methodologies
Applying empirical research methodologies to studies covering topics within the
traditional boundaries of legal academia is a practice that has become commonplace in
the United States. Many law schools in the United States teach methodology courses
focused on empirical studies within the law. 356
In Canada, however, the application of empirical studies to legal topics has not yet
entered the academic mainstream. Based on a search of Canadian law school course
offerings, it appears that no courses in empirical methodologies have yet made it into
Canadian law school curriculums. Empirical studies applied to legal topics in Canada
thus far have primarily originated through collaborations with academics working in
other disciplines such as sociology, health, economics and finance.
It is apparent from recent trendlines that the application of empirical research
methodologies to legal topics by legally trained academics will continue to increase in
frequency and stature in Canada. As it remains a nascent discipline within law at this
juncture, however, it is recognized that the methods employed in the PCD Study may be
unfamiliar to a portion of the audience coming from a traditional legal background.
Considering that present reality, this Research Methodologies chapter will go through the
research methodology associated with the PCD Study in greater detail and spend more
time discussing the underlying assumptions and key research choices made in the process
than might otherwise be seen in a typical empirically-based Dissertation.
Having started with the observation that public company decline in Canada was a subject
matter desperately in need of study to remedy the existing void in empirical data, the first
step in the process of defining the PCD Study was assessing all realistic avenues of
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inquiry for empirically studying the phenomenon. Through the process of elimination, it
was determined that a survey of key Operating Company senior decision-makers and
public company influencers in Canada was the most practical and promising tool to
generate meaningful empirical data. This led to the execution of an extensive process of
preparation involving a significant amount of directed-study and self-study research into
contemporary best practices in empirical studies in law, survey research methodologies
and the implications and specific challenges of conducting empirical research involving
human subjects in the context of a PhD Dissertation through a Canadian law school.

5.2- Ethics Approval Process and Outcome
As the PCD Study was executed under the auspices of Western University, Faculty of
Law and involved research on human subjects, an application for approval to the Western
Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (“NMREB”) was required. The NMREB
application process is extensive, and required the drafting and filing of approximately 20
different documents including an 8500 word Survey Protocol and Research Plan that
detailed all of the relevant elements, plans, procedures and policies that would be adopted
and observed during the course of the PCD Study initiative. Copies of the draft survey
instruments, interview scripts, verbal recruitment scripts, email solicitations and proposed
advertisements were also submitted for review.
One of the main documents vetted in the NMREB process was the form of the Letter of
Information that is required to be reviewed and acknowledged by every study participant,
with confirmation of acknowledgement retained as a record of informed consent by the
study administrators. Copies of all of the paper formats of the survey instruments were
also individually submitted for approval.
Ultimately the NMREB process is principally focused on: (i) ensuring the protection of
the privacy and dignity of the potential participants in a research study before during and
after the study; (ii) confirming that appropriate steps are made to safeguard all data
collected, particularly any data that can be used to identify individuals; (iii) guaranteeing
that the recruitment process is free of undue coercion; (iv) ensuring that full and informed
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consent is obtained from every study participant; and (v) ensuring that best-practices in
human research are followed at all stages of the research process.
The initial Western NMREB application was filed, along with all supporting documents,
on November 20, 2018. Minor comments were received from the NMREB personnel on
the initial application and a revised application was submitted on December 5, 2018.
Final NMREB approval for the PCD Study was received on December 7, 2018.
One of the biggest issues in the review of NMREB applications generally is consideration
of the vulnerability of the specific populations being studied. Any specific vulnerabilities
require a corresponding plan for enhanced protections in the study protocol. However, in
the PCD Study underpinning this Dissertation, the various subgroups being targeted for
inclusion are amongst the least vulnerable groups that one can identify in Canada. The
target participants in the PCD Study are highly educated and generally highly
compensated. They can also be assumed to have developed immunity to recruitment
pressures, as they face competing requests for their valuable time on a daily basis. As
such, the biggest concern in designing the protective elements of the PCD Study were
less about protecting the target participants from undue pressures in recruitment due to
any vulnerabilities (although best practices in that area were followed throughout) and
more focused on protecting the identity and personal information of everyone who
enrolled in the PCD Study.
On this topic, many of the respondents evidenced little concern on retaining anonymity,
going so far as to include their names and phone numbers in the text responses and
inviting calls back to discuss their comments further. 357 Individuals who requested
specific contact were generally followed-up with phone calls, inviting them to share
further on the topic. The information from these follow-up calls was collected for
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additional context, but did not form part of the formal PCD Study data. A small number
of respondents did express concern about potential attribution of their responses as the
questions sought personal opinions. Several participants were keen to ensure that it was
clear that they were providing their opinions only in their personal capacities and not in
their capacities as formal representatives of their specific organizations.
Collectively demographic data that allows for personal identification of the respondents
also creates a host of data security issues that continue long after the completion of a
research project such as the PCD Study. As such, the decision was ultimately made that
no information would be collected in the PCD Study that would allow for individuals to
be personally identified. Only generalized demographic data was collected and utilized
to define and assess the responses of the multitude of demographic subgroups tracked
throughout the analysis of the PCD Study data. Careful process was followed to ensure
that no individualized responses were reported alongside compiled demographic data that
might collectively establish a profile where readers are able to make educated guesses at
the identities of the respondents. Ultimately, the data protection processes of the
respondents were outlined in the Survey Protocol & Research Plan filed with the
NMREB, providing a high degree of anonymity to the PCD Study participants.
In terms of human research and NMREB ethics concerns, the PCD Study is relatively
straightforward and does not engage the usual complexities that can become problematic.
No waivers or variations of the NMREB policies were required. The single area in which
the Survey Protocol & Research Plan engaged a topic that is considered ethically
sensitive was in reference to the use of snowball sampling in the recruitment process.
Snowball sampling involves using individuals, other than those who are investigators in
the research study to assist in the recruitment process, generally asking that people who
have participated in the study pass along the invitation to other individuals that they know
would fit within the target participant group. Those individuals are then asked to invite
other individuals to participate and so on. Snowball sampling can be an effective tool in
securing enrolment for target groups that are hard to reach directly. However, snowball
sampling also inherently raised NMREB ethical concerns because the recruitment effort
is delegated outside the direct control of the investigators who are trained in survey
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methodology and understand both the specifics of the NMREB approval conditions for
the study and best-practice ethical boundaries in survey recruitment generally.
It was disclosed in the NMREB application and in the Survey Protocol & Research Plan
that it was intended to use passive snowball sampling in the PCD Study. Passive
snowball sampling is where a request is extended to persons outside of the investigator
group to pass along the invitation to participate in the research study to others.
Investigators are not allowed to follow up with individuals and ask them whether they
have in fact passed along the invitation or, if so, to whom. In active snowball sampling,
investigators follow up with individuals to determine whether requests to participate have
been forwarded. Passive snowball sampling is allowed by the NMREB recruitment
guidelines of Western University, while active snowball sampling is prohibited.
As a result, passive snowball sampling combined with anonymous survey responses
prevents the researcher from knowing which of the responses received are attributable to
the passive snowball sampling efforts as opposed to direct solicitations of the respondents
by the study investigators. Moreover, passive snowball sampling does not allow the
investigator to ask for contact information of others who meet the study criteria and
thereby solicit those individuals directly. Passive snowball sampling forces the
investigators to rely on others to follow through on recruitment efforts without any ability
to verify if that is indeed occurring or to what degree. The only practical method of
determining what effect passive snowball sampling is having in the overall recruitment
effort is to discontinue all direct solicitation efforts over an extended period of time and
assess the results, such that an inference can be drawn that most of the new responses
being completed are attributable to the snowball sampling and not direct recruitment.
In the PCD Study, the aggressive timeframes for survey enrollment did not allow for a
significant gap in the active recruitment efforts, so it cannot be known with certainty
what portion of the total responses received came from the passive snowball sampling
efforts. However, based on observation of the correlation between the timing of direct
solicitation efforts and the timing of the responses received, it is believed that more than
90% of the responses received in the PCD Study were as a result of direct solicitation by
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the Co-Investigator. More details on the recruitment process, and the lessons learned
therefrom, are included later in this chapter.

5.3- Format and Delivery of the PCD Study
The PCD Study ultimately utilized four different survey methods at various stages in the
research process: (i) in-person interviews; (ii) phone interviews; (iii) paper surveys; and
(iv) online surveys. The use of live interviews was limited to the survey validation phase
discussed hereafter and also for participants in the main survey who indicated via email
response or phone call that they preferred to have a live conversation with the CoInvestigator. In those situations, the Co-Investigator would go through the relevant paper
version of the survey with the specific respondent and would then enter the paper version
as an online response. In total, less than 15 paper surveys were completed (all of which
were thereafter inputted online), with the remainder of the responses occurring through
the online portal. As such, more than 95% of the responses in the PCD Study were
originally secured online.
The online data collection portion of the PCD Study exclusively utilized the Qualtrics
survey platform. Qualtrics has entered into a university-wide license with Western
University, making Qualtrics the obvious choice for the PCD Study from a cost
perspective. However, assessment of the Qualtrics survey platform also confirmed that
the Qualtrics software offers all of the desired functionality for efficient administration of
the PCD Study along with robust technical support. Qualtrics was also used for basic
review and analysis of the data collected in the PCD Study. For the more complex
statistical analysis, the Qualtrics responses were exported into CSV files and analyzed
using Excel and a specialized open-source statistical software program called “R”.
Due to the full anonymity provided to the respondents in the PCD Study, the issue of how
to prevent “ballot-box stuffing” was considered at length to ensure the integrity of the
data collection process. The decision was ultimately made to utilize a Qualtrics feature
that embeds cookies in respondents’ browsers and prevents anyone using that same
computer terminal from completing the survey a second time. Although this protection
can be defeated by an intentional deletion of the embedded cookies by the user, the risk
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of ballot-box stuffing in the PCD Study was considered very low. No compensation was
offered for participation in the PCD Study, so no apparent motivation for any respondents
to complete more than one survey can be identified. As such, the use of this particular
Qualtrics feature was considered sufficient as an anti-ballot-stuffing measure.
For online responses, eligibility to participate in the survey was verified through selfreporting and self-certification at the beginning of the online responses using a variety of
screening questions. In the PCD Study, it was determined that self-certification was the
only practical method for eligibility verification in order to assure anonymity and avoid
collecting personal data. While relying on self-certification opens up the possibility that
respondents can improperly report their eligibility in order to participate, the chance of
this occurring was determined to be low in the PCD Study. The solicitation process,
discussed in more detail hereafter, was targeted only to those individuals who were likely
to meet the eligibility criteria from the start. Also, there is no obvious incentive for
respondents to misrepresent their eligibility in order to participate in the survey.
Participation in the PCD Study takes effort and time without any tangible reward being
offered to respondents. Based on all of these factors, self-certification of eligibility was
considered an appropriate methodology for the low level of risk in the PCD Study.
Finally, the core of the PCD Study included several matrix questions listing a number of
potential factors that the respondents were asked to rank or otherwise evaluate according
to specific criteria. On matrix questions, the issue of question order bias must be
considered in the design and implementation of the survey. In a list of items, it is
recognized that respondents’ perceptions may be influenced by where the items are
placed sequentially in the lists, thereby introducing question order bias that can result in
sample error. Utilization of an online survey tool such as Qualtrics offers a simple
solution to this issue, enabling the appearance order of the items in lists to be randomized
for each individual respondent. This randomization functionality was used in the PCD
Study to ensure that question order bias was eliminated in the responses which were
originally collected through the Qualtrics system.
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5.4- Nature of the Empirical Effort
The rationale for resorting to an empirical study based on survey research to illuminate
the relative importance of contributing factors to public company decline was discussed
at some length in the introductory chapter of this Dissertation. Empirical research has
repeatedly demonstrated the significant linkage between preferences expressed in surveys
and decision-making outcomes. 358 The correlation between attitudes and future decisionmaking is strongest when the attitudes are based on direct experience, 359 which is clearly
reflective of the participants in the PCD Study. These authorities validate the underlying
proposition that the PCD Study outcomes illuminating the perceptions of Canadian senior
business decision-makers and public markets influencers on the key topics relevant to
public company decline provide valuable insight as to the actual IPO / private decisionmaking process and likely outcomes. While formal causality of public company decline
cannot be determined using the survey methodology, the PCD Study data provides the
best information yet collected to formulate hypotheses on a number of critical issues
intuitively and conceptually linked to the public company decline phenomenon in
Canada.
One of the principal goals of the PCD Study is to determine a rank-ordering of the
importance of various factors posited as contributing to public company decline in
Canada. The PCD Study accomplishes this by determining a rank-order of the factors in
terms of their perceived importance to senior business decision-makers and public
markets influencers when faced with a hypothetical go public / stay private decision.
Another principal research goal in the PCD Study is analyzing the biases and
predispositions of senior decision-makers and influencers towards IPOs, the capital
markets and private financing alternatives generally. Key questions in the PCD Study
were designed specifically to determine whether survey participants exhibited a positive
or negative bias to public or private financing alternatives, with the results discussed
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hereafter demonstrating that significant biases against the public markets persist amongst
several key subgroups included in the PCD Study.
The PCD Study was designed and executed as a cross-sectional survey, meaning that it
gathered information from a sample group taken from a larger population at a particular
point in time.
There were two separate components in the PCD Study, namely the Preliminary Survey
and the Main Survey. The Preliminary Survey was utilized in order to test and validate
the form and content of the final survey instrument for the subsequent Main Survey. The
Preliminary Survey phase took place between December 14, 2018 and January 14, 2019.
The format adopted for the Preliminary Survey was live interviews conducted either inperson or over-the-phone. The average interview length in the Preliminary Survey was
approximately one hour. A total of 14 different individuals were interviewed during the
Preliminary Survey phase representing a cross-section of the target subgroups for the
Main Survey: three public company senior decision-makers, three TSX-eligible private
company senior decision makers, three securities lawyers, two public accountants /
auditors, one investment banker and two private equity investors. As such, the
Preliminary Survey participants represented a cross section of all target subgroups that
were also solicited in the Main Survey.
In each Preliminary Study interview, a short initial discussion was held in which the
nature of the public decline phenomenon and the purpose of the PCD Study were
discussed. The participants were then given approximately 20 minutes to go through the
survey, either online or with a paper version, without any interaction with the interviewer.
The participants were requested to make personal notes as they progressed through the
survey instruments indicating any items in the PCD Study that they felt were confusing,
unclear, inaccurate, leading, misleading or irrelevant.
The amount of time that each participant took to complete the Preliminary Survey was
logged. After the participants completed the survey, the interviewer went back over the
survey instrument with the participants on a question-by-question basis, asking whether
the participants had any comments on the particular questions. Afterwards, the
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participants were asked if they could identify any potential additional downsides
associated with being a public company or other possible contributing factors to public
company decline that had not been mentioned in the survey instrument. Finally, the
participants were asked if they had any final suggestions on the survey execution plan,
the design of the survey or any other related topic.
The notes from the 14 interviews in the Preliminary Survey phase were then incorporated
and used to create the final survey instrument for the Main Survey. During the course of
the Preliminary Survey process, several revisions were made to the questions and
instructions in order to improve the clarity of those items based on feedback received
from the Preliminary Survey participants.
After completion of the Preliminary Survey, the Main Survey enrollment phase was
begun immediately. The Main Survey was completed over a five-month period,
commencing on January 15, 2019 and ending on June 15, 2019.

5.5- Determining the Target Participants in the PCD Study
Which Senior Business Decision-Makers?
Having developed the argument earlier that the decision to pursue public or private
alternatives is fundamentally a conscious decision by senior business decision-makers,
and that the decline in the number of public Operating Companies must thereby be
inferred to be a result of a shift in perception over time of the relative merits of public
versus private financing options, one of the first critical questions that had to be defined
early in the PCD Study planning process was which individuals should be studied? In
order for the study outcome to have empirical validity and interest to market participants,
the individuals surveyed for the primary research undertaking need to come from
amongst that elite group of senior business leaders who have the actual authority to
unilaterally determine, or at least strongly influence, the public/private decision.
How should the class of senior business decision-makers be defined? Since no similar
empirical research project has been undertaken on the decline in public Operating
Companies prior to the PCD Study, there is little illumination in the literature providing
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guidance on the appropriate selection of study participants. The Brau / Fawcett and
Mittoo Bancel studies completed in the U.S. and Europe on IPO motivations and timing,
previously discussed in the Literature Review chapter of this Dissertation, both rely
solely on opinion of CFO’s. 360 Although the opinions of CFO’s certainly can be
anticipated to be well-informed in most instances, it was determined that relying solely
on CFO opinions was insufficient to secure the breadth and depth of perspectives being
sought in the PCD Study.
Ultimately, three different groups of senior business decision-makers were included in
the PCD Study solicitation. While many internal and external voices may be consulted by
company leadership in advance of an IPO, the ultimate public/private decision in each
company generally rests with a small number of decision-makers who reside at the very
top of the corporate hierarchy: Executive Chairpersons, Presidents/CEOs, CFOs and
COOs (collectively, “C-suite” executives). Ultimately, the IPO process is so timeconsuming and distracting for C-suite management that it is all but impossible for a
company to go public without the C-suite management being supportive of the ultimate
goal.
The second group of decision-makers included are significant shareholders. In certain
instances, significant non-management shareholders (i.e., those shareholders with
sufficient shareholdings to force their liquidity agenda on C-suite management) also are
key decision-makers in the IPO / private financing determination. Most often, this occurs
when a specific shareholder has secured registration rights during an earlier private round
of financing. Ultimately, it was decided that the category of non-management
shareholders eligible to participate in the PCD Study would be limited to those
shareholders holding at least 20% of the voting shares in a particular company
The third group of decision-makers included in the PCD Study were non-executive
directors. Non-executive directors may also play a role in the decision-making process,
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Supra notes 87 and 91.
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although their influence is likely to be significantly less on this particular topic than that
of executive directors. Non-executive directors will rarely be the impetus for an IPO on
their own without the full support of the C-suite executives. However, it was determined
that their opinions may have sufficient weight in the ultimate go public / stay private
decision that they should be included in the PCD Study.
The definition of the class of senior business decision-makers in Canada eligible for
participation in the PCD Study certainly excludes many individuals who may have a
significant voice in the company on the go public / stay private decision. However, it
was determined that the PCD Study data would be more informative if the definition of
senior business decision-maker erred on the side of being too restrictive rather than too
inclusive. In other words, it is preferable to exclude participation by some individuals
who may have some valuable insight on the topic than to include individuals who may
not be influential in the IPO analysis and decision-making process. By using the
restrictive definition adopted for PCD Study eligibility, we can be assured that each of
the responses from a senior business decision-maker represents an individual whose
opinions are informed by personal experience and is in a position to significantly
influence the outcome of the decision-making process.
From amongst the three categories of individuals fitting with the PCD Study definition of
senior business decision-makers, it is obvious that the most influential group are the Csuite executives. As such, the recruitment effort for senior business decision-makers was
focused primarily on C-suite executives. The minimum target for C-suite executive
representation within the senior business decision-maker demographic was initially set at
70% of the respondents in that group.
Analysis of the PCD Study data ultimately shows that approximately 85% of senior
business decision-maker respondents are C-suite executives, thereby exceeding the
minimum target. Approximately 9% of the senior business decision-maker respondents
in the PCD Study are non-executive directors. The remaining 6% of PCD Study senior
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business decision-maker respondents represent large-block shareholders who are neither
directors nor C-suite executives. 361
Does the mix of respondents in the PCD Study from the senior business decision maker
group in the PCD Study represent an appropriate allocation amongst the various
constituents of senior business decision-makers with reference to their relative
importance in the IPO / stay private decision? There are no authorities in the literature
specifically addressing this particular point, as no published research has been historically
focused on empirically determining the comparative influence of senior executives,
independent directors and large shareholders on the go public / stay private decision.
The two studies cited in the Literature Review discussion at Chapter 2 of this
Dissertation, which are the only two previous instances where survey methodology has
been used to assess IPO motivations, both solicited the opinions only of CFO’s. 362 Brau
/ Fawcett acknowledge the limitation of restricting their analysis to the opinions of
CFO’s, but express their belief that “the CFO is in the best position to understand the IPO
process”. 363 They also point to previous American empirical studies in which only CFO
opinions were solicited on particular corporate finance topics, concluding that reference
to CFO opinions alone on corporate finance topics is in line with accepted practice. 364
However, these other studies cited by Brau / Fawcett address specific topics related to
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63.4% of the C-suite executives who participated in the PCD Study also served on the Board of
Directors of their companies.
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Supra notes 87 and 91. Of the two studies, only Brau / Fawcett address this methodological issue.
Mittoo / Bancel simply disclose that they are following the methodology of Brau / Fawcett.

363
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corporate finance other than IPOs and do not provide any compelling rationale for
limiting empirical study of IPOs opinions to only CFO’s.
In framing the PCD Study, the conclusion was reached that the solicitation of senior
business decision-makers should go beyond CFO’s to include other C-suite executives,
independent directors and large shareholders for two main reasons. First, Canada is a
much smaller economy than the U.S. and there are far fewer firms to solicit, making it
infeasible to secure a statistically-significant cohort of responses from the CFO category
alone. Second, while CFO’s may be the individuals within a company best positioned to
understand the IPO process as contended by Brau / Fawcett, there is nothing in the
literature to suggest that they are the most influential in the critical stay private /go public
decision-making process. As the PCD Study is focused on securing the input of
individuals who have the greatest influence on the IPO decision-making process,
solicitation of a broader group of senior business decision-makers not limited to CFO’s is
clearly mandated.
Does the PCD Study evidence an ideal breakdown of senior business decision-makers
that appropriately reflects the relative influence of each type of respondent on the
decision-making process? That question is impossible to answer because, as previously
stated, there is no empirical evidence determining what the relative influence of each type
of respondent is on the stay private / go public decision. The appropriate standard should
be, therefore, reasonableness based on expert opinion.
Ultimately, the targets established for the PCD Study were based on the combined
perceptions of the Co-Investigator and several other IPO experts consulted on this
particular issue. These opinions on the relative influence of various senior business
decision-decision makers on the IPO process are based on direct experience of the CoInvestigator and the other IPO experts engaging in numerous Canadian IPOs over the
course of their careers. The consensus expressed by this expert group is that the final
breakdown of senior business decision-maker respondents who participated in the PCD
Study is a reasonable reflection of the relative influence of different types of senior
decision-makers on the stay private / go public decision-making process.
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Decision-Makers of Which Canadian Companies?
Another preliminary question that had to be addressed with respect to the corporate
decision-makers component of the PCD Study is which types of companies should be
targeted? Should the focus be on senior business decision-makers who have direct
management experience with existing public companies, or should the focus be on senior
business decision-makers currently managing growth-stage private companies that are
realistic prospects for future IPOs? In order to maximize both the credibility and impact
of the PCD Study, it was determined that strong representation should be solicited from
senior business decision-makers of both public and private companies.
If the decline in Canadian public Operating Companies is an evolution in the preferences
of corporate leadership, then it is imperative to determine the factors that are important to
decision-makers from both existing public companies and from prospective public
companies. The senior business decision-makers in existing public companies possess a
wealth of information on the actual advantages and disadvantages of being a public
company as a result of their personal experience, whereas the beliefs and perceptions of
the decision-makers in prospective future public companies is instructive as to whether
there is a gap between the perception and reality of the relative benefits and costs of
pursuing an IPO versus private alternatives.
As will be discussed at various places later in this Dissertation, the differences in
perception between senior decision-makers of public and private companies offer fertile
ground to better understand the nature of public company decline generally. Also, since
pursuing an IPO is a conscious decision, the current perception of decision-makers in
private IPO-eligible companies may be viewed as predictive for the near-term future of
the IPO market in Canada.

5.6- Considering the Junior Canadian Stock Exchanges
A further critical question that had to be addressed in defining the scope of the PCD
Study was determining which particular stock exchanges would be eligible in the
research project. Amongst the classes of senior business decision-makers discussed
above with experience in public company management, should junior-market TSXV and
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Canadian Stock Exchange ("CSE") decision-makers be included amongst the target
participants? Or should enrollment be limited to decision-makers of TSX-level
companies? There is no obvious right or wrong answer to this particular question from an
academic perspective. The decision was made, after significant reflection, to limit
enrollment of those subgroups to those with TSX-level experience. The rationale for
doing so is largely based on pragmatic considerations.
The statistics on decline in the number of public Operating Companies in the introduction
to this Dissertation were drawn only from the TSX, but the TSXV junior market has also
experienced a 36.5% percentage decline in the number of Operating Company listings
during the same interval. 365
A portion of these TSXV listings have moved over to the alternative CSE exchange in the
interval, which has seen a significant increase in the number of total listings during the
period in which the decline in the TSX and TSXV is reported. However, very few of
these CSE listings are of a size and stage of development that they would have been
eligible for the TSX with the notable exception of companies from the cannabis and
blockchain industries. Certainly, the cannabis boom in 2018 generated a temporary boom
in CSE listings, trading volume and markets valuations. In 2019, however, the cannabis
bubble ended and the volume of new listings on the CSE slowed to a trickle, most of
which are small mining exploration projects.
Ultimately, there were two key reasons behind the decision to exclude TSXV and CSE
companies from the PCD Study and focus exclusively on TSX-listed companies and TSX
eligible private companies. The first reason is for the purposes of retaining comparability
of the study results and the applicability of conclusions drawn therefrom for capital
markets outside of Canada. The TSXV and CSE listing requirements, along with the
average asset base of the listed companies on the TSXV and CSE, are significantly lower
than any comparable markets in the United States or Europe. The challenges,
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Source: TMX Market Intelligence Group report on annual listings on TSX and TSX 2008-2019.
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opportunities and hurdles associated with being a micro-cap public company listed on the
TSXV or CSE are often unique to companies of that particular size and stage of
development. For example, the average company listed on the TSXV has only a single
analyst covering it (often affiliated with the firm who completed the IPO) and a
significant percentage of the institutional investors in Canada will not buy TSXV stocks.
The single TSX IPO completed in Canada in the first three quarters of 2019 overwhelms
all the TSXV and CSE IPOs completed in terms of the amount of money raised by an
order of magnitude.
To the degree that the public company decline phenomenon observed on the senior public
markets in Canada has commonality with the U.S. and European experiences, those
commonalities will have to be evaluated companies of comparable size and in similar
industries across the geographic regions. If the TSXV and CSE companies were to be
included in this research project, the nuances of those exchanges and the smaller size of
the public companies listed thereon may fundamentally alter the underlying narrative,
sentiment analysis and rank-order outcomes of the PCD Study. This would obscure the
nature of commonality and differences between Canadian public company decline and
the same phenomenon in other western industrialized countries.
A second reason for exclusion of the CSE specifically is the numerous complications,
complexities and future uncertainties associated with the specific cannabis and
blockchain industries that have been so heavily weighted in the CSE listings over the past
few years. The CSE has recently come through a historic boom cycle in both cannabis
and blockchain fueled by retail investor exuberance. Clearly, that bubble has now passed
as evidenced by the lack of new listings in either cannabis or blockchain on the CSE and
the decline in those industry-specific indexes since their peaks in the past couple of
years. 366 If the senior decision-makers of CSE companies were added into the analysis,
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Robin Levinson-King, “Why Canada’s cannabis bubble burst” BBC News (29 October 2019) online:<
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burst. Here’s why” BNN Bloomberg News (16 November 2019) online:< https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/
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the proclivities and recent experience of the cannabis and blockchain industries, both
positive and negative, would again fundamentally alter the research outcomes and
obscure key findings on the broader nature of public company decline in Canada.
In order to ensure that the issue of broad-based public company decline remains in sharp
focus, along with the desire to maximize the potential impact of the proposed research
project outside of Canada, the decision to focus the PCD Study on senior decision-makers
associated with TSX-listed and TSX-eligible companies was determined to be the most
prudent course of action. Analyzing the unique challenges associated with the decline of
small-scale public companies on the TSXV and CSE, and the temporary blips in IPO
volume associated with industry-specific bubbles in cannabis and blockchain, are
interesting phenomena in Canada and certainly worthy of further study. However,
pragmatic considerations dictate that those are matters best left for a different day in a
different research study.
Rationale for Including Public Markets Influencers
There is one final important consideration to discuss with reference to the target
participants of the PCD Study. Namely, the following question had to be answered in the
PCD Study design: should the PCD Study be limited to senior business decision-makers,
or are there other classes of individuals who are influencers within the public markets
ecosphere whose opinions should be also be included?
In answer to this question, it is noted that this Dissertation is submitted in conjunction
with the pursuit of a PhD in the Faculty of Law. The underlying subject matter of public
company decline in Canada is inherently interdisciplinary in nature and the lines of
distinction frequently blur between business and law. It is the hope of the author that the
PCD Study observations and recommendations will be considered in both the faculties of
business and law. However, the analysis portion of this Dissertation engages, as a core
theme, the regulatory implications of the PCD Study. In particular the fundamental
question of whether regulatory reform can realistically be expected to reverse, or at least
stem, the decline in public Operating Companies in Canada is considered. The hope is
that the research output will ultimately have some influence on existing and future
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regulatory reform initiatives, in part by the assessment of which specific factors
established as being most influential in the public/private decision-making process can be
addressed through regulatory reform. Clearly, not all factors lend themselves to
regulatory solutions; some factors are simply endemic to the public markets ecosphere at
this point in time.
In the previous chapter of this Dissertation summarizing the recent CSA and OSC
initiatives into public company burden reduction (see Chapter 4), it was discussed that the
voices of public markets influencers are disproportionately heard during the consultation
process compared to those of senior business decision-makers. For the purposes of
instructing future regulatory reform in Canada, therefore, there is value in determining
whether the perception of the key subgroups who participate in the traditional regulatory
reform process are consistent with the perceptions of the business decision makers. If
significant differences exist between public markets influencers and decision-makers,
what are the underlying issues?
Moreover, senior decision-makers rarely reach a final determination on an issue as
important as whether to ultimately pursue an IPO for the company without taking counsel
from external advisors (securities / corporate lawyers, investment bankers and auditors /
accountants). Since these groups all have strong familiarity with the public markets, their
counsel is often considered carefully before a decision on the direction the corporation
will pursue is finalized. Also, since these groups of key public markets influencers
advise a number of clients simultaneously, their perceptions reflect wide cross-sections of
public market experience unlike senior business decision-makers who may serve in only
a few different organizations for much of their career. As such, there is obvious value in
having the participation of securities / corporate lawyers, investment bankers and auditors
/ accountants in the PCD Study.
Beyond these three groups of influencers, there is obvious value is including one
additional subgroup into the PCD Study research project, namely private equity investors
in Canada. Private equity investors are the one group of public markets influencers
whose overriding self-interest is often perceived to be in opposition to the public markets,
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specifically given that the public markets and private equity investors have historically
competed for the same deals. For that reason, there is value in understanding what the
perception of public company decline is amongst private equity financiers with the
narratives that they use to convince senior business decision makers to avoid the public
markets. Moreover, IPOs remain a potential exit option for private equity financiers,
although an IPO exit for a private equity-backed Operating Company generally occurs at
a more mature stage of company development than would otherwise be the case.
Regardless, adding the perspective of the private equity participants to the analysis for
further comparison is certainly accretive to the PCD Study analysis.
There is one final group of public markets influencers whose opinions would have added
value to the PCD Study data, namely securities regulators working for the provincial
securities commissions and for the TSX. This group of public markets influencers is
aware of the existence of the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada and it
would be interesting to see how the perceptions of the securities regulators on the key
topic compares to the perceptions of the senior business decision-makers and public
markets influencers. Indeed, securities regulators were initially defined in the PCD
Study as the fifth target group of public markets influencers that would be solicited.
For pragmatic reasons, however, securities regulators were ultimately removed from the
PCD Study as participants. The elimination of securities regulators as a subgroup for
participation in the PCD Study results from the decision of OSC representatives not to
participate. Although there were initial indications that the OSC would support the
participation of its senior employees in the PCD Study, this turned out not to be the case
at the end of the day. The rationale for the OSC declining to participate was not
articulated beyond a vague attribution to concerns expressed by the legal division.
Notably, the TSX senior administration expressed a willingness to participate and were
supportive of the PCD Study, indicating their belief that the study could provide valuable
information for the TMX Market Intelligence Group. Other securities commissions in
Canada were not solicited, as it was determined that there was little ultimate value in
including securities regulators as a subgroup for analysis from outside of Ontario unless
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the OSC was onboard with participation given the obvious importance of the OSC to
securities regulation in Canada. Any empirical effort with respect to the opinions of
securities commission personnel that does not include the participation of the OSC is
open to obvious criticism that the lack of participation by the largest and most important
securities regulatory body in the country is insufficient.
Although disappointing, the inability to secure the participation of the OSC was not
deemed to be of fundamental concern to the validity of the underlying PCD Study. In the
IPO process, the securities commissions are certainly consulted at various stages with
respect to regulatory compliance matters, but they rarely interface directly with the senior
decision-makers of the prospective IPO targets and are not part of the group of voices
that actively supports the IPO alternative in the decision-making process. The TSX, on
the other hand, does play an active role in marketing itself to potential IPO candidate
companies and it would have been accretive to have their perspective reflected in the
PCD Study. However, without the participation of the OSC and the other securities
commissions, the TSX simply does not constitute a sufficiently large subgroup such that
their participation would give rise to observations at the required level of statistical
significance.
In summary, the final specific groups targeted for enrollment in the PCD Study included:
(i) senior business decision-makers of TSX-listed Canadian-based and Canadiancontrolled companies; (ii) senior business decision makers of TSX-eligible private
Canadian-based and Canadian-controlled companies; (iii) securities / corporate lawyers;
(iv) auditors / accountants with public company practices; (v) investment bankers; and
(vi) private equity investors. The first two subgroups are collectively referred to herein
for the purpose of convenience as Group I, senior business decision-makers, and the latter
four groups are collectively referred as Group II, public markets influencers. 367
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In the analysis portion of this Dissertation, reference may be made simply to “lawyers” or “auditors”
for the sake of brevity. However, the lawyers are all individuals who identify as securities law and/or
corporate transaction specialists, and the auditors are individuals working at public accounting firms that
have a significant exposure to audit and assurance services for public and private companies.
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5.7- Review of Survey Enrollment Efforts and Outcomes
It was clearly understood from the initial concept phase of the PCD Study that securing
sufficient survey enrollment to arrive at statistically significant observations at a macro
level and, even more so, at a subgroup comparison level, would be a material challenge.
Canada has a relatively small population compared to the United States or Europe, and
the criteria for survey participation eligibility are sufficiently stringent that the total
population size is relatively small.
Although there are no easily accessible sources that allow for a scientifically-determined
estimate of the population sizes of the six different participant groups, a total population
estimate of 20,000 individuals was used for enrollment target planning purposes in the
PCD Study. This estimate is of the total population size of Group I- Senior Business
Decision-Makers and Group II- Public Markets Influencers in Canada that qualify for
eligibility in the study. The estimate of 20,000 is believed to be significantly higher than
the actual population number, but it was deemed most prudent and statistically
conservative to use a high-end population estimate in the absence of any data that would
allow a more accurate determination of actual population. By using a high-end
population estimate, the most conservative methodology is being applied from a
statistical validation perspective. 368
Based on the population estimate of 20,000 individuals, our initial enrollment target was
set at 377 respondents in order to meet the target confidence level of 95% with a 5%
margin of error, which is the commonly accepted standard for survey data analysis in
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The target enrollment for the PCD Study is defined by the population size estimate, the acceptable
margin of error and the desired confidence level for the overall survey. With reference to the PCD Study, if
a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error are defined as the targets, then the total sample size needs
to be 375 respondents if the total population is 15,000 individuals. However, if the total population size is
25,000 individuals, then the total sample size in the PCD Study only increases to 379 individuals to reach
the same confidence level and margin of error for the PCD Study. Even if the population size is 50,000, the
total sample size indicated at the same levels only increases to 382 individuals. As such, at the scale of the
population we are dealing with, there is no real return on spending the significant resources it would require
to reach a more accurate estimate of population size.
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social science research. 369 However, the Study Protocol & Research Plan also clearly
stated that the budgeted period of survey enrollment would run for four months, after
which time the PCD Study could be ended provided that the minimum enrollment targets
had been achieved. The minimum targets for the PCD Study were established as 267
total responses, which is the level at which a 90% confidence level with a 5% margin of
error is achieved. Although less common than the 95% confidence level in social science
research, the 90% overall confidence level on survey data is still widely accepted within
the social sciences as statistically valid in complex and more lengthy surveys (which the
PCD Study certainly represents). 370
It was understood at the outset that the recruitment goals in the PCD Study, both at the
target level and at the minimum level, were highly ambitious. By their nature and
business stature, it is very difficult to gain access to large numbers of Canadian C-suite
executives and convince them to take the time from their busy schedules necessary to
complete a detailed survey questionnaire, regardless of their ultimate belief in the
underlying importance of the subject matter. The group of senior business decisionmakers targeted in the PCD Study is comprised of extremely busy people in Canada with
significant competing demands on their time. The situation is similar for the four
categories of Group II- Public markets influencers that were targeted for participation, all
of whom have significant demands on their time. 371

369

Alan Bryman, et al, Business Research Methods, Canadian Edition (Toronto, Ontario: Oxford
University Press, 2011) at 508; W. Lawrence Neuman and Karen Robson, Basics of Social Research:
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 2nd Canadian Edition (Toronto, Ontario: Pearson Canada, 2012)
at 247-248; James K. Skipper, Jr., Anthony L. Guenther and Gilbert Nass, “The Sacredness of 0.05: A
Note concerning the Use of Statistical Levels of Significance in Social Science” (1967) 2(1) The American
Sociologist 16.

370
371

B.J. Winer, Statistical Principles in Experimental Design (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1962).

It is noted that the targeted study participants in the PCD Study are not the only groups in Canada who
are extremely busy. Certainly, disadvantaged groups, such as single parents and new immigrants working
multiple low-paying jobs simultaneously to support their families, are often at least as “busy” as senior
business decision-makers. Nor is anything in the discussion herein intended to imply that the time of the
targeted study participants in the PCD study is inherently more valuable than that of any other identifiable
demographic groups in society. However, it is submitted that the fact that the opinions of the targeted PCD
Study participants are frequently solicited in a variety of other forums, along with the reality that the PCD
Study targets generally have executive assistants who view their role as weeding out distractions (including
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The knowledge of the nature of the challenge faced in securing sufficient enrollment
dictated that a significant degree of thought and planning be directed into the survey
recruitment methodology for the PCD Study. First, previous efforts to enroll similar
groups of respondents in Canada and abroad were evaluated for precedent value.
In Canada, KPMG previously sponsored a quarterly survey of C-suite executives on
topical issues that was widely reported in the business media. This survey was
undertaken by The Gandalf Group, a professional market research firm. The C-suite
executives solicited by the Gandalf Group were exclusively interviewed by phone,
requiring an extensive time commitment by a number of different researchers. The last
version of this survey was conducted in the fourth quarter of 2017, resulting in the
participation of 159 C-suite executives. 372 However, this initiative has been abandoned
in the past couple of years due to the significant costs associated with collecting the data.
Instead, KPMG now conducts their own internal C-suite survey on topical business
issues. Only 75 Canadian C-suite executives were solicited in the most recent version of
the KPMG Survey. 373 Of the 75 solicited, it is unclear from the report how many
responded. The survey methodologies are also not disclosed, leading one to surmise that
the survey is conducted almost exclusively from a captive list of KPMG clients with
whom existing relationships exist. Without the research budget necessary to retain the
services of a professional market research firm like the Gandalf Group, it was determined
that there is no contemporary precedent in Canada which provides any valuable
methodological insight into how to approach the target participants for the PCD Study.
Looking abroad, it was previously discussed in the literature review chapter of this
Dissertation that there are two precedents of academic research studies that were

requests for survey participation) on behalf of their bosses, makes the target group of PCD Study
participants particularly challenging to enroll.
372

The Gandalf Group, “C-Suite Survey, Executive Summary”, (12 December 2017), online:<
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conducted at the C-suite level. 374 Brau and Fawcett recruited their target participants
(i.e., CFO’s of U.S. companies that completed or attempted and withdrew an IPO and
private firms from a Dun and Bradstreet database) using only regular mail solicitation.
Brau and Fawcett included a paper copy of the survey along with a pre-paid return
envelope and the promise of placing all respondent participant names in a draw for
$1,000. Brau and Fawcett repeated this paper mailing procedure over three different
mailing solicitations undertaken over a six-month timeframe. 375 Bancel and Mittoo
replicated the methodology of Brau and Fawcett, with the target respondents all being
located in the European Union and the three mailings occurring over an eight-month
timeframe. Assessing this method for its potential application to the PCD Study, it was
clear that the collection of the data by the standard mail method over three different
mailings would make it impractical to complete the data collection effort during the
budgeted timeframe. More importantly, the cost of mailing an extensive survey three
different times, each time with a prepaid return envelope, to thousands of potential PCD
Study participants in Canada necessitates a budget that is orders of magnitude higher than
the available budget for the data collection element in the PCD Study.376
With the classic hard-copy mailing methodology clearly unattainable for adoption in the
PCD Study on an economic basis, other more cost-effective forms of targeting survey
enrollment for the PCD Study were identified and evaluated. Ultimately, it was
determined that an online version of the PCD Study administered through the Qualtrics
online platform would be the most efficient means of distributing and collecting the PCD
Study data. With respect to solicitation efforts to secure sufficient enrollment from the
target groups of participants, it was determined that a combination of recruitment
methods would be applied, in parallel tracks, to maximize the opportunity for reaching
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the enrollment goals within the four- month budgeted timeframe. Three separate
recruitment strategies were originally identified in the Survey Protocol & Research Plan
submitted for the PCD Study.
The first strategy utilized was the direct approach method, in which target participants
were identified from across Canada who were believed to meet the necessary criteria for
the PCD Study. As the senior decision-makers of both the TSX-listed and private
companies were perceived as representing the biggest recruitment challenge in the PCD
Study, the early recruitment efforts were focused on these Group I participants.
The initial challenge to overcome in this first portion of the recruitment plan, which was
not insignificant, was compiling a list of the contact information of the C-suite
executives, directors and major shareholders of the TSX-listed and private companies. A
review of approximately100 different websites demonstrated that the contact information
of the C-suite executives is rarely included on the websites. Only general reception
phone numbers are normally provided for phone inquiries to C-suite executives and
general company contact addresses are listed for email inquiries. A test of inquiries sent
to a number of different company general inquiry mailboxes explaining the nature of the
PCD Study and asking for the information to be forwarded to the relevant C-suite
executives generated no responses. As soon as an inquiry was identified by the corporate
gatekeeper as originating from a non-customer of the business, it was ignored. Clearly,
this avenue of inquiry was a non-starter and was quickly abandoned.
Ultimately, it was determined that successfully reaching individual C-suite executives
based on the contact details available on the company website required calling the
general reception number and asking the attendant to forward the call to the executive
assistant for a particular C-suite executive. The executive assistants will invariably be
trained not to pass along the email or phone contact information for the C-suite executive,
so the explanation on the PCD Study and the nature of the request for participation must
be communicated to the executive assistant in the hope that the executive assistant will
relay this request onto the C-suite executive. Again, a test with approximately a dozen
different attempts to secure enrollment of the C-suite executive by communicating
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through the official channels did not generate any successful responses. In hindsight, this
is not surprising at all because of the fact that executive assistants of C-suite executives
invariably have no personal interest in the phenomenon of public company decline. They
are paid to insulate their bosses from such distractions, and most of the executive
assistants see the PCD Study invitation as just one more distraction for their executive.
While the topic of public company decline may be inherently interesting to their bosses,
the message filtered through the executive assistants rarely results in any successful
participant recruitment.
Operating on the belief / hope that a number of significant C-suite executives still read
their own email, the focus for Group I shifted to direct recruitment by accessing direct
email addresses for the target respondents. A list of the specific companies that should be
targeted was compiled from various sources.
For the TSX-listed public companies, identification was simple as a list of all TSX
issuers is available on the TMX website. Starting from the 799 Operating Companies
listed on the TSX during the recruitment phase, a list of 658 Canadian-based companies
was created that became the target group for the PCD Study. The remaining 141 TSXlisted companies not solicited were those TSX-listed companies that have head offices
outside of Canada. The NMREB approvals did not allow for direct solicitation of
individuals located outside of Canada in the PCD Study.
With respect to TSX-eligible private companies, the creation of the target list required
more effort. A variety of sources were consulted, including Lexis / Nexis Public Suite,
Globe & Mail Top 300 Private Companies and the Financial Post 500 Report. A variety
of industry award publications were also consulted, including Canada’s Top SME
Employers and Canada’s Fastest Growing Companies.
Ultimately, the target lists of TSX-listed and TSX-eligible companies were provided to a
marketing solutions company, DataCaptive, who are in the business of compiling
business-to-business data of various types, including C-suite level contact information,
for commercial sale. The list of companies was then compared by DataCaptive against
their list of C-suite contact information and a database of the overlapping records was
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created. DataCaptive also provided additional contact data for private Canadian
companies not otherwise on the private company list originally provided to them based
on company revenue criteria. Ultimately, this database of C-suite contact information
was purchased from DataCaptive and served as the foundation of the solicitation efforts
for the Group I participants discussed hereafter. This data was certified by the vendor,
DataCaptive, as containing the contacts of Canadian executives collected from a number
of public sources, including trade show attendance, and 100% of these were opt-in
confirmed for receipt of communication and cross-checked against the do-not-call
registries. Approval for utilization of these two databases in the PCD Study was sought
from the NMREB prior to initiation of the solicitations.
The second strategy planned for use in the PCD Study enrollment was the use of passive
snowball sampling discussed previously. This recruitment strategy focused on securing
the support of survey participants who expressed a clear interest in the subject matter of
public company decline, and were known to have previously-existing relationships and
direct accessibility to a number of target survey participants. The individuals who were
requested to pass along invitations to the PCD Study were given clear instructions on the
specifics of the NMREB rules for passive snowball sampling and the limitations in what
they were allowed to communicate in the solicitation process. To preserve commonality
of approach and ensure compliance with the NMREB rules, these individuals were asked
to simply pass along the email invitation to the PCD Study to potential participants with a
brief cover note to their contacts highlighting their interest in the topic.
The passive snowball sampling strategy was beta-tested in the law firm context in
February 2019 and it was found to generate a limited return in terms of the actual number
of survey responses completed. Due to the anonymous nature of the responses, it is
unknown what percentage of the responses ultimately resulted from passive snowball
sampling. However, analysis of the response dates and geographic locations of the
respondents demonstrates that less than 15% of the total responses secured in the PCD
Study are attributable to passive snowball sampling.
Ultimately, the plan to pursue further passive snowball sampling as a priority was
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abandoned due to its limited success during the beta testing phase. It is believed that a
number of the individuals in the law firms who were requested to pass along the survey
invitations did, in fact, pass along the requests. However, the final response uptake was
low because of the lack of direct connection to the investigators in the study. Rather, it
became apparent that a successful recruitment strategy required a more direct connection
between the respondents and the study investigators that only arises through direct
communication. For the purposes of PCD Study, therefore, the limitations imposed by
the NMREB significantly impacted the effectiveness of snowball sampling as a viable
strategy.
The third recruitment methodology initially identified in the Survey Protocol & Research
Plan was the use of industry conferences and trade shows to solicit target respondents.
This approach was beta-tested during the annual Prospectors & Developers Association
of Canada conference in Toronto in March 2019. Ultimately, this method was also
abandoned after the beta-test, as it was found that return on investment was too low to
justify the time and expense associated with conference attendance. With respect to
Group II participants who are readily accessible at the trade shows, other avenues of
contact were available for PCD Study recruitment which are discussed in more detail
hereafter. With respect to the C-suite executives, it was found that their time is in such
high demand during the trade shows that it is very difficult to individually get their
attention in the trade show format. After presentations, the lineup of people waiting to
talk to each C-suite executive was several people deep, making it only practical to talk to
3 or 4 C-suite executives in a full day. Although conversations with C-suite executives
were generally successful in securing survey participation, the number of recruitments
per day were simply too small to continue that investment.
A fourth recruitment strategy not originally included in the Survey Protocol & Research
Plan was added to the list of potential recruitment tools and tested at a beta level. This
new methodology involved the use of a targeted social media campaign executed through
the LinkedIn platform. This particular strategy was added based on the recommendation
of a social media marketing expert and involved the creation of a short animation that
summarized the content of the PCD Study Invitation in animated form. Ultimately,
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although this strategy generated a number of “click-throughs” to the first page of the
survey, it resulted in very few additional completed surveys and was abandoned as being
economically inefficient.
In summary, having tried each of the three recruitment strategies originally outlined in
the Survey Protocol & Research Plan and a fourth recruitment strategy identified midstream, it was determined that the direct recruitment strategy, in which the PCD Study
investigator directly contacts the target participants via phone and email, was the most
effective strategy in terms of return on investment (i.e., the number of completed
responses secured per hour of time spent on the recruitment process). Once this
conclusion was reached, the recruitment efforts for the remainder of the PCD Study were
focused primarily on the direct solicitation strategy with a small component of passive
snowball sampling, used on an opportunistic basis, where available.

5.8- Summary of Group I Recruitment Process
After going through the identification process described above, a final list of
approximately 1,100 usable emails for C-suite executive of TSX public companies and a
list of approximately 2,100 usable emails for C-suite executives of Canadian private
companies was established as the master lists for solicitation of the Group I participants.
Notably, the C-suite records typically did not include direct phone number information
for the C-suite executives, but rather included only main company phone numbers.
The two master lists of C-suite executives from TSX public companies were uploaded to
the Mail Chimp website, an electronic management platform for electronic marketing and
solicitations. Utilization of the Mail Chimp system for email distribution allows for realtime monitoring of the status of email solicitation campaigns and analysis of results.
Mail Chimp also allows for any recipient to immediately click “unsubscribe” if they view
the email solicitation as an unwanted intrusion. The email addresses for any individuals

171

who unsubscribed were immediately removed from the list. 377
Each person on the target database list received an email inviting them to participate in
the PCD Study and briefly describing the PCD Study based on the form of email
solicitation script approved by the NMREB. Each email included an html link that could
be clicked by the recipient and would take the prospective respondent to the introductory
page of the online version of the PCD Study.
The first email solicitation from Mail Chimp was distributed on March 6, 2019. Three
additional email distributions were sent using the Mail Chimp distribution platform on
March 21, April 2 and April 16, 2019, respectively. Ultimately, these four solicitations
resulted in a total of 228 participants responding who were senior business decisionmakers of TSX-listed or private companies (i.e., Group I participants). 378
The total number of 228 responses received from all Group I participants compared to the
total number or 3200 original solicitations sent out to potential Group I recruits equates to
a response rate of 7.1%. In and of itself, this was a surprisingly stellar response rate for
an internet-based survey without any contact to the recipients to validate that the
solicitation was not an elaborate phishing attempt. However, the actual effective
response rate is likely even higher as the original email invitation outlines the minimum
qualifications required for survey participation, and there were certainly numerous emails
on the list from the Data Captive-supplied group of private company names who did not
meet the minimum requirements to be eligible for the survey. The number of Group I
private company respondents was 125 individuals out of the original 2100 solicitations,
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A total of 20 individuals, from the 3,200 email solicitations originally sent to C-suite executives,
representing 0.6%, selected the option to unsubscribe from the mailing list.
378

For the purpose of determining response rates, only those individuals who completed the third question
in the PCD Study (confirming which of the two main groups of respondents they were part of) were
counted as having responded to the survey. As such, 228 is the number of individuals who selected “Group
I: Senior Business Decision-Maker” in their Question 3 response. This methodology under-reports the
number of total respondents in the PCD Study as a result of the attrition discussed later in this chapter, but
is the most conservative reporting option. Although it is known there was an overall attrition of 25
respondents prior to the completion of Question 3 in the Qualtrics platform, it is unknown what percentage
of the attritions were senior business decision-makers.
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representing a response rate of 6.0%. 379 The number of Group I TSX-listed respondents
was 103 individuals out of the original 1100 solicitations, representing a response rate of
9.4%.
In addition to participating in the study, dozens of replies were received by email from
the individuals receiving the invitations. Most of these email communications expressed
support for the importance of the research being completed on public decline and
indicated that they were pleased that empirical academic research was finally being
undertaken in this area. A number of other responses were received by individuals who
indicated that their companies did not meet the minimum criteria set out in the survey
based on residence, control or maturity of the business, but stating that they would have
participated in the PCD Study if they had met the eligibility conditions. A single
negative response was received from a disgruntled recipient who was upset at being
disturbed with a solicitation on his work email.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that there is a high degree of suspicion towards
any unsolicited email in the current online environment. Many business organizations
prohibit any emails being opened from unverified sources and standard institutional IT
security training protocols advise against opening emails from unknown senders. Often
internal IT firewalls will transfer any emails from sources that have not been
independently verified and place them in clutter folders, requiring the recipients to
specifically release those responses to their inboxes before the pictures and other email
functionality of the email are visible. Again, it is unknown what percentage of the emails
sent out via the Mail Chimp campaign reached the targeted inboxes of the recipients as

379

The “effective” response rate for the private company respondents is certainly higher than the reported
response rate of 6.0% given, given that the reported rate of 6.0% does not account for emails sent to
individuals who were ineligible to participate according to the criteria established for the PCD Study.
Apparent from the eligibility responses of the senior business decision makers of private companies in the
PCD Study along with the direct email replies received from the Mail Chimp recruitment program, a
number of the email solicitations sent to senior business decision-makers of private companies were
received by individuals working in companies that did not meet the minimum eligibility criteria in terms of
size or stage of development in order to be TSX-eligible. It is uncertain what percentage of the email
solicitation recipients from private companies were ineligible to participate.
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opposed to being trapped in filters.
On the whole the Mail Chimp email solicitation campaign completed on the Group I
senior business decision-makers has to be considered as a significant success considering
all of the limitations associated with the online email solicitation methodology and the
inherently challenging nature of securing the attention of the targeted Group I
respondents.
How the response rates compare to other survey-based studies undertaken elsewhere will
be discussed later in this Dissertation.

5.9- Summary of the Group II Recruitment Process
The following section provides the details of the recruitment process for the various
targeted subgroups. A table summarizing this information is included later in this chapter
in Section 5.11.1. The solicitation of the Group II respondents occurred in two different
phases. The first phase involved live presentations made to the securities law groups at
two of Canada’s pre-eminent businesses law firms, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP and
McCarthy Tétrault LLP. In both situations, the law firms provided a live platform for the
Co-Investigator to present the PCD Study across a number of different offices through
simulcast. The presentation to McCarthy Tétrault occurred in Toronto (with a simulcast
to the Montreal, Quebec City, Ottawa, Calgary and Vancouver offices) on February 12,
2019. The presentation to Blake, Cassels & Graydon took place in Calgary (with a
simulcast to Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal) on February 22, 2019. The total
number of lawyers participating in these presentations was approximately 75. These two
law firm presentations resulted in approximately 30 responses to the PCD Study being
completed by securities lawyers and corporate lawyers.
Other than those live presentations, an intensive email and phone solicitation campaign
was initiated to secure enrollment from the four subgroups of Group II participants. With
respect to each subgroup, the recruitment process was initiated by compiling databases of
both email addresses and phone numbers of securities lawyers, accountants / auditors,
investment bankers and private equity investors across Canada.
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The major difference in accessibility to contact information between the Group I and
Group II participants is that many of the websites for Group II participants include both
direct phone numbers to specific individuals and direct emails for all levels of their
members. As such, whereas it was extremely difficult to by-pass the executive assistants
and communicate directly with the Group I senior business decision-makers via phone, it
was relatively straightforward to directly contact the Group II public markets influencers.
The databases for the Group II public markets influencers were compiled by the CoInvestigator directly from firm websites. Each of the four different categories of public
markets influencers had their own nuances in terms of accessibility that necessitated
adjustment of the recruitment strategy to respond to the specific information available.
With respect to the subgroup of securities / corporate lawyers, the initial two
presentations to the two major corporate law firms mentioned above resulted in 29
responses with a strong representation across British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario. It
was clear in the presentations that this issue resonated strongly with securities lawyers, in
particular, and that it would be possible to recruit a large cohort of lawyers to participate.
However, it was determined that the target number of total responses for the securities /
corporate lawyers subgroup should not exceed 50 in order to ensure that the opinions of
this particular demographic were not overrepresented in the PCD Study data as a whole.
As such, it was decided that the recruitment target for the securities / corporate lawyer
database would be focused primarily in the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Manitoba and
Saskatchewan, which remained underrepresented after the initial law firm presentations.
The lawyers targeted for the email/phone solicitation phase, therefore, were lawyers from
those specific provinces who met the following conditions: (i) they worked in firms
identified as the most recommended for securities law expertise in the Lexpert rankings;
(ii) they were identified in their profiles as specializing in securities law; and (iii) they
had a direct phone number and a direct email listed online for contacting the individual.
A total of 72 additional lawyers were contacted during this recruitment phase, resulting in
an additional 20 PCD Study responses being completed through the Qualtrics platform.
At that point, the total number of responses from lawyers stood at 49 and further
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recruitment efforts were discontinued for this particular subgroup. Certainly, further
recruitment would have been successful in securing higher participation from the
lawyers.
With respect to the subgroup of accountants / auditors, there were greater hurdles to
recruitment. Specifically, none of the “big four” accounting firms publish individual
names, practice profiles, addresses or email contacts of their accounting professionals.
Yet, the big four accounting firms account for a significant percentage of the overall audit
work completed for public companies in Canada.
In order to deal with this recruitment hurdle, senior practice group leaders were identified
from the public audit and assurance divisions and contacted at each of the big four
accounting firms. In each case, a description of the PCD Study was relayed to the
practice group leader and a request was made for the practice group leaders to forward
the PCD Study invitation internally amongst the individuals with significant experience
in the public audit and assurance groups. Once again, the lack of direct contact
information for specific individuals published on the big four websites necessitated the
use of passive snowball sampling for solicitation within the big four accounting firms,
and once again this practice proved wholly ineffective as only five responses were
received as a result of this particular solicitation effort. Clearly, the inability to contact
the potential participants directly resulted in a very limited uptake in survey participation.
After hitting this roadblock and having exhausted the obvious recruitment opportunities
within the big four accounting firms, the recruitment strategy for accountants / auditors
was shifted in focus beyond the big four. In support of this effort, a database was
compiled of all of the accounting firms in Canada beyond the big four who were listed in
the top 20 accounting firms in terms of revenue and also published individual contact
information and practice profiles for their accounting professionals. 380 Fortunately, 13
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The database of the top 20 firms in Canada was compiled from a variety of different online sources and
firms appearing consistently across the lists were included in the database. One of the published lists used
was: Statistica, “Leading accounting firms in Canada”, accessed April 15, 2019, online:< Statshttps://
www.statista.com/statistics/478822/leading-canadian-accounting-firms-by-revenue>
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out of the 16 accounting firms, other than the big four, who were listed in the top 20
accounting firms in Canada publish individual practice profiles and contact data. In the
case of the auditors / accountants, the database compiled included all professionals from
the 13 accounting firms whose practice profiles listed an expertise in audit and assurance
(public or private), had at least five years of industry experience and included individual
contact information. This resulted in the identification of 108 targeted individuals for
recruitment, and ultimately led to 34 additional responses in the PCD Study being
completed.
Turning to investment bankers, a similar issue was encountered here as with the auditor /
accountant group. Namely, the bank-owned investment banking firms do not publish any
personal contact information for their investment banking divisions and only publicly
disclose the names of their department heads. Once again, the recruitment effort within
the bank-owned investment banking firms had to rely on direct presentations to groups
and passive snowball sampling, which evidenced limited success in securing a significant
number of PCD Study responses.
It was again found that the majority of investment banking firms in Canada other than the
bank-owned firms do indeed provide personal contact details for both phone numbers and
emails for all of their principals and employees. In this case, a list of investment banks in
Canada was assembled from a variety of sources (including Bloomberg league tables,
Reuters M&A advisory tables and a number of other lists). A recruitment database was
created containing individuals from the investment banking firms with a least 5 years of
industry experience, whose firms listed both a direct phone number and an email contact.
The investment banking database identified a total of 138 targets for PCD Study
recruitment, resulting in 45 completed PCD responses.
Near the end of the enrollment process, an opportunity arose to make live presentations to
groups of senior investment bankers from CIBC World Markets and Scotia Capital.
These presentations were made in Toronto on June 12, 2019, resulting in three additional
PCD responses being completed online. Although these in-person presentations did not
result in a large number of completed PCD Study responses, the information gleaned
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from the investment bankers in the discussions was highly illuminating on the specific
topic of the potential impact on the flow of investment capital into ETF’s.
Finally, turning to the subgroup of private equity investors, it was initially anticipated
that this would be the most difficult of all of the categories of public markets influencers
to enroll. However, that turned out not to be the case, as the private equity investors
demonstrated a higher degree of interest in the public company decline topic than
expected.
Once again, a database was compiled of all of the significant private equity firms based in
Canada from a variety of different sources. From this original list, an analysis was
completed of which firms published the individual phone numbers and emails of their
personnel. A target recruitment database was then recruited which included the names of
all of the personnel at these firms who operated in the investment portfolio divisions of
the private equity firms, had been in the business for at least five years, and had published
direct emails and phone numbers available. This effort resulted in a target recruitment
database of 198 private equity investors, from which 59 completed PCD Study responses
were ultimately received.
In summary, the recruitment process for the PCD Study was an iterative process, with a
significant degree of trial and error resulting in refinement of each element of the
recruitment methodology. Of the four different methodologies that were originally
conceived and attempted during the recruitment process, only the direct recruitment
strategy can be classified as having been an unqualified success. Overall, more than 80%
of the total responses in the PCD Study occurred as a result of direct recruitment efforts.
In the Group I recruitment phase in which individual phone numbers were not available,
a response rate between 6.0% (for private company C-suite executives) and 9.4% (for
TSX-listed C-suite executives) for the email solicitations was observed. However the
response rates for the Group II participants in the email solicitations were materially
higher: (i) for securities / corporation lawyers, 20 completed responses out of 72 email
solicitations for a 27.8% response rate; (ii) for accountants / auditors, 36 completed
responses out of 108 email solicitations for a 33.3% response rate; (iii) for investment
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bankers, 45 completed responses out of 138 email solicitations for a 32.6% response rate;
and (iv) for private equity investors, 59 completed responses out of 198 email
solicitations for a 29.8% response rate.
Reflecting further on the recruitment process, it is clear that the key to the significantly
higher response rates for the Group II participants compared to the Group I participants
was the ability of the Co-Investigator to access individual phone numbers for most of the
Group II participants who were ultimately solicited. This conclusion can be inferred
from the fact that, other than the follow-up phone call, the format of the email solicitation
was identical for the Group I participants and Group II participants.
For each Group II target participant solicited, a personal phone call was made to the
target recipient within 15 minutes of the delivery of the initial email invitation by the CoInvestigator. The phone was answered by the target recipient in only approximately 20%
of the instances. In the other 80% of instances where the call went to voicemail, a
detailed message was left for each individual. The voicemail message introduced the CoInvestigator, advised the target recipients that the Co-Investigator was following up on an
email invitation that had recently been sent to the target recipient, then continued on to
quickly summarize the nature of the PCD Study and personally invited the target
recipient to participate in the PCD Study. The voicemail message concluded with the
Co-Investigator leaving his phone number and inviting the recipient to either email or call
the Co-Investigator back with any questions or concerns on the survey.
This additional step in recruitment methodology for Group II target recipients is simple in
theory, but necessitated more than 500 phone calls to the Group II email recipients alone.
With the Co-Investigator able to make approximately 5 phone calls per hour, the phone
call follow-up step required the investment of approximately 100 additional hours of
effort to support the recruitment effort. However, it is clear from the results that the
simple act of following up each email solicitation for the Group II respondents in the
PCD Study with a phone call on a timely basis was sufficient to materially reduce the
concern of the email recipients that the solicitation was a sophisticated phishing attempt
and thereby increase their likelihood of participation. Many of the phone call recipients
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indicated verbally that they had dismissed the original email solicitation as a potential
phishing attempt, but were willing to complete the survey once this fear was eliminated
as a result of the phone-call follow-up.
This approach also made it apparent that it is unnecessary that the target recipients
actually speak to the researchers on the phone in order for the phone call strategy to be
successful. Many emails and phone calls were received from target participants who
indicated that they had received the voicemail message and that they were intending to
complete (or had already completed) the PCD Study. This level of feedback was
unexpected, but provided clear evidence of the value of being able to access a direct
phone number for the target recipient and making the investment in leaving voicemail
messages to confirm the veracity of the email in ultimately improving the response ratio.
In summary, one of the key take-aways from the direct recruitment efforts in the PCD
Study was confirmation that the biggest challenge in executing an electronic-based
recruitment strategy through email is the inherent distrust that exists for any unverified
solicitations from unknown sources. Without any external verification in the form of an
accompanying phone call, many of the emails sent to Group I participations targets were
certainly deleted without even being opened simply as standard security procedure.
Considering the volume of spam that arrives in email inboxes daily, and the number of
competing requests that senior business decision makers face for their valuable time, the
responses rates from the Group I respondents were surprisingly strong. However, with
access to the personal phone numbers of the Group II respondents, the extra step of
making a follow-up phone call (even if the target participant does not answer) more than
tripled the response rate between the Group I and Group II respondents. This particular
observation from the PCD Study should be noted for future electronic-based email
surveys.

5.10- Probability Sampling and Bias
A paramount goal for survey recruitment planning and execution is to ensure that
systemic error (bias) is eliminated to the greatest degree practical. Although true
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probability sampling is impossible to achieve in survey design for populations such as
those targeted in the PCD Study, the objective nevertheless continues to be that the
selection methodologies applied ensure that the group of respondents solicited comes as
close as possible to true probability sampling.
True probability sampling occurs where a surveying methodology is adopted in which
everyone within a target population has an equal chance of being solicited to participate
in the survey, and the ultimate determination of who is actually solicited to participate is
done on a random basis. The textbook example of true probability sampling historically
was where every 10th name listed in a phone book for a city is selected to be solicited.
However, true probability sampling is very rare in practice, even in the modern
environment. Indeed, even the classic phone book example no longer constitutes true
probability sampling as a significant percentage of the populations no longer have
landline phones and therefore are not listed in telephone directories. As such, using the
phonebook as a basis for determining survey enrollment now can be viewed as
introducing clear systemic error because landlines (from which the phone book listings
are derived) are disproportionately used by seniors and rarely used by millennials. The
phonebook as a data source no longer even approximates the characteristics of broader
population. Moreover, the few data sources that do allow for true probability sampling in
the modern environment in the broader populations (like Government of Canada census)
are generally inaccessible to researchers due to privacy concerns.
As stated, the nature of the target participants in the PCD Study makes it impossible to
implement true probability sampling mechanisms. There is no single database accessible
to researchers containing the names of all the eligible participants in any one of the six
main categories of target participants. Not even the Government of Canada with all of its
statistical resources possesses a comprehensive database of the senior decision-makers in
TSX-eligible private companies. The direct and repeated recruitment efforts required to
secure sufficient survey enrollment consequently dictates that non-probability
mechanisms must be applied.
The goal in the recruitment process for the PCD Study therefore, is to adopt appropriate

181

policies and procedures to ensure that the actual recruitment methodology utilized comes
as close as is reasonably practical to statistical sampling. Statistical sampling is a type of
probability sampling that ensures proper representation of strata or cohorts reflected in
the population in order to minimize systemic error (bias). As such, the target is to
achieve the best approximation of probability sampling that can be achieved through a
recruitment process by the Co-Investigator, executed in a reasonable timeframe and with
reference to the financial resources available, without actually using true probability
sampling.
Since it is impossible to recruit a true probability sample in the PCD Study, it is also not
possible to calculate the true margin of error for the study. However, as the PCD Study
attempts to approximate a probability sample, statistical inference methods (such as
confidence levels, statistical significance, P-values, etc.) that assume a probability sample
will be used in the analysis of the PCD Study, while recognizing that attempts to
extrapolate the results to the greater population will be limited by the lack of a true
probability sample.
It is submitted that the version of the PCD Study executed adequately approximates true
probability sampling methodology in the specific context of the factors surrounding the
survey and with regard to the time and budgetary constraints. To support this assertion,
the recruitment strategy with respect to each of the six categories of target participants
will be quickly discussed.
With respect to Group I target recipients from private companies, the list of initial target
companies was compiled from a number of independent industry sources. With respect
to the Group I target recipients of TSX-listed companies, the initial list of target
companies was a comprehensive list of all current Canadian-based Operating Companies
currently listed on the TSX. In both of these circumstances, the lists were crossreferenced against the entire DataCaptive list of C-suite contact data and all individuals in
the C-suite contact list who met the target eligibility criteria were selected as target
participants and were ultimately solicited for participation. As such, if there is any
identifiable recruitment bias with respect to the Group I target respondents, it arises from
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the processes that DataCaptive utilizes to collect their C-suite contact data. Confirming
specifically what those processes are is beyond our scope of direct knowledge, but it is
known that DataCaptive’s data gathering processes are extensive and combine machine
learning, extensive analysis of company website data, predictive analysis and human
intelligence. 381 If an individual respondent at the C-suite level in Canada is not on the
DataCaptive list, it is likely because they have been intentional in keeping their contact
information private. That group of individuals is likely unreachable through any
mechanism or database available to the PCD Study effort. In the case of incomplete
population lists, sampling frame error is unavoidable. Yet, it is submitted that the Group
I target recipients in the PCD Study were objectively selected, broadly solicited and there
is no apparent recruitment bias evident in the methodology. If there is bias to be found
from within the Group I respondents, it is more likely to be non-response bias than
recruitment bias, a risk factor which is identified and discussed later in this Research
Methodology chapter.
With respect to the potential for bias in the Group II target participants, it is undeniable
that the PCD Study does indeed evidence selection bias with respect to one particular
subgroup, namely the securities/corporate lawyer class. The significant number of PCD
Study respondents generated as a result of the live presentations to Blake, Cassels &
Graydon and McCarthy Tétrault in February 2019 certainly leads to the result that
securities lawyers from these two firms are overrepresented in the PCD Study data.
Moreover, it also results in the participants from other large corporate law firms based in
Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta not having been given the same opportunity to
participate in the PCD Study.
While this high degree of concentration from two law firms is methodologically
problematic in that it represents selection error from a statistics procedure perspective, it
is submitted that this issue in PCD Study methodology should not be interpreted as
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See Data Captive website for a more in-depth discussion of their data collection and validation
procedures: online:<www.datacaptive.com>.
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materially diminishing the value of the PCD Study data from the legal subgroup. Both
McCarthy Tétrault and Blake, Cassels & Graydon are consistently ranked at the top of
both the Lexpert practice area rankings for corporate finance and securities law in Canada
based on industry recommendations and the published “league tables” by Bloomberg and
Thomson Reuters with transaction volume in corporate finance activity. As such, these
two particular law firms are clearly amongst the most knowledgeable and most respected
in the area of corporate finance and securities law, and also work on the greatest number
of relevant transactions.
There is no particular indication that the securities / corporate lawyers in two particular
firms evidence any type of firm-related bias on the issues tested in the PCD Study, but to
the degree that any firm-related perceptions do exist in the relevant subject areas they are
certainly well-informed perceptions. Law firms do not generally exhibit any degree of
ideological hegemony, and the opinions of individual lawyers within the firms are formed
by their specific experiences. Ultimately, the overrepresentation of these two law firms
in the PCD Data represents one of those items that must be noted for the sake of fully
disclosing potential sources of selection error, but is more problematic from a
methodological purity perspective than from a pragmatic perspective in terms of the
likely impact on the quality of the PCD Data.
With respect to the other Group II respondents, a second item to note in potential
selection error is the undeniable underrepresentation in the PCD Study data from the big
four accounting firms and from the bank-owned investment banking firms. There is no
question that both of those groups of target participants have lower representation in the
PCD Study data than would be warranted by their overall importance and market share
within their particular industries. However, as discussed previously in this Dissertation,
the underrepresentation of these participants in the PCD Study is a direct result of the
unwillingness of the big four accounting firms and the bank-owned investment banking
firms to publish individual contact data for their key employees, thereby making direct
contact with these individuals extremely difficult.
It is submitted that all reasonable avenues of contact were exhausted in the course of the
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PCD Study recruitment effort to increase the participation of these particular target
participants (including keeping the recruitment period open for 3 additional weeks and
flying across the country to make in-person presentations to bank-owned investment
banks), but the limitations associated with the NMREB guidelines on survey recruitment
generally, and passive snowball sampling specifically, limited the impact of these efforts.
Once again, this potential issue on selection bias is more problematic conceptually than
pragmatically, as the target participant groups who were accessible and participated in the
PCD Study certainly brought a high degree of experience in the capital markets to their
analysis.

5.11- Assessment of Non-Response Bias in the PCD Study
In addition to sample design error discussed in the previous section, including sampling
frame and selection error, any proper research methodology analysis must assess the
potential impact of non-response bias.
Assessment of Overall Response Rate in the PCD Study
The first level of analysis on the non-response bias topic is consideration of the overall
response rates and the individual category response rates compared to other academic
studies. The individual category responses rates in the PCD Study have been discussed
above, but are summarized here again. 382
Table 1- Summary of Response Rate by Demographic Subgroup
Individuals
Category of Respondents
Solicitated
Group I- TSX-Listed Company senior decision-makers
1100
Group I- Private Company senior decision-makers
2100
Group II- Securities / corporate lawyers
147
Group II- Auditors / accountants
120
Group II- Investment Bankers
145
Group II- Private equity investors
203

382

Responses
Attained
103
125
49
39
48
59

Response
Rate
9.4%
6.0%
33.3%
32.5%
33.1%
29.1%

The numbers for the total solicitations and responses in the following table include both the live
solicitations made in person as well as the email / phone solicitations. The numbers reported previously
represented only the email / phone solicitations. This accounts for the small variations between the
response rates previously discussed and the numbers reported in the following table. The total solicitation
numbers do not account for any passive snowball sampling efforts, as the number of solicitations relayed
through this methodology are indeterminate and outside the ability of the researchers to assess.
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Category of Respondents
Total- All Respondents
(includes both direct solicitations in person and online
solicitations through email)

Individuals
Solicitated
3,815

Responses
Attained
423

Response
Rate
11.1%

Overall, the minimum overall response rate for the PCD Study is reported at 11.1%. This
statistic is referred to as the “minimum” because of the fact that the email invitation to the
initial 2,100 invitees in the Group I- Private Company category defined several minimum
eligibility criteria for participation in the survey. It is unknown what percentage of that
solicitation list actually meets all of the qualification criteria outlined in the invitation, so
it is unclear what percentage of the targeted respondents who received the initial email
declined from participating solely on the basis that they failed to meet the eligibility
criteria. As such, while we can infer that the actual response rate of eligible respondents
was higher than 6.0% for this particular category, it is impossible to determine how much
higher. Once again, the decision has been taken to report the most conservative position
statistically.
How, then, does the PCD Study overall response rate of 11.1% compare with other
surveys completed in similar academic studies? It has already been discussed that this is
believed to be the first empirical study of its kind completed specifically on the topic of
public company decline in the world, so there is nothing in the literature that is directly
comparable. However, it is also discussed in Chapter 2- Literature Review that Brau /
Fawcett and Bancel / Mitoo have completed survey-based studies in the United States
and Europe, respectively, focused on the motivation of companies for completing
IPOs. 383 Both of those studies solicited respondents using the more time-consuming and
expensive methods of mailing hard-copies of their surveys with pre-paid self-addressed
return envelopes, repeating the mailing three times. The Brau / Fawcett study also handaddressed each envelope (no labels) for personalization and offered the prospect of
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financial rewards based on respondents being eligible to participate in a draw for a cash
prize. 384
Ultimately, Brau and Fawcett report an overall response rate of 18.8%. 385 Brau and
Fawcett note that their response rate compares very favorably to what they describe as the
leading precedent for surveys of senior executives set by Graham and Harvey, who
reported a response rate of just under 9%. 386 The Graham and Harvey study is notable in
that they are also targeting senior officers of companies. Graham and Harvey disclose
their methodology as involving the sending of both a mail and a fax version of their
survey to the target participants. Graham and Harvey then discuss that they followed up
with each target recipient by having a team of 10 MBA students make individual phone
calls to each targeted participant. In their analysis, Graham and Harvey cite a number of
other academic surveys of senior officers to support their assertion that their response rate
of approximately 9% is indicative of other outcomes. 387
As a further point of comparison, Mittoo and Bancel report an overall response rate of
4.3%, which they describe as “reasonable considering the length of time, the nature of the
data gathered and the number of countries involved” and draw comparisons to other
survey-based studies of senior executives with responses rates in the 5% range. 388
An additional issue to be considered in comparing the PCD Study response rate to these
other three studies is the relevance of the use of email solicitations in the PCD Study.
None of the other three studies utilized the email solicitation methodology, likely because
the public sources from which the investigators constructed their databases included
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physical mailing addresses but did not include direct email addresses for the senior
executives being targeted for solicitation. On this topic, a 2002 meta-analysis of surveys
undertaken using both email and regular mail solicitations reported that the large majority
of surveys encountered a significantly lower response rate through email than through
regular mail. 389
With this discussion as background, how does the PCD Study response rate compare to
these three particular studies of senior executives? The overall response rate of 11.1%
from the PCD Study is higher than the reported response rates of both Mittoo/Bancel and
Graham/Harvey, but lower than Brau and Fawcett. This higher response rate in the PCD
Study was achieved notwithstanding that the PCD Study used email solicitation as a
primary recruitment tool, where Mittoo/Bancel and Graham/Harvey used the higher cost
regular mail delivery option which often leads to higher response rates. 390
Comparing the PCD Study specifically to Brau and Fawcett, it is notable that the Brau
and Fawcett study was financially supported by five different external funding sources
disclosed in the acknowledgements. Although the total budget of Brau and Fawcett is not
disclosed, it is clear that their recruitment budget was orders of magnitude higher than the
PCD Study. Brau and Fawcett also offered a $1,000 cash prize drawn amongst those
individuals who participated in the study. Based on these factors, it is submitted that the
PCD Study response rate compares favorably to Brau and Fawcett.
Beyond these three particular studies, Cycyota and Harrison have published a metaanalysis on response rates for surveys of executives generally. 391 Their analysis of the
literature reports response rates for surveys of executives ranging from 3.5% to 18.1%
where there is follow-up by the investigators, but no financial incentive for participation.
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At the 11.1% level of overall response rate, therefore, the PCD Study compares favorably
to the previously-undertaken survey-based academic studies seeking the input of seniorlevel business executives.
Analysis of Non-Response Bias Based on Demographic
Participation in the PCD Study
The next level of analysis for potential non-response bias is to consider how well the
demographic make-up of the PCD Study participants reflects the overall demographic
make-up of the entire target population. This analysis will be undertaken in three
components: (i) geographic representation; (ii) industry representation; and (iii) late vs.
early response analysis.
Beginning with the geographic representation, the are several different metrics that can
be used to assess how well the PCD Study respondents reflect the overall Canadian
economy. However, since the ultimate focus of the PCD Study is in the area of public
company decline at the senior stock exchange level, the most logical foundation is to look
at the geographic distribution of the existing TSX Operating Companies. The current
breakdown of TSX Operating Companies by the jurisdiction of the corporate head offices
compared to the percentage representation of each province in the PCD is as follows: 392
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Table 2- Percentage of TSX Operating Company Head Offices by Province
Percentage of TSX
Operating Company Head
Offices

Percentage of
Respondents
in the PCD Study

British Columbia

21.5%

12.2%

Alberta

20.6%

25.6%

Saskatchewan

0.6%

0.9%

Manitoba

1.7%

2.1%

Ontario

40.3%

48.2%

Quebec

13.2%

4.9%

Atlantic Provinces

2.0%

5.8%

Province

On the whole, the data demonstrates that the geographic representation of the respondents
in the PCD Study is a realistic reflection of the percentage of Canadian public companies
based in each province with two obvious exceptions. British Columbia and Quebec are
both under-represented in the PCD Study compared to their degree of importance in the
public company ecosphere. However, these particular outcomes were anticipated and are
representative of similar issues seen in other Canadian survey-based research projects.
British Columbians have been observed to have lower participation rates generally than
other provinces in Canada in survey-based research. 393 In Quebec, participation rates
decline significantly when the survey is not available in French, which is consistent with
the understanding that non-response rates increase significantly when the survey is not
carried out in the first language of the target recipients. 394 This language limitation in
the PCD Study was unavoidable, as the Co-Investigator responsible for recruitment
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efforts has no French language capacity and financial resources were not available to
secure sufficient bilingual supports to solicit, collate and interpret the PCD Study results
in French.
Other than the underrepresentation by British Columbia and Quebec, the geographic
distribution of the PCD Study is quite consistent in reflecting the proportion of TSXlisted Operating Companies emanating from each province. The underrepresentation
from British Columbia and Quebec results in a small overrepresentation from each of the
other provinces or regions. On the whole, therefore, there is some potential for nonresponse bias on a geographic basis due to the underrepresentation in British Columbia
and Quebec, but these particular limitations are systemic in English-language Canadian
research surveys generally.
Turning now to industry representation, a similar methodology will be used in the
analysis. Although a variety of calculations could be applied to determine what the target
industry breakdown should be, this analysis will utilize the current break-down of
Operating Companies on the TSX by industry as the target for comparison. The
following show the comparison of the industry breakdown by the three major industry
segments tracked throughout the PCD Study compared to the percentage reflected by
Group I senior decision-makers who participated as PCD Study respondents.
Table 3- Industry Comparison of PCD Respondents to Current TSX Operating Companies
Percentage of
General Industry Category
Percentage of TSX
Respondents
Companies
in the PCD Study
Oil & Gas / Pipelines /
19.2%
22.6%
Energy Services
Mining
25.2%
20.3%
Non-Resource Based
55.6%
57.1%

The table evidences that the mining sector is slightly underrepresented in the PCD Study
compared to its actual weighting in the overall TSX Operating Company list. Again, this
outcome is not unexpected because of the high concentration of mining companies based
in British Columbia where, as discussed above, the overall response rate is known to be
generally lower than the rest of Canada. On the whole, it is submitted that the industry
breakdown of the PCD Study respondents correlates sufficiently to the overall weighting
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of the industry breakdown of the current list of TSX Operating Companies such that
geographic non-response bias is not a material concern.
Last in this portion of the analysis is an evaluation of the PCD Study data according to
early and late responses, using the late-response analysis as an analog for simulating nonresponse bias. This test is frequently applied in similar studies to test for non-response
bias, including both the Brau / Fawcett and Bancel / Mittoo studies discussed
previously. 395 In the PCD Study, completing this portion of the analysis is somewhat
complicated by the fact that the Group II public markets influencers were recruited either
through two different methodologies that principally determine the early and late
responders (i.e., for lawyers) or were recruited through an intensive effort over a short
period of time (i.e., for accountants, investment bankers and private equity investors),
thereby eliminating these cohorts from the early / late response analysis. This leaves only
the Group I respondents for the early / late analysis.
One of the methodologies generally accepted as valid in testing survey results for nonresponse bias is comparing the first 30 responses received (i.e., the early responders) to
the last 30 responses received (i.e., the late responders). 396 Analysis of the 30 early
responders and the 30 late responders amongst the Group I cohort were run using Fisher’s
F-test in the software program “R”, testing for evidence of variability in the make-up of
respondents by demographic representation as well as variability in the nature of the
responses.
In terms of demographic representation, there was no statistically significant difference
found between the early and late responders with respect to geographical distribution or
years of public company experience. A weakly significant difference was found with
respect to years of total career experience.
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In terms of variability of responses between early and late responders, four key questions
from the PCD Study were selected as best representing the overall attitude of the
participants and disclosing any embedded bias in favour or against the public markets
generally: question 16-7, question 16-8, question 18-1 and question 18-2. The specifics of
these questions are discussed later in this chapter. Applying Fisher’s F test, no
statistically significant difference was found between the early responders and the late
responders on any of these four key questions.
As such, the early vs. late responder analysis suggests that the PCD Study data does not
materially suffer from non-response bias in terms of demographic make-up or responses
on key questions.

5.12- Demographic Overview of the PCD Study Respondents
In the PCD Study recruitment, no minimum amount of career experience was specified as
a gating condition in survey eligibility criteria. However, the Group I respondents are
required to be in positions at the C-Suite levels of their TSX-listed or TSX-eligible
companies, or else serve as directors or major shareholders, in order to qualify for the
PCD Study. In the Canadian context, that level of seniority in a business organization
generally implies that the individual has a significant degree of overall career experience.
A Group II respondent can have less overall experience than a Group I respondent,
because the Group II respondents do not have to reach a similar level of seniority in their
organizations in order to qualify for the PCD Study. However, as previously discussed,
the databases compiled for solicitation of the Group II participants were limited to
individuals with a minimum of 5 years of business experience in their respective
professions.
Looking to the PCD Study data, we observe that 100% of the Group I respondents have
at least 10 years of experience in their business careers. Further, over 61% of Group I
respondents have at least 25 years of career experience, evidencing that the Group I
cohort brings a high level of business experience to the PCD Study. With respect to
Group II participants, 89% of respondents have at least 10 years of career experience,
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while 48% have 25 years of experience or more. While less experienced than Group I,
Group II respondents still bring a high level of personal career experience to the PCD
Study as a whole.
With respect to industry representation, a summary of the respondent mix according to
the three big industry groupings was outlined in the previous analysis on response bias.
Within the non-resource industry category, a significant number of industries are
represented. None of these industries is individually large enough to be statistically
significant for analysis in the PCD Study as a stand-alone cohort, and therefore all the
smaller industry segments have been grouped together in the PCD Study analysis.
However, the individual industries are tracked, and the following table summarizes the
breakdown of the various industries according to their specific classification.
Figure 1- Summary of PCD Study Respondents by Specific Industry

Figure 1 evidences the significant breadth of the PCD Study respondent group from an
industry-based perspective. The chart in the previous section on survey recruitment bias
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demonstrated the significant breadth of the PCD Study on a geographic basis, noting that
all areas of the country were represented in the survey and that only British Columbia and
Quebec were underrepresented in terms of their overall contributions to the public capital
markets as a whole.
It is clearly understood that specific industries in Canada have a strong linkage to
geographic regions. For example, consumer goods manufacturing is concentrated in
Ontario and Quebec, oil & gas production is concentrated in Alberta and Saskatchewan,
and mining is focused in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and the three territories. As
additional information that will be useful in tracking the linkage between geography and
industry throughout the remainder of the analysis on the PCD Study, the following chart
reflects the breakdown of the three major industry categories tracked in the PCD Study
across the geographic regions of the country.
Figure 2- Major Industry Groups by Geographic Region

In addition to its breadth, geographically and by industry, the PCD Study respondent
group represents a strong cross-section of company sizes as determined by total annual
revenue and by employee count.
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Ensuring that the PCD Study has a decent contingent of various-sized companies is
particularly important on the topic of public company decline in Canada because of the
strong belief expressed throughout the literature that SME companies are suffering
disproportionately in the public markets for a variety of reasons. As such, it is
anticipated that the SME companies will evidence an even higher degree of overall
aversion to the public markets than the larger companies. In order for this belief to be
demonstrated in the PCD Study data, it is important to have sufficient sample sizes of
responses from Group I decision-makers of both SME companies and larger non-SME
companies to make the observations related to company size statistically significant.
The following charts summarize the breakdown of the Group I senior business decisionmaker respondents according to the two elements tracked in determining company size.
Figure 3- PCD Study Respondents by Company Size (Revenue)
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Figure 4- PCD Study Respondents by Company Size (Employee Count)

It was anticipated that the attention of the larger company C-suite executives would be
harder to get than the smaller company C-suite executives simply because the largecompany executives have more demands on their time due to their higher profiles.
However, this expectation was ultimately proven wrong, and the final demographic mix
includes a strong cross-section of company sizes at all stages of development. If
anything, it appears as if the larger company executives were inherently more interested
in the public company decline phenomenon than their counterparts at smaller companies.

5.13- PCD Study Format and Content Summary
The PCD Study data are primarily quantitative in nature, applying a variety of 5-Point
Likert Scales. There are a total of 24 different questions in the online version of the PCD
Study, 397 although the application of skip logic results in a maximum of 20 questions
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being required to complete the survey for DG5- Private company respondents and fewer
questions being required for all other subgroups. 22 out of the 24 questions solicit
quantitative data. The other two questions (namely question 17 and question 24) solicit
qualitative data.
The quantitative PCD Study questions can be categorized into three separate categories.
The first category is the survey eligibility validation questions, which are utilized as
screens to determine that each respondent properly fits within one of the following six
subgroups of target participants: (i) senior decision-maker (C-suite executive, director or
major shareholder) of an existing TSX-listed public company; (ii) senior decision-maker
of a TSX-eligible private company; (iii) corporate or securities lawyer; (iv) public auditor
or accountant; (v) investment banker; or (vi) private equity investor.
The second category of PCD Study questions are the questions designed to convey
demographic information about the individual respondent. It is this data that allows us to
categorize the respondents into a variety of demographic subgroups that are tracked
throughout the PCD Study analysis.
The third category of PCD Study questions are the substantive content questions. These
are the questions where the respondents give their opinions on a variety of different
topics relevant to the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada. It is these
substantive questions that ultimately are the focus of the PCD Study analysis.
The first two subgroups of respondents above constitute the Group I participants, namely
senior business decision-makers. In addition to fitting within that particular criteria,
participants must also verify that their companies qualify as an Operating Company,
which is defined in Question 6 of the PCD Study as follows:

10 and Question 12, which are only answered by senior decision-makers of public and private companies,
respectively.
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Figure 5- Definition of “Operating Company” in Q6 of PCD Study
"Operating Company"- An operating company is a business that directly produces a
product or delivers a service to customers, or else owns a subsidiary that directly
produces a product or delivers a service to customers.
Note: Mutual Funds, ETF's and REITS are not considered operating companies.

The latter four subgroups in the above list constitute the Group II participants, namely
public markets influencers. If participants cannot certify that they meet all of the
requirements of one of those six subgroups, they are thanked for their willingness to
participate in the survey and the survey is terminated at that point.
In addition to attesting that they properly fit within one of the above-listed six subgroups,
respondents must also confirm that they are currently Canadian residents and that they
work in Canada for Canadian-based and Canadian-controlled businesses. This limitation
was somewhat controversial amongst a number of respondents who desired to participate
in the PCD Study, but did not meet the strict residency requirements. However, the
limitation was required to be implemented in order to preserve the comparability of the
data for Canadian businesses and to eliminate any complexity in cross-border ethics
approval requirements for solicitation of individuals located outside of Canada.
Most of the quantitative questions in the PCD Study are formatted as 5-Point Likert-Scale
questions. Question 10 and Question 12 result in the collection of nominal data, each of
which is specific to senior decision-makers of either TSX-listed or private companies.
Question 19 is also nominal, allowing respondents to define the premium required in a
hypothetical fact pattern to achieve equality in attractiveness between an IPO option and
a private financing option.
The two qualitative questions in the PCD Study are the following open-ended text
responses questions: Q17- a text-based question asking the respondent’s perception as to
the primary factors contributing to public company decline; and Q24- a concluding textbased question inviting the respondents to share any final thoughts that they have on any
topic related to the PCD Study.
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The following figure is provided as a visual representation of the skip logic processes
applied in the PCD Study.
Figure 6- PCD Study Online Layout Summary

The next figure reproduces the minimum financial requirements set forth in Question 11
of the PCD Study, which is used to confirm that a private company is of sufficient
maturity to be TSX-eligible.
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Figure 7- Minimum Requirements in PCD Study for Private Companies
You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker in a private operating
company.
We would like to confirm one final eligibility criteria for participation in this survey, namely the
size and stage of development of your company. We are looking for Senior Decision-Makers
of private companies that are of a sufficient size and stage of development that they would be
eligible to pursue a TSX listing if they chose to.
Does your private operating company meet all the criteria in at least one of the
following categories?
Category A- Profitable Companies
Minimum of $10,000,000 in annual revenue;
Minimum of $2,000,000 in pre-tax cash flow; and
Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $10,000,000.
Category B- Technology Companies and R&D Companies Not Yet Profitable
Company owns proprietary technology that is close to being ready for commercialization or is
already at the commercialization stage;
Company has at least two years of development history in developing its technology;
Company has spent a minimum of $5,000,000 in developing its technology to date; and
Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $20,000,000.
Category C- Resource Companies Not Yet Profitable
Company owns a resource property which is already in production or else has an independent
technical report confirming commerciality;
Company has spent at least $5,000,0000 on the acquisition and development of the property;
Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $20,000,000.
My private operating company meets all of the criteria of at least one category listed
above.

o
o
o

Yes
No
I Choose Not to Answer

Anyone familiar with the minimum listing requirement of the TSX will recognize that the
minimum financial conditions set out in Question 11 of the PCD Study, as per the above
excerpt, are significantly higher than the actual minimum listing requirements in the TSX
Company Manual. However, it is also understood that it is impractical for a company to
go public on the TSX if it barely meets the formal minimum listing requirements.
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Indeed, the argument certainly can be made that even more stringent standards should
have been applied for participation of private company senior-decision makers as the
financial tests outlined above are still far too small to consider pursuing an IPO on the
TSX in this market. However, it is submitted that the enhanced minimum financial
requirements adopted by the PCD Study to define TSX-eligible private companies are
appropriate for determining which companies are, at least, of a sufficient size that they
can realistically begin to consider whether an IPO alternative is something that should be
on their long-term horizon. Although those companies might not yet be at a size where
the IPO alternative is realistically imminent, they are at least at a size where an IPO is an
option that can be considered for the future as the company continues to grow.
Each of the substantive content questions in the PCD Study is analyzed later in this
Dissertation in Chapter 7- Analysis of Quantitative Data in PCD Study.

5.14- Online Survey Participant Attrition Analysis
In any online survey, there will inevitably be an element of attrition where participants
drop out of the survey somewhere between the initial action of clicking through to the
survey website and completion of the survey. The longer and more complex the survey
instrument is, the greater the percentage of respondents who will drop out prior to
completion. Survey orthodoxy indicates that the ideal survey length is a median of ten
minutes, with a maximum survey length of 20 minutes indicated before significant
attrition occurs amongst the respondents. 398
In considering the design and content of the PCD Study in particular, significant
consideration was given to the fact that a common thread amongst all of the subgroups
targeted for participation is that all are comprised of extremely busy individuals who face
a number of competing demands for their time and attention daily. It was clearly
understood that simply capturing their interest, to the extent that they opened the survey,
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was a major challenge and would require significant effort. If the PCD Study was too
ambitious in its scope, it was recognized that the entire research effort would be at risk if
it generated excessive participant attrition.
Yet, having gone to the significant effort to enroll the respondents in the PCD Study, the
clear desire was to secure as much relevant data from each respondent as possible. If the
PCD Study drop-out rate significantly exceeded the comparable drop-out rates for online
surveys generally, the PCD Study would be open to criticism that it over-reached in
trying to gather too much data. If this outcome were seen to exist in the PCD Study
output, it could further be argued that the quality of the data collection near the end of the
survey instrument is impugned. If the respondents are frustrated by the survey length,
they may no longer be thinking as carefully about their answers and the data may be
unreliable.
As previously discussed, the time required to compete the PCD Study was tested during
the Preliminary Survey phase. This beta trial established that the average completion
time was in the range of 12-17 minutes with a median completion time of 15 minutes.
This places the PCD Study on the longer side of what is generally used in online surveys.
Ultimately, does the output data demonstrate that the PCD Study struck an appropriate
balance in length and complexity, or does the attrition rate indicate that the PCD Study
over-reached in length and complexity?
To undertake that analysis, we must understand that attrition in the PCD Study occurs
from different sources. Formal attrition results from the survey programming (where
participants are prevented from continuing in the survey as a result of the survey design
and their responses). Informal attrition occurs when participants stop completing the
survey on their own volition at some point before completion due to any reason other
than eligibility. Within the respondents who dropped out as a result of formal attrition, it
is useful to distinguish between participants who were excluded from completing the
survey because they failed to meet a required condition for survey participation (such as
private company size or Canadian residency) and those who were excluded from
completion because they chose not to answer a question.
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The PCD Study is composed of two different types of questions, mandatory response and
voluntary response. Mandatory response questions must be answered in a specific
manner in order for the respondent to continue in the survey. Voluntary response
questions are not required to be answered in any particular manner in order for the
respondents to continue further in the survey. Participants even have the ability to skip
voluntary response questions and continue in the survey if they so choose.
Of the mandatory questions in the PCD Study, the first screen is unique. This first screen
combines the formal Letter of Invitation and the Consent to Participate forms that are
mandated for inclusion in the online survey version as a condition of research ethics
approval by the Western University NMREB. The compulsory ethics disclosure on this
first screen is quite lengthy, running to nearly 1000 words. At the end of this first screen,
the following statement is given to participants:
Figure 8- Screen-shot from PCD Study survey online- Consent to Participate

If the participant selects “Yes” in response, they are able to continue to the main body of
the PCD Study. If the participant answers “No” on the first screen, they skip straight to
the survey completion screen, which displays the following message:
Figure 9- Screen-shot for PCD Study survey online- Terminal Message

Once this survey completion screen is displayed in the PCD Study, the survey is designed
such that there is no ability for the respondent to go back and change their answer to
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“Yes” on the first screen. Those specific participants are also prevented from starting the
survey again due to the anti-ballot stuffing security measures that were selected in the
PCD Study settings. To further ensure that informed consent is freely given and properly
documented, PCD Study settings have also been selected such that there is no ability to
bypass the first screen without selecting “Yes” or “No”. This ensures and documents the
informed consent of all participants.
All other mandatory questions in the PCD Study relate specifically to demographic
questions which are necessary to establish whether the particular participant falls within
the class of eligible respondents who are targeted in the survey. The question on
Canadian residency is also designated as mandatory, as the NMREB research ethics
approval was limited to solicitation of individuals living in Canada. In each mandatory
question, the participants are unable to bypass the question and continue without
selecting an answer. If the initial response of a participant on a mandatory question is
one which fails to confirm that the participant is eligible to continue in the survey, the
participant is given the following warning message:
Figure 10- Screen-shot for PCD Study survey online- Ineligibility Message

If the participant makes an entry error which leads them to this termination warning
screen unintentionally, they can correct the input error and continue with the survey by
selecting “Back”. However, if the respondent selects “Next” after seeing this particular
message, they are forwarded to the survey completion screen and are thereafter blocked
from further participation in the survey.
Under Western NMREB survey ethics regulations, providing an answer to each
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individual question must be voluntary. To recognize this NMREB requirement, every
mandatory response question in the PCD Study provides participants the option of “I
Choose Not to Answer”. If the participant selects this option on a mandatory response
question, they receive the following message:
Figure 11- Screen-shot for PCD Study survey online- Mandatory Response Warning

Once again, if the respondent selects “Next” after seeing this particular message, they are
forwarded to the survey completion screen and are blocked from further participation in
the survey.
To respect the free will of the respondents, the PCD Study was carefully constructed such
that only those questions which were mission critical in verifying survey eligibility were
constructed as mandatory questions.
All other questions, including demographic questions soliciting valuable information, but
not information which is essential to validation of the eligibility of respondents, were
designed as voluntary questions. If a participant selects the “I Choose Not to Answer”
option on a voluntary question, they are moved onto the next question without any
comment. Alternatively, if a participant simply skips a question by selecting the “Next”
option without having selected any answer, they receive the following notification
advising that questions on the screen were left unanswered:
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Figure 12- Screen-shot for PCD Study survey online- Missed answer warning

If the participant selects the “Continue Without Answering” option, they move onto the
next question. The above warning does not force a response, but rather ensures that any
failures by participants to answer voluntary questions are intentional rather than
accidental.
The following table provides a detailed summary of the PCD Study attrition throughout
the survey instrument up to the completion of the critical matrix question (Question 20),
past which point the PCD Study is considered to be substantially completed. The coding
under the “Attrition Type” column is summarized as follows: (i) FV is “Formal
Voluntary Attrition”, referring those participants who were terminated by the survey rules
as a result of selecting “I Choose Not to Answer” to a mandatory response question or
else declining to acknowledge; (ii) FI is “Formal Involuntary Attrition”, referring to those
respondents whose were terminated by operation of the survey rules as a result of their
failing to match the survey conditions; and (iii) IV is “Informal Voluntary Attrition”,
referring to those respondents who simply failed to advance to the next question for
unknown reasons (i.e., quit the survey on their own volition). The attrition number is the
total number of respondents who did not continue onto the following question, and the
remainder number is the total number of respondents who continued on past that
question.
Table 4- PCD Study Survey Attrition Analysis
Q#

Survey Question Summary
Total number of initial
respondents who show as
“registered” responses in the
Qualtrics software database for
the PCD Study

Attrition
(Remainder)
449

Attrition
Type

Attrition Analysis Summary
n/a
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Q#

Survey Question Summary

Q1

Letter of Invitation and Consent
Form- Unless consent accepted
by participant, survey terminated.

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Respondents requested to selfidentify as falling within the 2
main groups targeted for the
survey: Group I (Senior Business
Decision-Makers) or Group II
(Public Markets Influencers).
Unless participants identify as
falling within Group I or Group
II, survey is terminated

Group I: Respondents requested
to self-identify as falling within
the 3 groups of Senior Business
Decision-Makers: C-Suite
Executive, Corporation Director
and/or Major Shareholder. If not
fitting in any of the three groups,
survey terminated.

Group I: Canadian residency
question for Group I. Unless
participant confirms they are
Canadian resident and working
for a Canadian-based company,
survey terminated

Group I: Respondents requested
to confirm that their companies
are “operating companies” within
definition provided

Attrition
(Remainder)

Attrition
Type

Attrition Analysis Summary

15

FV= 4

(434)

IV=11

8

FI= 7

(426)

FV=1

1

FI=1

Single respondent who failed to
match any group. Likely a
senior executive who did not
meet the criteria for C-Suite
Executive.

11

FI=8

(414)

FV=1

Although recruitment targeted
solely at Canadian companies
and residents based on
available data, a small number
of respondents were nonCanadian and therefore
ineligible.

(425)

IV=2

16

FI=15

(398)

FV=1

Slightly less than 1% attrition
on this question from 4
respondents who declined
online consent form.
Rationales for declining
consent unknown.

Slightly under 2% attrition
from 7 respondents who
selected “None of the above”
and 1 respondent who selected
“I choose not to answer”.

Although recruitment targeted
at companies believed to
operating companies, some
respondents were from REITS
or other businesses not included
in definition.
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Q#

Survey Question Summary

Q9

Group I: Respondents requested
to confirm that companies are
TSX-listed or TSX-eligible
private companies

Q11

Q16

Q18

Group I: Private company
respondents asked to confirm that
their companies meet minimum
size threshold in revenue and pretax cashflow to be TSX-eligible

First substantive question of the
survey, asking opinion on a
variety of statements

Introduction of hypothetical

Attrition
(Remainder)

Attrition
Type

6

FI=6

(392)

IV=2

19

FI=19

Although these eligibility
criteria were included in
solicitation, these respondents
only picked up on the eligibility
requirements at this stage.

IV=15

A dozen additional participants
exited prior to making it to the
substantive element of the
survey. 8 individuals who
exited were Group II and 7
were Group I. Group I attrition
was likely validation fatigue at
this stage; Group II attrition
was tire-kickers who had not
invested much time in the
survey to this stage

IV=11

Additional attrition after
completion of unprompted text
question at Q17.

IV=3

Additional attrition between
Q18 and Q19.

IV=8

Final attrition before major
matrix question, likely put off
by the size of the matrix table.

(373)

15
(358)

11
(344)

Q19

Valuation premium question

3
(341)

Q20

Core question on public company
disadvantages with 31 subelements

Attrition Analysis Summary

6
(333)

Attrition here is likely due to
respondents from companies
listed on TSXV or CSX
exchanges.

Based on the above analysis, 333 of the 449 individuals who originally opened the PCD
Study continued to the stage of substantial survey completion (i.e., beyond the major
matrix question at Q20). This survey completion ratio represents 74.2% of all those who
initially opened the PCD Study. On its own, the overall PCD Study completion rate is
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slightly below the average online survey completion rate of 78% and 87% that are
reported by various online survey firms. 399
However, the 74.2% number is not an accurate reflection of the effective PCD Study
completion rates for the purpose of comparison to these other precedents. Unlike most
online surveys, the PCD Study contained a rigid eligibility criteria that eliminated the
vast majority of the population from participation. Unless the participants certified their
eligibility in the validation portion of the survey, they were disqualified as being
ineligible. The analysis in the above table on PCD Study survey attrition evidences that,
of the 116 initial respondents who failed to substantially complete the survey after
initially opening it, just under half of the drop-outs (i.e., 54 participants) were attributable
to formal involuntary reasons (i.e., the participants confirmed that they did not meet the
eligibility criteria and were excluded from continuing on to survey completion by the
operation of the online PCD Study rules). If you exclude the formal involuntary attrition,
then 333 of the 395 participants (representing 84.3%) who opened the first screen of the
PCD Study) continued to the stage of substantial completion. The effective completion
rate is likely even higher, as it is anticipated that several of the initial participants who
dropped out without providing a reason in fact dropped out and exited the survey once
they realized that they were ineligible without taking the additional time to fill in the
answer advising that they were ineligible. Regardless, as the completion rate in the PCD
Study is in line with the range for online surveys reported by the professional survey
companies elsewhere, there is no indication that the respondents were overly frustrated
with the length and complexity of the survey such that the data collected can be
impugned for that reason.
As a final note on the PCD Study recruitment effort, what should be reported as the final
survey participation number? Did the PCD Study meet its target threshold of 377 valid

399

M. Liu & Wronski, L., “Examining Completion Rates in Web Surveys via Over 25,000 Real-World
Surveys” (2017) 36:1 Social Science Computer Review 116–124. Also, Fluid Surveys, “Response Rate
Statistics for Online Surveys- What Numbers Should You be Aiming For?” (18 October 2014), online:<
http://fluidsurveys.com/university/response-rate-statistics-online-surveys-aiming/>
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respondents to support a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error overall? The
answer depends on the particular question in the PCD Study. Although survey response
totals are sometimes reported using all respondents who entered the survey instrument,
the PCD Study adopts a more conservative reporting methodology. The decision was
made not to include reference to prospective participants who entered the survey, but
were ineligible to continue according to the survey enrollment requirements.
Unfortunately, those particular individuals missed the explanation of the eligibility
criteria that was included in the emailed survey invitation. The PCD Study numbers also
exclude eligible participants who voluntarily dropped out of the PCD Study during the
eligibility validation phase before providing responses to the substantive content
questions.
As such, only those respondents who were eligible to participate and continued through
to the first substantive response question at Q16-1 are included in the PCD Study
calculations. This results in a survey of 360 respondents, which is sufficient (again using
a high-end population estimate of 20,000 and assuming a probability sample) to support a
94.4% confidence level at a 5% margin of error. Alternatively, it can support a 95%
confidence level at 5.12% margin of error. Either way, the recruitment effort came a
hair’s breadth of meeting the initial target of 377 valid responses to support a 95%
confidence level at a 5% margin of error for the PCD Study analysis. Regardless, the
recruitment effort is still considered successful, as it significantly exceeds the minimum
condition stated in the Survey Protocol & Research Plan approved by the dissertation
advisory committee.
Beyond simple numbers, reference to the PCD Study demographic data also demonstrates
that the recruitment effort secured a respondent pool that demonstrates a strong breadth
and depth in terms of geographical reach, industry representation and a surprising level of
experience in the field of private and public company markets, thereby adding weight to
the opinion of this group of respondents. It is the breadth of demographic diversity that
protects the PCD Study survey against answer bias, which was analyzed previously in
this chapter.
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5.15- Collation and Analysis of PCD Study Data
The PCD Study collected an immense amount of data. Extracting meaning from the
dataset first requires that the data elements be broken down into appropriate constituent
groupings for analysis. Although this analytical process is conceptually simple, there are
a seemingly infinite number of ways to group and present the PCD Study data.
Determining which groupings are most appropriate for the presentation of the PCD Study
data requires the synthesis of a significant amount of contextual knowledge on the
specific qualities and nature of the individual respondent subgroups, geographical
tendencies and industry nuances. When first beginning the data analysis process, a
variety of different options for compartmentalization and presentation strategy were
considered.
Ultimately, it was determined that the optimal framework for analysis of the type of data
gathered in the PCD Study is a matrix structure in which the individual question topics
are assessed by both demographic and subject matter groupings.
With respect to demographic analysis, the conclusion was reached that the most logical
process is to define a limited number of demographic groups for consistent analysis
throughout this Dissertation. By defining and maintaining a consistent format for
demographic analysis, the demographic group characteristics, trends and correlations can
be coherently tracked across the multiple elements of the PCD Study.
In determining how to properly define each demographic group for analysis, the principal
goal was to identify logically-defined groupings that might be expected to have similar
views on the particular topics raised in the PCD Study based on their demographic makeup. Moreover, although the groups are defined based on commonality of background and
a belief that the unique demographic characteristic of the group may lead to different
perspectives on the topics under consideration, pragmatism also plays a role in
determining boundaries between the groups and amongst the subgroups. In order for the
observations of particular group nuances to have statistical significance, the social
sciences “rule of thumb” of n=30 for the minimum target size for subgroup comparison
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was adopted. 400 However, certain logical demographic subgroups in the PCD based on
geography (i.e., Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces) did not meet the minimum target
subgroup size of n=30, the implications of which are discussed below.
Ultimately, 25 demographic categories were defined and utilized throughout the analysis.
The first 8 categories were defined in advance during the PCD Study design phase. The
last 17 categories were determined during the data analysis phase based on assessment of
the enrollment results. The 25 demographic groups include the following:
Table 5- Definition of Demographic Groups in PCD Study
Main Group
All
Respondents
Group I / II
Group ICore
Components

Group IICore
Components

Group
Identifier
DG1

Demographic

Subgroup Title
All Respondents

Demographic Group Details
All respondents in survey

DG2

Group I

Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers

168

DG3

Group II

Group II- Public Markets Influencers

190

DG4

TSX-Listed

97

DG5

Private

DG6

Lawyers

Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers
of TSX Listed Companies
Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers
of Private Companies
Group II- Corporate / Securities Lawyers

DG7

Auditors

39

DG8

Investment
Bankers
Private Equity

Group II- Professional accountants /
auditors
Group II- Investment bankers
Group II- Private equity investors

59

DG9

401

402

N
358

71
44

48

400

Chuck Chakrapani, “Statistical Reasoning vs. Magical Thinking- Shamanism as Statistical Knowledge:
Is a Sample Size of 30 All You Need?” April 2011, Vue Magazine (Marketing Research and Intelligence
Association) 16; also, Sitanshu Sekhar Kar and Archana Ramalingam, “Is 30 the Magic Number? Issues in
Sample Size Estimattion” (2013) 4:1 National Journal of Community Medicine 175.
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Throughout this Dissertation, the 25 demographic groups will be referred to according to the group
identifier number combined with the demographic subgroup title for ease of reference and consistency of
terminology. For example, reference to the subgroups of respondents in the PCD Study who are Senior
Business Decision-Makers of SME companies (have less than 500 employees and less than $50 million
($Cdn.) in annual revenue will simply be "DG10- SME").
402

“N” is the total number of respondents that fit within each of the specified groups or subgroups. The
value of N may differ for each question in the PCD Study, generally becoming slightly smaller through
respondent attrition in the latter survey questions. The N numbers in the table above are for Question 16-1,
which is the first substantive question in the PCD Study. N for each subgroup with respect to each
individual question has been recorded and the appropriate N value is used in determining inferential
statistics in the analysis contained in this Dissertation.
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Main Group

Group I by
Company
Size

Group I by
Industry

GeographicalProvince of
Residence

Years of
Career
Experience

Years of
Public
Company
Experience

Group
Identifier
DG10

Demographic

DG11

Non-SME

DG12

Oil & Gas

DG13

Mining

DG14

Non-Resource

DG15

British Columbia

DG16

Prairies

DG17

Ontario

DG18

Quebec

DG19

Atlantic Provinces

DG20

Early-Career

DG21

Mid-Career

DG22

Late-Career

DG23

Limited Pubco
Experience

DG24

Moderate Pubco
Experience

DG25

Extensive Pubco
Experience

Subgroup Title
SME

401

Demographic Group Details
Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers
of SME Companies using Stats Canada
definition- Less than 500 employees and
less than $50 million in annual revenue
Senior Business Decision-Makers of NonSME Companies using Stats Canada
definition- Either more than 500 employees
or more than $50 million in annual revenue
Senior Business Decision-Makers of oil &
gas companies
Senior Business Decision-Makers of
mining companies
Senior Business Decision-Makers of nonresource based companies
Respondent (Group I or II) resident in
British Columbia
Respondent (Group I or II) resident in
Alberta, Manitoba or Saskatchewan
Respondent (Group I or II) resident in
Ontario
Respondent (Group I or II) resident in
Quebec
Respondent (Group I or II) resident in New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, PEI or
Newfoundland and Labrador
Respondent (Group I or II) with 15 years
or less total career experience
Respondent (Group I or II) with 16-25
years total career experience
Respondent (Group I or II) with more than
25 years total career experience
Respondent (Group I or II) with 5 years of
less experience working for, or advising,
public companies
Respondent (Group I or II) with between 6
and 15 years experience working for, or
advising, public companies
Respondent (Group I or II) with more than
15 years of experience working for, or
advising, public companies

402

N
65

96

38
34
96
40
95
157
16
19
56
111
160
103
81
143

From this point forward in this Dissertation, the particular demographic subgroups will
be referenced according to their specific subgroup number (i.e., DGx) and the descriptive
summary to avoid any confusion as to which subgroup is being discussed.
Selection of the subgroups requires the application of knowledge of the nature of the IPO
decision-making process, and geographic and industrial context on the nuances of the
Canadian markets.
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With reference to company size, the demographic information collected in the PCD
Study offers a number of alternatives for defining subgroups. In developing the survey,
consideration was given to breaking the size-defined category into 3 respondent groups
defined as small, medium and large. However, having limited the PCD Study eligibility
to Senior Decision Makers from either TSX-listed or TSX-eligible companies, the dataset
collected turned out to be skewed towards representatives from larger enterprises. As
discussed, securing responses from senior decision makers of private companies was the
most challenging part of the recruitment process, and the total number of SME's
responses reflected in the survey is significantly less than the number of large-company
(ie, non-SME) responses.
Also, the academic analysis related to company size and its relevance to public company
decline is largely focused on the dichotomy of SME / non-SME. As such, the decision
was made to define only two demographic subgroups by company size for the analysis
phase, SME's and non-SME's. The definition of what constitutes an SME varies from
country to country and even industry to industry, so the definition selected for the PCD
Study analysis is taken from the internal categorization adopted by Statistics Canada for
its own internal ongoing economic research. 403 Companies are classified as being SME's
if they have fewer than 500 employees and less than $50 million (Cdn.) in annual
revenue.
With respect to industry, the decision-making process was largely determined by
pragmatic considerations. As demonstrated in Figure 1 earlier, the only two industries
with sufficient size to support significant inferences in the PCD Study with respect to
statistical analysis are the mining and oil & gas industries. This outcome is not
unexpected. The Canadian economy generally, and the Canadian capital markets
specifically, have for decades been heavily weighted in favor of these two extractive
sector industries. Both of these extractive sector industries have faced significant
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Statistics Canada, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Data Warehouse, Statistics Canada website,
(Accessed July 21, 2019), online:< http://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&Id
=51554>.
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headwinds in the past five years, and therefore it is anticipated that there will be
meaningful observations on the nature of the responses within these two groups. Outside
of these two groups, no single other industry has a sufficient number of respondents to
support meaningful analysis in terms of determining statistically significant outcomes.
The computers, technology and software industries constitute the third largest group of
respondents at 20. However, unlike the United States, where tech-focused IPOs have
formed a significant percentage of the recent IPO market, 404 the Canadian IPO market
has not benefitted from a resurgence in tech-focused IPOs. As such, there is no
compelling rationale to break down the responses from the Senior Decision Makers of
non-resource companies into any smaller demographic subgroups for analysis of the PDC
Survey.
With respect to the geographic analysis, there were only three provinces in the PCD
Study with a sufficient number of respondents to exceed the target subgroup minimum of
30 responses: British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario. Initial consideration was given to
simply breaking down the PCD Study into two geographic subgroups defined as Western
and Eastern Canada, but that was determined as sub-optimal for analysis because of the
distinct nature of Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces culturally and economically.
Combining Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces with Ontario in the analysis phase also
might negatively affect the identification of trends within the Ontario data, and would
certainly obscure the unique nuances of any observations from Quebec and the Atlantic
Provinces by virtue of the large number of Ontario respondents in the PCD Study.
There was admittedly a temptation to combine Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces as a
single subgroup for the PCD Study analysis in order to secure a sufficient-sized cohort
for statistical significance, but the conclusion was reached that the underlying nature of
the respondents from these two regions made this combination inappropriate. Quebec
and the Atlantic Provinces are certainly two of the most distinctive regions in Canada.
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Alyson Clabaugh and Rob Peters, "The Unicorn IPO Report Summary", Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (20 March 2019), online:< https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2019/03/20/the-unicorn-ipo-report/>.
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While located in close geographic proximity to each other, the cultural differences
between Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces are significant. As such, it was concluded
that Quebec and the Atlantic Provinces should each remain as their own subgroup for
geographic analysis purpose, with the recognition that the limited sample sizes of these
two subgroups would limit the ability to make statistically significant observations.
With respect to Western Canada, there was concern about losing the distinctiveness of the
British Columbia responses given the economic and cultural nuances of the west coast.
The conclusion was reached that the most appropriate subgroup definition in the west
would be to consider British Columbia as a stand-alone province and then combine the
responses from Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba into a "Prairie" group. Although
Manitoba might be expected to evidence a different industry make-up than Alberta and
Saskatchewan because of its lack of oil & gas companies, it is reasonable to anticipate
that Manitoba respondents will exhibit significant similarity in responses to the other two
provinces on non-oil & gas companies given the nature of its industry.
With respect to grouping of the two experience-based demographic categories, the issue
is simply where the appropriate boundaries are for the subgroup delineation. The fact
that these groupings include both Group I and Group II respondents gives us a larger
number of datapoints to start with, so the categories can be broken down into more
subgroups without approaching the lower size limits of subgroup targets. With respect to
both total career experience and specific public company experience, it was determined
that it would be most useful to define different subgroups based on limited, moderate and
significant experience.
Overall, the respondents on the PCD Study tend to be more experienced than the general
population as a result of the fact that: (a) more senior Group II participants were
specifically targeted in the enrollment process to secure more informed data on the topic
of public company decline; and (b) by the time that individuals qualify for the criteria of
Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers, they will obviously have a higher level of
experience than the general population. There is no overriding principle that dictates the
specific boundaries for the experience-defined subgroups, but the definitions of the
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subgroups utilized are reasonable in the circumstances and the different groups exhibit
outcomes that one would expect based on increasing levels of experience and knowledge.

5.16- Considering the Nature of the Data Collected
Several different forms of empirical data were collected in the PCD Study. Assessing the
underlying nature of this data is important in that the categorization of the data provides
instruction on how to properly describe the various data elements statistically and also
defines what statistical tests are appropriately applied in analysis.
First, the PCD Study has two questions that collect a significant volume of qualitative
data in the form of text responses: namely, Question 17 and Question 24, both of which
have been previously discussed in the Research Methodology chapter. Analysis of the
text-based qualitative data involves coding the data into subject matter groupings and
hierarchies and conducting frequency analysis, which is undertaken in Chapter 6Analysis of Qualitative Data in the PCD Study. Word cluster charts are also used to
summarize the qualitative data.
Second, the PCD Study collects several different forms of quantitative data. Detailed
analysis of the quantitative data collected in the PCD Study is undertaken in Chapter 7Analysis of Quantitative Data in PCD Study and in Chapter 8- Correlation in the PCD
Study.
Quickly reviewing the forms of quantitative data collected in the PCD Study, we begin
with nominal-level data. Nominal-level data are the form of quantitative data in which
the information collected can be classified by categories and counted, but there is no
inherent order to the categories from which further statistical meaning can be derived. 405
The nominal-level data collected in the PCD Study is demographically-based. These
questions in the PCD Study allow us to categorize the respondents into either Group ISenior Business Decision-Maker or Group II- Public Markets Influencer categories, and
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Carl McDaniel, Roger Gates and Submranian Sivaramakrishnan, Marketing Research Essentials,
Canadian Edition (Mississauga, Ontario: John Wiley & Sons, 2009) at 220-223.
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then further divide those groups into the sub-categories of Group I (TSX-Listed, Private
Company) and Group II (Corporate Lawyers, Auditors, Investment Bankers and Private
Equity Investors). The question on province of residence also collects nominal-level
data.
Second, ratio-level data are the category of quantitative data in which the differences
between values is a constant size and a meaningful “0” point is present. Much of the
obvious ratio-level data collected in the PCD Study is also demographically based. The
clear ratio-level data relates to the level of experience of the survey respondents in their
industry generally, working with their current employer and also their experience
working with or advising public and private companies. However, the PCD Study also
collects ratio-level data that is not demographically based, specifically in the hypothetical
question in reference to the pre-money valuation premium that would be required to
make the IPO and private equity equally attractive.
Finally, the PCD Study collects a large amount of data that would traditionally be viewed
as ordinal-level data or interval-level data in the form of responses to a variety of 5-point
Likert Scale questions. The following three different 5-point Likert Scales were used in
the PCD Study generating ordinal-level data:
Table 6, Forms of Likert Scales Used in the PCD Study
Likert Scale A
(Question 16)
Likert Scale B
(Question 18)
Likert Scale C
(Question 20 &
Question 21)

Strongly
Disagree
1
Extremely
Unlikely
1
Not at All
Important
1

Disagree
2

Neither Agree or
Disagree
3

Agree
4

Unlikely
2

Neutral
3

Likely
4

Strongly
Agree
5
Extremely
Likely
5

2

Moderately
Important
3

4

Extremely
Important
5

Ordinal-level data are sequenced data in which the categories form a logical ascending
and/or descending ranking. However, ordinal-level data do not innately provide a logical
foundation on which to determine that the differences between the various data points in
the responses are consistent. Interval-level data, by comparison, is data in which the
distances between data points is consistent and equal. The distinction between ordinal-
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level data and interval-level data has consequences for the statistical tests that can be
appropriately applied in analysis of each type of data.
There are two distinct statistical ideologies which have been at odds for decades as to the
proper interpretation and use of Likert Scale data. The debate focuses on whether the
data generated through Likert Scales is interval or ordinal data in nature, and also as to
the statistical analysis implications thereof. The two sides of this debate essentially pit
the statistical purists versus the statistical pragmatists. Statistical purists dogmatically
refuse to consider Likert Scale data as constituting interval-level data. 406 The
pragmatists, however, argue that Likert Scale outputs have consistently been shown to
evidence characteristics sufficiently similar to interval-level data that it is appropriate to
use statistical tests in Likert Scale data analysis that have historically been reserved for
interval-level data. 407 The biggest practical implication of this debate for the PCD Study
analysis is as to whether reference to the “mean” is permissible and, thereafter, which
statistical tests are appropriate to use on the Likert Scale-derived data.
As this Dissertation is being completed in the field of business law (and not in statistics),
it is beyond our scope to take a definitive position on this decades-old statistical feud.
However, the pragmatic statistical approach clearly is much more useful in the analysis
phase and will be adopted to a degree. 408 This Dissertation will take a “middle of the
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ssrn.com/abstract=2692323> or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2692323; Susan Jamieson, supra note 155;
and Susan Jamieson, “Likert Scales and How to Abuse Them” (2005) 39 Journal of Medical Education 971
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See, for example: Godfrey Pell, “Use and Misuse of Likert Scales” (2005) 39 Journal of Medical
Education 970; James Carifio & Rocca Perla, “Resolving the 50-Year Debate Around Using and Misusing
Likert Scales” (2008) Journal of Medical Education 42; James Carifio and Rocca Perla, “Ten Common
Misunderstandings, Misconceptions, Persistent Myths and Urban Legends About Likert Scales and Likert
Response Formats and Their Antidotes” (2007), 3:3 Journal of the Social Sciences 106; and Nicola Petty,
“Oh Ordinal Data, What do We Do With You?” (8 July 2013) Creative Maths: A World of Mathematicians
(blog); online:< https://creativemaths.net/blog/ordinal>.
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Following the advice of McDaniel, Gates and Sivaramakrishnan in Marketing Research Essentials,
supra note 405 at 154: “The best procedure would seem to be to treat ordinal measurements as though they
were interval measurements, but to be constantly alert to the possibility of gross inequality of intervals.”
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road” approach on the use of the Likert Scale data derived in the PCD Study, accepting
that the Likert Scale output evidences interval-type characteristics and that there is value
in reference to the mean as the most illuminating measure of central tendency in the PCD
Study data. In fact, this is the only measure of central tendency that can be reported in
the PCD Study dataset that has illuminative value to any practical degree.
However, in order to avoid offending the statistical purists any more than necessary, the
statistical tests applied in the ensuing analysis chapters within the body of this
Dissertation (beyond the calculation of the central tendency) are restricted to tests that are
widely accepted within statistical science as being appropriately applied to ordinal data.
While possibly less illuminating than the tests that might be applied if one were to accept
that the Likert Scale responses were fully interval in nature, this approach is more
statistically conservative. This approach will also be less controversial if the elements of
the analysis from the PCD Study are extracted and used, as hoped, for follow-on
academic publications beyond this Dissertation. As the author of this Dissertation is
legally trained and does not come from a formal statistics background, and in
consideration of the fact that the statistical tests available for ordinal data are sufficiently
powerful to demonstrate significant differences amongst the respondent subgroups, this
conservative course was considered the most prudent alternative for the analysis in the
body of this Dissertation.
However, it is also recognized that when reviewing and digesting the volume of source
data derived from the PCD Study, and statistical analysis thereof contained in this
Dissertation, it is a significant challenge to extract the big picture for those readers who
have not been intimately involved in the data gathering and statistical analysis
undertaking. To access more of the statistical analysis relating to the PCD Study in a
summary form that is more easily digested, it is helpful to apply other statistical
interpretation methods that are designed specifically for application on interval-level
data. In particular, the use of multivariate analysis of covariance (“MANCOVA”)
calculations is helpful in quickly determining whether a particular demographic
characteristic tracked in the PCD Study can be used to predict variability in specific
Likert Scale response questions after removing the effect of other confounding variables.
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As such, application of MANCOVA allows one to quickly assess whether specific
demographically-defined subgroups evidence statistically significant differences of
opinion on a particular topic independent of the effect of other demographic
characteristics. As the application of MANCOVA on Likert Scale questions is
controversial for those statisticians who tend not to view the Likert Scale data as intervallevel, the MANCOVA calculations and the bulk of the accompanying analysis have been
segregated in appendices of the Dissertation at Appendix 7.

5.17- Visual Presentation of the PCD Study Data
Presentation of both qualitative and quantitative elements data can occur in any number
of ways. In considering the best alternatives for effectively communicating the results of
the PCD Study data, consideration was given to the fact that the primary audience of this
Dissertation will be from the disciplines of law and business. The legal audience, in
particular, may have limited exposure to empirical data analysis. As such, visual
presentations of the PCD Study data in the form of figures and charts were used as the
preferred methodology of summarizing the data wherever practical.
The use of the visual presentation format for the PCD Study data brought up one major
limitation of the Dissertation format that had to be addressed. Namely, the Dissertation
formatting requirements stipulate that grey-scale colour schemes be exclusively used.
This restriction limits the amount of content that can be summarized visually in a single
figure or chart, and forces the use of more figures charts that are smaller in size and
convey less content than would have been practical if the full colour scale had been
available.
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Analysis of Qualitative Data in PCD Study
6.1- Introduction to Analysis of PCD Study
This Chapter 6 marks the start of the formal analysis portion of the Dissertation, where
the PCD Study data will be summarized and discussed at length. The analysis of the
PCD Study is ordered primarily according to the specific major question headings, laid
out in the PCD Study survey. 409 Where questions are matrix questions with multiple
sub-questions embedded therein, the analysis of the sub-questions is broken down
topically for the purpose of expediency and ease of analysis.
Relevant observations from the PCD Study are noted throughout the analysis in both
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. However, the key findings are also repeated in summary form
later in Chapter 9-Summary of Key Findings and Observations of PCD Study.

6.2- Question 17- Why do you think fewer senior business
decision-makers are choosing to take their companies
public?
The qualitative data collected in the PCD Study in Question 17 (“Q17) and Question 24
(“24”) are open-ended text questions with responses that can be arranged by categories
into themes in order to summarize and describe the outcomes.
The question posed to respondents in Q17 is simple and goes straight to the core of the
phenomenon of public company decline in Canada.
Q17 was framed as a voluntary response question, and participants were allowed to
bypass this question and continue on to complete the remainder of the survey. Notably,
the question was also intentionally presented without any reference to whether a single
factor or multiple factors were desired in the text response answer. The decision on
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For additional reference, the various paper versions of the PCD Study are included in Appendix 1 to
this Dissertation.

223

whether to answer Q17, and how much to write in the answer box, was left completely to
the discretion of the individual respondent without any additional guidelines.
Q17 was positioned in the survey order prior to the disclosure of the downside factors
associated with being a public company in Q20. This was done in order to ensure that the
factors presented by the respondents in Q17 were generated spontaneously and reflected
the personal opinions held by the participants, without reference to the hypotheses
generated by others in the business and academic literature.
Throughout the other analysis sections in this Dissertation, it is reiterated on numerous
occasions that the quantitative elements of the PCD Study are not designed to prove
statistical causation with respect to the phenomenon of public company decline in
Canada. What is being tested in the quantitative elements of the PCD Study is the degree
of importance that the various factors, posited in the business and academic literature as
potentially contributing to public company decline, play in the decision-making process
leading to an ultimate determination of whether to take a company public or pursue
private financing alternatives.
Here in Q17, however, the qualitative open-ended question clearly is asking for the
respondents' opinion on the causes of the decline in IPO volume in Canada, which is
directly linked to the phenomenon of public company decline. While Q17 does not in
any way statistically prove what the underlying causes of public company decline in
Canada are, it does reflect a compendium of the opinions on causation of a broad crosssection of key senior business decision-makers and public markets influencers across
Canada on the topic.
While it is understood that a compendium of opinions of a group of people regarding
causality of a particular phenomenon does not constitute scientific proof of actual
causality, there is no denying that the opinions reflected in Q17 do represent the beliefs of
a highly informed cohort on private and public capital topics. This is also the first time
that this specific and critical question has been asked of a broad group of industry experts
in an empirical research study. Unless and until a research methodology can be
determined to provide scientific proof of causality on the phenomenon of public company
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decline, it is submitted that the opinions and perceptions of the specific classes of
individuals who comprise the participants in the PCD Study certainly are more certainly
accretive to understanding the nature of the phenomenon than the complete void of
relevant data that existed before the PCD Study.
In total, 330 respondents in the PCD Study provided some form of answer to Q17. The
responses to Q17 ranged in length from a few words to several hundred words. Some
responses proposed a single explanation for public company decline; others proposed
several alternative or complementary explanations. Clearly, the longer answers were
from those respondents who feel more strongly about the topic and/or were less timepressed in completing the survey. Ultimately, the combined responses created a
significant amount of data to sift through in order to identify trends and themes.
The first step in the analysis process was reviewing the responses in Q17 in detail in
order to become familiar with the data and develop focus on the critical areas. Next, a
tentative master framework was created for organization and presentation of the data. In
this step, referred to as "coding" or "indexing", an iterative process was used in which a
tentative master framework was created based on an initial review of the data. The master
framework was then refined over several iterations as the data was indexed in detail.
Ultimately, the master coding framework was finalized once the framework was
determined to be sufficiently robust to accurately reflect all of the relevant responses. On
a second pass through the data indexing process, any consequential amendments
necessary to update the initial coding of responses were inputted to update the coding
consistent with the final master framework template.
The final coding master list utilized in the PCD Study analysis is as follows:
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Figure 13, Q17- Text Coding Master List
Text Answer Coding – Question 17
Version 2- Multiple Answers Within Class Coded to “9”
10. Regulation and Reporting Challenges
11. Complex / excessive regulation
12. Recent changes in securities regulations
13. Inefficiencies / duplications in securities
regulations
14. Financial statement certification
requirements
15. Change in accounting requirements
16. General regulatory/reporting overload
19. Multiples from 10-16
20. Public Company Costs
21. Continuous disclosure costs
22. IPO costs
29. Multiples from 20-22
30. Private Capital Availability
31. Private equity availability
32. Cheap debt availability
39. Multiples from 30-32
40. Liquidity & Valuation Concerns
41. Lack of SME analyst coverage
42. Orphan stock / liquidity concerns
43. Low valuation of SME’s in public
markets
44. Relatively higher valuation in private
markets
49. Multiples from 40-44
50. Access to Capital
51. Cyclical nature of public markets
52. Availability of capital in public markets
when needed at fair price
59. Multiples from 50-52
60. Short Termism in Public Markets- Generally
61. Quarterly target perseveration /
Managing to analyst expectations
62. Inability to manage for the long-term as
a public company
63. Private capital more patient than public
capital
69. Multiples from 60-62
70. Short Termism in Public MarketsShareholder Specific
71. Short-sellers
72. Day traders

73. Program trading
79. Multiples from 70-73
80. Public Market Volatility
90. Legal Risk in Public Markets
91. Securities class actions
99. Multiples from 90-91
100. Management Time / Effort
101. General issues dealing with daily
distractions of public company
102. Dealing with uninformed shareholders
103. Dealing with proxy advisors
104. Lack of time to focus on core business.
105. Time / effort of IPO process
109. Multiples from 100-105
110. Competitive Disclosure Disadvantage
120. Social Agenda Weaponization (Social)
130. General Shareholder Activism (Economic)
140. Reputational risks / scrutiny from public
150. Management control loss
160. Resale restrictions
170. Resource-sector specific challenges
180. Tax disincentives in public markets
190. Decline of market infrastructure to support
public markets (small brokers)
200. Systemic Market Change 1- Technology
change impact on public market
210. Systemic Market Change 2- Shift of
investment funds towards ETF/CEF’s
220. Systemic Market Change 3- Increase in
number of mega-companies offering quick exits
at pre-IPO stage via acquisition
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Readers may note that the breakdown of the data into categorical topics does not
perfectly match the 10 categories of factors which were set out in Chapter 1 as the list of
factors gleaned from the literature to explain public company decline. This is because the
decision was made to be more specific and granular in this instance, analyzing the PCD
Study data, than in summarizing the literature, and not to limit the analysis to those 10
specific categories. However, all of the 22 different categories used in coding the PCD
Study data are encompassed within the list of 10 categories of factors described in
Chapter 1. For example, both Category 10-Regulation and Reporting Challenges and
Category 20- Public Company Costs are embedded within the regulatory overreach
category from Chapter 1.
In the PCD Study, coding of the data was relatively straightforward. The process
confirms that the universe of potential explanations for public company decline in
Canada is, indeed, finite. The list of 22 different topical categories in the master
framework is able to satisfactorily encompass all the explanations posited by the
respondent group in Q17 as potential factors impacting public company decline. 410 As
such, the master framework does not require the inclusion of the generic category of
"other" as a catch-all for outlier answers not fitting within the defined categories.
What, then, does the Q17 data tell us with respect to the beliefs of the Canadian business
community as to the causes of public company decline? In advance of the PCD Study, it
was assumed that the twin issues of increasing regulatory compliance complexity and
increasing public company costs would be the two most prominent factors observed in
the Q17 responses, based on the notoriety of these two issues in the business media.
Indeed, these issues did factor prominently into the survey responses.
With respect to DG1- All Respondents, 47.0% of respondents made reference to
Category 10- Regulatory and Reporting Challenges at some point in their answer to Q17.

410

There were only two answers submitted by the respondents that do not fit within the 22 categories
above, and the decision was made not to add an additional factor to reflect those responses. Both of those
responses referred to general government policies making Canadian companies less competitive
internationally. It was determined that this issue is outside the general scope of the PCD Study
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Also, 42.4% of respondents referenced Category 20- Public Company Costs. The
percentage of respondents who cited either Category 10 or Category 20 in their answers
is above the two-thirds threshold at 68.7%. Clearly, this outcome demonstrates that the
opinion of the significant number of academics outlined earlier in this Dissertation, who
seek to downplay the role of increasing regulatory complexity and increasing costs as
factors contributing to public company decline, is at odds with the perceptions of the
senior decision-makers and public markets influencers reflected in the PCD Study.
Simply stated, the PCD Study text response demonstrates that the twin factors of
increasing regulatory complexity and increasing public company costs are perceived by
those who serve in positions of significant influence within the Canadian business
community as being important contributors to the public company decline phenomenon.
Whether or not the academic community accepts those perceptions as properly founded,
one fact is indisputable: the perceptions of the senior business decision-makers and public
market influencers are critical in that these are the specific people who directly influence
the ultimate decision of whether to pursue an IPO or keep a company private at the key
inflection points of business development.
A summary of the Q17 responses is as follows. Responses coded to the general category
heading (example, 10. Regulation and Reporting Challenges) are those that referred to the
category at a general level. Responses coded to the individual sub-topics within the
category heading are those that referred to the specific sub-topic. Categories ending in
"9" were used as the repository for those responses that referred to multiple subgroups.
Table 7, Q17- Summary of Responses by Category
DG1
All Respondents

%

10. Regulation and Reporting Challenges

21

6.4%

11. Complex / excessive regulation

24

7.3%

12. Recent changes in securities regulations

14

4.2%

13. Inefficiencies / duplications in securities regulations

11

3.3%

14. Financial statement certification requirements

1

0.3%

15. Change in accounting requirements

4

1.2%
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DG1
All Respondents

%

16. General regulatory/reporting overload

64

19.4%

19. Multiples from 10-16

16

4.8%

155

47.0%

20. Public Company Costs

78

23.6%

21. Continuous disclosure costs

44

13.3%

22. IPO costs

12

3.6%

29. Multiples from 20-22

6

1.8%

140

42.4%

30. Private Capital Availability

69

20.9%

31. Private equity availability

74

22.4%

32. Cheap debt availability

3

0.9%

39. Multiples from 30-32

6

1.8%

152

46.1%

40. Liquidity & Valuation Concerns

6

1.8%

41. Lack of SME analyst coverage

5

1.5%

42. Orphan stock / liquidity concerns

20

6.1%

43. Low valuation of SME’s in public markets

12

3.6%

44. Relatively higher valuation in private markets

33

10.0%

49. Multiples from 40-44

2

0.6%

78

23.6%

50. Access to Capital

5

1.5%

51. Cyclical nature of public markets

3

0.9%

52. Availability of capital in public markets when needed at fair price

12

3.6%

59. Multiples from 50-52

1

0.3%

21

6.4%

60. Short Termism in Public Markets- Generally

21

6.4%

61. Quarterly target perseveration / Managing to analyst expectations

15

4.5%

Total 10-19

Total 20-29

Total 30-39

Total 40-49

Total 50-59
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DG1
All Respondents

%

62. Inability to manage for the long-term as a public company

19

5.8%

63. Private capital more patient than public capital

6

1.8%

69. Multiples from 60-62

9

2.7%

70

21.2%

70. Short Termism in Public Markets- Shareholder Specific

2

0.6%

71. Short-sellers

6

1.8%

72. Day traders

1

0.3%

73. Program trading

1

0.3%

79. Multiples from 70-73

0

0.0%

10

3.0%

80. Public Market Volatility

14

4.2%

90. Legal Risk in Public Markets

18

5.5%

91. Securities class actions

4

1.2%

99. Multiples from 90-91

0

0.0%

22

6.7%

100. Management Time / Effort

7

2.1%

101. General issues dealing with daily distractions of public company

21

6.4%

102. Dealing with uninformed shareholders

8

2.4%

103. Dealing with proxy advisors

4

1.2%

104. Lack of time to focus on core business.

4

1.2%

105. Time / effort of IPO process

10

3.0%

109. Multiples from 100-105

6

1.8%

60

18.2%

110. Competitive Disclosure Disadvantage

23

7.0%

120. Social Agenda Weaponization (Social)

2

0.6%

130. General Shareholder Activism (Economic)

11

3.3%

Total 60-69

Total 70-79

Total 90-99

Total 100-109
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DG1
All Respondents

%

140. Reputational risks / scrutiny from public

18

5.5%

150. Management control loss

16

4.8%

160. Resale restrictions

1

0.3%

170. Resource-sector specific challenges

26

7.9%

180. Tax disincentives in public markets

11

3.3%

190. Decline of market infrastructure to support public markets
(small brokers)

11

3.3%

200. Systemic Market Change 1- Technology change impact on public
market

7

2.1%

210. Systemic Market Change 2- Shift of investment funds towards
ETF/CEF’s

27

8.2%

220. Systemic Market Change 3- Increase in number of megacompanies offering quick exits at pre-IPO stage via acquisition

19

5.8%

It is worth noting that, while 68.7% of all Q17 responses made some reference to
regulatory challenges or public company costs, those two factors collectively were the
first item cited in the response only in 33.0% of the total responses in the PCD Study. In
the other 67.0% of responses, the first item cited by more than two-thirds of the
respondents had nothing to do with either regulatory challenges or public company costs.
Notwithstanding the clear importance of regulatory challenges and public company cost
issues as highlighted in this table, it is submitted that the headline observation from Q17
of the PCD Study should be the unexpected prominence of a number of other key factors
that the senior business decision-makers and public markets influencers believe are
important contributing factors to public company decline.
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The PCD Study data also make it clear that, in the opinion of the PCD Study participants,
the public company decline phenomenon is not fully, or even principally, explained by
the twin factors of regulatory cost and complexity. Rather, it is clear from the response
that the phenomenon of public company decline is multifactorial and highly complicated.
While the prominence of those two particular factors was anticipated, the prominence of
a number of other factors in the Q17 responses represented a significant surprise.
Chief amongst the other categories of factors that were unexpectedly prominent is
Category 30- Private Capital Availability. The increased access to private equity capital
and cheap debt financing was cited by 46.1% of respondents, essentially placing it in a tie
with the regulatory challenges category as the most-cited factor. In fact, each of
Category 10 and Category 30 were the first factor cited in approximately one-quarter of
the total text responses in the PCD Study (i.e., 24.5% of responses).
This is particularly surprising given that increased access to alternative capital is not one
of the factors that has been given much attention in the Canadian business and academic
commentary on public company decline. As discussed earlier in Chapter 2- Literature
Review, the increased access to private capital is a factor that has recently been receiving
attention in the U.S. academic literature, but that thread has not yet been picked up in
Canada. 411
The prominence of this factor in the Q17 text responses is also notable because the
increased availability of private financing intuitively operates independent of anything
that has changed in terms of the public markets themselves in the past twenty years. An
increase in access to private capital does not infer that the experience of being a public
company in Canada has itself changed over the period of public company decline, but it
does indicate that the alternatives to going public have been increasingly accessible over
that period. Also, anyone observing the capital markets over the past number of years is
aware that the multiples paid by private equity investors have increased as a result of the

411

The leading advocates of the theory that increased availability of private equity is a principal cause of
public decline in the U.S. are De Fontenay, Ewens and Farre-Mensas, supra notes 162 and 165.
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increased competition for good deals, thus reducing the anticipated valuation differential
between private and public transactions.
Notably, reference to the private capital factor in Q17 was widely reflected across all the
demographic subgroups represented in the survey. Not surprisingly, it appeared most
frequently in responses from DG5- Lawyers and DG9 Private Equity. However, it was
included as a factor in at least 20% of the responses of each of the 25 demographic
subgroups tracked in the PCD Study, with the sole exception of DG13- Mining. 412 The
breadth of support for this factor from across multiple demographic subgroups has to
increase the seriousness with which this factor is viewed as a major contributor to public
company decline.
While the increased availability of private capital does not directly impact the public
markets experience, the PCD Study data demonstrates that there is a strong perception
that private financing alternatives are both more readily accessible and comparatively
more attractive than in the past. Therefore, although the impact of increased availability
of private capital is indirect on the public markets, it still may be one of the most
important factors contributing to public company decline. The perceptions and
implications of increased access to private capital are discussed in more detail later in this
Dissertation in the quantitative analysis section. Certainly, this is a factor in need of
further empirical analysis to determine the extent to which the perceptions expressed in
the PCD Study can be empirically validated.
Next up for consideration are three different groups of factors that were included in the
range of +/- twenty percent of the total responses: Category 40- Liquidity and Valuation
Concerns (23.6%); Category 60- General Short-Termism in the Public Markets (21.2%);
and Category 100- Management Time / Effort (18.2%). The prominence of the first and

412

Mining's lack of connection to increased availability of private equity in Canada is noted and discussed
at some length later in this Dissertation. The high-risk nature and long-horizon to positive cash-flow
associated with exploration and development in mining makes it one of the Canadian industries least
compatible with the traditional private equity funding model.
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third categories in this group were anticipated based on the literature; 413 the prominence
of general short-termism as a major factor was, however, a significant surprise due to the
limited ink given to this factor in the literature.
Concerns regarding liquidity and valuation are not unique to the Canadian market, but
their relative importance is generally perceived as being higher in Canada due to the
smaller size of the Canadian economy, lower trading volumes on Canadian stock
exchanges and the number of smaller companies listed on Canadian exchanges compared
to the U.S. The management time and effort associated with managing the public
elements of a public company are often considered as an unwelcome distraction from
focusing on growing the core business, a factor which has featured prominently in the
business media analysis of public company decline. As such, the only surprise in the
Q17 responses on both of these factors is that they did not appear even more often.
It is submitted that the unexpected prominence of market short-termism highlights that
this group of concerns is becoming a bigger issue every year in the public markets even
though it receives little attention in the academic and business literature. Indeed, one of
the items included in this particular category, the pressure of meeting quarterly analyst
targets, surprisingly ranks as the most important factor in the Q20 Likert Scale analysis of
downside factors associated with the public markets. 414
The common theme of text responses relating to the factors within this category is that it
is becoming increasingly difficult in Canada to manage public companies with a view to
long-term value maximization, due to a number of different competing obligations
pushing management towards placating short-term expectations. This includes the
specific issues of short-sellers, day-traders and program trading from Category 70-

413

Including Tingle, supra note 4, and, particularly, in the financial media analysis in articles such as
Burgess supra note 11.
414

Although the fact that it was brought up by less than 5% of the respondents in Q17 indicates that it is
not a factor which is at the forefront of everyone's mind on the topic without prompting, but is viewed as
being materially important when provided as one of the available options.
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Shareholder Short-Termism, in addition to the general short-termism issues falling under
Category 60.
The challenges associated with short-termism are complex, and a full analysis of the
complexities, trendlines, causes and potential solutions to short-termism could alone
support another Dissertation. Short-termism is also inextricably linked to the increasing
role of technology in business and our daily lives, for it is the advancing technology that
places public information in our grasp instantaneously and feeds our belief that we are
entitled to expect immediate returns. For the sake of brevity in this analysis, however, it
is sufficient to identify short-termism as a nascent issue of concern that is gaining in
importance in the perception of key business decision-makers in terms of its impact on
public company decline.
Below these major categories discussed above are a number of other less publicized
factors in the other categories listed in the table. In the aggregate, each of these specific
factors were not brought up by a large percentage of overall respondents in the PCD
Study, but were still referenced by a sufficient number of different individuals that the
factor cannot be dismissed as lacking importance as a potential contributing factor to
public company decline. In fact, 19 out of the 22 categories were brought up by at least
10 different respondents on an unprompted basis and 12 out of the 22 categories were
referenced by at least 20 different respondents in the PCD Study. Once again, analysis
of the PCD Study data points towards a complex and multifactorial phenomenon that will
not be reversed or rectified by addressing a single contributing factor.
Beyond the coding matrix analysis, a second methodology that is frequently applied to
assess overall sentiment in qualitative research is the use of word clouds. Word clouds
visually show the frequency with which specific words are used in open-text responses,
thereby providing a quick visual summary of overall sentiment of the respondent group.
Word clouds also can reveal patterns in the responses that can guide us in deciding which
topics merit more in-depth analysis. With reference to the PCD Study, word clouds are
particularly useful in comparing the difference in the sentiments and areas of focus
between the different major demographic subgroups.
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The following word clouds disclose words that appear at least 10 times in the responses
of each demographic subgroup. The larger that a word is represented in word cloud, the
more times that it is used. Certain ubiquitous terms that do not differentiate sentiment
are excluded. Synonyms and alternate versions of words are combined.

415

The following two word clouds reflect the text responses of the two subgroups of senior
business decision-makers:
Figure 14, Q17, Word Cloud, DG4- TSX and DG5- Private Company

What is observed in the figure above is that the DG4-TSX subgroup demonstrated a
broader focus in terms of the content they discussed. Both the DG4- TSX and DG5-

415

Words excluded in word clouds: "public"; "private"; "company"; "companies"; "businesses";
"business"; "market"; "markets"; "corporation"; "corporate"; and "corporations"
Words merged in word clouds, represented by the first word in each group: "costs, cost, costs";
"advantages, advantage, advantageous"; "actually, actual"; "conflicted, conflicts"; "concern, concerned";
"comply, compliance"; "complexity, complex, complexities"; "change, changed, changing, changes";
"challenges, challenge, challenging"; "additional, addition, added, additionally"; "compete, competition,
competitive, competitors"; "controls, control"; "decision-maker, decision-making, decision, decisions";
"equities, equity"; "managers, manage, managing, managed, management"; "reasons, reason"; "regulations,
regulation, regulated"; "accessible, access, accessing"; "availability, available"; "disclosures, disclosure";
"financing, financial"; "relates, relate, relation, relative, relevant, related"; "government, governance,
governments, governing"; "increases, increased, increase, increasingly, increasing"; "investing, invest,
invested"; "investments, investment"; "listed, listing, lists, listings" "strategy, strategic, strategies";
"shareholders, shareholder".
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Private Company subgroups evidence a similar primary concern about the costs
associated with being public, as well the impact of increased access to private capital to
fund growth phases that historically would have required that a company pursue an IPO
in order to secure. Both subgroups also express concern about the impact of increasing
regulation on the public markets. Clearly, the concept of quarterly reporting features
more prominently in the responses of DG5- Private Company, whereas the continuous
evolution of governance requirements features more prominently in the responses of
DG4-TSX.
The next four word clouds reflect the text responses of the four subgroups of public
markets influencers:
Figure 15 Q17, Word Clouds, Group II- Public Markets Influencers
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From the word clouds above, we see that all of the subgroups of public markets
influencers perceive increased access to alternative sources of private capital as a major
factor to be considered. Public company costs are most important to the DG7- Auditor
subgroup, while liquidity has a greater prominence amongst DG8- Investment Bankers.
Concerns about the requirements of disclosure are reflected only in the word cloud of
DG-9 Private Equity investors.

6.3- Question 24- Final Open Text Response Analysis
Q24 is a simple catch-all open text question at the very end of the survey that provides a
final opportunity for the respondents to convey any last information they wish to add
after completion of the survey. The text of Q24 is as follows:
Q24: Thank you for the time you have spent completing this survey. It is
greatly appreciated!
From your knowledge and experiences, do you have any final thoughts
that you would like to share with us on the topic of public company
decline in Canada, the content or format of this survey or anything else
that you would like to convey?
It is apparent that the purpose of Q24 was broadly defined. It was hoped that Q24 would
solicit both positive and negative feedback on the survey, as well as suggestions on how
the research efforts could be improved in further studies. It was also hoped that the
question would give respondents an opportunity to underline any specific insights that
they had on the broader topic of public company decline, particularly on issues that they
had been reminded of by the lists of potential factors outlined by the matrix questions in
Q20 and Q21.
A total of 134 responses were received on Q24, once again ranging from a few words to
several paragraphs in length. A common theme of the responses to Q24 is that the senior
business decision-makers and public markets influencers, who took the time to add a
second written text response after completing an admittedly lengthy survey, care deeply
about the phenomenon of public company decline and are concerned about the trajectory
of the public markets. Many of the responses in Q24 took the opportunity to provide
clarity on their hypothesis of the public company decline phenomenon and further
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expound on their answers from Q17, many of which were very articulate and thoughtprovoking. A number of the responses commended the PCD Study initiative as being of
vital importance and indicated that the writers looked forward to seeing the ultimate
survey reports when published.
Admittedly, several responses in Q24 provided constructive criticism of elements of the
PCD Study design. Mostly, these comments pointed out the challenges in answering the
hypothetical valuation premium question in Q19, but a number provided suggestions as
to refinement of the research methodology moving forward.
Given the broad riverbanks provided to the respondents on this question, it was found
that it is impractical to code the data in a similar manner to the methodology applied on
Q17. There is simply too much variation in the topics covered in the Q24 responses.
As such, rather than trying to summarize the sentiments expressed in Q24, representative
excerpts are provided so that readers of the Dissertation can view the comments as
originally phrased.
The following response excerpts from Q24 have been selected as being representative of
the sentiments most commonly expressed by the respondents and reflect consistent
themes that are repeated throughout the Q24 responses.
Q24 Comments- Representative Comments
Cost and disclosure overload make it cumbersome from a financial reporting perspective to go public.
Although I see a decline in the interest of my clients to take their companies public and believe that
some of this decline is a result of the regulatory environment, I do think that there are other key factors
at stake. I believe that in the past businesses were taken public without a proper understanding by the
ownership group of the other options available or what being public would mean long term.
The rise of private equity and debt transactions has provided alternative financing routes that
sometimes are simply better solutions than becoming public which better serves the long term interests
of some businesses. Additionally, I work with many enterprising families who have witnessed the loss
of family legacy by a public transaction and in reflecting on this prefer to keep the ownership of their
enterprises within their extended family.
Being a small cap Canadian stock with little coverage holds scant appeal while private markets are so
healthy.
Consolidate Provincial Security Regulators to one National Regulator to reduce number of filings.
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Q24 Comments- Representative Comments
From an investor perspective, the clear trend is towards getting access to private company investments
as a result of demonstrated historical return premiums v. public market investments - the trend towards
increased private market investment will continue.
I personally feel the regulators need to find ways to make going public more attractive by streamlining
the process of listing and reducing the disclosure burden/scrutiny on companies to conform to
institutional investor preferences (vs. minority retail).
Unless the regulatory environment changes or the ability to raise capital in the private markets
weakens, I would expect to see a continued reduction in the number of businesses who chose to become
publicly traded.
Through recent experience, I am very concerned that bureaucrats at the TSX have replaced any desire
to facilitate the mutually beneficial capitalization and growth of business with a paternalistic desire and
naive approach to protect small shareholders, not only through complex and redundant rules but also
through the exercise of their discretion in many matters.
There is no "light" version for smaller public reporting requirements. Be it a $50M market cap or much
higher, all documents and reporting deadlines are the same. Public reporting takes away from the
added-value work senior financial people should be doing. We do understand the requirement for
strong guidelines to avoid issues that arise in the past and to protect investors, but it seems that the
swing of the pendulum needs to come back slightly to the middle.
The public markets increasingly have made sense only for the largest corporations. Mid-market
companies (most of Canada, and particularly Western Canada) struggle to get the attention of investors,
analysts and investment bankers. Without that attention, the ongoing value of the public listing is
greatly diminished.
Private markets are getting a lot more efficient and now offer many of the benefits that you used to only
get through public markets: - you can get liquidity through secondary sales - decent access to growth
capital - follow-ons are easy privately But with the more developed market also has greater demands as
institutional private capital providers have rigorous reporting requirements so I'm not sure there is quite
the difference vs. public.

The next set of response excerpts from Q24 are chosen for inclusion because they
represent novel opinions on the topic of public company decline that are unique and not
reflective of other responses. These particular responses evidence a deep consideration
of the complicated nuances of the phenomenon.
Q24 Comments- Novel Comments
I think we should consider what is the appropriate scale required for a public company to exist
successfully in the long run (enough trading volume, analysts, etc.) and work backwards from that to
identify the right profile of companies to be public before assuming that public is always best option.
Service providers out there generate fees from activity of going public so there is a perception that if
anyone will take your money it's not because the business necessarily should be public. Canada can
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Q24 Comments- Novel Comments
have more public companies if it focuses on the right profile of public companies and builds the
supporting conditions to identify those companies and make the transition easier for them. Part of this
can happen naturally as more CEO stories on why they became public get out there or more education
on the phases/alternatives of financing are understood.
I don't believe the reduction is a result of securities regulation but rather market forces. A review of the
average size of a public company in the US vs a public company in Canada is a factor that should be
reviewed. Canada is a small-mid cap market vs the US which is mid-large cap. A consolidation of
capital on the buyside has influenced the ability of investors to invest in smaller cap companies. I
believe you will find a higher correlation in this than regulatory framework of the securities
commissions. Capital flows are also impacted by fiscal environment which in Canada is very high
which increases the cost of doing business in Canada and inherently makes our businesses less
competitive from a return standpoint. (ie higher corporate taxes, greater government involvement in
business, higher labor costs, increased government regulation and approval requirements = increased
costs and lower revenues).
Capital flows will not return to Canada until our business are able to generate more globally efficient
returns. We have the best technology in the world but are plagued by higher cost structures as a result
of the above.
There is also a systemic shift to larger capitalization companies with increased liquidity. This trend
will not reverse easily and is in large part a function of the ever increasing amount of passive investing
(index or basket investing vs active portfolio management) and quantitative / technical investing (vs
fundamental research) which requires increased market size and liquidity to smooth out the volatility
generated by the velocity of capital flows moving into and out of a sector or stock.
Your survey is focused primarily on the downsides of being a public company. I would encourage you
to explore the key upsides of being a private company, particularly a private equity-backed company
with access to the patient capital, strong, well-aligned governance and domain expertise of a hands-on,
actively engaged board/shareholder group. In my opinion, the advantages of being private, as much as
the clear disadvantages of being public, are now well-understood by top-tier management teams and are
the primary driver of the shift towards private ownership. The other factor to bear in mind is that
private equity-backed companies have outperformed the public markets over the past twenty years.
This has attracted significant institutional capital to the private markets at the expense of the public
markets. This tectonic shift in capital (which shows no signs of abating) will continue to reinforce the
attractive opportunities for management teams in the private space.
The costs of being public are real and I think underestimated by the majority of private companies. The
public shareholder (in general) has changed from relationship managers to quant based short term
traders. This has real implications for how you try and build a company in addition to all the
implications for liquidity, compensation and ability to use paper to fund potential acquisitions (cost of
capital). This is arguably one of the starkest differences between private equity backed businesses and
the general public company today.
I mostly advise public companies and only the occasional private company, but both are in my scope of
activity. I think there are a lot of human factors as mentioned earlier that will swing you one way or
another between P/E and IPO. Age and stage and number of the principal shareholder(s). Size of the
company and requirement for continuous capital investment to grow the business. Estate planning
considerations. The often times considerable difference in valuation multiples between P/E and IPO.
P/E investment structures are 5 to 10 years and then the business is sold (or IPO'd). With the IPO, if all
goes well, you can be set for a very long time with ease of raising capital if your business is successful,
both in financial terms and in the view of the capital markets.
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Q24 Comments- Novel Comments
One advantage of the public company route is that it allows for a faster migration of the shareholder
base to investors that matter at different stages of growth.
Conversely, private shareholders can be more supportive of a company whose strategy is to maximize
market penetration at the expense of financial performance.
Likely the most important reason for a decline in public companies is the very deep amount of capital
in the private market combined with the reduced hassles of private ownership, however that is
somewhat offset by the give-up of control to large private holders. Only in the public market can you
get differential voting shares.

Overall, the Q24 responses offer a rich repository of data. There is nothing in the
question Q24 responses that contradict the overall sentiments expressed in Q17, but
certain answers such as those included above provide significant additional context on the
broader subject of public company decline.
Although it is impractical to summarize all of the disparate comments in Q24 further
given the restrictions of the Dissertation format, it is clear that these responses
demonstrate the depth of the experience of the respondents in the capital markets and the
extent to which they have given thought to the challenges of public company decline.
Certainly, the depth and breadth of the qualitative data from Q17 and Q24 of the PCD
Study is sufficiently rich that it could serve as the foundation for a stand-alone academic
publication. It is hoped that the opportunity arises in the future to revisit the qualitative
data gleaned in Q17 and Q24 in analysis completed on a stand-alone basis, giving more
space to discuss the nuances of the data and delving into greater detail with respect to the
differences and similarities in priorities and perceptions across the various demographic
groups and the relationship between the issues prioritized by each group.
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Analysis of Quantitative Data in PCD Study Data
7.1- Selecting and Applying the Appropriate Statistical Tests
As stated in the earlier discussion on the nature of Likert Scale data, the different
statistical tests that are used in the following analysis of the PCD Study are those that are
deemed appropriate for the interpretation of ordinal data, summarized in the following
paragraphs.
Two Proportions Z-Test
The Two Proportions Z-Test is used to compare two different observed proportions to
determine if a statistically significant difference exists. 416 This can be used when you are
comparing two different subgroup responses on a single question.
In reference to the analysis of Likert Scale data, the Two Proportions Z-Test is generally
used to compare whether the proportion of respondents who select “agree” or “strongly
agree” in the 5-Point Likert Scale is significantly different between two groups.
Likewise, you can also compare the proportions of the “disagree” or “strongly disagree”
responses to see if there is a difference, or even whether there is a difference with respect
to the strongly held opinions on the question (i.e., compare the “strongly agree” responses
or the “strongly disagree” responses).
Since we are only looking for a significant difference, not direction of the difference, the
Two Proportions Z-Test is two-tailed, meaning that it allows for differences that are
higher or lower between two samples. No pre-existing hypothesis as to which of the two
observations should be higher or lower than the other is necessary.
The most significant limitation of the Two Proportions Z-Test is that it focuses only one
side of the data on a particular question at a time; i.e., those who agree or those who
disagree, but not those who agree and those who disagree. As such, it does not take into
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Jerold H. Zar, Biostatistical Analysis, 4th edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice Hall, 1998)
at 555-557.
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consideration the full range of the scale. It is possible that a statistically significant
difference could be observed on either the agree or disagree side of the responses on a
single question, but not on the other. The Two Proportions Z-Test also does not factor in
the neutral responses, which is another limitation of the test.
The Two Proportion Z-Test can also be a one-tailed test if there is a hypothesis
explaining that one group’s proportion will be greater or less than another. Rather than
just testing whether a difference exists between the two statistics, it requires a preexisting hypothesis that predicts both the difference and the direction of the difference
(higher or lower) in order for valid application. A one-tailed test is more statistically
powerful than a two-tailed test, since you do not have to consider the effect in the other
direction.
For simplicity in terminology, the reference to the Two Proportions Z-Test in this
Dissertation will generally refer to the two-tailed test. If a one-tailed Two Proportions Ztest is being utilized anywhere in the analysis of PCD Study, that fact will be specifically
stated.
Mann-Whitney Test
The Mann-Whitney Test is also used to compare the significance of difference in
outcomes on Likert Scale data between two groups answering the same question. 417 It
was discussed above that the two-tailed Two Proportions Z-Test has a number of
limitations, particularly its inability to encompass the neutral responses and to consider
both ends of the Likert Scale in the same calculation. The Mann-Whitney Test does not
suffer from these same limitations, and therefore is the preferred statistical test in
comparing rankings by the two different groups.
The limitation on the use of the Mann-Whitney Test is that it can only be applied on two
different populations. In other words, all of the respondents must fall into two mutually
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exclusive and exhaustive categories for the Mann-Whitney Test to be applied. In the
PCD Study, this condition naturally exists when comparing Group I- Senior DecisionMakers to Group II- Public Markets Influencers. Within the subset of the PCD Study that
is limited to Group I respondents, the condition also exists between DG4- TSX and DG5Private Company respondents, and again between DG10-SME and DG11-Non-SME
respondents. For these pair analyses, the Mann-Whitney test is available and is applied
as the preferred test during the PCD Study analysis discussion. For all of the other linked
demographic groups with three or more components, resort is made to the Two
Proportions Z-Test.
It should be noted that the data for the linked demographic subgroups with more than two
constituents can be synthetically converted for Mann-Whitney use by defining two
subgroups: one being an actual subgroup in the PCD Study, the other being the
combination of all of the other linked subgroups within that grouping. However, this
requires that a unique database be created for every Mann-Whitney test, and even then,
the test is limited to comparing the particular subgroup response to all other responses
and does not allow the test to be run between two existing subgroups. As such, this
methodology is not utilized in the PCD Study analysis.
Three Sample Tests: Kruskal Wallis Test and Chi Square Goodness
of Fit Test
Three samples (i.e. subgroups in the PCD Study) can be compared using the Kruskal
Wallis Test. This test compares the rankings of response to the three questions. If the
three samples are demonstrated to be different on a statistically significant basis, then a
pairwise comparison is done as a follow-up calculation to determine which of the three
samples are different.
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Three samples can also be compared using the Chi Square Goodness of Fit test. If the
samples are demonstrated to be different, then a pair comparison is once again
undertaken as a second step to determine which of the three are different. 418
One Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
The One Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is used to compare an observed response to
a hypothetical number of relevance. 419 With reference to the PCD Study data, this test
has material value in terms of comparing the Likert Scale data to the theoretical level of
neutrality for Question 16 and Question 18. 420 As such, the One Sample Wilcoxon
Signed Rank Test is used in the PCD Study analysis to determine whether the overall
sentiment expressed by a subgroup on a particular question generally can be calculated to
represent a departure from neutrality on a statistically significant basis.
Spearman Rank Correlation Test
The Spearman Rank Correlation Test is used to determine whether a statistically
significant correlation exists between a specific group on two different questions. 421 The
correlations can be positive or negative. The nature of the Spearman Rank Correlation
Test is described in more detail later in this Dissertation in Chapter 8- Correlation in the
PCD Study.
Confidence Levels and P-values
The information most often reported in the statistical analysis of the PCD Study includes
the confidence level and the P-values. In statistical analysis, a P-value measures the
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probability that a null hypothesis (i.e., that the two groups being compared have the same
opinion on the particular question) is true. Therefore, a researcher would look for a small
P-value in order to be confident that the two groups being compared are actually
different.
A confidence level, such as a 90% confidence level, is reported as one minus the amount
of Type 1 error allowed in the survey design. Type 1 error is the chance of concluding
that two things are different from each other when, in fact, they are not. If the researcher
is willing to be wrong a maximum of 10% of the time, then the researcher can dictate a
90% confidence level, which is the level at which the researcher is 90% confident in his
or her findings. By extension, if a 95% confidence level is established, the researcher can
be 95% confident that he or she is not concluding that two observations are different
when they are not. Another way to characterize a 95% confidence level is that it predicts
that a difference observed between two groups in a particular test will be observed 95%
of the time (i.e., 19 out of 20 times) in repeated samplings of the same population with
different respondents comprising the survey participants.
As long as the P-value is smaller than the Type 1 error allowed in the survey design, then
the researcher can be confident that his or her findings are different, but only up to the
confidence level specified. For example, a P-value of 0.08 would indicate that there is a
statistically significant difference at confidence level of 90%, but not for a confidence
level of 95%. The higher the P-value that is mandated by the research design, the lower
the level of error that is accepted. The amount of allowable error that is acceptable in the
research design (and therefore what confidence levels are determined as acceptable by the
research design) depends on the cost and/or risk associated with concluding that there is a
difference between groups when there is not (Type 1 error) versus the cost and/or risk
associated with concluding there is no difference between two groups when there is
(Type II error).
The ability to detect a difference in a sample, and then infer that difference also exists in
the general population, depends on how big the sample size is and how big of a
difference is observed in the samples. Both of these factors are considered in comparing
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the P-value to the Type 1 error. Only when the P-values are less than the Type 1 error
can the researcher be confident in his or her findings (which is often noted as constituting
a statistically significant observation). To be more confident in the findings (i.e., to
establish results that are statistically significant at a higher confidence level) requires
either a greater difference in the samples or a larger sample size.
In the analysis of the PCD Study, reference to “weak statistical significance” will be used
to describe differences that are detected at a 90% confidence level (but less than a 95%
confidence level). Reference to “strong statistical significance” will refer to differences
that can be detected at or above a 99% confidence level). Differences that can be
detected between a 95% confidence level and a 99% confidence level are described as
evidencing “moderate statistical significance”. Obviously, the lower the P-value and the
higher the confidence level associated with a particular observation of differences in the
PCD Study data, the more influential the outcome and the increased reliance that can be
placed on an observation.
Use of MANCOVA Calculations in PCD Study Analysis
As previously discussed in section 5.16 hereof, the statistical analysis in this Dissertation
generally applies analytical methodologies which are universally accepted as being
appropriate for ordinal-level data, given the difference in opinion with academia as to
whether the Likert-scale outputs should be used for tests designed for interval-level data.
However, there is no question that additional meaning, at a big picture level, can be
quickly extracted from the PCD Study data by applying the more powerful statistical tests
designed for interval-data, particularly MANCOVA analysis.
Ultimately, it was determined that MANCOVA calculations would be utilized for
specific purposes in assessing the PCD Study data, but that those calculations, along with
the bulk of the MANCOVA analysis, would be segregated in an appendix outside the
main body of the Dissertation. As such, Appendix 6 is dedicated specifically to the
application of MANCOVA analysis of the PCD Study. Appendix 6 also provides
confidence interval charts (with reference to the mean) for all of the independent
variables (i.e., demographic characteristics) that are determined to be statistically
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significant in predicting outcomes on the Likert Scale questions after completion of the
MANCOVA analysis.
As a quick summary, MANCOVA provides a quick assessment of which independent
variables in the PCD Study data can be used to predict variability within a particular
dependent variable, after removing the variability impact of the confounding covariates.
The independent variables of interest in the PCD Study data are all demographically
defined, with the following five different sets of independent variables tested in
MANCOVA calculations: (a) Group I respondents (i.e., senior business decision-makers)
vs. Group II respondents (i.e., public markets influencers); (b) senior business decisionmakers of SME’s vs. senior business decision-makers of non-SME’s; (c) senior business
decision-makers of TSX-listed companies vs. senior business decision-makers of TSXeligible private companies; (d) the four types of public markets influencers; and (e) the
six main respondent demographic sub-groups (senior business decision-makers of TSXlisted companies, senior business decision-makers of TSX-eligible private companies,
securities / corporate lawyers, auditors / public accountants, investment bankers and
private equity investors).
The dependent variables tested are the four major Likert Scale questions in the PCD
Study: (a) Question 16 (with seven sub-questions); (b) Question 18 (with two subquestions); (c) Question 20 (with 31 factors assessed); and (d) Question 21 (with 14
factors assessed).
The five covariates tested were the following: (a) industry (Q13); (b) geography (Q23);
(c) number of years of public company experience (Q22-3); (d) number of years of total
career experience (Q22-1); and (e) SME / non-SME (combined Q7 and Q8). Of these
covariates tested, industry and SME / non-SME are only applicable as covariates for the
Group I- Senior Business Decision-makers. The other three covariates tested are relevant
to all of the respondents in the PCD Study.
All MANCOVA calculations were run in the R database, which runs four different
variations of the MANCOVA tests: namely, Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s
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Trace and Roy’s Largest Root. In each MANCOVA calculation, any covariates
determined not to be statistically significant as confounding factors at first instance were
removed and the MANCOVA tests were re-run without those factors in order to increase
the degrees of freedom in the calculation.
The MANCOVA calculations were also used for enrichment of the data analysis process
to provide a quick overview of the most influential independent variables after extraction
of the impact of confounding covariates. The outputs of the MANCOVA calculations in
Appendix 6 were checked against the relevant statistical analysis contained in the body of
the Dissertation to ensure that there were no material inconsistencies between the
MANCOVA analysis and the other ordinal-appropriate calculations.
The MANCOVA calculations do not constitute the core analysis of the PCD Study Data.
Notably, application of MANCOVA calculations to ordinal-level variables can attenuate
effect sizes such that Type II error rates increase, meaning that statistically significant
variations may be missed in the MANCOVA analysis. However, as the MANCOVA
calculations included in Appendix 6 hereof are only being used to generate summary data
and are used as a check on the other ordinal-appropriate statistical calculations utilized in
the body of this Dissertation, it was considered appropriate to use MANCOVA for these
specific purposes.
The MANCOVA calculations in Appendix 6 were compared against the statistical
analysis done using the interval-specific statistical tests that are applied throughout the
body of the Dissertation. No material inconsistencies were identified between the
MANCOVA analysis and the statistical analysis undertaken in the body of this
Dissertation. However, the MANCOVA data in Appendix 6 does offer a readilyaccessible high-level summary that is useful in attaining an overview of the variability in
responses between the different demographic groups without going through the detailed
data and charts that underpin the analysis in the body of the Dissertation.
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7.2- Order of Analysis of Quantitative Elements of PCD Study
Turning now to the analysis of the quantitative elements of the PCD Study, the following
analysis sections begin with summary tables providing a general overview of the
disposition of the PCD Study participants, as a whole, on the various questions. After the
summary tables, each question is analyzed in greater detail with respect to the variation in
disposition amongst the 25 demographic subgroups tracked throughout the PCD Study.
As a final note before delving into the quantitative analysis aspects of the PCD Study, it
should be noted that the majority of the ensuing analysis in this Chapter 7 goes through
the questions in sequential order. However, the analysis of the various sub-questions
embedded in Question 16 is undertaken out-of-sequence in order to group the questions
according to topical heading. Within each topic, the order or analysis is determined
according to perceived importance of the question. The following is the order in which
the data derived from the sub-questions within Question 16 are analyzed and their
grouping by topic:
•

Q16-1: General disposition towards relative long-term benefits of an IPO

•

Q16-7: Regulatory overreach hypothesis

•

Q16-3 & Q16-5: Impact of technology

•

Q16-4, Q16-2 & Q16-6: Impact of increased access to private equity

It is worth noting, once again, that the question orders of the Question 16 sub-questions
were scrambled in terms of their appearance in the online version of the PCD Study
survey. As such, the question numbering of the sub-questions only has relevance in
terms of providing a reference for discussion in this analysis, as the question order does
not reflect the order in which the sub-questions appeared to the PCD Study participants.

7.3- Summary Charts for PCD Study Quantitative Questions
The following tables summarizes the output of the PCD Data on the given main
quantitative questions that were posed to all respondents in the PCD Study. The subquestions within Question 16 are organized by topics. Within each element of Question
18 and Question 20, the various elements tested are presented in descending order of the
mean for each variable / factor. The specific Likert Scales utilized in each instance are

251

also included above each question. The minimum and maximum responses in each
question ranged from 1 to 5.
Table 8- Quantitative Summary Tables- Likert Scale- Question 16
Likert
Scale Used

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Neither Agree or Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree
1
2
3
4
5

Label
Variable
General Disposition on the Net Advantages of an IPO
Q16-1
Taking a company public offers more long-term advantages than disadvantages.
Regulatory Overreach Hypothesis
Securities regulators in Canada have been too aggressive in protecting public
shareholder interests at the expense of public companies.
Q16-7
Impact of Technologial Advancements
Technological advancements have made it harder for public companies to compete
with private companies.
Q16-3
The rapid pace of technological change has made it more attractive for private
companies to sell out to larger corporations rather than pursue their own IPO.
Q16-5
Proliferation of Private Capital Alternatives
Private equity financing to fund company growth in Canada is significantly easier to
access now than it used to be.
Q16-4
The decline in IPO volume is primarily attributable to the increased availability of
private equity as an alternative.
Q16-6
Companies should consider an IPO to finance growth only when private equity
funding is not readily available.
Q16-2

Mean

Std Dev

N=

2.82

0.95

358

3.34

1.14

358

2.58

0.98

359

3.27

1.01

359

3.72

1.09

359

3.37

1.1

359

2.95

1.13

358

Mean

Std Dev

N=

2.69

1.04

342

3.61

0.95

343

Table 9- Quantitative Summary Tables- Likert Scale- Question 18
Likert
Scale Used

Extremely Unlikely / Unlikely / Neutral / Likely / Extremely Likely
1
2
3
4
5

Label

Variable- With reference to the hypothetical fact patttern outlined above ….

Q18-1

How likely are you to recommend the IPO option as ABC's preferred course of action?
How likely are you to recommend the private equity option as ABC's preferred course
of action?

Q18-2

No premium
is sufficient

Needs to be at a
specified premium

Average Premium
Required for Equality

N (Excluding Respondents
Who Declined to Answer)

Q-19: How much would the pre-money valuation premium
offered to ABC by an investment bank with respect to an IPO
transaction need to exceed the pre-money valuation offered to
ABC with respect to a private equity transaction in order to make
the two alternatives equally attractive to you?

Transactions equally
attractive w/o premium2

Table 10- Quantitative Summary Tables- Multiple Choice with Text Response- Question 19

12.9%

9.6%

77.5%

26.6%
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Table 11- Quantitative Summary Tables- Question 20
Likert
Scale Used

Label
Q20-23
Q20-7
Q20-6
Q20-5
Q20-3
Q20-19
Q20-2
Q20-10
Q20-24
Q20-1
Q20-9
Q20-31
Q20-16
Q20-30
Q20-15
Q20-11
Q20-26
Q20-13
Q20-28
Q20-27
Q20-12
Q20-21
Q20-4
Q20-25
Q20-14
Q20-17
Q20-29
Q20-8
Q20-23
Q20-20
Q20-18

Not at All Important / Moderately Important / Extremely Important
1
2
3
4
5

Variable- In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are
each of the following potential downside risks associated with pursuing the TSX IPO
in your analysis?
The pressures of meeting quarterly analyst targets
The increased cost of continuous disclosure obligations due to regulatory changes
The complexity of continuous disclosure obligations arising from regulatory changes
Running a public company creating too many distractions for management
The cost that it takes to complete an IPO
Concern that being public leaves too little time for management to focus on the core
business of the company
The management effort required to complete an IPO
Concern the company will be able to generate sufficient trading volume to keep
shareholders happy
Redundancy of filing requirements for public companies
The time required to complete an IPO
The increased litigation risk associated with being public
Concern that being public will not ultimately provide quicker access to follow-on
financing in the future
The challenges of competing against private companies that don't have to disclose
any secrets
Overall fatigue arising from being a senior executive in a public company
The hassle of short-term traders looking for quick profits
Concern as to ability of company to maintain sufficient analyst coverage
The risk of proxy battles initiated by activist shareholder groups
The hassle of dealing with proxy advisory firms
The requirement to adopt corporate governance best practices that are continuously
evolving
Having to listen and respond to the opinions of uninformed shareholders
Concern that the current regulatory environment favors minority investor protection
above the interest of the public company
Increased risk to personal reputation being associated with a public company if things
go bad
Executive compensation disclosure of public companies being overly invasive for
management
An increase in short-sellers in the public markets
Fear that special interest groups will use public status to exert pressure on the
company to adopt their agendas
Challenges for public companies to complete acquisitions efficiently due to Business
Acquisition Report requirements
Risk of a hostile take-over
The requirement to file insider reports so that everyone is aware of management
trading activities
Restrictions resulting from public conflict-of-interest regulations for related party
transactions
Inability in a public company to keep personal income and shareholdings secret from
family, friends and acquaintances.
The requirement of financial statement certifications by senior executives

Mean
3.97
3.94
3.81
3.78
3.68

Std Dev
1.03
0.93
1.02
0.97
1.04

N=
333
333
333
332
333

3.65
3.53

1.08
1.13

332
333

3.47
3.42
3.39
3.38

1.09
1.15
1.09
1.07

333
332
333
333

3.37

1.15

331

3.36
3.26
3.22
3.16
3.06
3.01

1.2
1.2
1.1
1.09
1.06
1.13

332
333
333
333
333
333

3.00
2.99

1.15
1.22

333
333

2.97

1.1

333

2.95

1.22

332

2.95
2.90

1.13
1.07

333
333

2.88

1.12

333

2.86
2.80

1.13
1.1

332
333

2.63

1.17

333

2.59

1.08

332

2.56
2.55

1.18
1.15

333
333
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Table 12- Quantitative Summary Tables- Question 21

Label
Q21-4
Q21-5
Q21-2
Q21-3
Q21-1
Q21-6
Q21-14
Q21-11
Q21-8
Q21-9
Q21-7
Q21-12
Q21-10
Q21-13

Variable- In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are
each of the following potential upside opportunities associated with pursuing the TSX
IPO in your analysis?
Easier ability to use public stock as currency for future acquisitions
Opportunity for founding shareholders to obtain liquidity for a portion of their
investment
Anticipated higher valuation post-IPO
Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings
Higher pre-money valuation in an IPO than in a private equity financing
Increased ability to use stock options to recruit and retain key employees
Opportunity to grow the business to a more advanced stage of maturity
Enhanced credibility with potential investors
Increased public visibility as a public company with potential customers
Enhanced credibility as a public company with suppliers
Ability for the largest shareholders to keep stronger management control of ABC as a
public company
Opportunity to increase your personal profile as a leader of a public company
You look forward to the challenges associated with managing a public company
Opportunity to increase effective voting control by diluting minority shareholder
positions

Mean
4.01

Std Dev
0.93

N=
329

3.94
3.81
3.78
3.68
3.67
3.66
3.28
3.12
2.89

0.99
0.96
0.99
1.04
0.98
1.03
1.06
1.1
1.14

328
327
328
329
329
329
329
329
329

2.88
2.38
2.26

1.12
1.18
1.08

328
329
329

2.19

0.95

327

7.4- Question 16-1: General Disposition on the Long-Term Net
Benefits of an IPO
“Q16-1: Taking a company public offers more long-term advantages
than disadvantages”
General Observations and Statistical Analysis
Q16-1 is one of the core questions of the survey. This question tests overall perception
on the relative merits of public markets, and whether going public is perceived as being a
net benefit to a business over the long-term. Respondents' perception on this question
can be logically inferred to be linked to the likelihood that they will support an IPO
alternative in the hypothetical situation posed later in the PCD and, more importantly, in
the real-world of their daily business lives. 422 Given that Q16-1 is viewed as core to
understanding the phenomenon of public company decline, the breadth of the statistical

422

By inference, individuals who answer more favorably on Q16-1 would be expected to be more likely to
choose or recommend the going-public option at a key inflection point in a company’s growth cycle
(reflected later in the PCD Study in Q18-1). Conversely, individuals who answer more negatively on the
net benefits of being public on Q16-1 would be expected to be less likely to choose or recommend the
going public option. See correlation analysis in Chapter 8 of this Dissertation for verification of this
hypothesis.
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analysis discussed on this particular topic will be significantly more comprehensive than
for questions viewed as less core.
Looking at the first headline statistic, we immediately observe that the mean on Q16-1
for DG1-All Respondents is at 2.82. Considering the wording of the Likert options on
Q16-1, it is obvious that neutrality on this question would be expressed at a mean of
3.00. 423 Therefore, the average score evidenced by respondents is lower than the level of
theoretical neutrality. That the PCD Study demonstrates a negative inclination on the
proposition contained in Q16-1 is supported at a strong level of significance (Wilcoxon
Signed Rank Test, P-value<0.001). Only 23.5% of respondents in the PCD Study
moderately or strongly agreed with the proposition that taking a company public is a net
benefit to the corporation, whereas 37.4% of respondents expressed moderate or strong
disagreement.
The PCD Study data from Q16-1 reflects that a significant bias against the public markets
exists in the current Canadian business environment. Simply, amongst senior business
decision-makers and public markets influencers, the group who believes that taking a
company public in Canada is negative for the business over the long term is significantly
larger than the group that believe it represents a net positive. Unless these perceptions
can be altered in the future at a fundamental level, the overriding negative perception on
net benefit of public listing clearly bodes poorly for future IPO volume in Canada.
Looking deeper, the negative inclination on Q16-1 is reflected in the responses from 19
of the 25 demographic subgroups in the PCD Study. Only six of the demographic
subgroups tested scored Q16-1 with a mean at 3.0 or above, and the same six
demographic subgroups were the only demographic subgroups where the percentage of
respondents who agreed with the proposition was larger than the percentage of
respondents who disagreed. 424

423
424

i.e., (3= Neither Agree or Disagree).

DG19: Atlantic Provinces is excluded from the discussion on this question. As discussed previously,
the Atlantic Provinces is an undersized respondent group (N=19) and over-weighted with representation
from DG6: Lawyers (N=6) and DG7: Auditors (N=9). As both of these subgroups are also positively
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Table 13, Six most favorable demographic subgroups on Q16-1
DG
Group #
6
13
8
4
25
7

Demographic Group Category
Lawyers
Mining
Investment Bankers
TSX
Extensive Pubco Experience
Auditors

Strongly Agree + Agree
5 or 4
34.1%
38.2%
35.4%
32.0%
30.8%
25.6%

3 Neither Agree
or Disagree
40.9%
32.4%
37.5%
42.3%
42.0%
53.8%

Strongly Disagree + Disagree
Mean
1 or 2
25.0%
3.14
29.4%
3.09
27.1%
3.06
25.8%
3.03
27.3%
3.01
20.5%
3.00

N
44
34
48
97
143
39

It should be noted that, for the above six demographic subgroups that scored at 3.00 or
above on mean on Q16-1, none can be demonstrated to have a positive disposition on this
question above the minimum acceptable level of statistical significance (i.e., 90%
confidence level) stipulated in this Dissertation.
Compared to the top six demographic subgroups, the bottom six demographic subgroups
(in terms of their responses on Q16-1) exhibit a much higher degree of statistical
strength. Each of the bottom six demographic subgroups evidence a negative deviation
from the theoretical neutral position (i.e., 3.00) with a strong level of statistical
significance. The lowest level of statistical significance in the following table is for the
DG10-SME subgroup (Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, P-value<0.001), which still exceeds
the threshold of a 99.9% confidence level. The rest of the p-values are even smaller,
thereby allowing us to confirm a deviation from the neutral position with a high level of
confidence.
Table 14, Question 16-1, Six least favorable demographic subgroups
DG
Group #
5
9
23
10
14
16

Demographic Group Category
Private Company
Private Equity
Limited Pubco Experience
SME
Non-Resource
Prairies

Strongly Agree + Agree
5 or 4
8.5%
8.5%
12.6%
16.9%
18.6%
17.0%

3 Neither Agree
or Disagree
28.2%
37.3%
33.0%
30.8%
33.0%
39.4%

Strongly Disagree + Disagree
1 or 2
Mean
63.4%
2.34
54.2%
2.47
54.4%
2.50
52.3%
2.60
48.5%
2.61
43.6%
2.61

N
71
59
103
65
96
95

To summarize the statistical outcome on Q16-1, the negative disposition of the bottom
six demographic subgroups can be validated as being strongly statistically significant as

disposed towards Q16-1, we are unable to decipher any meaningful geographic data about the Atlantic
Provinces on this question based on the confounding impact of these non-geographic factors.
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compared to the hypothetical neutral position, while the positive disposition of the top six
demographic subgroups cannot. This is not particularly surprising considering the overall
negative inclination of respondents on the question discussed above. Nevertheless, it is
an important observation and valuable in explaining the perception issue that is one of the
main impediments to increased IPO activity.
The specific identity of the top six demographic subgroups and the bottom six
demographic subgroups is also of interest, and will be addressed in the following section
on linked subgroup observation and analysis.
Linked Subgroup Observations and Statistical Analysis
Group I v. Group II- On the Group I vs. Group II dichotomy, we observe from the
following figure that Group II (public company influencers) appears slightly more
favorable than Group I (senior business decision-makers) on Q16-1.
Figure 16,Q16-1, Linked Subgroups- Group I v. Group II

However, the relatively small variation between these two groups does not meet the
minimum significance test for us to conclude that there is a difference between Group I
and Group II on Q16-1 at a statistically significant level (Mann-Whitney Test; Pvalue=0.1416). As such, the important differences between the various demographic
groups are not inherently manifested at the level of the Group I vs. Group II analysis.
This may initially appear to be a surprising outcome, but consideration of the make-up of
each of these two main groups provides an explanation. Each of Group I and Group II
are comprised of specific subgroups that are inherently either more significantly positive
or more negative on Q16-1 than the PCD Study average on this question. If we consider
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Group I and Group II only at the composite level, the difference in predispositions of the
component subgroups are largely obscured. It is only when we break down each of
Group I and Group II further and conduct the analysis by subgroups that the statistically
significant differences are manifested. Recognizing that this "cancelling out" effect is
occurring within the larger groups in Q16-1 is a clear reminder as to why a fulsome
analysis of the dataset in the PCD Study requires a disciplined approach that assesses the
subgroups at various levels in the search for significant observations.
Group I: TSX v. Private- At this more granular level of analysis, one of the key
observations linked to a recurrent theme in the PCD Study data comes into focus. When
comparing the senior business decision makers of public and private companies, we
observe with reference to the mean that DG4-TSX (mean=3.03) is notably more
favorable on Q1-16 than DG5-Private Company (mean=2.34).
Figure 17, Q16-1, Linked Subgroups- Group I, TSX-Listed v. Private Company

On a statistical basis, the difference between these two outcomes is strongly significant
(Mann-Whitney Test, p<0.0001), which would support a confidence level greater than
99.99%.
This outcome demonstrates that senior decision-makers of existing TSX public
companies are materially more positive on the long-term net benefits of taking a
company public than senior-decision makers of private companies.
Why is this the case? There are two potential explanations. Does increased familiarity
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with the public markets (i.e., better information and a higher level of personal experience)
lead to improved perceptions with respect to the net advantages of the public markets?
Or, alternatively, do the senior decision-makers who are more predisposed to perceive
public markets positively naturally gravitate towards being involved in public companies,
while senior decision-makers who are more negatively disposed towards public markets
stay away from being involved in public companies? Although we see correlation
between experience in public markets and positivity towards public markets, the research
is not designed to establish causality that would prove either of those alternative
explanations of this outcome. Further details on the potential explanations of this
correlation occur later in the analysis of the PCD Study. The linkage between increased
familiarity with public companies and positivity towards public companies recurs as a
theme throughout the PCD Study data.
Finally, on this particular observation, it should be pointed out that, even though DG4TSX is significantly more positive on the topic of the net benefits of being a public
company than DG5-Private Company, it would be inaccurate to state that DG4-TSX is
positively disposed on the point. With a mean at 3.03, it is apparent that DG4-TSX is
essentially neutral on the net benefits of public companies. The reason that DG 4-TSX is
significantly more positive than DG5-Private Company is because DG5-Private
Company is the most negative of any demographic subgroup on any component of
Question 16. 425 Only 7.4% of the DG5-Private Company respondents (or approximately
1 in 14 individuals) agreed that the being public was a net long-term value.
Relevant to consider with respect to this particular observation is that it does not matter if
these DG-5 Private Company respondents can be proven objectively correct in their
belief that being public has more downside than upside in the long term. The point of the
question is to establish perceptions, not objective truth. It is the perception of the public
markets that is most significant here. That DG5-Private is so negatively disposed on this
topic demonstrates again the depth of the negative perception challenge facing the TSX

425

The mean of DG5- Private Company on Q16-1 is 2.34.
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in convincing senior decision makers of private Canadian companies to consider an IPO.
Group II Constituents- The headline statistic amongst the constituent subgroups that
collectively form DG3- Group II is that DG6- Lawyers, DG 7-Accountants and DG 8Investment Banks are all notably more favorable in their disposition on Q16-1 than DG9Private Equity investors (means of 3.14, 3.00 and 3.06 respectively vs. 2.47).
Figure 18, Q1: Linked Subgroups- Group II, Public Company Influencers

The observed difference between DG9- Private Equity and the other three DG subgroups
making up the remainder of DG3- Group II supports a strong level of statistical
significance (Mann-Whitney Test, p<.0001). Using the Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test
followed by pairwise tests on each of the various subgroups further confirms that DG9Private Equity is significantly more negative on Q16-1 than the other three subgroups
comprising DG3- Group II.
Utilizing the Chi Square Goodness of Fit Test to analyze the responses of DG6- Lawyers,
DG7- Auditors and DG8- Investment Bankers on Q16-1, we can determine that none of
these three subgroups evidences a statistically significant variation from the other two (Pvalue=0.0234).
It is not particularly surprising that the DG9- Private Equity subgroup evidences a
significantly more negative view in Q16-1 on the net benefits of becoming a public
company than the other three subgroups of public market influencers. Private equity is
often viewed as a direct competitor to the public markets on the same potential deals.
Yet, the degree to which private equity evidences negativity towards the public markets
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in Q16-1 should be concerning for public markets advocates.
Also worth noting, private equity firms are not always competitors to the public markets
as the two alternatives for a company to consider. On occasion, private equity firms rely
on the public markets in order to secure liquidity for their private company investments
by completing an IPO.
Once again, it is important not to confuse the fact that lawyers, auditors and investment
bankers are significantly more positive on Q16-1 than private equity investors as
indicating that they are overall positive towards the public markets as subgroups. As
previously discussed, although these three subgroups are in the six top subgroups in terms
of the median score on Q16-1, none of them can be demonstrated to have a statistically
significant variation from the neutral position. To the extent that they are more positive
than the other subgroups in the PCD Study, one wonders to what extent the perceptions
of the lawyers, auditors and investment bankers are influenced by the financial selfinterest of each subgroup resulting from the transaction revenue generated by IPOs and
the higher compliance revenue (for lawyers and accountants) generated by public clients.
Of course, as one would anticipate, the subgroups of lawyers, auditors and investment
bankers in the PCD Study also include a higher percentage of individuals with significant
public company experience than either DG9- Private Equity or DG5- Private Company.
The theme in the PCD Study data that increased experience in public companies
improves perception of public markets is a thread seen throughout the Dissertation.
Company Size- DG10-SME’s are observed in the chart below to be less favorable on
Q16-1 than DG11-Non-SME (mean 2.60 vs. 2.85). The difference between the two
subgroups is statistically significant on the disagree / strongly disagree side of the scale at
a 95% confidence level (Two Proportion Z-Test, P-value= 0.0355). That respondents in
subgroup DG10-SME's are less favorably disposed towards public markets than nonSME's is another theme observed in multiple instances in the PCD Study.
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Figure 19, Q16-1: Linked Subgroups- Group I, Company Size

Industry- We observe, with reference to the mean, that DG13-Mining appears more
favorable on Q16-1 than DG14-Non-Resources (mean of 3.09 vs. 2.61). The mean for
the third subgroup, DG12-O&G, is between the other two, slightly below the overall
respondent average on Q16-1 (2.76 vs. 2.82). Applying statistical analysis, however, it
is determined that any differences between the three groups are not significantly different
(Kruskal Wallis, P-value=0.2011)
Figure 20, Q16-1: Linked Subgroups- Group I, Industry

The fact that DG12-Oil & Gas and DG13-Mining cannot be proven to be different from
DG14-Non-Resource on a statistically significant basis is, in and of itself, an interesting
outcome in the PCD Study. Both the oil & gas and mining sectors have come through a
challenging commodity cycle over the past five years, generally faring poorly in the
public markets as a result. Liquidity and enterprise valuation have both suffered
significantly during this cycle. Orphan stocks have become common place. These two
extractive industries have traditionally been core to the Canadian public markets
generally, and the high-risk portion of investment portfolios specifically, but have clearly
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struggled to retain the attention of the public markets investors who have migrated their
high-risk portfolio attention to cannabis and blockchain during those recent boom cycles.
On the flip-side, it has been previously discussed in this Dissertation that non-resource
sectors in Canada have generally seen steady growth over the past five years. As such,
one might anticipate that both of these extractive sector industries would evidence a
significantly more negative perception of the relative benefits of taking a company public
than non-resource sectors. Yet the PCD Study does not demonstrate the anticipated
result.
A hypothesis to explain the observed outcome is that the junior capital markets in Canada
have historically been acknowledged as one of the premier mechanisms for raising highrisk mining exploration capital in the world. The inherent nature of mining exploration in
Canada has traditionally made early stage exploration and development efforts too risky
for all other avenues of financing. Speculators place small bets on mining stocks on the
junior markets with the hope of windfall returns for the rare successful discoveries, but
the understanding is that the vast majority of exploration-stage mining ventures will
ultimately fail. As such, investment in mining exploration is often perceived as being
more a form of legalized gambling than disciplined investing. Individual investors are
often only willing to bet small amounts of capital on any particular venture given the
inherent risk, meaning that the funds to pursue mining exploration need to be raised from
a large number of investors each investing a small amount of high risk capital they are
willing to lose in its entirety. This is certainly not the type of investment for which
private equity is generally competing, and therefore the public market is often the only
option still available for this type of financing. If we look at the small-sized IPOs that
have been completed in Canada in 2019 on the TSXV and CSE, we see that these are
indeed heavily weighted towards mining exploration, making junior mining exploration
the only new-listings sector in Canada with even the hint of a pulse this year. In this
light, it is not surprising that the senior decision-makers of TSX mining companies retain
a higher degree of belief in the net benefit of taking a company public than non-resource
companies for whom multiple non-public financing options are available.
Geographic Location- In analyzing the geographically-defined demographic subgroups
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from a statistical basis, we are forced to largely ignore individual subgroup analysis of
DG18-Quebec and DG19-Maritmes in our analysis of all but the largest variations
because of the small sample sizes of these two particular subgroups. These two
subgroups are simply too small in size to support statistically significant observations in
most instances.
Figure 21, Q16-1: Linked Subgroups- Group I, Geographic Location

Referring first to the mean as a guide pointing towards any testable observations on
geographic differences, its is noted that DG16-Prairies is lower than any of the other
geographic areas (mean of 2.61 for Prairies vs. means of 2.83 and above for all other
regions). Is this a sufficient variance to constitute statistical significance? Compared to
all other regions, the DG16-Prairies difference fails to meet the minimum level of
significance at 90% confidence level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.1377). As
such, the PCD Study data does not support any statistically significant observations based
on geographic subgroups. This result is in and of itself worth noting, as it evidences that
general negative perception of the respondents on Q16-1 is reflected across the entire
country with no demographic group having a mean above 2.88.
Total Career Experience- A quick look to the mean for the demographic subgroups
defined by total career experience appears to indicate that individuals with more overall
career experience are less inclined to believe that being public offers more long-term
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advantages than disadvantages. 426 However, the differences are not sufficient to reach
the minimal level of statistical significance under the Kruskal Wallis test (P-value=
0.7571).
Figure 22, Q16-1, Linked Subgroups- Career Experience

Pubco Experience- With respect to the demographic subgroups defined by total years of
experience working with, or advising, public companies, the opposite trend appears
compared to what was observed in the analysis on total career experience. 427 The mean
in Q16-1 (and the degree of favourablity towards taking a company public) increases as
the level of experience working with public companies increases.
Looking at the three-group comparison test, we see that there is a difference between the
three subgroups at strong level of significance (Kruskal Wallis, P-value=0.0071). In
fact, the difference between DG23-Limited Pubco Experience and DG24-Moderate
Pubco Experience and the difference from DG24 to DG-25 Extensive Public Experience
are both statistically significant (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.054 and 0.042,
respectively).

426
427

Mean=2.98 for DG20- Early Career, 2.86 for DG21- Mid-Career and 2.71 for the three groups.

Mean = 2.50 for DG23- Minimal Pubco Experience, 2.85 for DG24- Moderate Pubco Experience and
3.01 for Extensive Pubco Experience.
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Figure 23, Q16-1, Linked Subgroups- Public Company Experience

Once again, we are faced with the recurrent theme that increased exposure to public
companies improves the disposition of the respondents to public markets. A possible
explanation is that increasing familiarity with public companies increases the
understanding of the benefits associated with being public, while simultaneously
reducing concerns about the downsides.
One may infer from the PCD Study data that experience with public companies is a more
influential factor than general career experience, and may even act as a countervailing
force. This hypothesis is supported by the following chart, which reports the responses
on Q16-1 for those respondents who have more than 25 years of overall career
experience, but five years or less of experience being involved with public companies.
For this subgroup, the mean on Q16-1 drops to 2.41, indicating that public company
experience is a moderating and countervailing factor on overall experience that leads to
greater support for public companies.
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Figure 24, Q16-1: Linked Subgroups- DG22- Late Career, but limited public company experience

Implications of PCD Study Outcomes for Public Company Decline
Analysis
Ultimately, consideration of the data on Q16-1 in the PCD Study gets straight to the core
of the issue of public company decline in Canada. The key decision-makers and
influencers in Canadian capital markets simply do not, on the average, believe that taking
a company public in Canada offers a net long-term advantage.
Everyone who has been through the IPO process understands that completing an IPO is a
difficult, time-consuming and expensive process. This is especially true for SME's, for
whom senior management time and attention is a finite resource. Distractions associated
with completing an IPO frequently lead to a short-term deterioration in operating results
due to the distraction of senior management away from the profitability of the core
business operations during the IPO process.
Logic dictates that completing an IPO will almost never be the path of least resistance for
a company. Rather, the IPO options will likely be amongst the most challenging and
time-consuming of the alternatives under consideration. In order to justify committing to
the challenges, distraction, and cost of an IPO, there needs to be a significant consensus
amongst the collective group of decision-makers that the IPO alternative will deliver a
long-term net benefit to the company.
Moreover, the decision to pursue an IPO is rarely made by a single decision-maker within
an organization. Unless the IPO mandate is forced on a company through a shareholder
exercising compulsory registration rights, the decision to pursue an IPO is usually
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reached only after an extensive consultative process in which the C-Suite executives,
company directors and significant shareholders take advice from the lawyers, auditors,
accountants and investment bankers.
If more negative opinions than positive opinions are being voiced around the discussion
table in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing the IPO option, it is
difficult to build the consensus necessary to commit to the IPO process. The data from
the PCD Study indicate that there are likely to be significantly more negative opinions
expressed within the decision-making team than positive opinions on the IPO question
over the entire group of participants (37.4% negative compared to 23.5% positive). The
PCD Study also evidences a significant cohort who are neutral on the proposition in Q161 (i.e., 39.1%). As such, the cohort of respondents who support the IPO process (23.5%
in the PCD Study) need to be sufficiently committed to the IPO process to overcome both
the negative and the ambivalent opinions being voiced in the decision-making process
(who combined, represent 76.5% in the PCD Study).
Being in the minority, it is likely that the IPO proponents in a specific company are going
to have to feel strongly about the merits of completing an IPO in order to overcome the
more numerous voices who are negative or ambivalent towards the IPO option. Someone
in a position of significant influence with the company must champion the IPO option
internally and secure the consensus needed to initiate the process. How many of these
potential champions are out there? In the PCD Study, only 3.1% of all respondents
indicated that they strongly agreed with the proposition in Q16-1. This is less than half
the number of respondents who strongly disagreed on Q16-1. Moreover, no single
demographic subgroup had more than 6.3% who strongly agreed that taking a company
public offered a long-term net benefit.
With this low of a level of strong agreement for Q16-1, the pool of individuals willing to
be the internal champion for advancing the IPO initiative within the organization is
worryingly small. As such, the overall bias against IPOs demonstrated in Q16-1 of the
PCD demonstrates the size of the hurdle that public markets proponents in Canada face in
the current environment.
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7.5- Question 16-7: Regulatory Overreach
“Q16-7: Securities regulators in Canada have been too aggressive in
protecting public shareholder interests at the expense of public
companies.”
General Observations and Statistical Analysis
This question is also considered fundamental to the PCD Study, as it is the clear
expression of the regulatory overreach hypothesis. Respondents who agree or strongly
agree with the proposition in Q16-7 evidence a belief that the Canadian securities
commissions and stock exchanges have missed the mark in balancing the competing
interests between efficiency and ease of compliance in IPOs, transactional reporting and
continuous disclosure reporting, on the one side, and the interests of protecting public
shareholder interests and the integrity of the public markets on the other side. Again, the
statistical analysis will be more detailed on this particular question because of the fact
that it is identified as core to understanding the nature of the public company decline
phenomenon in Canada.
The first item of note at a surface level is that the mean on this question is 3.34,
demonstrating a notable level of support for the proposition in Q16-7 across the study.
Across the entire PCD Study, nearly twice as many participants agreed /strongly agreed
with the regulatory overreach hypothesis than disagreed / strongly disagreed. 428 On the
two extremes of the Likert scale, the difference was even greater for Q16-7; 17.0% of all
respondents strongly agreed with the proposition while only 5.9% expressing strong
disagreement with the proposition. The difference between the observed responses in the
PCD Study and the neutral value of 3.00 is strongly significant, which would achieve a
confidence level greater than 99.99% (One Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test,
p<.00001).
The next observation that jumps out from the PCD Study data on Q16-7 is that only a
single demographic subgroup, DG20- Early-Career, out of the 25 different demographic
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The percentage of respondents who chose 4 (agree) or 5 (strongly agree) on Q16-7 was 48.0%
compared to 25.2% who chose 2 (disagree) or 1 (strongly disagree).
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subgroups considered, produced a mean (2.89) lower than the neutral mean of 3.00.
However, even this lone subgroup cannot be claimed to be lower than the neutral mean
on a statistically significant basis (One Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test, Pvalue=0.2365).
Looking elsewhere for groups that are less harshly disposed towards the actions of the
regulators, only one other DG included in the PCD Study exhibited a higher percentage
of "disagree" answers than "agree" answers on Q16-7. 429 DG 15- Investment Bankers
ended up with 35.5% selecting either 4 or 5 vs. 41.7% selecting 1 or 2, but this group also
included a higher number of respondents who strongly agreed with the proposition
(18.8%) than those who strongly disagreed with it (10.4%). As such, the mean for DG8Investment Bankers was at 3.02.
On the whole, anyone combing the data in the PCD Study searching for any demographic
subgroup who comes to the defence of the Canadian securities regulators and disagrees
with the regulatory overreach hypothesis on a statistically significant basis will be left
empty-handed.
Linked Subgroup Observations and Statistical Analysis
Group I v. II- DG2- Group I decision makers scored notably higher in mean on Q16-7
than DG-3 Group II Influencers. (3.54 mean v. 3.17 mean). The difference between the
two groups is statistically significant at a 99% confidence level (Mann-Whitney Test, Pvalue=0.0021).
That DG2- Group I respondents in the PCD Study hold a position on the regulatory
overreach statement that is notably different than that of DG3- Group II is not surprising.
The direction of the difference is also not surprising. After all, one must recognize that
there is a fundamental distinction between being a decision-maker in a public company
paying the professional services invoice for continuous disclosure or transactional advice
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I.e., Those who chose 1 (strongly disagree) or 2 (disagree) versus those who chose 5(strongly agree) or
4 (agree) on Q16-7.
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and support, on the one hand, and being the service provider who relies on that fee
revenue, on the other hand. As such, it is expected that DG2- Group 1 respondents would
be more disposed to agree with the proposition in Q16-7.
Figure 25, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Group I vs Group II Respondents

However, this outcome also demonstrates two inherent problems in the current capital
markets environment that should be keeping the securities regulators awake at night.
First, it is the members of the DG2- Group I cohort who make the final decisions about
whether to pursue an IPO or stay private. With a mean of 3.54 on Q16-7, it has to be
concluded that there is a strong level of support for the regulatory overreach hypothesis
amongst the PCD Study cohort whose opinions matter the most in understanding the
public company decline phenomenon.
Secondly, the outcome on Q16-7 specifically demonstrates the risks in pursuing a
consultation process intended to instruct regulatory streamlining initiatives without
sufficient participation from senior business decision-makers in Canada. The nature of
these processes is discussed earlier in this Dissertation under Chapter 4- Analysis of the
CSA and OSC Regulatory Processes, and the implications of the PCD Study outcomes on
these processes are discussed later under Chapter 10- Implications of the PCD Study for
Regulatory Reform Initiatives. However, it is clear that relying primarily on the
voluntary input of individuals and organizations who respond to the requests for
comments sent out by the securities regulators, and are disproportionately weighted
towards public markets influencers and against senior business decision-makers, will
result in the regulators relying on comments that do not accurately reflect the view of the
critical population of senior business decision-makers in Canada.
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Group I, Public v. Private- This is one of the most interesting and unexpected
observations in the entire PCD Study. It should also be one of the most sobering
observations for provincial securities regulators throughout Canada. In the preceding
discussion on Q16-1, it was reported that DG4- TSX is one of the subgroups that
demonstrated the most favorable disposition in accepting the proposition that taking a
company public provides more long-term advantages than disadvantages (mean 3.01).
Now, in our analysis of Q16-7, we observe that DG4- TSX also is one of the most
favorable demographic subgroups in terms of supporting the proposition that Canadian
securities regulators have missed the mark in striking the appropriate balance between the
competing interests of public issuers and public shareholders, having tipped the balance
too far towards shareholder protection. 430
Figure 26, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- TSX-Listed vs. Private Respondents

Some might interpret these two outcomes for DG4-TSX on Q16-1 and Q16-7 as hinting
at a paradox. However, that is not true. It was hypothesized in the analysis on Q16-1
that the most intuitive explanation of the fact that senior decision-makers of TSX-listed
companies were more positively disposed to the public markets than other subgroups in
the PCD Study was as a result of their increased knowledge and familiarity with the
public markets. The perceptions of DG4-TSX participants are informed by direct
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DG4 TSX mean=3.59 on Q17-7; percentage of those who agree /strongly agree on Q16-7 at 59.9% vs/
21.7% who disagree / strongly disagree.
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experience managing public companies.
It follows that the opinions of DG4-TSX participants on Q16-7 have to reflect some of
the most informed opinions of the various demographic groups on the topic of regulatory
overreach, because each respondent in this subgroup lives with the reality of operating a
public company under the Canadian securities law on a daily basis. Certainly, the
members of subgroup DG4-TSX have had a front-row seat in observing the trendlines in
Canada public company regulation over the past decade, and their perspective is defined
by personal experience rather than through the third-party perceptions and anecdotal
evidence that would influence many of the respondents in the DG5-Private Companies
subgroup.
With reference back to the Q16-1 outcomes on DG4- TSX and DG5 Private Company,
the case can be made that heightened personal knowledge and experience on public
markets may act as a countervailing force to the general negative perception on the net
disadvantages of taking a company public. As such, one can advance the hypothesis that
the reality of the public markets experience is better than the perception of the public
market experience by outsiders, a hypothesis that would be supported by considering
both the DG4-TSX / DG Private Company subgroups and the DG23-25 subgroups crossreferenced against the amount of public company experience each respondent possesses.
Yet, if one subscribes to that rationale for the Q16-1 analysis, the same logical inference
supports the hypothesis that the degree of regulatory overreach experienced in reality by
public markets insiders is even worse than what is perceived by public markets outsiders.
If that hypothesis is true, then the expectation would be that, in reference to Q16-7, the
results would demonstrate an increased level of support for the regulatory overreach
proposition. Indeed, that anticipated trend is observed in the PCD Study data at a
statistically significant level, with the mean on Q16-7 increasing contemporaneously with
the degree of public company experience. 431
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The specifics of which are discussed hereafter in this section under the analysis of the variations
between the results for DG23, DG24 and DG25.
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Is the difference observed on Q16-7 between the subgroups DG4-TSX and DG5- Public
Company statistically significant? While the mean for DG4-TSX is relatively high on
Q16-7 at 3.59, the mean for DG5- Private Company is also relatively high at 3.46. As
such, it would be expected that it will be difficult to establish statistical significance on
the difference between DG4- TSX and DG5- Private Company at the sample sizes used
in the PCD Study. Indeed, running the available tests discloses that testing the hypothesis
that DG4-TSX will be lower than DG5-Private Company with respect to the proportion
of disagree/strongly disagree responses, a weakly significant difference can be reported
(Single-Tailed Two Proportion Z-Test, P-value=0.0670), sufficient for the 90%
confidence level, but not reaching the 95% confidence level.
It is recognized that these weak levels of statistical significance are insufficient to draw
conclusions on the hypothesis that increased experience and knowledge increases one's
belief in the regulatory overreach proposition between DG4- TSX and DG5- Private
Company. Yet, the data does suggest that this is an appropriate area for further analysis.
If further research can demonstrate at higher levels of statistical significance that an
increased degree of direct participation and experience in the public markets leads to both
an increased appreciation of the net benefit associated with being public and a
strengthened belief that the regulators are overreaching, that outcome would certainly be
relevant in instructing the arc of future regulatory reform.
One additional interesting observation can be made by looking at the ratio of combined
agree and strongly agree versus combined disagree and strongly disagree answers on
Q16-7 from these two subgroups. DG4-TSX evidences 59.8% respondents agreeing with
the regulatory overreach proposition (i.e., selecting 4 or 5) compared to 21.7% of
respondents evidencing disagreement (i.e., selecting 1 or 2). By comparison, DG5Private Company is at 49.3% 4 or 5 answers vs. 14.1% 1 or 2 answers. This is unusual in
that, although DG4 is overall more supportive of the regulatory overreach proposition in
Q16-7 than DG5-Public Company respondents, there are a higher proportion of DG4TSX participants who also disagree with the proposition than DG5-Public Company
participants. Although counter-intuitive, this observation indicates that direct personal
experience of the DG4-TSX respondents appears to crystallize their opinion either for or
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against the regulatory overreach proposition, as further evidenced by the fact that only
18.6% of DG4 respondents answered with the neutral “3” compared to 36.5% of DG5Private Company respondents who answered with a “3”.
In terms of strongly held opinions, the PCD Study data shows that 26.8% of DG4-TSX
respondents answered Q16-7 with a “5” (strongly agree), which is the highest percentage
of strongly agree responses of all 25 demographic subgroups in the PCD Study. Again,
the regulators should consider this particular outcome soberly, as having more than onequarter of the crucial DG4-TSX demographic strongly agreeing with the regulatory
overreach proposition has to be viewed as an indictment of the collective actions of
Canadian securities regulators in the past years.
Group II Constituents- Noteworthy here is that three out of the four constituent Group
II’s demographic subgroups ranked in the lowest quartile based on mean: DG6- Lawyers
(mean 3.18); DG8- Investment Bankers (mean 3.02) and DG9- Private Equity (mean
3.07). This indicates that these subgroups of public company influencers are less likely
to subscribe to the regulatory overreach proposition than either of the Group I subgroups.
Figure 27, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Group II Constituents

Again, as in the preceding Group I analysis on this question, it bears mentioning that a
significantly different opinion is exhibited between Group I and Group II. This
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observation makes it particularly concerning that Group I opinions form such a small part
of comment letters filed in response to OSC Notice 11-784 initiative.
It is not particularly surprising that DG6-Lawyers and DG8- Investment Bankers appear
to be less exorcised about regulatory overreach than Group I senior decision-makers in
general. Both subgroups secure some direct financial benefit from the additional
securities regulation over the past few years. Lawyers gain benefit in the form of
additional revenue from their compliance advising. Investment bankers gain benefit in
the form of additional fee revenue related to valuations and fairness opinions on both
related-party transactions and independent transactions. However, it is admittedly
surprising that DG19- Private Equity also ranks on the lower end of the demographic
subgroups on this particular topic. One might assume that private equity would be
particularly averse to increasing regulatory complexity, but this is not borne out in the
PCD Study data. No obvious explanation comes to mind to explain this outcome other
than private equity investors have little reason to pay attention to the ongoing changes in
securities regulation and therefore have not formed any strong opinions relating thereto.
Also surprising is the fact that it is the fourth subgroup, DG7-Auditors, who score notably
higher on the regulatory overreach hypothesis than the other constituent DG3- Public
Markets Influencer subgroups with a mean at 3.49. This difference between DG7Auditors and the other three constituent subgroups in the PCD Study with respect to
regulatory overreach is moderately statistically significant, supporting a 95% confidence
level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0178).
A number of participants from the DG7- Auditors subgroup were keen to discuss the
subject of public company decline orally via phone after participating in the PCD Study.
Anecdotally from these conversations, which were not recorded and do not form part of
the official PCD Study record, the accountant / auditor subgroup largely focused their
regulatory displeasure on the perceived continually increasing complexity, risk and cost
added to the public company review process by the Accounting Standards Board of
Canada (the "ASBC"). A common sentiment expressed by several members of this
subgroup was that it is no longer sufficiently profitable for auditing firms to complete

276

public company audits to the extent that the profits justify the legal risks. They
particularly expressed a belief that there has been a misalignment in risk vs. reward for
public company auditors, which has been exacerbated by the pronouncements of the
ASBC in recent years. As reported by these individuals, the public review process has
become so time-consuming that they believe their clients would revolt if they billed for
all the verification time spent on a file. Instead, the auditors frequently end up writing
down the auditing bills in order to preserve their reputation and relationships. A senior
partner in the audit group of one of the "big four" accounting firms expressly stated that
their firm no longer prioritizes marketing in an attempt to secure new public company
audit files. Rather, they continue to engage in public company audit work primarily as a
service to long-time clients with whom they have a level of mutual trust.
Clearly, the auditors are in a unique position compared to the other two main public
markets service provider subgroups, DG6- Lawyers and DG9- Investment Bankers. Each
of the three different subgroups of service providers has a degree of legal liability in
servicing the capital markets. However, the perception amongst the accountants /
auditors subgroup is that the auditing function has historically borne the lion's share of
the legal risk for the large public company collapses, essentially being forced to provide
insurance policies against financial reporting irregularities which they do not necessarily
have the ability to detect.
Company Size- As evidenced by the following chart, there is little distinction in
disposition on Q16-7 between DG10-SME’s and DG11-Non-SME’s.
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Figure 28, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- SME vs. Non-SME Respondents

If there is a significant demographic difference to be found within the subgroup
components of DG2, it appears to be based on a public company / private company
distinction rather than with respect to company size.
Industry- DG 12- Oil & Gas has the highest mean of any of the 25 demographic
subgroups (3.71) on Q16-7. With respect to the relative percentages of favorable and
unfavorable responses for DG12- Oil & Gas, the ratio is 63.1% agree and strongly agree
to 15.8% disagree and strongly disagree. This represents a four-to-one ratio between
overall positive and negative responses on Q16-7, which is also the highest of any
significant demographic group in the PCD Study.
Why does DG12- Oil &Gas exhibit a strong belief in the regulatory overreach statement
proposition? Nothing in the PCD Study questionnaire format delves deep enough to
identify root causes. However, we can refer back to the qualitative analysis section of the
PCD Study for clues. The overall level of frustration of oil & gas issuers with
government policy in general was a common theme in the text responses. Continuing to
go through one of the longest market downturns in Canadian oil & gas history, senior
decision-makers of oil & gas companies repeatedly discussed their perception that the
decline has been exacerbated by the failure of various levels of government in Canada to
respond to the crisis proactively, and even to recognize the importance of the oil & gas
industry to the overall economy.
There is, unquestionably, a present widespread perception in the oil & gas industry in
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Canada that they have been abandoned by government for the sake of maintaining
popularity with the environmentally-focused lobby domestically and abroad who focus
on Alberta heavy-oil production as a special culprit in global warming. It may well
simply be that the general antipathy of senior oil & gas decision-makers towards all
levels of government at this juncture is manifested in the extreme Q16-7 response
relating to regulatory overreach. Of course, initiatives such as the recent CSA Staff
Notice 51-354 “Report on Climate Change-Related Disclosure Project”, perceived by
many oil & gas executives as laying the groundwork for more invasive disclosure
regulations targeted at the oil & gas industry, might also contribute to the outcome.
Figure 29, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Industry-Based

The DG15- Non-Resource subgroup also has an above-average mean on Q16-7 at 3.54,
but that variation can be attributed to the knock-on effect of the higher ratings of all DG2Group I respondents generally on Q16-7 rather any industry-related differences. DG13Mining also appears to be lower based on mean (3.33), but the sample sizes on the two
extraction-based demographic subgroups are too small for that level of variation to
approach the minimum levels of statistical significance necessary to report any
conclusions on the observation.
Geographic Location- Since Ontario is, by far, the largest subgroup represented in the
PCD Study at 47.7% of the total survey population, the analysis logically begins with
consideration of perceptions of DG17- Ontario on the regulatory overreach statement in
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Q16-7. The quick observation is that Ontario-based respondents evidence a materially
lower average on Q16-7 (mean=3.09) than PCD Study respondents from other
geographic regions (mean=3.54). The difference between DG17-Ontario respondents
and all non-Ontario demographic subgroups based on agree/strongly agree responses is
significant at the 95% confidence interval (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0125).
DG18- Quebec and DG19- Atlantic Provinces both evidence a disposition on Q16-7
similar to the DG1- All Respondents subgroup and, given the small size of each of those
two samples, do not bear any further discussion here.
Looking westward, it is obvious that both DG15- British Columbia (mean=3.54) and
DG16-Prairies (3.60) subgroups appear notably higher on average than Ontario in their
disposition on Q16-7. There is a strong statistically significant difference between the
three demographic subgroups (Kruskal Wallis, P-value=0.0015). The follow-on pairwise
test using the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test demonstrates that biggest differences are
between DG15-Prairies and DG17- Ontario (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, P-value<0.001).
The difference between DG15- British Columbia and DG17-Ontario reaches the
threshold for statistical significance at a 95% confidence level (Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test, P-value=0.0257).
Figure 30, Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Geographically-Based
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What are the implications of these geographically-based statistical observations? One
interesting observation to consider is that the mean of DG-15 British Columbia on Q16-7
is 0.21 higher than the mean of DG13-Mining. Given that the mining industry has the
largest representation amongst the subgroup of British Columbia-based respondents, we
can conclude from this observation that the higher support for the regulatory overreach
proposition from British Columbia participants in the PCD Study is not driven by
sentiment in the mining industry.
With respect to the Prairies, the mean score of Q16-7 is similar whether you include
respondents from the oil & gas industry (mean=3.60) or exclude them (mean=3.55), so
that industry is also not significantly skewing the DG16- Prairie results on Q16-7. In
both resource and non-resource industries, the Prairie-based respondents have the highest
averages supporting the regulatory overreach proposition. The dissatisfaction with the
balance struck by the securities regulators operates independently of the extractive sector
industries throughout western Canada.
Clearly, there is a higher level of discontentment on the Prairies and, to a lesser extent
British Columbia, with the arc of securities regulation in Canada over the past number of
years. In other areas of the economy, this would be hypothesized as being at least
partially attributable to western alienation generally, as the most important policy
pronouncements are dictated by the population concentration in Ontario and Quebec. In
the case of regulatory overreach, however, the convenient bogeyman of western
alienation fails to have the same degree of resonance because each province has its own
securities commission and any wounds associated with regulatory overreach are largely
self-inflicted at the individual provincial securities regulation level. In fact, within all
areas of the economy, securities regulation is one of the areas in which the provinces
(particularly Alberta in its steadfast opposition to the national securities regulator
initiatives) retain the highest degree of autonomy.
On the flip side, there is nothing to suggest that the securities commissions in western
Canada have adopted regulations that are any more invasive or restrictive than those
adopted by the Ontario Securities Commission. Yet, while Ontario-based respondents
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were close to the level of neutrality on regulatory overreach in Q16-7, the western
Canadian-based respondents supported the regulatory overreach proposition in
significantly higher numbers. Without any industry-based linkages to point to, the
simplest inference from the data is that western Canadians are simply less tolerant of
increasing securities regulation generally than their Ontario-based counterparts.
Career Experience- The headline statistic from a quick analysis of the responses on
DG20, DG21 and DG22 is that the early-career respondents are the one subgroup with
the lowest average on Q16-7, producing a mean=2.89. 432 Comparing DG20- Early
Career to all other respondents in the PCD Study, the difference on Q16-7 is significant at
a confidence level of 95% (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0119).
Figure 31 Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Total Career Experience

What factors give rise to this outcome? There are two alternative intuitive explanations.
The first is based on the belief that the length and nature of career experience alters
perception on the regulatory overreach proposition stated in Q16-7. This theory would
argue that exposure to the arc of changing securities regulation over a longer period of

432

In fact, DG20- Early-Career is the only subgroup in the PCD Study with a mean lower than the
theoretical neutral outcome of 3.00. However, the difference between DG20 and the neutral value of 3.00
is not enough to be statistically significant at our minimum threshold (One Sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank
Test, P-value=0.2365)
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time gives public market participants more experience and history on which to assess the
regulatory overreach proposition in Q16-7 and that this longer experience makes
individuals more disposed to believe that regulators have overreached.
The alternative explanation is that the millennial generation is fundamentally more
accepting of public regulations than the preceding Gen X and baby-boomer generations.
This theory does not imply any causation between length of career experience and
perception on regulatory overreach summarized in Q16-7, simply correlation based on
generational characteristics. The PCD Study does not contain any data to support one
explanation over the other, although it is argued that the first alternative is the more likely
explanation absent any specific data as to the willingness of millennials to accept
regulation more readily than earlier generations.
Pubco Experience- It was discussed previously (in the DG4-TSX analysis on Q16-7) that
the relationship between general career experience and specific public company
experience appears to work in the opposite direction for Q16-7 as compared to Q16-1. In
the Q16-1 analysis, it was discussed that public company experience appears to act as a
countervailing force to general career experience in terms of perception of the net benefit
of being public, resulting in a negative correlation. In Q16-2, the correlation between
these same two factors appears to be positive, meaning that public company experience
correlates with an increase in the strength of belief in the regulatory overreach
proposition. 433
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In fact, running a Spearman Rank correlation analysis (the specifics of which are discussed later in
Chapter 8- Correlation in the PCD Study) demonstrates a statistically significant correlation between these
two items: P-value=0.08693, RS=0.1023.
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Figure 32 Q16-7: Linked Subgroups- Public Company Experience

We can test the hypothesis, informed from these earlier observations on DG4-TSX, that
the perceptions of the regulatory overreach hypothesis will increase in strength along
with the amount public company experience. The difference between DG23- Limited
Pubco Experience and DG25- Extensive Pubco Experience is significant at a 90%
confidence level (Single-Tailed Two-Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0588) and just under
the 95% confidence level. Further analysis of the correlation is undertaken later in
Chapter 8- Correlation in the PCD Study Data.
Implications of PCD Study Outcomes in Q16-7 for Public Company
Decline Analysis
The PCD Study was not designed to test causality on an empirical basis. As wonderful as
it would be to identify a magic bullet, nobody has yet identified a realistic and practical
method for empirically testing causality with reference to public company decline.
Rather, the empirical data collected in the PCD Study is designed to be descriptive and
illuminative in many areas that have been posited as being relevant to public company
decline. It is also intended to provide additional context for deeper analysis of the
phenomenon, hopefully providing instruction on specific areas to prioritize for
completing further research.
Analysis of the PCD Study responses on question Q16-7 demonstrates that the majority
of the respondents believe that the securities regulators have indeed overreached and
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tipped the balance against reporting issuers. Overall, nearly twice as many participants
agreed with the regulatory overreach proposition in the PCD Study as disagreed with it.
That is not an insignificant result, and certainly should be taken seriously by the
securities regulators across the country. In particular, the relationship indicating that
more experience in public companies leads to an increased belief that regulators have
overreached should be soberly considered. The implication of this statistic is that the
most knowledgeable and experienced subgroups in the PCD Study agreed most strongly
with Q16-7, suggesting that, the more you deal with public markets, the more inclined
you are to support the regulatory overreach proposition.
However, regulatory overreach is simply a perception. There is no objectively right or
wrong answer to Q16-7, just opinions of market participants. The regulators are tasked
with the critical function of protecting the integrity of the capital markets, but are
entrusted to do so utilizing policy that is not so restrictive as to damage the robustness of
the capital markets they are tasked with protecting. This is unquestionably a challenging
balancing act, and it is unlikely that any regulator will ever execute his or her task to
perfection in finding the optimal balance between maintaining market freedom and
market protection. 434
The fact that the cross-section of market participants targeted for participation in the PCD
Study evidence a significant level of belief that the regulatory field is tilted too far in
favour of investor protection is noteworthy, and hopefully will provide further impetus to
other provincial jurisdictions outside of the OSC who have yet to take up the gauntlet of
burden reduction passed onto them by the CSA in Notice 51-404. The mandate for
burden reduction of the OSC has been already delivered top-down from the governing
Conservative government of Premier Doug Ford in Ontario. Ideally, the data gathered in
the PCD Study on Q16-7 will push other securities commissions to also prioritize moving
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Notably, the PCD Study does not solicit the opinions of the investor rights lobby on this topic, whose
members may well evidence the overriding belief that the securities commissions have not yet reached far
enough to protect public shareholder interests. However, the investor rights lobby does not exert material
influence on the go public / stay private decision in Canada and therefore were not identified as a priority
group to study in the PCD Study.
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forward with their own regulatory streamlining processes. Based on the geographic
break-down on Q16-7, it would seem that Alberta-based senior business decision-makers
in particular are anxious for this process to begin.
What the data on Q16-7 cannot do in any meaningful way is quantify the degree to which
the perception of senior business decision-makers on the topic of regulatory overreach is
responsible for the phenomenon of public company decline. Intuitively, the fact that
twice as many respondents agree with the regulatory overreach proposition as disagree
with it provides an indication that the perception of regulatory overreach in Canada is a
contributing factor to public company decline. Assessing whether it’s a major factor or a
minor factor requires us to continue down the analytical path further in the PCD Study.

7.6- Question 16-3: Impact of Technology- Part A
“Q16-3: Technological advancements have made it harder for public
companies to compete with private companies.”
This particular question asks respondents’ opinions of the hypothesis that the immediate
and universal access to public company information by all markets participants as a result
of technological advances (proliferation of smartphones with internet capabilities, high
speed data connections, easy access to SEDAR filings, data mining and monitoring
programs to track competitor filings, etc.) has made it harder for public companies to
compete with private companies. It was included in the PCD Study to provide an
additional data point on the “Competitive Disclosure Disadvantage” factor, which was
considered as a potential "sleeper" factor not widely discussed in the academic or
business literature that might be demonstrated to be more important to public company
decline than widely perceived.
The smartphone revolution truly began in Canada in July, 2008 with the commercial
release of the first iPhone to consumers by Rogers Wireless. It has been previously
discussed that the peak of public company listings in Canada occurred at roughly the
same point in time, and that the public markets have been in continual decline in Canada
ever since. Thus, the specific hypothesis behind Q16-3 is that proliferation of
smartphone technology over the past dozen years has fundamentally changed the
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competitive landscape between public companies and private companies in Canada.
Whereas throughout the past decades there was a time-lag between the release of
information and its dissemination, and it required a moderate degree of effort to access
that information, every competitor, customer and supplier can now download apps to
keep them apprised of every detail that is publicly reported by competitors within
seconds of its release. If you are a senior executive of a public company meeting with a
key supplier, that supplier will certainly know whether you have just reported blow-out
positive quarterly financial results. They will also know if you are in financial trouble
and a credit risk for further deliveries, even if you have never been late on payment thus
far. Access to that information intuitively gives more negotiating power to the
counterparties and makes it more difficult for the public company to retain their operating
margins than for private company competitors.
Although other items related to the Competitive Disclosure Disadvantage topic are tested
in the major matrix at Question 20, this hypothesis was considered sufficiently plausible
that it merited an independent verification question in Q16-3. Based on the data in the
PCD Study, however, the respondents do not support this hypothesis to any material
degree. The mean across all respondents on Q16-3 was 2.58, with the number of agree
and strongly agree answers amongst all respondents at only 13.9% compared to disagree
and strongly disagree at 44.6%. More surprising, there was not a single demographic
subgroup in the PCD Study for whom the number of agree / strongly agree responses
outnumbered the disagree / strongly disagree responses.
The two demographic subgroups that were most favorable on the competitive disclosure
disadvantage proposition as a result of technology proliferation in Q16-3 were DG10SME’s (3.02 mean- the level of ambivalence) and DG5-Private Company at 2.87. This
result is intuitive for SME's, as smaller companies have fewer resources to compete on
financial strength and would be expected to be more focused on the value of retaining
privacy in competition. Private companies are accustomed to being able to keep their
key financial data private in the competitive environment and would be expected to be
wary of the prospect of having their data available to competitors, customers and
suppliers.
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Figure 33 Q16-3: Top Subgroups in Terms of Support for Q16-3 Proposition

The difference between DG5- Private Company and DG4-TSX in terms of agree and
strongly agree responses is weakly statistically significance at the 90% confidence level
(Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0842). The difference between DG10- SME and
DG11- Non-SME in terms of agree and strongly agree responses is significant (Two
Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.001) above a 99% confidence level.
There are no material observations to be made in the analysis of which particular
demographic subgroups are the least favorable on the proposition in Q16-3 other than the
fact that those demographic subgroups come from across the different subgroup
definitions.
One trend in the PCD Study data on Q16-3 that is worth noting is the positive
relationship between years of total career experience and tendency to support the
proposition in Q16-3, 435 whereas there appears to a negative relationship between public
company experience and the degree of support for Q16-3. 436 Once again, the correlation
between factors is discussed in Chapter 8- Correlation in the PCD Study.

435

On Q16-3: DG20- Early Career, mean=2.39; DG21- Mid-Career, mean=2.57; DG22- Late-Career,
mean=2.65.
436

On Q16-3, DG23- Limited Pubco Experience, mean=2.76; DG24- Moderate Pubco Experience, mean=
2.62; DG25- Extensive Pubco Experience, mean=2.43.
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Figure 34 Q16-3: Linked Subgroups- Total Career Experience

Figure 35, Q16-3: Linked Subgroups- Public Company Experience

With respect to overall career experience, the difference between DG20- Early Career
and DG22- Late Career on the agree / strongly agree answers in Q16-3 is statistically
significant at a 95% confidence level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0260). With
respect to public company experience, the difference between DG24- Limited Pubco
Experience and DG25- Extensive Pubco Experience for the disagree / strongly disagree
side of the Likert Scale demonstrates strong statistical significance at the 99% confidence
level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0096).
As in Q16-1, the implication of the data here is that general career experience is linked
with a corresponding increase in one's belief in the Q16-3 proposition, but that public
company experience operates in the opposite direction as a countervailing factor.
Namely, the public company experience effect is sufficient to overcome the trendline of
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general experience and invert the trendline.

7.7- Question 16-5: Impact of Technology- Part B
“Q16-5: The rapid pace of technological change has made it more
attractive for private companies to sell out to larger corporations rather
than pursue their own IPO.”
This particular question represents a simplistic formulation of the Fundamental Economic
Change Hypothesis proposed by Dr. Jay Ritter and discussed earlier in this Dissertation
in Chapter 1-Introduction and Chapter 2- Literature Review. Ritter's Fundamental
Economic Change Hypothesis has many nuances beyond what can be properly expressed
in a single sentence proposition, but it is submitted that Q16-5 articulates the key
elements of the hypothesis.
Overall, the respondent group was moderately supportive of the Q16-5 proposition, with
an average mean amongst all respondents of 3.27. For DG1- All Respondents, there
were nearly twice as many individuals who selected agree or strongly agree (41.8%)
compared to those who selected disagree or strongly disagree (21.1%). Although the
support of the PCD Study participants on Q16-5 was not as high as for some of the other
propositions, the support was widely distributed across all demographic groups. In fact,
each of the 25 demographic subgroups assessed in the PCD Study generated a mean on
Q16-3 above the level of neutrality at 3.00, as well as a higher percentage of agree and
strongly agree responses than disagree and strongly disagree responses.
Table 15, Q16-5: Fundamental Economic Change Hypothesis
5 and 4
Strongly Agree
and Agree

3
Neither Agree or
Disagree

1 and 2
Strongly Disagree
and Disagree

DG1: All Respondents

41.8%

37.0%

21.1%

DG2: Group I

40.9%

38.5%

20.7%

DG3: Group II

42.7%

35.8%

21.6%

DG4: TSX-Listed

35.8%

39.8%

24.5%

DG5: Private Company

47.9%

36.6%

15.5%

DG6: Lawyers

36.4%

47.7%

15.9%

DG7: Auditors

66.6%

20.5%

12.8%

DG8: Investment Bankers

39.6%

33.3%

27.1%

DG9: Private Equity

33.9%

39.0%

27.1%

DG Subgroup
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5 and 4
Strongly Agree
and Agree

3
Neither Agree or
Disagree

1 and 2
Strongly Disagree
and Disagree

DG10: SME

46.2%

40.0%

13.8%

DG11: Non-SME

39.2%

37.1%

23.7%

DG12: Oil & Gas

28.9%

50.0%

21.0%

DG13: Mining

29.4%

44.1%

26.5%

DG14: Non-Resource

49.5%

32.0%

18.6%

DG15: British Columbia

37.5%

35.0%

27.5%

DG16: Prairies

42.1%

41.1%

16.9%

DG17: Ontario

36.7%

40.5%

22.8%

DG18: Quebec

62.5%

12.5%

25.1%

DG19: Atlantic Provinces

63.2%

21.1%

15.8%

DG20: Early-Career

42.9%

35.7%

21.5%

DG21: Mid Career

51.3%

32.4%

16.2%

DG22: Late Career

32.9%

42.2%

24.9%

DG23: Limited Pubco Experience

49.5%

35.0%

15.5%

DG24: Moderate Pubco Experience

37.1%

34.6%

28.4%

DG25: Extensive Pubco Experience

36.8%

41.7%

21.5%

DG Subgroup

Overall, therefore, the Fundamental Economic Change hypothesis of Dr. Ritter secured
broad support amongst the PCD respondents. Given the relative consistency in opinions
expressed on Q16-5, there are only a couple of observations within the linked
demographic groups worthy of further note. First, the DG7- Auditors subgroup appears
to be an outlier on the favorable side with the highest percentage of agree and strongly
agree responses at 66.6%. The difference between DG7- Auditors and the remainder of
the Group II respondents on the agree and strongly agree responses is significant at a
confidence level of 99% (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0013). There is no obvious
explanation as to why the auditors and public company accounting group would support
this proposition at a significantly higher level than other public markets influencers.
Possibly, it is a function of the higher level of risk that the DG7- Auditors subgroup
perceives in the IPO process compared to other subgroups arising from the financial
statement certification process. However, with no logical hypothesis arising from
elsewhere in the data to explain the outcome, it remains an anomaly to be noted for future
consideration in other research.
Second, the two extractive-sector industries both appear to rate the proposition in Q16-5
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lower than DG14- Non-Resource. Whereas DG14-Non-Resource has 49.5% of its group
choosing agree or strongly agree on Q16-5, DG12- Oil & Gas and DG13- Mining have
only 28.9% and 29.4%, respectively, in agreement. Applying the Kruskal Wallis test, the
difference in rankings between these three groups evidence weak statistical significance
(Kruskal Wallis, P-value=0.0928). Follow-on pairwise analysis demonstrates that the
most significant difference in responses here are between the DG12- Oil & Gas and
DG15- Non-Resource subgroups (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, P-value=0.065). A possible
explanation for these outcomes is that there is easier access to transactional liquidity for
trade sales of companies outside of the extractive sector in Canada, which would be
anticipated given the commodity downturn in Canada over the past few years. Another
possible explanation is that technology has been less impactful in the extractive sector
industries than in the non-resource industries with respect to general competitiveness and
time-to-market.
No other differences within any of the linked subgroups are of sufficient size to rise to
anything close to the minimum level of statistical significance.
On the whole, it is submitted that the PCD Study outcome on Q16-5 provides a level of
support that the hypothesis identified by Ritter is recognized by the respondent group as
being real. However, the extent of the support does not rise to a level which would
indicate that this factor is likely as critical to the overall phenomenon of public company
decline as suggested by Dr. Ritter. Rather, the Fundamental Economic Change
hypothesis appears to be one of a series of factors that are each contributing to ongoing
public company decline in Canada.

7.8- Question 16-4: Private Equity Impact- Part A
“Q16-4: Private equity financing to fund company growth in Canada is
significantly easier to access now than it used to be.”
Q16-4, Q16-2 and Q16-6 all deal with the proliferation of private capital in Canada and
its connection to the phenomenon of public company decline. Each of these three
questions deals with a slightly different topic. Q16-4 simply asks respondents whether
private equity funding has become easier to access in Canada. Q16-2 asks respondents to
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give their opinion on the proposition that private equity capital should be the default
funding option and that IPOs should only be considered when private equity capital is not
available. Q16-6 asks respondents to give their opinion on the proposition that public
company decline is primarily attributable to the increased availability of private equity.
The correlation between these three private equity-focused questions will be explored
later in this Dissertation.
Starting with Q16-4, this is the single question that scored highest of the group of seven
different sub-questions contained with Q16 with reference to mean. As such, there is a
high degree of consensus amongst senior decision-makers and public markets influencers
that private equity financing in Canada is indeed significantly easier to access than in
previous eras. The average mean for Q16-4 amongst all respondents was 3.72. On a
proportion basis, the number of respondents who chose agree or strongly agree on Q16-4
was 66.0%, compared to only 13.9% who chose disagree or strongly disagree with the
statement, a ratio exceeding four-to-one. Strongly held positions were even more skewed
on the favorable side. 25.1% of respondents chose strongly agree compared to 5.3% who
chose strongly disagree, a ratio of nearly five to one.
The high level of support for Q16-4 supports the text responses in the Qualitative
Analysis part of this Dissertation, pointing to increased availability of private equity
financing in Canada as one of the fundamental factors relevant to the public company
decline phenomenon.
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Figure 36, Q16-4, All Respondents, Group I and Group II

From the above chart it is relatively clear that DG3- Group II respondents are more
favorably disposed on Q16-4 than DG2- Group I respondents. The difference between
DG3- Group II and DG2- Group I is strongly significant (Mann-Whitney Test,
p<0.0001). There are two simple explanations for this difference between Group I and
Group II respondents. The first is that the perception of the ease with which private
equity funding can be secured is greater than the reality, therefore the Group I
respondents perceive it as being more difficult than Group II respondents. The second is
that the Group II respondents see a larger number of corporate transactions as advisors
than the Group I respondents do as senior business decision-makers, giving the Group II
respondents a broader exposure to the trends in private equity financing observed over a
larger number of deals.
Notably, there is very little divergence between the DG2 subgroups, DG4 TSX and DG5Private Company. As evidenced below, the senior decision-makers of the TSX-listed and
private companies have the highest degree of consistency in their opinion on Q16-4.
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Figure 37, Q16-4, Group I, Senior Decision-Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private Companies

As would be anticipated from the four constitute subgroups of public markets influencers,
DG9- Private Equity scored the highest on Q16-4. Although expected, the outcome is
notable in that DG9- Private Equity respondents possess the highest level of direct
knowledge of the trendlines in the private equity market and its growth over the past
number of years.
Figure 38, Q16-4, Group II- Public Markets Influencers

With respect to company size, non-SME's rate moderately higher on this question than
SME’s. The observation to be made here is that the increase in access to private equity
funding seems to be more accessible in larger companies than in smaller companies.
This observation is noteworthy, but also unsurprising given the trajectory of the private
equity market in the past number of years and the minimum investment size implemented
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by a number of the larger pools of private capital. The difference between DG10-SME's
and DG1- Non-SME's is statistically significant at a 90% confidence level (Two
Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0720).
Figure 39, Q16-4, SME vs. Non-SME

On an industry basis, another moderate difference can be observed in Q16-5 between the
resource and non-resource companies.
Figure 40, Q16-4, Industry Breakdown

DG12- Oil & Gas and DG13- Mining companies appear to not find it as easy to access
private equity in the current economic environment as DG14- Non-Resource companies.
Running a Kruskal Wallis test on the three industry-based demographic subgroups, it is
observed that there is a significant difference in the rankings of the subgroups on Q16-5
(Kruskal Wallis, P-value <0.001). Running the follow-on pairwise tests, it is apparent
that the difference occurs between the two extractive sectors industries and the non
resource -based subgroup (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, P-value<0.001) for mining v. non-
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resources and P-value= 0.0046 for oil & gas vs non-resources). There is no statistically
significant difference between the two extractive sector industry demographic subgroups,
DG12- Oil & Gas and DG13- Mining. Again, given the recent depressed economic
environment for extractive sector businesses, this outcome is not unexpected.
Geographically, DG16-Prairies (mean=3.40) are notably less favorable in their response
to Q16-5 than any other geographic region. Sentiment on the Prairies indicates that the
increased private equity accessibility increases have not been as accessible as across other
regions in Canada. This difference is partly explained by the concentration of O&G
companies in the Prairies respondents, but the mean for the Prairies excluding all DG12O&G respondents (i.e., mean=3.53) is still lower than the mean of all other respondents
outside of the Prairies (i.e., mean=3.83). The difference is statistically significant at a
90% confidence level (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0518).
Figure 41, Q16-4, Geographic Breakdown

With respect to total career experience and public company experience, there is nothing
noteworthy beyond the fact that these subgroups all exhibit a significant degree of
similarity in their dispositions on this question.
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Figure 42, Q16-4, Career and Public Company Experience Based

7.9- Question 16-2: Private Equity Impact- Part B
“Q16-2: Companies should consider an IPO to finance growth only
when private equity funding is not readily available.”
Like Q16-1, Q16-2 again represents a general predisposition test on the topic of IPOs and
the public markets, this time focusing specifically on the decision to take a company
public or keep it private. This question is considered less core to the overall PCD Study
analysis than Q16-1 and our discussion will, accordingly, focus only on the notable
highlights.
In effect, Q16-2 states the proposition that IPOs should be pursued only as a last resort if
private equity financing is not otherwise available. As such, Q16-2 was included in the
PCD Study as a check to determine the embedded level of inherent anti-IPO bias that
exists in the Canadian markets at this point in time. If a respondent agrees or strongly
agrees with the proposition in Q16-2, they are exhibiting a fundamental bias against the
public markets and in favour of private financing alternatives. That bias can be formed
by personal experience with the public markets or through conclusions reached by
observing the public markets and the experiences of others. Regardless of the source of
the bias, the presence of an anti-IPO bias demonstrates that capital market proponents
have a bigger hurdle to overcome when trying to identify policies that will stem the
ongoing tide of public company decline in Canada.
What public capital markets proponents would like to see in the PCD Study data on Q162 is a mean that is significantly below the level of neutrality (3.00) in order to provide
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evidence that market participants at least retain an open mind on pursuing IPOs. The
actual outcome demonstrates a mean on Q16-2 for DG1- All Respondents at 2.95, which
is slightly below the level of theoretical neutrality. However, the difference is not far
enough below the level of neutrality to be statistically significant (One Sample Wilcoxon
Signed Rank Test, P-value=0.1787). This has to be a disappointing outcome for public
markets supporters, as it demonstrates that a certain level of bias does exist against even
considering IPOs except as an alternative of last resort.
More bad news for future IPO prospects in Canada is drawn from analysis of the
demographic breakdown of the Q16-2 responses.
Figure 43, Q16-2, All Respondents and Group 1 v Group II

From the above chart, it is apparent that DG2- Group I respondents are significantly more
favorable on Q16-2 than DG3-Group II respondents. DG2- Group I respondents have a
mean of 3.11 on Q16-2, compared to a mean of 2.81 for DG3- Group II respondents. This
difference is strongly significant, supporting a 99% confidence level (Mann-Whitney
Test, P-value=0.0088). As the Group I participants are understood to be more influential
in the ultimate going public decision than the Group II participants, this difference is
discouraging for public markets proponents.
Even more concerning is the fact that, within the two component elements of DG2Group I respondents, the senior business decision makers of DG5- Private Company are
significantly more favorable on Q16-2 than DG4- TSX on a strong statistically significant
basis (Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.0060). DG5- Private Company respondents have
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a mean on Q16-2 of 3.37 compared to a mean of 2.92 for DG4- TSX respondents.
Figure 44, Q16-2, Senior Decision Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private companies

Considering that the members of the DG5- Private Company subgroup are all senior
decision-makers of TSX-eligible private companies in Canada, it is alarming that only
one in five respondents from this subgroup disagreed or strongly disagreed with the
proposition that IPOs should only be considered as a last resort when private equity
financing options have been exhausted. This is particularly disconcerting when
considering that the DG5- Private Company subgroup is the single most important
demographic group to consider when looking at the prospects for arresting the public
company decline phenomenon.
Within the constituent subgroups of DG3- Group II, it was expected that there would be
one outlier subgroup that would generate a notably higher mean on Q16-2 than the rest.
However, the expectation was that the outlier would be DG9- Private Equity as a result of
the anticipated bias in favour of the merits of private equity financing options; however,
the data from the PCD Study evidences that outlier group on Q16-2 is actually DG7Auditors. The difference between DG7- Auditors and the other three subgroups of public
markets influencers is statistically significant at a 99% confidence level (Two Proportions
Z-Test, P-value=0.0022).
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Figure 45, Q16-2, Group II Public Markets Influencers

It is unknown why the group of auditors and public accountants that comprise DG7
evidence this higher degree of bias against IPOs. However, this higher-than-expected
anti-public market sentiment is observed in the DG7- Auditor responses elsewhere in the
PCD Study as an unanticipated recurring theme.
Also notable, yet anticipated, is the fact that the PCD Study shows that senior decision
makers in DG10-SME's have a higher degree of aversion to IPOs than senior decision
makers in DG11- Non-SME's. The difference is sufficient to be statistically significant at
a confidence level of 95% (Two Proportions Z-Test, P-value=0.0105).
Figure 46, Q16-2, SME's and Non-SME's

There is nothing particularly noteworthy in the data on the linked subgroups defined by
industry or geography. However, with respect to overall career experience and specific
public company experience, we see a similar effect to what was observed in Q16-1.
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Figure 47, Q16-2, Overall Career Experience

Figure 48, Public Company Experience

Once again, it appears that increased overall career experience is linked with a less
favorable disposition towards IPOs, but increased public company experience operates as
a countervailing force working in the opposite direction. If there is any solace to be
found in the PCD Data on Q16-2 for public markets proponents, it is that increased
familiarity with public companies is linked to increased positivity on IPOs in general.
This suggests again that the reality of public markets experience is more positive than the
perception by outsiders. Unfortunately, the prime target market in which to solicit future
IPOs is generally not the senior decision-makers who already possess extensive public
markets familiarity, but the senior decision-makers of private companies eligible to go
public.
Finally, it is worth noting that, if a PCD Study respondent agrees with the anti-IPO
proposition stated in Q16-2, inferentially they should also generally evidence a positive
disposition on Q18-2 (favourability towards private equity option), a negative disposition
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on Q18-1 (favourability towards IPO option) and, to a lesser degree, a negative
disposition on Q16-1 in order to be internally consistent in disposition. As such, Q16-2
also serves as an internal validity check on Q18-1, Q18-2 and Q16-3 to validate the
consistency of the answers on these questions between specific demographic subgroups.
The correlations are discussed later in this Dissertation under Chapter 8- Correlation
Analysis in the PCD Study.

7.10- Question 16-6: Private Equity Impact- Part C
“Q16-6: The decline in IPO volume is primarily attributable to the
increased availability of private equity as an alternative.”
This is an interesting question in that it acts as a counterpoint to Q16-4 in the PCD Study,
which asks participants whether private equity was easier to secure now than in the past.
As discussed above, this proposition is widely supported by the respondents across the 25
demographic subgroups in the PCD Study. In Q16-6, however, the question asked is
whether respondents believe that increased availability of private equity is the primary
driver of the decline in IPO volume (and therefore, by extension, overall public company
decline). This statement was included to test the hypothesis being advanced in the
United States by de Fontenay, Ewens and Farre-Mensas, discussed previously in this
Dissertation in Chapter 2- Literature Review, as to the critical role that increased access
to private capital plays in overall public company decline. Overall, the proposition in
Q16-6 was positively supported by respondents with a mean of 3.37, although at a
materially lower level than in Q16-4, where the mean was 3.72.
Indeed, it was surprising that respondents rated this question as positively as they did,
given the plethora of other contributing factors discussed in the PCD Study having been
posited as contributing to public company decline. If this ranking is truly an accurate
reflection of the beliefs of the respondent groups, that outcome is both extremely
significant and extremely depressing to those who believe that regulatory streamlining
initiatives offer a prospect of stemming the tide of public company decline. No amount
of burden reduction in the public markets will reduce the availability of private equity
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financing as an alternative. 437
If, indeed, private equity proliferation is the primary driver of public company decline,
then no amount of burden reduction that streamlines IPOs and reduces the cost and
complexity of continuous disclosure for public companies will be sufficient to stem the
inevitable tide further decline in Canada.
At face value, it certainly appears that the respondent group in the PCD Study is
supporting the proposition that increased private equity access is the primary cause of
public company decline in Canada. However, it is submitted that the outcome on this
Q16-6 should be considered in the context of the broader dataset of the PCD Study and
taken with a proverbial grain of salt.
Looking at the qualitative data analysis from Q17, there is no question that the
proliferation of private equity is one of the factors that is cited most frequently, and
posited in the strongest language, in answer to the question: "Why do you think fewer
senior business decision-makers are choosing to take their companies public". Yet, it was
presented as an explanation in slightly less than half of the written explanations on Q17,
similar in frequency to the obvious twin bogeymen of regulatory complexity and
compliance costs. In other words, private capital proliferation was presented on an
unprompted basis by 152 respondents in Q17, representing 46.1% of all responses. Yet
199 respondents, representing 55.4% of all responses on Q16-6, selected agree or
strongly agree on essentially the same question. Many of the respondents who discussed
private capital proliferation in the qualitative responses in Q17 also presented a number
of other factors contributing to the phenomenon. This points to a small disconnect
between the text answers in Q17 and Likert Scale answers to this question in Q16-6, if
the responses in Q16-6 are all taken at face value.
Possibly, a number of the respondents in Q16-6 chose agree or strongly agree in
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It stretches credulity to believe that, in order to stimulate the IPO markets, it would be palatable to
governments to bring in new restrictions that limit private equity availability, thereby forcing companies
back towards public financing options.
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answering Q16-6 who consider private capital proliferation to be an important factor
contributing to public company decline, but not necessarily the primary factor, to the
exclusion of the other important factors, that they also list in Q17. This may well be an
example of a case where the language utilized in this particular question was suboptimal
in terms of its clarity. As such, it would appear to be reasonable to interpret the agree and
strongly agree answers in Q16-6 as sometimes indicating a belief that private equity
proliferation is one of the primary factors that they believe is contributing to public
company decline, but failing to appreciate the distinction in Q16-6 that is asking if
increased private equity is the primary factor.
Turning briefly to analysis of differences amongst linked DG subgroups, the proposition
proposed in Q16-6 (mean=3.54) has notably higher support from DG4- Group II than
DG3- Group I (mean=3.18) This difference is significant at a 99% confidence level
(Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.0016).
Figure 49, Q16-6, Group I v. Group II Respondents

Often in the analysis of the PCD Study thus far, we have inferred that the perceptions of
the DG2- Group I respondents might be more informed compared to the DG3- Group II
respondents, who can be viewed as being one step removed from the decision-making
process by virtue of their status as service providers in the public and private marketplace. DG2- Group I Respondents have direct experience as senior business decisionmakers operating on the "front lines" of managing Canadian companies.
However, in reference to this particular issue, an argument can be advanced that the
opposite is true. Even serial entrepreneurs from Group I, who become senior decision-
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makers of multiple companies during the course of their career, are at most involved in a
handful of private equity transactions. The perception of the Group I respondents as to
the availability of private equity is, therefore, formed by a high level of direct
involvement in a limited number of transactions. Of course, Group I respondents'
perceptions on private equity will also be influenced by the experiences of other
businesses that they observe, but these observations occur at a distance and the
perceptions are formed based on hearsay evidence relayed to them by their friends and
business associates.
In comparison, each of the subgroups that collectively form the class of Group II
participants in the PCD Study are likely to be involved at a significant level in dozens,
and possibly hundreds, of transactions involving private equity investment over the
course of their careers. Although the depth of their experience on each individual
transaction will likely be less than for a Group I participant, the breadth of their
experience will be informed by a significantly larger number of transactions.
In terms of viewing trends in the availability of private equity investment over a period of
time (Q16-2) and the impact of the proliferation of private equity on public company
decline (Q16-6), it is submitted that increased depth of experience of the DG2- Group I
respondents may lead to personal-experience bias, whereas the increased breadth of
experience possessed by DG3- Group II respondents positions them to more objectively
and accurately form opinions on overall market trends. As such, a strong argument can
be made on Q16-6 (and Q16-2) that the Group II public markets influencers are
positioned to provide at least equally informed, if not better informed, analysis on this
particular topic.
With respect to DG4-TSX and DG5- Private Company, quick reference to the mean
provides an indication that DG5- Private Company (mean=3.48) more strongly supports
the proposition in Q16-6 than DG4- TSX (mean=2.98). This difference is strongly
significant from a statistical point of view (Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.0047),
supporting a 99% confidence level.
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Figure 50, Q16-6, Group I, Senior Decision-Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private Companies

There are two possible explanations for this observed difference. The first is that the
DG4- TSX respondents, having greater exposure to the public markets on a daily basis,
can identify more alternative causes to explain public company decline from their
personal experience, and are therefore less likely to rate private equity proliferation as the
"primary" factor. The second explanation is that DG-4 TSX respondents, having already
gone public, are more removed from the trendlines and opportunities presented by private
equity alternatives than the DG-5 Private Company respondents who deal with private
equity pitches more frequently. The PCD Study data does not point to one explanation or
the other, and the cause of the observed differences may well be a result of a combination
of both explanations.
Turning quickly to both geographic location and industry demographic analysis, it is
apparent that the Western provinces and the extractive-sector industries are both less
likely to support the proposition in Q16-6 than DG17- Ontario-based respondents and
DG14- Non-Resource companies respondents.
Figure 51, Q16-6, Industry-Based
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Figure 52, Q16-6, Geography-Based

The explanation for these observations is previously discussed in the analysis of Q16-4,
which evidenced similar differences based on these demographic factors. The extractive
sector industries, concentrated in British Columbia and the Prairies, have had
significantly more difficulty accessing private capital during the commodities downturn,
compared to the non resource-based companies in the PCD Study concentrated in
Ontario. As such, it is intuitive that the western respondents and the resource-based
respondents are all more likely to identify factors other than easier accessibility to private
capital as a primary factor contributing to public company decline.
On the whole, the data gathered in response to Q16-6 is amongst the most important in
the entire PCD Study. Unequivocally, it supports the conclusion that the respondents
exhibit a strong belief that private equity proliferation is a key factor contributing to the
phenomenon of public company decline in Canada. Whether you can infer more than
this conclusion from the data is a matter of some debate, based on the totality of the data
gathered throughout the PCD Study. It is submitted that there is not a sufficient degree of
clarity arising from the analysis of the data on Q16-6 to support a conclusion that private
capital proliferation is the single-most important factor contributing to public company
decline.
To reach such a critical conclusion, further research focusing specifically on this issue
needs to be undertaken. Regardless, it is submitted that the data gathered in both Q17
and Q16-6 of the PCD Study on the importance of private capital proliferation to the
phenomenon of public company decline makes it challenging to advance an argument
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that public policy intervention designed to stimulate the public markets in Canada will
likely be successful unless it addresses the implication of this fact: private capital is
significantly easier to access in Canada today than in previous eras. The financing
choices to secure growth capital available to senior business decision-makers today are
greater than they were when the public markets in Canada were thriving. Although not
necessarily the primary factor contributing to public company decline, increased
availability of private equity certainly has played a role in this phenomenon.

7.11- Question 18-1 and Question 18-2: General Preference for
IPO or Private Equity Alternative
Question 18 outlines a simple hypothetical fact situation as follows:
“Imagine that you are the key decision-maker in ABC Inc., a highly
successful private company based in Canada that now needs to access
significant equity capital in order to finance its ambitious
international expansion plans.
In answering the questions, please draw on the knowledge and beliefs
that you have gained through your real-life experiences.
A very short background on ABC's status is as follows:
• ABC has been repeatedly approached by several investment
banks offering to raise the necessary funds by sponsoring ABC
in a TSX IPO.
• ABC has also been repeatedly approached by several private
equity firms offering to give ABC the necessary funds by
investing in ABC privately.
The entire management team of ABC is waiting for you to decide
whether ABC will pursue an IPO or take investment from private
equity. The strategy decision that will define the future of ABC is
yours alone!
Q18-1: How likely are you to recommend the IPO option as ABC’s
preferred course of action?
Q18-2: How likely are you to recommend the private equity option as
ABC’s preferred course of action?”
The point of this short hypothetical fact pattern is to place the respondent (whether from
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Group I or Group II) in the role of a key decision-maker, forced with determining which
of the two alternative paths to pursue in order to access growth capital in a TSX-eligible
private company: public offering through IPO or private equity financing. Significant
additional capital is required by the company in the hypothetical fact pattern, so not
completing any type of significant corporate finance transaction is not an option.
However, the two options of pursuing an IPO track or a private equity financing in order
to secure the necessary capital to execute the planned international expansion are both
described as being clearly accessible.
In creating this question, no additional details were presented other than what is disclosed
above in order to prevent further complication of the key point in this question and in
order to prevent biasing the respondent towards one option or another.
Obviously, any real-world scenario will involve many more variables that will impact the
ultimate decision-making process and may influence the ultimate outcome. However, the
goal on Q18-1 and Q18-2 in the PCD Study is not to test the response to a real-world fact
pattern, but to once again test the respondents’ predisposition towards public or private
alternatives where both options are equally available. By providing only basic facts in
the fact pattern, the goal is to have the output of this question reflect the respondents
disposition towards IPOs and private equity financing options generally, rather than to
seek their opinions on a set of facts that simulates a specific real-world scenario.
In a perfect world, the responses to Q18-1 and Q18-2 would have direct inverse
correlation with a correlation coefficient of -1.0. However, in the real world, it is
understood that various individuals will interpret the question differently. One
interpretation of Q18 is that an answer of "unlikely" on Q18-1 should mandate an answer
of "likely" on Q18-2, an answer of "highly likely" on question 18-1 should mandate an
answer of "highly unlikely" on Q18-2, and so forth, thereby interpreting the two
questions as mutually exclusive. This is the most obvious interpretation.
An alternative interpretation, however, is that the questions Q18-1 and Q18-2 are asking
how likely the respondent is to put forth the option of IPO or private equity financing as
an option for consideration to the management team, interpreting the two questions as
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non-exclusive.
The majority of the respondents applied the first interpretation, but some respondents
applied the second interpretation. The PCD Data evidences a Spearman Rank correlation
coefficient between Q18-1 and Q18-2 of -0.6655 with P-value of less than 0.001. It is
submitted that this correlation demonstrates a sufficiently strong degree of internal
consistency in the answers between Q18-1 and Q18-2, evidencing that the respondent
group on the whole did properly comprehend the inverse relationship between the two
questions.
Yet, a number of respondents indicated that they were likely or extremely likely to
recommend the private equity option in Q18-2, but also indicated that they were neutral
on the IPO option in Q18-1. While some may perceive these two answers as
inconsistent, it is in fact a normal phenomenon in survey research. This occurs because
certain respondents, particularly in Canada, have an innate aversion to selecting negative
answers and will instead select the neutral option in a survey even when they are, in
reality, negatively disposed on a question. 438

Five-Point Likert Scales are therefore

amongst the most challenging research formats to analyze because of such proclivities,
and the correlation coefficients are often lower for Five-Point Likert Scales based on
opinion responses than in research assessing "hard" scientific data. As such, the observed
correlation between Q18-1 and Q18 in the PCD Study at -0.6655 is robust by the
standards of Five-Point Likert Scale data.
Reference to the headline statistics on Q18-1 and Q18-2 demonstrate that the respondent
group in the PCD Study overall leans heavily towards favoring the Private Equity option
over the IPO option. The mean for Q18-1 (the IPO as the preferred alternative) amongst
DG1- All Respondents is 2.69 compared to 3.61 (the private equity option as the
preferred alternative) for Q18-2. The percentage of respondents who indicated that they
are likely or extremely likely to recommend the private equity option (i.e., 58.6%) is
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Alvin C. Burns and Ronald F. Bush, Marketing Research, 6th Edition (Upper Saddle River, New
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more than 2.5 times the number of respondents who indicated that they are likely or
extremely like to recommend the IPO option (23.1%). Any way you look to analyze the
data to improve the picture, it is hard to find much encouragement for public markets
advocates in the PCD Study responses in Q18-1 and Q18-2.
Figure 53, Q18-1, All Respondents and Group I v. Group II

Figure 54, Q18-2, All Respondents and Group I v. Group II

A quick visual inspection of the above charts demonstrates the overall strength of the
support for the private equity alternative over the IPO alternative. The charts above also
clearly point to another notable observation, which is that the DG2- Group I and DG3Group II respondents evidence an unusually high level of similarity on both Q18-1 and
Q18-2.
The demographic subgroups most likely to recommend the IPO option in Q18-1 (and, by
extension, the subgroups least likely to recommend the private equity option in Q18-2)
are the following:
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Figure 55, Q18-1, DG Subgroups Most Likely to Recommend IPO Option

Again, it should be noted that the most positive subgroups listed above are not, in fact,
positive on the IPO alternative in Q18-1 overall. In fact, not even the most favorable of
the above subgroups (DG13- Mining) can be statistically validated as being more positive
on the IPO option than the hypothetical neutral ranking of 3.00 (One Sample Wilcoxon
Signed Rank, P-value=0.1952). The most optimistic statement that can be made about
the above groups is that they are effectively neutral on the IPO proposition.
The demographic subgroups in the PCD Study most likely to recommend the private
equity option in Q18-2 (and, by extension, the subgroups least likely to recommend the
IPO in Q18-1) are the following:
Figure 56, Q18-2, DG Subgroups Most Likely to Recommend Private Equity Option

What can be surmised from a quick review of the charts above? We observe immediately
that two different sets of demographically-linked subgroups appear in the two different
charts, evidencing that they fall on opposite ends of the spectrum in their dispositions
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towards IPOs and private equity. DG5- Private Company and DG23- Limited Pubco
Experience are amongst the subgroups most favorable to the private equity option (and
least favorable to the IPO option), while the linked subgroups DG4: TSX and DG25Extensive Pubco Experience are amongst the subgroups most favorable to the IPO option
(and least favorable to the private equity option). That observation points us towards the
likelihood of a statistically significant difference in opinions existing between these
particular linked subgroups. The extent of the differences is highly visible in the
following set of charts:
Figure 57, Q18-1, Senior Decision-Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private Companies

Figure 58, Q18-2, Senior Decision-Makers of TSX-Listed vs. Private Companies

Figure 59, Q18-1, Degree of Public Experience
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Figure 60, Q18-2, Degree of Public Experience

When the statistical calculations are run, that the variation is strongly significant is easily
confirmed. Calculating the significance of the difference on the agree / strongly agree
responses between DG4- TSX and DG5- Private Company, and between DG23-Limited
Pubco Experience and DG25- Extensive Pubco Experience, gives us P-values of 0.0024
or lower on each of the four calculations. As such, there is strong statistical significance
in the difference on each of those four relationships at a confidence level of 99% and
higher.
Based on these observations of linked subgroups, we can determine that increased
exposure to, and experience working in, public companies is linked to a higher likelihood
of a respondent being willing to recommend the IPO option in the PCD Study.
Looking further at the summary charts above, we see that the DG8- Investment Bankers
and DG13- Mining subgroups also rate comparatively high in their willingness to support
the IPO option. It is not at all surprising to see investment bankers being more likely to
support the IPO than other demographic subgroups, given their increased familiarity with
public companies and the opportunity for fee revenue associated with IPOs.
It is somewhat surprising to see DG13- Mining on this list of subgroups more favorable
to IPOs, particularly since the public mining capital markets have been significantly
depressed for several years. However, the pro-public market sentiment for the DG13Mining subgroup is consistent with the opinions that were expressed by the mining
company decision-makers discussed earlier in reference to Q16-1. As was discussed in
the analysis on that topic in Q16-1, the junior mining exploration market in Canada has
historically evidenced a high level of affinity with the public markets. Mining is also one
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of the industry sectors that benefitted least from the increased ease of access to private
equity. As such, senior decision-makers in the mining sector appear to have retained a
more favorable opinion of the public markets overall than the other industry sectors in the
PCD Study as evidenced by the following figures:
Figure 61, Q18-1, Senior Decision-Makers of Mining vs. Non-Resource Companies

Figure 62, Q18-2, Senior Decision-Makers of Mining vs. Non-Resource Companies

Finally on Q18-1 and Q18-2, a quick reference to the mean on Q18-1 and Q18-2 also
points towards a notable difference between DG11-SME (mean on Q18-1 is 2.46; mean
on Q18-2 is 3.79) and DG12- Non-SME (mean on Q18-1 is 2.88; mean on Q18-2 is
3.48). The difference between these two linked subgroups on Q18-1 achieves statistical
significance (Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.0538) at a 90% confidence level. The
difference between these two linked subgroups on Q18-2 falls just outside the minimum
significance level (Mann-Whitney Test, P-value=0.1011). On the whole, it appears that
senior decision-makers of larger companies are more positively disposed towards IPOs
and public markets than the senior decision-makers of SME's, although the demographic
factor is not as significant as the differences defined by the extent of public company
experience.
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7.12- Question 19: Pre-Money Premium Required to Achieve
Equal Attractiveness
“Q-19: How much would the pre-money valuation premium offered to
ABC by an investment bank with respect to an IPO transaction need to
exceed the pre-money valuation offered to ABC with respect to a private
equity transaction in order to make the two alternatives equally
attractive to you? “
It has long been accepted in the capital markets that some level of valuation premium is
required in most situations before the public and private financing alternatives will be
equally attractive. The public premium is required in order to justify the extra time and
expense associated with operating a public company. The goal in Q19 is, therefore, to
determine, all other factors being equal, what the required level of pre-money premium is
in order for the IPO option to be equally attractive to the private equity option.
With the benefit of hindsight, this question proved to be more challenging for
respondents to answer than intended, and certainly could have been better articulated. A
few respondents wrote editorial comments on the question design in the "Premium
Required" text box, indicating that they believed additional context and background on
the nature of the competing IPO and private equity alternatives was required before they
could realistically determine what the necessary premium would be to make the two
alternatives equally attractive. These comments included statements such as “it depends”
and “need more facts”. This is an understandable position and demonstrated that the
respondents were not generally confused about the nature of the question being asked, but
were hesitant to commit to a generic equivalency premium without more detailed
information to better understand the nuances of the two alternatives being presented.
To allow for the possibility that some respondents would not be comfortable committing
to an equivalency premium without more detailed facts to support the analysis, Q-19 is
designed to allow respondents to opt out of answering, either by simply skipping the
question entirely or choosing the "I don't have an opinion on this question" option.
Overall, just under 30% of respondents selected the option not to answer this question.
This is unquestionably a high percentage of the PCD Study participants, and
demonstrates the conceptual challenges that the respondents encountered with this
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problem as a whole. Due to the challenges in question design, it is imprudent to analyze
and draw inferences from the response data in Q19 using the same level of detailed
subgroup analysis as is applied in other elements of PCD Study analysis. However, it is
nevertheless submitted that a few valuable insights can be gleaned from the 70% of
respondents who chose to provide substantive answers on Q19.
All percentages reported on Q19 below are based on the pool of respondents who
provided a substantive answer; i.e., the percentage reported excludes from the calculation
respondents who selected the "I have no opinion" option. The number of PCD Study
respondents who provided a substantive answer to Q20 is 240, which still constitutes a
significant cohort.
Q19 reflects a key embedded assumption, which is that the decision-maker will require
some form of valuation premium in the IPO transaction in order to make the IPO and the
private equity routes equally attractive. In other words, the private equity alternative will
generally be the preferred transaction alternative if there is no premium offered for an
IPO alternative. This assumption has historically constituted a key element of the IPO
narrative in Canada, which is that companies pursing an IPO anticipate they will be able
to command a pre-money valuation premium in the IPO transaction that exceeds what
private equity investors are prepared to offer to their business.
Critically, as we saw in the qualitative responses in Q17, along with the quantitative
responses to Q16-2 and Q16-4, there is a widely-held perception that private equity in
Canada is now significantly easier to access than in previous generations. Also expressed
frequently in the Q17 responses is the belief that private equity investors are now paying
materially higher valuations on transactions because of an increased intensity of
competition for good deals in which to invest. This is a fundamental change from the
historical belief in Canada that the number of reasonable investment opportunities
exceeded the pool of private capital seeking investments. If the perception expressed by
the respondents in Q17 as to the proliferation of private equity is indeed accurate
(validation of which is beyond the scope of this research project), the responses in Q19
become highly illuminative in terms of explaining the extent to which private capital
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proliferation is linked to the phenomenon of Canadian public company decline as a
whole. 439
Although Q19 reflects the embedded assumption, articulated above, that a valuation
premium at some level is generally required in the IPO alternative before the private
equity option and the IPO option are equally attractive, the question does clearly allow
the opportunity for respondents to rebut this assumption by indicating that the two
alternatives are equally attractive without any premium. This alternative was
intentionally placed as the first alternative in the answer order to overcome any perceived
bias in the framing of the question. Ultimately,12.9% of the Q19 respondents in the PCD
Study indicate that they believe the IPO transaction is equally attractive without any
premium.
In comparison, 77.5% of respondents indicate that some form of valuation premium is
indeed required in order for the IPO alternative to be equally attractive to the private
equity alternative. An additional 9.6% of respondents state that no potential premium is
sufficient in their opinions to make the make the two transactions equally attractive.
As such, the presumption that private equity will be the preferred alternative in the PCD
Study hypothetical fact situation without any IPO valuation premium is supported by the
answers of 87.1% of respondents in Q19. This level of support validates that the
assumption reflected in the question design is, in fact, accurate in reflecting the opinion
of the large majority of respondents in the PCD Study.
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There are numerous sources quantifying the amount of private equity dry powder (i.e., undeployed
capital committed to private equity) that is available for investment around the world and tracking the
increase in that number over a period of time. Clearly, the amount of dry powder available for private
equity investment worldwide has increased exponentially over the past dozen years. Tawfic Hammoud and
Vinay Shandal, "Canada Needs to Work on its Private Equity Game" The Globe and Mail (13 April 2017).
The volume of private equity investments is also tracked and reported quarterly by the Canadian Venture
Capital Association. See, for example, Darrell Pinto and David Kornacki, "VC & PE Canadian Market
Overview / Q1 2019", Canadian Venture Capital Association, accessed July 30, 2019, online:<
file:///C:/My%20Documents/Western%20Law/PhD%20Dissertation-%20Public%20Markets/LiteraturePublic%20Markets%20Decline/Stats/CVCA_EN_Canada_Q1-2019_Final.pdf>. However, there are no
reliable public data-sources available on the amount of dry power that has been available in Canada
specifically, a notable deficiency in the public record.
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Turning to the quantification of the required valuation premium to achieve equality in
attractiveness of the IPO and private equity alternatives, the average premium in the PCD
Study is 26.6% calculated based on the mean. To allow for the potential impact of
outliers, the median was also calculated at 25% for all respondents on Q19. However, it
should be noted that the median was on the boundary between 20% and 25% (with no
responses between 20% and 25%), so the most accurate summary of central tendency in
Q19, adjusting for the impact of outliers on the upper end, would be to say that the
average premium required for equality of preferences is between 20% and 25%.
Amongst the various demographic subgroups in the PCD Study, there was a surprising
degree of consistency in Q19. No significant subgroup evidenced a materially different
position than the other groups, and even the range of the average premium required for
the two paths to be equally attractive was not as large as might have been expected (i.e.,
21.8% at the minimum to 39.6% at the maximum).
Ultimately, the goal for including Q19 in the PCD Study was to come up with a
percentage number that reasonably reflects the point where the IPO and private equity
options become equally attractive for the average respondent. As a topic for future
research thereafter, it would be a relatively simply matter to determine whether the
average IPO valuation premiums being seen in the market compared to available private
equity valuations are indeed reaching the minimum premium required. If the specified
premiums necessary to achieve equality in preference between the two alternatives are
not being reflected in the market, then an inference can be drawn that the inability to
secure the required valuation premium is a factor contributing to public company decline.
Although the execution of the original intention behind Q19 was admittedly less than
perfect in hindsight, it is submitted that the data collected in this question certainly retains
value on the broader topic of public company decline. While not being sufficiently
robust to serve as a single definitive datapoint on which to base the follow-on research
due to the limitations of the question discussed above, it is submitted that the data does
provide a useful measure to serve as a starting point for comparison in other research
studies.
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Intuitively, the required premium of 20% to 25% in an IPO transaction indicated by
analysis of the median in the PCD Study is reasonable and within the range that would
have been anticipated in the response. If that range of premium is not being reflected in
the current IPO market, then that fact provides a level of support to a particular
hypothesis articulated by a number of PCD Study respondents in Q17; namely, that the
private financing valuation increases, attributable to an excess of private equity capital
chasing the same attractive deals in Canada, has reduced the premium between IPO and
private equity financing alternatives below the threshold at which senior decision makers
view as necessary to reach equality between public and private financing options.
Certainly, the perceived reduction in valuation spread over the past number of years
between IPO financings and private equity alternatives is an area that merits further study
to better understand to what degree this issue is linked to overall public company decline.

7.13- Question 12: Recent Consideration of Going Public by
TSX-Eligible Private Companies
“Q-12: Has your private company considered going public? Select the
answer that best applies.”
Question 12 reflects the expressed intentions of the respondents from DG5-Private
Company subgroup. As a reminder, the eligibility conditions of this subcategory
determine that all the respondents in DG5- Private Company subgroup are from
companies that are of a sufficient size that they are eligible to go public on the TSX, and
significantly exceed the TSX minimum listing criteria. In fact, review of the PCD Study
data demonstrates that nearly half (i.e., 33 out of 68) of the responses in this subgroup
come from key decision-makers of non-SME companies, confirming that they have more
than 500 employees or $50 million in annual revenue. Over 20% of the respondents in
Q12 (i.e., 14 out of 68) are senior business decision-makers of companies with more than
$250 million in revenue. As such, DG5-Private Company respondents should represent
fertile ground for future IPOs all other factors remaining equal.
The implication of the PCD Study data, however, is that there is little momentum at the
current time to suggest that the existing supply-side constraint with respect to prospective
IPO candidate companies will change in the near future. Of 68 respondents in the DG5-
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Private Company subgroup who answered Q12, not a single respondent indicated that
they have current plans to go public. Moreover, 86.7% of the DG5-Private Company
respondents indicated that they have either not considered an IPO option or have already
rejected the idea of pursuing an IPO in the future.
Figure 63, Q12, DG5-Private Company

To conclude that the sentiment expressed by the senior business decision makers of TSXeligible private companies who responded to Q12 does not bode well for a significant
uptick in IPO volume is to state an obviosity. The data may not be overly surprising
considering the terrible state of the present IPO market in Canada, but it is nevertheless
ominous for the future of our public markets. There is no escaping the conclusion that, at
this point in time, the pool of companies that are open to the idea of pursuing an IPO in
Canada is a small subset of the companies that are currently eligible to pursue an IPO.
Although we have certainly witnessed a difficult period in the two key extractive industry
sectors over the past five years, the cyclical commodity downturn cannot be blamed for
the complete lack of IPO activity. Benefitting from a relatively low Canadian dollar that
is significantly influenced by the commodity downturn, the non-resource portion of the
Canadian economy has performed well, as evidenced by consistent GDP growth over the
last five years. 440 Yet, this period of economic growth across all non resource-based
industries has not led to any resurgence in non-resource IPO activity in Canada. Clearly,
waiting for Canadian IPOs volume to return to historic volumes absent some type of
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significant intervention represents a fool’s hope.

7.14- Question 10: Recent Consideration of Going-Private
Transactions by TSX-Listed Public Companies
“Q-10: You have indicated that you are a Senior Business DecisionMaker of a TSX-listed company. Has your public company considered
going private?”
Turning now to analysis of Question 10, which reflects the opinion of senior business
decision makers of TSX-listed companies in the DG4-TSX subgroup. This question
represents the mirror image of the question asked of private company senior business
decision makers discussed above in Q12. As the respondents answering Q12 are all
Senior Decision Makers of companies that are already public and listed on the TSX, the
question is simply asking whether they are satisfied with their experience as public
companies or whether they are considering a going private transaction.
Just over half of all DG4-TSX respondents on Q12 (i.e., 56.4%) reported that their
companies had not considered a going-private transaction and were satisfied remaining as
a public company. The other 43.6% of respondents indicated either that: (i) they had
considered going private and decided not to (20.2%); (2) are still in the process of
evaluating a going-private transaction (22.3%); or (3) have adopted a definitive plan to go
private (1%).
The PCD Study of the senior decision-makers of TSX-listed companies on this question
can be interpreted in a variety of ways. An optimistic interpretation would point out that
there does not appear to be an imminent risk of a slew of going-private transactions, with
only a single respondent to Q12 indicating that a going-private transaction was in their
company's immediate plans. While that is accurate, going-private transactions are often
as costly, time-consuming and complex as IPOs, particularly if there is any related-party
element to the going-private transaction that brings Multilateral Instrument 61-101 into
play.
Public company decline has occurred over the past dozen years at an alarming rate in
Canada primarily as a result of organic attrition in the public markets; i.e., the loss of
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public companies through acquisition and consolidation without a sufficient number of
new listings to replace the losses. This history demonstrates that a company that is
unsatisfied with its existing public status may well look towards selling itself as a means
of exiting the public markets rather than undergoing the cost, hassle and legal risk
associated with a going-private transaction.
A pessimistic interpretation of the data derived from Question 10 of the PCD Study, on
the other hand, would point to the fact that over 40% of the senior decision-makers are
sufficiently unhappy with their public company status that they have actively considered
a going private transaction at some point. Even those who have concluded that a goingprivate transaction is not optimal for the businesses may still well be looking to secure a
public exit by executing some form of corporate sale transaction. That question was not
asked of respondents. As such, while the PCD Study data does not portend an imminent
collapse of the public markets in Canada resulting from a stampede of going-private
transactions, it is equivocal, at best, and offers little in the way of comfort to the
supporters of the Canadian public markets hoping for a recovery.
What else can be gleaned from analysis of the responses on Question 10? The relevant
academic literature, the business media commentary and the Qualitative Analysis
component of the PCD Study all evidence a widely-held belief that SME's are having a
significantly more difficult time succeeding in the public markets than larger companies.
If that is an accurate perception, then one would expect to observe a lower percentage of
DG4-TSX respondents from SME companies indicating that they are satisfied with
remaining as a public company, and a corresponding higher percentage indicating that
they are considering or planning a going-private transaction in the future, than for their
non-SME counterparts (i.e., Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers of larger TSXlisted companies).
Figure 64, Q10, DG4-TSX
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When looking at the data, we observe that 39.3% of the DG10-SME subgroup stated that
they remain in active consideration of a going-private. Another 17.9% have previously
explored going-private options, but have decided not to pursue a going-private
transaction at this time. Only 42.9% of DG10-SME respondents indicate that they are
sufficiently satisfied with the experience of being public on the TSX such that they have
not actively considered a going-private transaction.
The data are indeed more positive with respect to contentment with remaining as a public
company for respondents from the DG5-Non-SME subgroup. For this subgroup, 60.9%
of decision-makers from Non-SME companies indicated that they are satisfied with being
public and have not considered a going-private transaction. Another 21.9% considered
going-private opportunities and decided to remain public. Only 15.6% of DG5-NonSME respondents continue to have a going-private transaction under consideration.
Applying statistical analysis, the hypothesis that senior business decision-makers of NonSME’s are more satisfied remaining as a public company than their SME counterparts is
demonstrated at a confidence level of 90% (Single-Tailed Two Proportions Z-Test, Pvalue=0.0842). The lower confidence level here is due to the small sample size in the
PCD Study (n=28) of respondents whose companies qualify as fitting within both the
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DG10-SME and DG4-TSX subgroups. However, using the same Single-Tailed Two
Proportions Z-Test, the hypothesis that respondents associated with TSX-listed SME's are
more likely to be considering going-private transactions than TSX-listed non-SME's is
supported at a strong level of statistical significance (P-value=0.0037) notwithstanding
the small sample size. This difference is supported at a confidence level of 99%. In
combination, both of these observations provide support to the proposition that TSXlisted SME’s have a less favorable experience as public companies than TSX-listed nonSME's.
Considering the implication of the data from Question 10 and Question 12 together, the
overall sentiment expressed by the two subgroups of senior business decision-makers in
Canada does not bode well for a significant uptick in Canadian IPO volume in the near
future absent significant intervention. However, it also does not portend an imminent
stampede to the door in the form of going-private transactions on the TSX. Rather, the
implication of the data is that, absent a significant intervention, the current trendlines in
public company decline will continue to occur and the number of public companies listed
on the TSX will further decline through overall attrition as the volume of future IPOs is
insufficient to replace the listings lost through merger and acquisition.

7.15- Question 20: Ranking Potential Downside Risks in IPOs
“Q20- In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how
important are each of the following potential downside risks associated
with pursuing the TSX IPO in your analysis?”
Q20 Overview
Q20 is a large matrix question, representing one of the core elements of the PCD Study.
Q20 operates in concert with Q17, which earlier asks respondents (without the benefit of
seeing the comprehensive list of downside risk factors suggested in the literature) to give
their opinion as to why fewer companies are going public in Canada. Here, Q20 provides
respondents with the extensive list of factors gleaned from the literature that have been
posited by others as potentially contributing to public company decline, then asks the
respondents how important each factor is in their analysis of whether to pursue an IPO
option versus a private equity financing option in the hypothetical fact pattern posed in
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Q18. Thereby, Q20 summarizes the posited potential downsides that may be keeping
decision-makers away from pursuing IPOs in Canada and allows us to assess which of
these factors are most important in the deliberations of the key decision-makers and
influencers.
Once again, it should be noted clearly that the PCD Study was not designed to establish
causality. The downside factors that rank most highly in Q20 are not, as a result,
statistically proven to be the specific causes of public company decline within the
scientific definition of cause and effect. There is no ability, for example, to conclude
from the PCD Study data that Factor 1 is 30% responsible for the phenomenon of public
company decline in Canada while Factor 2 is 20% responsible, or even that Factor 1 and
Factor 2 can be proven to be causal on any statistical basis of a decision to avoid an IPO.
Moreover, some of the critical factors that are contributing causes of public company
decline are not downsides associated with being public. For example, both the
proliferation of private equity as an alternative to the public markets and the Fundamental
Economic Change Hypothesis operate independently of any negative factors associated
with the public markets. Q20 is limited to assessing downsides associated with being
public, and does not consider those other contributing factors.
What is being tested in Q20 is the level of importance of the key downside factors
associated with being public to the IPO decision-making process. By the application of
inference and simple logic, the more important that a down-side risk factor associated
with being a public company is in the decision-making process, the greater the degree to
which that particular factor ultimately influences the path that is chosen by the decisionmakers. As such, while the data in Q20 does not prove statistical causation, it is
nevertheless instructive on the ultimate question of what downside factors may be
amongst the most significant in contributing to the phenomenon of public company
decline. Yet, the output on Q20 must also be considered in combination with the relative
importance of the other potential factors contributing to public company decline that are
not public company downsides in order to assess the full picture of relative causality.
Much of the analysis on Q20 focuses on the ranking of the various factors according to
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mean. This is the simplest way of organizing the large volume of data collected in Q20
and conveying the results in summary form. Reference to the mean does not provide any
information as to the variability in responses on a particular factor. However, variability
in responses for each factor is presented visually in Figure 66, Q20- Rank Order of IPO /
Public Downsides, All Respondents.
It should be noted that the volume and depth of the data collected in Q20 (and, by
extension, in Q21) provide an opportunity for analysis (through a variety of forms) in
significantly greater depth and statistical sophistication than what is included in the
following analysis. As discussed earlier in this Dissertation, the PCD Study represents
the first time that an attempt has been made to collect any type of similar data on public
company risk factors from a large cohort of senior business decision-makers and public
markets influencers. However, even in a Dissertation format, there is a practical limit to
the length of a document that can be filed and this Dissertation already runs to over
125,000 words without expanding the analysis on Q20 or Q21 any further.
Also, there is a limit to the statistics analytical capacity of the author, coming from a legal
background and not a formal statistics background. As such, it is hoped that the data
gathered in the PCD Study will underpin follow-on research efforts beyond the scope of
the analysis in this Dissertation, in which the author collaborates with other statistical
analysis experts to engage in more sophisticated statistical analysis of the PCD Study
data.
In particular, one area identified that is ripe for further analysis is in terms of predicting
responses in Q18-1 and Q18-2 based on the response to the downside factors in Q20 and
the upside factors in Q21 using ordinal regressions. However, those future collaborations
are for another day in another forum.
Summary Tables
Turning now to analysis of the PCD Study data collected for Q20, one of the biggest
challenges in conveying the research output is determining how to best summarize and
present the most important information. There are 31 different potential downside factors
associated with being public included in Q20. This Dissertation has consistently utilized
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25 specific demographic groups throughout the PCD Study analysis, and will continue to
do so here for the purposes of consistency. However, discussing each demographic
subgroup’s specific disposition on each specific downside factor associated with the
public markets in Q20 results in 775 different permutations to consider. Even
summarizing the data in chart form at an individual subgroup level requires 25 different
charts for Q20 and 25 different charts for Q21 to display the summary data (each with 31
different rows of data). 441
Instead, presentation methodologies have been selected for Q20 and Q21 herein that
allow readers of this Dissertation to digest the largest amounts of summary data as
quickly as possible in simple visual formats. The result is fewer charts and tables with
large amounts of data in each table. These tables in particular are designed to enable the
identification of critical trends and outcomes across the entire dataset of 31 questions and
25 demographic subgroups.
In each of Q20 and Q21, a stacked bar graph format is utilized to summarize the overall
rank-order for the various factors tested. The data are organized sequentially according
to the mean as determined by the all PCD respondents (i.e., DG 1- All Respondents).
This stacked bar graph also demonstrates the distribution of the answers on the 5-Point
Likert Scale used for these questions. Next, a series of tables is presented that discloses
the mean and the rank order of each factor according to each of the 25 demographic
subgroups. In each of these tables, the five highest means or rank orders (white
backgrounds) and five lowest means or rank orders (black background) with respect to
each particular factor amongst the 25 demographic subgroups are highlighted.

441

Those 50 individual subgroup charts have been compiled, but are omitted from inclusion in this
Dissertation for reasons of limiting the length of the document. Formatting rules for this Dissertation
require that any charts be included in the body of the document, and not in the appendices. Adding those
50 charts into this document along with a summary analysis of each chart would add an additional 100-150
pages in length to this document at the minimum. Clearly, that would be too much depth of analysis on
Q20 and Q21. As such, the 25 individual subgroup charts for Q20 and the 25 individual subgroup charts
for Q21 are being withheld from inclusion in this Dissertation, but will be made available for review by any
interested party who desires to analyze the response data in further depth upon written request to the author
via email at contact@groupwilson.com.
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Unlike Q16 and Q18 previously, the middle position (i.e., a response of “3”) on the 5
Point Likert scale used in Q20 is not neutral, but rather "moderately important". An
answer of “1” on Q20 is defined as “Not at all Important”, and an answer of “5” is
defined as “Extremely Important”. Positions “2” and “4” are not defined, but clearly
represent mid-points between the extremes of “1” or “5” and “moderately important” in
the middle. Visually, the Likert Scale on both Q20 and a Q21 were presented in the PCD
Study as follows:
Figure 65- Likert Scale Response Layout for Q20 and Q21

As a general, yet critical, observation on Q20, it should be noted that the bulk of the
analysis on this question is a discussion about the comparative ranking and importance of
31 downside factors associated with IPOs and public companies that have been suggested
in literature as being potential contributors to public company decline. The fact that a
specific factor ranks near the bottom of a list in the rank order does not indicate that it is
inherently unimportant or of little consequence to the decision-making process.
In fact, the data indicates that most of the factors included in Q20 are not insignificant to
the decision-making process. A downside factor that is of moderate importance is still
clearly a factor that can be significant in the course of IPO deliberations. Moreover, a
number of moderately important downside risk factors can have a cumulative effect of
combining to create a strong disincentive to pursue an IPO option when private financing
alternatives are available. It is not necessary to identify a group of extremely important
downside factors in order to collectively explain the phenomenon of public company
decline. Notably, the lowest mean of any of the 31 factors tested in Q20 came in at 2.55,
which is a level at which an argument can be made that the factor continues to have
relevance in the decision-making process.
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In total, 19 out of the 31 factors in Q20 scored with a mean higher than 3.00. The
implications of this particular observation are once again ominous for the proponents of
public capital markets in Canada. Any hope that the PCD Study would demonstrate that
there are only a few contributing factors with material relevance to the public company
decline phenomenon is simply not supported by the data. Rather, the overall ratings on
Q20 alone make it apparent that the factors contributing to public company decline are
numerous and complex, ruling out any simple fixes to reverse public company decline.
The core of the analysis on Q20 will begin with a discussion of the rankings of the 31
different factors tested, grouped according to topical categories, to provide a context for
the ensuing analysis. Second, will be the presentation of a number of summary tables
that serve as the foundation of the Q20 analysis. Third, the downside factor associated
with public companies that was ranked most as the single most important factor of the 31
factors tested is discussed. Fourth, the top ranked factors from the PCD Study will be
discussed in the context of what they imply as to the importance the topical categories
into which they are categorized. Fifth, the PCD Study data will be analyzed in more
detail according to these topical categories. Finally, the perspectives and differences
exhibited within the demographic subgroups will be considered to highlight any key
findings not otherwise articulated.
To bring the big-picture trends in the PCD Study into sharper focus, and to assist in
digesting the large amount of data collected throughout Q20 more quickly, the 31
downside factors have been broken down into eight topical categories. These categories
and the overall rank order of each of the 31 factors according to mean is summarized in
Table 16, Q20, Overall Ranking and Breakdown of Factors by Categories- Downside
Factors. The rankings in this table are based on all responses received in the PCD Study.
This is followed by Figure 66, Q20- Rank Order of IPO / Public Downsides, All
Respondents. This figure shows the variability and range of the responses in the PCD
Study on each of the 31 factors for all respondents in the PCD Study.
Next is Table 17, Q20- Mean Analysis by Demographic Group, Part I and Table 18, Q20Mean Analysis by Demographic Group, Part II. The information in these tables has been
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broken into two separate tables, as the responses from the 25 different demographic
subgroups could not be presented legibly on a single sheet of paper. The means indicated
in these tables are the means for the particular factor according to the specific
demographic subgroup indicated. Also, the top 5 and bottom 5 responses in each row are
calculated on the basis of all 25 different demographic subgroups. To see all of the top 5
and bottom 5 of each category, one needs to look at both tables to see results of the 25
subgroups.
The last in the string of summary tables are Table 19, Q20- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-31)
by Demographic Group, Part I and Table 20, Q20- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-31) by
Demographic Group, Part II. Once again, the data are broken into two separate tables in
order to legibly summarize the responses from the 25 different demographic subgroups.
The ranking numbers indicated in these tables are the ranking of the particular factor
according to the specific demographic subgroup indicated. Again, the top 5 and bottom 5
results in each row are calculated on the basis of all 25 different demographic subgroups.
The reader should consult both tables to see all subgroups.
Table 16, Q20, Overall Ranking and Breakdown of Factors by Categories- Downside Factors
Downside Category

Regulatory Complexity /
Regulatory Overreach

Q#
206
12
17
18
23
24
28

Time / Distraction / Effort of
Going and Being Public

Public Company Costs

Specific Downside Summary
Increasing compliance complexity
Belief that regulatory environment favors
minority investor protection above the
interest of the public company
Business Acquisition Reports
Financial statement certification
Related party transaction
disclosure/restrictions
Redundancy of filing requirements
Evolving corporate governance practices

Rank Order
(by DG1)
3
21
26
31
29
9
27

1
2
5
13
19
27
30

Time to complete IPO
Management effort to complete IPO
General public management distractions
Proxy advisory firms
Inability to focus on core business
Responding to uninformed shareholders
Management overall public company
fatigue

10
7
4
18
6
20
14

3
7

Cost of IPO
Increasing compliance cost

5
2
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Downside Category

Q#
20-

Liquidity, Valuation and
Access to Capital

10
11
31

Trading volume concerns
Analyst coverage concerns
Lack of surety of access to follow-on
financing

8
16
12

Public Disclosure Disadvantage
and Privacy

4
8
16
20
21

Executive comp disclosure
Insider reporting requirements
Competitive disclosure disadvantage
Public disclosure of shares and income
Reputational risk

23
28
13
30
22

Short Termism

15
22
25

Short-termism by shareholders
Pressures of meeting quarterly targets
Short sellers

15
1
24

Company Control Concerns

14
26
29

Special interest groups
Proxy battle risk
Hostile takeover risk

25
17
27

Legal Risk

9

Increased litigation risk

11

Specific Downside Summary

Rank Order
(by DG1)
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Figure 66, Q20- Rank Order of IPO / Public Downsides, All Respondents
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Table 17, Q20- Mean Analysis by Demographic Group, Part I

Potential Public Company / IPO Downside

DG1- All Respondents

DG2 - Group I- Senior Decision Makers

DG3- Group II- Public Market Influencers

DG4- Group I- TSX Listed Companies

DG5- Group I- Private Companeis

DG6- Group II- Securities Lawyers

DG7- Group II_ Accountants / Auditors

DG8- Group II- Investment Bankers

DG9- Group II- Private Equity

DG10- Group I- Company Size- SME's

DG11- Group I- Company Size- Non SME's

DG12- Group I- Industry- Oil & Gas

DG13- Group I- Industry- Mining

DG14- Group I- Industry- Non Resources

NOTE:
In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on
mean are highlighted in white ;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on
mean are highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor according to
mean.
-Top 5 and Bottom 5 are calculated based on all 25
demographic subgroups (ie., both tables), not only
the DG's reflected on this particular table.

1. Time to complete IPO

3.39

3.36

3.41

3.17

3.63

3.12

3.87

3.23

3.47

3.64

3.26

3.22

3.30

3.42

2. Management effort to complete IPO

3.53

3.50

3.56

3.28

3.81

3.33

4.05

3.27

3.63

3.83

3.35

3.28

3.33

3.68

3. Cost of IPO

3.68

3.66

3.70

3.62

3.72

3.56

4.11

3.45

3.74

3.90

3.58

3.59

3.47

3.75

4. Executive comp disclosure

2.95

3.08

2.85

2.94

3.27

2.86

2.79

2.86

2.86

3.17

3.01

2.84

2.80

3.23

5. General management distractions

3.78

3.75

3.80

3.47

4.14

3.49

3.95

3.55

4.12

3.97

3.64

3.84

3.47

3.79

6. Increasing compliance complexity

3.81

3.81

3.80

3.62

4.08

3.53

4.26

3.55

3.89

3.93

3.70

3.50

3.40

4.05

7. Increasing compliance cost

3.94

4.07

3.83

4.02

4.14

3.65

4.32

3.52

3.88

4.12

4.07

3.81

3.87

4.22

8. Insider reporting requirements

2.63

2.74

2.54

2.48

3.09

2.51

2.79

2.30

2.60

2.90

2.67

2.38

2.67

2.92

9. Increased litigation risk

3.38

3.59

3.21

3.34

3.92

3.33

3.39

2.98

3.19

3.81

3.44

3.44

3.17

3.76

10. Trading volume concerns

3.47

3.41

3.53

3.34

3.50

3.28

3.45

3.59

3.72

3.51

3.34

3.19

3.40

3.44

11. Analyst coverage concerns

3.16

3.15

3.17

3.16

3.13

2.91

3.00

3.30

3.39

3.27

3.05

2.72

3.03

3.31

12. General regulatory overreach

2.97

3.21

2.77

3.00

3.48

2.81

3.00

2.55

2.77

3.27

3.20

3.38

2.77

3.30

13. Proxy advisory firms

3.01

3.20

2.85

3.07

3.38

2.86

3.00

2.59

2.93

3.22

3.23

3.00

3.23

3.26

14. Special interest groups

2.88

2.95

2.82

2.78

3.17

2.86

2.71

2.48

3.12

2.90

2.95

3.03

3.03

2.92

15. Short-termism amongst shareholders

3.22

3.27

3.18

3.14

3.45

3.30

2.89

3.05

3.39

3.46

3.12

3.06

3.30

3.35

16. Competitive disclosure disadvantage

3.36

3.44

3.29

3.40

3.48

3.26

3.39

3.28

3.25

3.54

3.37

3.34

3.07

3.59

17. Business Acquisition Reports

2.86

2.97

2.76

2.82

3.17

2.79

3.24

2.41

2.70

3.17

2.84

2.72

2.90

3.08

18. Financial statement certification

2.55

2.68

2.44

2.49

2.92

2.47

3.00

2.34

2.12

2.86

2.58

2.44

2.53

2.84

19. Inablity to focus on core business

3.65

3.66

3.64

3.36

4.08

3.56

3.76

3.37

3.82

3.88

3.53

3.69

3.30

3.75

20. Public disclosure of shares and income

2.56

2.65

2.48

2.36

3.05

2.37

2.74

2.32

2.51

2.85

2.55

2.47

2.20

2.84

21. Reputational risk

2.95

3.05

2.88

2.93

3.20

2.84

2.92

2.64

3.07

3.22

3.00

2.91

3.00

3.08

22. Pressures of meeting quarterly targets

3.97

3.79

4.13

3.59

4.06

3.98

4.00

3.91

4.49

3.92

3.71

3.72

3.43

3.93

23. Related party transaction disclosure/restrictions 2.59

2.65

2.54

2.45

2.92

2.67

2.71

2.39

2.45

2.76

2.59

2.41

2.70

2.73

3.42

3.55

3.31

3.49

3.63

3.10

3.76

2.91

3.47

3.63

3.52

3.50

3.37

3.64

24. Redundancy of filing requirements

2.9

2.91

2.90

2.85

2.98

3.19

2.82

2.70

2.88

3.07

2.80

2.66

2.77

3.01

26. Proxy battle risk

3.06

3.08

3.05

2.90

3.33

3.26

2.95

2.77

3.18

3.02

3.09

2.81

2.77

3.22

27. Responding to uniformed shareholders

2.99

3.19

2.84

2.86

3.63

2.56

3.00

2.61

3.11

3.54

3.00

3.06

3.00

3.30

28. Evolving corporate governance practices

3

3.15

2.87

3.07

3.27

2.91

3.05

2.61

2.91

3.19

3.20

3.19

2.90

3.25

2.8

2.71

2.88

2.56

2.91

2.95

2.71

2.84

2.98

2.66

2.76

2.53

2.47

2.86

30. Management overall public company fatigue

3.26

3.36

3.18

3.10

3.72

2.93

3.45

2.82

3.46

3.68

3.20

3.44

2.83

3.47

31. Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing

3.37

3.44

3.31

3.30

3.63

3.10

3.42

3.23

3.47

3.51

3.43

3.81

3.07

3.47

25. Short-sellers

29. Hostile takeover risk
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DG15- British Columbia

DG16- Prairies

DG17- Ontario

DG18- Quebec

DG19- Atlantic Provinces

DG20- Career Stage 0-15 Years

DG21- Career Stage- 16-25 Years

DG22- Career Stage- > 25 Years

DG23- Pubco Experience- 0 to 5 Years

1. Time to complete IPO

3.39

3.25

3.47

3.27

3.50

4.11

3.21

3.32

3.48

3.53

3.56

3.17

2. Management effort to complete IPO

3.53

3.55

3.44

3.46

3.94

4.00

3.63

3.52

3.49

3.82

3.77

3.18

DG25- Pubco Experience- >15 Years

Potential Public Company / IPO Downside

DG1- All Respondents

NOTE:
In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on mean
are highlighted in white ;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on
mean are highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor according to
mean.
-Top 5 and Bottom 5 are calculated based on all 25
demographic subgroups (ie., both tables), not only
the DG's reflected on this particular table.

DG24- Pubco Experience- 6 to 15 Years

Table 18, Q20- Mean Analysis by Demographic Group, Part II

3. Cost of IPO

3.68

3.70

3.61

3.60

3.81

4.47

3.64

3.58

3.75

3.89

3.83

3.43

4. Executive comp disclosure

2.95

2.88

2.88

2.96

3.06

3.26

2.84

2.84

3.06

3.13

2.91

2.83

5. General management distractions

3.78

3.55

3.90

3.73

3.81

4.05

3.71

3.93

3.69

4.07

3.91

3.49

6. Increasing compliance complexity

3.81

3.77

3.76

3.79

3.81

4.05

3.70

3.76

3.85

4.02

3.85

3.60

7. Increasing compliance cost

3.94

4.05

3.87

3.87

3.88

4.53

3.71

3.97

3.97

4.09

3.91

3.82

8. Insider reporting requirements

2.63

2.58

2.59

2.60

2.75

3.05

2.70

2.58

2.63

3.01

2.68

2.31

9. Increased litigation risk

3.38

3.20

3.34

3.41

3.38

3.53

3.30

3.39

3.38

3.56

3.41

3.21

10. Trading volume concerns

3.47

3.30

3.47

3.43

3.94

3.79

3.32

3.43

3.53

3.59

3.58

3.31

11. Analyst coverage concerns

3.16

3.02

2.94

3.26

3.69

3.16

3.09

3.05

3.24

3.29

3.04

3.11

12. General regulatory overreach

2.97

2.92

3.10

2.82

3.06

3.42

2.77

3.00

2.99

3.16

3.01

2.78

13. Proxy advisory firms

3.01

3.15

3.10

2.88

3.19

3.11

2.91

3.06

2.98

3.03

3.14

2.90

14. Special interest groups

2.88

2.60

3.01

2.78

3.06

3.00

2.88

2.74

2.93

3.03

2.80

2.76

15. Short-termism amongst shareholders

3.22

3.15

3.14

3.28

3.50

3.00

3.25

3.23

3.19

3.26

3.33

3.11

16. Competitive disclosure disadvantage

3.36

3.17

3.42

3.28

4.00

3.53

3.23

3.35

3.39

3.50

3.26

3.28

17. Business Acquisition Reports

2.86

2.73

2.87

2.77

3.06

3.47

2.70

2.88

2.87

3.03

3.02

2.61

18. Financial statement certification

2.55

2.48

2.55

2.47

2.56

3.11

2.32

2.73

2.47

2.72

2.56

2.39

19. Inablity to focus on core business

3.65

3.77

3.73

3.50

3.81

4.21

3.63

3.75

3.58

3.90

3.79

3.38

20. Public disclosure of shares and income

2.56

2.25

2.70

2.46

2.69

3.11

2.45

2.58

2.56

2.84

2.62

2.29

21. Reputational risk

2.95

2.63

2.97

2.95

2.94

3.42

2.93

2.91

2.97

3.05

3.01

2.83

22. Pressures of meeting quarterly targets

3.97

3.55

3.94

4.06

4.50

4.26

4.29

4.05

3.84

4.27

4.05

3.75

23. Related party transaction disclosure/restrictions

2.59

2.35

2.48

2.59

2.69

3.47

2.50

2.61

2.58

2.78

2.70

2.35

24. Redundancy of filing requirements

3.42

3.65

3.47

3.28

3.44

3.68

3.29

3.41

3.45

3.64

3.46

3.21

2.9

2.67

2.80

2.99

3.00

2.95

3.07

2.86

2.86

3.03

3.01

2.73

26. Proxy battle risk

3.06

2.85

3.01

3.15

3.00

3.05

3.16

3.16

2.94

3.22

3.27

2.81

27. Responding to uniformed shareholders

2.99

3.10

3.05

2.91

2.94

3.05

2.89

3.08

2.94

3.42

2.93

2.69

25. Short-sellers

3

2.75

2.97

3.02

3.06

3.32

2.75

3.01

3.06

3.16

2.93

2.90

2.8

2.67

2.71

2.82

3.25

2.84

3.09

2.72

2.75

2.97

2.90

2.62

30. Management overall public company fatigue

3.26

3.15

3.40

3.10

3.50

3.84

3.13

3.23

3.31

3.60

3.19

3.03

31. Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing

3.37

3.30

3.65

3.20

3.44

3.42

3.05

3.43

3.42

3.45

3.27

3.34

28. Evolving corporate governance practices
29. Hostile takeover risk
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10

14

9

13

13

14

7

12

11

2. Management effort to complete IPO

7

9

7

12

7

8

4

10

3. Cost of IPO

5

6

5

3

9

4

3

6

23

22

23

20

21

23

27

16

5. General management distractions

4

4

4

6

2

6

6

6. Increasing compliance complexity

3

2

3

2

4

5

2

1. Time to complete IPO

4. Executive comp disclosure

DG14- Group I- Industry- Non Resources

DG13- Group I- Industry- Mining

DG12- Group I- Industry- Oil & Gas

DG11- Group I- Company Size- Non SME's

DG10- Group I- Company Size- SME's

DG9- Group II- Private Equity

DG8- Group II- Investment Bankers

DG7- Group II_ Accountants / Auditors

DG- Group II- Securities Lawyers

DG5- Group I- Private Companeis

DG4- Group I- TSX Listed Companies

DG3- Group II- Public Market Influencers

Potential Public Company / IPO Downside

DG2 - Group I- Senior Decision Makers

NOTE:
In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on rank
are highlighted in white ;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on
rank are highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor.
-Top 5 and Bottom 5 are calculated based on all 25
demographic subgroups (ie., both tables), not only
the DG's reflected on this particular table.

DG1- All Respondents

Table 19, Q20- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-31) by Demographic Group, Part I

10

13

14

11

14

8

7

11

13

8

8

6

5

5

6

3

7

25

23

21

22

23

21

4

2

2

4

1

2

4

3

3

3

3

8

6

2

2

1

2

1

1

2

1

5

4

1

1

3

1

1

8. Insider reporting requirements

28

27

29

29

26

29

26

31

28

27

28

31

28

27

9. Increased litigation risk

11

7

13

10

6

7

14

14

16

8

8

10

13

5

7. Increasing compliance cost

8

12

8

9

14

10

11

2

7

15

12

16

5

13

11. Analyst coverage concerns

16

20

16

14

25

20

21

8

14

18

20

25

17

16

12. General regulatory overreach

21

16

26

19

16

25

20

25

26

17

15

11

26

18

13. Proxy advisory firms

18

17

22

18

18

22

19

24

22

20

14

20

12

19

14. Special interest groups

25

25

25

26

24

21

31

26

18

26

24

19

16

26

15. Short-termism amongst shareholders

15

15

15

15

17

9

24

13

13

16

18

18

10

15

16. Competitive disclosure disadvantage

13

11

12

7

15

12

13

9

15

13

10

12

15

10

17. Business Acquisition Reports

26

24

27

25

23

26

15

27

27

22

25

24

21

24

18. Financial statement certification

31

29

31

28

30

30

18

29

31

28

30

29

29

30

19. Inablity to focus on core business

6

5

6

8

3

3

9

7

5

6

6

5

9

6

20. Public disclosure of shares and income

30

31

30

31

27

31

28

30

29

29

31

28

31

29

21. Reputational risk

22

23

20

21

22

24

23

21

20

19

22

21

19

23

10. Trading volume concerns

1

3

1

4

5

1

5

1

1

4

2

4

4

3

29

30

28

30

29

27

30

28

30

30

29

30

27

31

9

8

11

5

12

16

8

15

10

11

7

7

7

9

25. Short-sellers

24

26

18

24

28

13

25

20

24

24

26

26

25

25

26. Proxy battle risk

17

21

17

22

19

11

22

19

17

25

19

23

24

22

27. Responding to uniformed shareholders

20

18

24

23

11

28

17

23

19

12

23

17

18

17

28. Evolving corporate governance practices

19

19

21

17

20

19

16

22

23

21

16

15

20

20

29. Hostile takeover risk

27

28

19

27

31

17

29

17

21

31

27

27

30

28

30. Management overall public company fatigue

14

13

14

16

8

18

10

18

12

9

17

9

22

12

31. Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing

12

10

10

11

10

15

12

11

9

14

9

2

14

11

22. Pressures of meeting quarterly targets
23. Related party transaction disclosure/restrictions
24. Redundancy of filing requirements
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1. Time to complete IPO
2. Management effort to complete IPO

DG24- Pubco Experience- >15 Years

DG23- Pubco Experience- 6 to 15 Years

DG23- Pubco Experience- 0 to 5 Years

DG22- Career Stage- 25+ Years

DG21- Career Stage- 16-25 Years

DG20- Career Stage 0-15 Years

DG19- Atlantic Provinces

DG18- Quebec

DG17- Ontario

DG16- Prairies

Potential Public Company / IPO Downside

DG15- British Columbia

NOTE:
In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on rank
are highlighted in white ;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row based on
rank are highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor.
-Top 5 and Bottom 5 are calculated based on all 25
demographic subgroups (ie., both tables), not only the
DG's reflected on this particular table.

DG1- All Respondents

Table 20, Q20- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-31) by Demographic Group, Part II
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11

10

13

13

13

13

13

9

12

9

13

7

8

11

7

4

4

7

7

8

7

7

12

5

4

7

5

9

9

5

6

4

6

5

5

23

20

24

20

23

23

24

25

17

21

25

19

5. General management distractions

4

7

2

4

8

8

3

3

5

3

2

4

6. Increasing compliance complexity

3

3

4

3

7

7

4

4

2

4

4

3

7. Increasing compliance cost

2

1

3

2

5

5

2

2

1

2

3

1

8. Insider reporting requirements

28

28

29

28

28

28

28

30

28

27

29

30

9. Increased litigation risk

11

12

14

9

16

16

9

11

13

11

11

10

3. Cost of IPO
4. Executive comp disclosure

8

10

9

8

3

3

8

8

7

10

8

8

11. Analyst coverage concerns

16

18

23

14

10

10

17

19

15

16

18

14

12. General regulatory overreach

21

19

17

25

22

22

25

21

19

19

20

22

13. Proxy advisory firms

18

16

16

23

18

18

21

18

20

23

17

17

14. Special interest groups

25

27

20

26

21

21

23

26

24

24

27

23

15. Short-termism amongst shareholders

15

15

15

12

12

12

11

14

16

17

12

15

16. Competitive disclosure disadvantage

13

13

12

11

2

2

12

12

12

13

15

9

17. Business Acquisition Reports

26

23

25

27

20

20

27

23

25

25

19

27

18. Financial statement certification

31

29

30

30

31

31

31

27

31

31

31

28

19. Inablity to focus on core business

6

2

5

6

6

6

6

5

6

5

6

6

20. Public disclosure of shares and income

30

31

28

31

30

30

30

31

30

29

30

31

21. Reputational risk

22

26

22

21

27

27

20

22

21

22

21

20

1

6

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

2

29

30

31

29

29

29

29

29

29

30

28

29

9

5

8

10

15

15

10

10

10

8

10

11

25. Short-sellers

24

25

26

19

25

25

18

24

26

26

22

24

26. Proxy battle risk

17

21

19

16

24

24

14

16

22

18

13

21

27. Responding to uniformed shareholders

20

17

18

22

26

26

22

17

23

15

23

25

28. Evolving corporate governance practices

19

22

21

18

19

19

26

20

18

20

24

18

29. Hostile takeover risk

27

24

27

24

17

17

16

28

27

28

26

26

30. Management overall public company fatigue

14

14

13

17

11

11

15

15

14

9

16

16

31. Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing

12

9

6

15

14

14

19

9

11

14

14

7

10. Trading volume concerns

22. Pressures of meeting quarterly targets
23. Related party transaction disclosure/restrictions
24. Redundancy of filing requirements
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The Single Worst Thing About Being Public?
So, based on the PCD Study data in Q20, can any of the prospective downside factors
associated with going public, or being public, be defined as representing the "single worst
thing about being public"? It was hoped that the PCD Study would establish a particular
factor that could be definitively categorized as being the single most important negative
factor associated with taking a company public. Based on the PCD Study data for all
respondents, the most important negative factor associated with the public markets is
Q20-22, the pressure of meeting quarterly analyst targets. This is certainly an unexpected
outcome and worth discussing further. This particular factor is also complex, and it
implicates a variety of different underlying elements arising from different conceptual
foundations.
The first element to discuss on the quarterly target pressure issue relates to managing
analyst expectations. Analysts generally set their earnings expectations with reference to
the guidance provided by the senior management of the issuers. However, analyst
estimates also embed the analysts’ own personal research and beliefs on the prospects of
the issuer. Senior management do not have control over the final numbers that are
published by the analysts. Although the final numbers are outside the control of
management, the public markets seem to place an inordinate amount of importance on
these estimates being met. Failure to meet analyst estimates often results in a significant
decline in share price immediately after announcement of results. Is the higher-thanexpected ranking of this factor in the PCD Study a reflection of the degree of frustration
that senior decision-makers feel towards being held accountable to outsider expectations
that they cannot control? Intuitively, this would seem to be a component behind the
higher-than-expected ranking of the pressure of meeting quarterly analysts targets in the
PCD Study. However, this particular source of frustration operates independently of the
broader short-termism topic.
The second element of the quarterly target pressure issue relates to short-termism. Given
the importance that the public markets place on meeting quarterly targets, senior
executives certainly feel a significant amount of pressure to meet these targets to satisfy
both the pool of analysts covering the issuer and the public shareholders. In many cases
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this means evaluating both short-term and long-term strategic decisions with a continual
eye towards the impact that these decisions will have on the ability of the company to
meet quarterly analyst targets over the next several quarters.
However, it is widely understood that decisions made to maximize short-term
profitability may often come at the expense of long-term business growth. Positioning a
business for ultimate success years and decades down the road often requires a
commitment to making continued investment over a long period of time. This long-term
commitment may diminish profitability in the near term for multiple quarters, and even
up to several years, before the success or failure of the long-term strategy becomes
apparent. The high ranking of this particular factor, relating to the pressures of meeting
quarterly analysts targets, in the PCD Study strongly suggests that the key decisionmakers and influencers in Canadian business collectively believe that the public markets
fail to exhibit sufficient patience to allow companies to make the necessary long-term
investments and optimally position the company for long-term success. Instead, the
strong inference from the high ranking of this particular factor is that private financing
alternatives are perceived as offering a company an investment partner that is more
patient and willing to support investment strategies that will only pay off over longer
periods of time compared to the public markets.
A third element of the quarterly target pressures issue is the frequency of the occurrence.
There has been a strong lobby in the United States pushing to reduce the frequency of
reporting to a six month or biannual cycle. Indeed, President Donald Trump has
specifically requested that the SEC evaluate a move to biannual reporting (i.e., twice a
year instead of quarterly) and the proposal was one of the specific items considered in CP
51-404. 442 These proposals have been widely debated by forces that both strongly
support and oppose biannual reporting, and the ultimate outcome on these proposals in
both the U.S. and Canada remains uncertain at the current time.

442

David Michaels, Michael Rapoport and Jennifer Maloney, "Trump Asks SEC to Study Six-Month
Reporting for Public Companies", Wall Street Journal (17 August 2018), online:< https://www.wsj.com
/articles/trump-directs-sec-to-study-six-month-reporting-for-public-companies-1534507058>.
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One has to wonder if the degree to which the knowledge that the debate over biannual
reporting is continuing to be fought daily behind closed doors impacted the outcome of
the PCD Study on this particular question, moving the pressures of meeting quarterly
analyst targets higher in the rankings than might otherwise have occurred. In other
words, is there some effect in the PCD Study data resulting from respondents reporting a
higher importance on this particular issue in an attempt to build the empirical case for
adoption of biannual reporting? Did respondents in significant numbers “strategically
vote” to influence the outcome of the debate?
If this strategic voting effect was indeed occurring to any significant degree in the PCD
Study data, one would anticipate that this issue would be more highly ranked by DG4TSX respondents than by DG3-Group II and DG5- Private Company respondents. If
biannual reporting were adopted in Canada, it is the DG4- TSX respondents who have the
most to gain through a reduction in cost and time spent on reporting. DG5- Private
Company respondents should be more ambivalent about the prospect of biannual
reporting because it will not directly affect their businesses, and both DG6- Lawyers and
DG7- Auditors actually face a significant loss of revenue in their continuous disclosure
compliance support practices if biannual reporting is ultimately adopted.
The data in the PCD Study, though, demonstrates the opposite result. DG4- TSX
respondents have one of the lowest means on Q20-22 of any demographic subgroup at
3.59. DG5- Private Company respondents rated Q20-22 higher with reference to the
mean (4.06), but one also needs to recognize that DG5- Private Company respondents
generally evidenced a higher mean across all 31 factors than their public company
counterparts (DG5- Private Company had an average mean of 3.48 on the 31 factors in
Q20; DG4-Public Company had an average mean of 3.10). On a rank-order basis, DG4TSX respondents ranked Q20-22 fourth in order of importance, and DG5- Private
Company respondents ranked Q20-22 fifth in order of importance. As such, there is little
difference between the rank order of the private and public company senior decisionmakers on Q20-22.
Clearly, DG3- Group II respondents collectively are the driving force behind Q20-22
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achieving the top overall ranking of amongst Q20 factors. Three of the four linked
subgroups constituting DG3- Group II respondents (i.e., DG6- Lawyers, DG8Investment Bankers and DG9- Private Equity Investors) each ranked Q20-22 as the single
most important downside factor that would influence their decision-making process. 443
As such, does the top ranking of Q20-22, the pressure of meeting quarterly analyst
targets, deserve an asterisk or can it legitimately claim the title of "Single Worst Thing
About Being Public" in the PCD Study? The answer depends on your perspective, and
whether you believe that the opinions of the DG2- Group I respondents should be more
heavily weighted in the Q20 rankings than the opinions of DG3- Group II respondents. If
so, then there is a case to be made that the factor tested in Q20-7, increasing compliance
cost, can also lay claim to the crown as the most important downside factor driving
companies away from the public markets. This claim is bolstered by the fact that
increased disclosure costs had the lowest standard deviation of any of the 31 downside
factors tested (σ=0.93), evidencing a high degree of consistency amongst the respondents.
In this Dissertation, no definitive position is taken and the title of "Single Worst Thing
About Being Public" is left for others to interpret based on their own opinions and
methodologies. The conclusion on the factor of pressures of meeting quarterly analyst
targets is best summarized by stating that it is certainly materially more important to the
Canadian business community than was anticipated in advance of the PCD Study and,
regardless of the demographic subgroups being considered, significant angst with respect
to the pressure of meeting quarterly analysts targets is certainly one of the most important
factors affecting the public / private decision-making process. As such, the pressure of
meeting quarterly analyst targets can be inferred to represent an important factor relevant
to the topic of overall public company decline in Canada.

443

The fourth linked demographic subgroup (i.e., DG7- Accountants/Auditors) ranked this factor as the
fight most important out of the 31 factors.
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The Most Important Downside Factors Associated with Being
Public
The thirteen factors ranked as the most important in the PCD Study based on the mean
responses by all PCD Study respondents are summarized below in Table 21. When
analyzing the data, both the mean and the rank order are equally useful for summarizing
data. There is value in referring to the mean to determine the extent of the gap between
different rank ordered items, which is useful in determining cut-off points for reporting
tiers. 444
With respect to comparisons of the Q20 responses between different subgroups, however,
it is submitted that reference to the mean can be misleading given the nature of the
particular 5-Point Likert Scale. Different subgroups exhibited a material difference in
their grading scale across Q20. It has been previously mentioned that the DG5- Private
Company subgroup has a significantly higher average mean than DG5- TSX-Listed. As
another example, the average mean across all 31 factors for DG8- Investment Bankers on
Q20 was 2.95, whereas the average mean was 3.40 for DG10 SME's. A simple
explanation for the difference is that senior decision makers of SME's are generally more
concerned about the downside factors associated with being a public company than
investment bankers.
Regardless, the result is that the different demographic subgroups are applying the scales
differently. When comparing the answers of two subgroups, therefore, utilizing the mean
as the basis for the comparison can lead to error. Comparing subgroups by ranking order
provides a more accurate comparison. For example, the mean of DG8- Investment
Bankers on the factor in Q20-4 (executive compensation disclosure) is 2.86, where the
mean of DG10- SME's on the same factor was 3.17. It would be easy to imply that
DG10-SME viewed this factor as more important than DG8- Investment Bankers.

444

Normally, this type of summary table would be limited to the top 1/3 or top 10 factors. However, in
this case, factors 10-13 are essentially tied based on mean before a significant drop-off occurs between the
13th and 14th ranked factors. As such, it would be arbitrary to cut off the list at the top 10 and this list
essentially represents the top 10 plus statistical ties.
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However, Q20-4 was only the 23rd highest ranked factor for DG10-SME's, compared to
being the 16th highest ranked factor for DG8- Investment Bankers. As such, whereas the
mean will be used for determining rankings slots within subgroups, only the rank order
will be reported when analyzing comparisons between the various subgroups.
Table 21, Q20, List of Top Factors Ranked as Most Important
Rank
1
2
3
4
5

Q-ID
22
7
6
5
3

6
7

19
2

8
9
10
11

10
24
1
9

12
13

31
16

Downside Factor
The pressures of meeting quarterly analyst targets
The increased cost of continuous disclosure obligations due to regulatory changes
The complexity of continuous disclosure obligations arising from regulatory changes
Running a public company creating too many distractions for management
The cost that it takes to complete an IPO
Concern that being public leaves too little time for management to focus on the core business of the
company
The management effort required to complete an IPO

Mean
3.97
3.94
3.81
3.78
3.68

Std Dev
1.03
0.93
1.02
0.97
1.04

Count
333
333
333
332
333

3.65
3.53

1.08
1.13

332
333

Concern the company will be able to generate sufficient trading volume to keep shareholders happy
Redundancy of filing requirements for public companies
The time required to complete an IPO
The increased litigation risk associated with being public
Concern that being public will not ultimately provide quicker access to follow-on financing in the
future
The challenges of competing against private companies that don't have to disclose any secrets

3.47
3.42
3.39
3.38

1.09
1.15
1.09
1.07

333
332
333
333

3.37
3.36

1.15
1.2

331
332

What is apparent from this list is that there is no single category of downside factors that
dominates the top of the rankings. In fact, six of the eight categories defined previously
are represented in the list of the top 13 factors. Once again, this result makes it clear that
the challenges facing the public markets are complex and broad-based. Possibly most
sobering is the fact that, even if the wisest of public company regulators in Canada could
identify an ideal package of burden reduction and regulatory streamlining reforms that
magically eliminated all of the concerns associated with the two critical categories of
regulatory complexity / overreach and public company costs, nine out of the thirteen most
important downside factors associated with the public markets as per the PCD Study data
would still remain as barriers to renewed IPO activity.
Overview by Category of Downside Risk
Regulatory Complexity / Regulatory Overreach
Understanding the degree to which regulatory complexity and regulatory overreach can
be inferentially linked to public company decline in Canada is one of the recurring
themes in the PCD Study research. Six different factors fitting within the umbrella of
regulatory complexity / regulatory overreach were tested. The factor in Q20-6,
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increasing compliance complexity, was the highest ranked of these factors in the PCD
Study, coming in as the 3rd most important of the 31 factors. Q20-24, redundancy of
filing requirements, also ranked relatively high as the 9th most important factor. The high
ranking of these two particular factors was not surprising, as compliance complexity and
redundancy are two of the favorite areas of complaint amongst senior business decisionmakers and public company influencers.
However, what is surprising in the PCD Study data is that the other four regulatory
complexity / overreach factors scored relatively low compared to a number of other
factors. In the earlier analysis on Q16-7 of the PCD Study (i.e., the proposition
summarizing the regulatory overreach hypothesis), the general disposition of the
respondent group supporting the regulatory overreach hypothesis was discussed at some
length. Yet, a similar articulation of the regulatory overreach hypothesis in Q20-12 only
ranked as the 21st most important factor from the list of 31 amongst all respondents.
What should one make of this outcome? It is submitted that relatively low ranking of the
regulatory overreach factor (Q20-12) as the 21st most important factor in the PCD Study
should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with the outcome in Q16-7 on this topic.
Rather, it is a reflection of the comparatively high importance placed on the other factors
that exceed regulatory overreach in importance for the respondent group.
Another regulatory complexity-linked factor, the hassle of dealing with evolving
corporate governance practices, came in ranked as 19th most important.
Finally, the three specific regulatory requirements tested in Q20 all came in at or near the
bottom of the rankings. 445 The irony of this outcome, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3 of
this Dissertation, is that the one tangible regulatory reform recently proposed by the CSA
that is directed at Operating Companies is streamlining of the Business Acquisition

445

Namely: (i) Q20-17- the requirement to file Business Acquisition Reports for significant acquisitions,
which ranked 26; (ii) Q20-23- related party transaction restrictions and disclosure requirements in MI 61101, which ranked 29; and (iii) the requirement for senior executives to provide certificates on financial
statements, which ranked dead last at 31.
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Report rules, which ranked 26th out of the 31 factors in Q20 in terms of importance.
Time / Distraction / Effort of Going and Being Public
The time and effort of going and remaining public is one particular subject area that is
certainly acknowledged in the academic literature on public company decline, but never
gets top billing as being one of the most critical categories. The PCD Study results
indicate that this area should be included as one of the most important topics for future
research projects and regulatory streamlining initiatives, as each of four of the individual
downside factors fitting under this umbrella ranked in the top 10 most important factors
across all respondents. 446
This result represents one of the most important observations arising from the PCD Study
data. It is clear from this outcome that there is a strong perception amongst the Canadian
business community that the collateral requirements associated with running a public
company are time-consuming and mentally draining, taking away from one's ability to
focus their time and attention on building the core business of the company.
Public Company Costs
Both the cost of completing an IPO and the increasing costs of ongoing compliance
ranked in the top five most important factors in the PCD Study. As discussed earlier, the
increasing cost of ongoing compliance could be also argued to be the single most
important factor in the PCD Study. It was certainly the top ranked factor according to
both subgroups of senior business decision-makers in the PCD Study.
Liquidity, Valuation and Access to Capital
The liquidity, valuation and access to capital concerns ranked more highly in the PCD
Study than one might have expected. Although this group of factors is largely an
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Specifically: (i) Q20-5- the distractions associated with running a public company, which ranked 4th;
(ii) Q20-19- concern that being public leaves insufficient time to manage the core business, which ranked
6th; (iii) Q20-2- the management effort required to complete and IPO, which ranked 7th; and (iv) Q20-1- the
time required to complete an IPO, which ranked 10th.
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afterthought in the academic literature on public company decline, the three factors in this
category ranked at 8th (trading volume concerns), 12th (concern about access to follow-on
financing) and 16th (ability to attract analysts). This suggests that this category of factors
is underrated in the academic literature and should be given more attention in follow-on
research in Canada.
One likely explanation of the relatively high rankings of this particular group of factors in
the PCD Study is the size and liquidity in the Canadian public markets compared to the
U.S. markets. Whereas the availability of liquidity, access to capital and quality analyst
coverage may all be taken for granted in the much larger U.S. public markets, in Canada
even companies listed on the senior TSX exchange remain in real danger of becoming
orphaned if they fail to execute on their business plans and lose the following of analysts
and institutional traders.
Public Disclosure Disadvantage and Privacy
This is one of the two categories in the PCD Study that was ranked comparatively low,
with only one of the five factors in this group ranking in the top half of the 31 factors.
This was also a surprising result, as it was anticipated that this group of factors might be
proven to be more important than the PCD Study data demonstrated.
Competitive disclosure disadvantage ranked in 13th position in importance, evidencing a
moderate degree of belief in the proposition that the nature of the disclosure obligations
for public companies puts them at a disadvantage compared to their private competitors.
Worth noting, however, is that this factor was rated as the 7th most important factor by
DG4-TSX and the 15th most important factor by DG5-Private Company. This suggests
that public disclosure disadvantage is significantly more important to senior business
decision-makers than it is to public markets influencers. As such, it is another example in
the PCD Study of the reality of the situation based on personal experience being worse
than perception of the problem by outsiders.
Short-Termism
The data from the PCD Study as a whole demonstrates that short termism in the public
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markets is one of the most interesting categories that is largely ignored in the academic
literature. As previously discussed in Chapter 6, the topic of short-termism was raised
frequently in the open-ended text responses to Q17. The surprising ranking of the
pressure of meeting quarterly analyst targets (Q20-22) as the most important factor in the
Q20 across all respondents in the PCD Study has already been discussed at some length
previously. Although the pressures of meeting quarterly analyst targets is not exclusively
a short-termism issue, short-termism is clearly a significant component. This outcome
should be an indication for future academic research that this particular topic is worthy of
further attention in order to better understand which of the various elements discussed
relating to quarterly analyst targets are the most significant in it ranking so highly in the
PCD Study.
The other key element of short-termism tested in the PCD Study was the trend towards
shorter investment horizons by shareholders, including program trading and day trading.
This factor ranked in the middle of the pack in Q20 as the 15th most important position.
Again, this factor has attracted very little discussion in the academic literature and the
business media literature as a factor possibly contributing to public company decline, and
it ranked more highly in Q20 than a number of the other factors which have received
significantly more ink thus far.
The final element in the short-termism category is the topic of short sellers, which ranked
24th of the 31 factors in Q20. Short sellers certainly remain as a concern for companies
operating in the public markets, with the ability to cause significant damage to a public
company. It is admittedly surprising that the short sellers topics did not rank more highly
on Q20. Notably, the DG4- TSX subgroup and the DG6- Lawyers subgroup were both
significantly more concerned about short sellers than other respondents, ranking this
factor at 18th and 13th most important, respectively. As these two subgroups are most
familiar with short sellers, it may be that it is a topic that is not on the radar screen of the
other subgroups.
Company Control Concerns
This is a subject area that ranked relatively low on an overall basis with the three factors
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tested in Q20 under this umbrella all falling to the bottom half of the rankings, again a
surprising result. Even more surprising is the fact that DG5- Private Company
respondents did not rank the company control downside factors significantly higher than
other demographic subgroups in the survey. Although caution is indicated to assure that
the PCD Study data does not imply that company control concerns are insignificant to
senior decision-makers of private companies looking at taking their companies public, it
is accurate to conclude that this subject area is not amongst the most important factors in
the decision-making process.
One potential explanation of this outcome is the fact that founders’ control concerns can
be ameliorated in public companies through the use of dual-class share structures
providing super-voting shares, a feature which is relatively common in Canadian public
companies. However, in private equity transactions, the investors are much less likely to
accept dual-class share structures that dilute their ability to exercise voting control equal
to their equity interests. In fact, many private equity financing structures include ratchet
provisions that specifically increase the voting rights of the shares held by the nonmanagement investors in the event that the company fails to meet mutually-agreed
targets. 447
Legal Risk
Increased litigation risk is a stand-alone factor that ranked surprisingly high on the list of
importance (i.e., 11th), particularly considering the comparatively benign securities class
action litigation climate for public companies in Canada. Although not yet at the top of
the list, the PCD Data demonstrates that this is an item that bears watching in the future.
Of particular importance, increased litigation risk ranked as the 6th most important factor
amongst DG5- Private Company respondents, who are the prime target market for future
IPOs. As such, the perception of this subgroup is particularly critical to the future arc of
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For an overview of the history and use of dual-class share structures in Canadian public companies see:
Daniel Cipollone, “Risky Business: A Review of Dual Class Share Structures in Canada and a Proposal for
Reform” (2012) 21 Dalhousie L.J. 62; Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Poonam Puri, “Dual Class Shares in
Canada: A Historical Analysis” (2006) 29 Dalhousie L.J. 118.
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IPOs and they clearly are more concerned about public company litigation risk than their
DG4-TSX counterparts. Also of note, this factor was rated as the 7th most important
factor by DG6- Lawyers, evidencing a similar concern about the trendline of securities
class action litigation in Canada over the past years. Based on importance of the
subgroups who evidenced the highest level of concern about litigation risk in public
companies, Canadian legislators should take this outcome seriously when considering
any further liberalization of securities class action rules in Canada.
Overview of Differences on Q20 by Demographic Subgroup
The following analysis looks at the differences in disposition on the 31 downside factors
in Q20 on the basis of the various linked demographic subgroups.
Group I vs. Group II
As an overall observation, the opinions of DG2- Group I and DG3-Group II respondents
on the relative ranking of the public company downside factors in Q20 evidence a
surprising degree of consistency. The differential in rank order between these two main
groups was within three on 21 out of the 31 different factors.
Highlighting the areas in which the differential in rank order is five or higher as
representing a significant variation between these groups, DG2- Group I ranked the
following three downside factors as significantly less important than DG3- Group II:
Q20-1 (time to complete IPO); Q20-25 (short-sellers); and Q20-29 (hostile take-over
risk). On the flip-side, DG2- Group I ranked the following four factors as significantly
more important than DG3- Group II: Q20-9 (increased litigation risk); Q20-12 (general
regulatory overreach); Q20-13 (proxy advisory firms); and Q20-27 (responding to
uninformed shareholders).
The identity of the factors in the preceding paragraph should be important to the OSC
particularly in pursuing their burden reduction initiative. As has been discussed, the
senior business decision-makers of Operating Companies (i.e., DG2- Group I in the PCD
Study) are woefully underrepresented in the consultation process thus far, leading to the
possibility that the degree of concern over these particular factors has not been properly
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conveyed to the regulators.
Group I- Senior Decision-Makers of TSX vs. Private Companies
Again, the focus in this summary is on the specific downside factors where the
differential in the rankings is five or greater between the two subgroups, DG4-TSX and
DG5- Private Company. DG4- TSX respondents ranked the following four downside
factors as significantly less important than DG5- Private Company respondents: Q20-2
(management effort to complete IPO); Q20-19 (inability to focus on core management);
Q20-27 (responding to uninformed shareholders); and Q20-30 (management overall
public company fatigue) On the flip-side, DG4- TSX respondents ranked the following
four factors as significantly more important than DG5- Private Company respondents:
DG3 (cost of an IPO); DG 11 (analyst coverage concerns); DG16 (competitive disclosure
disadvantage); and DG24 (redundancy of filing requirements).
Considering the nature of the specific differences in the previous paragraph can be argued
to be one of the most important elements of the analysis in the PCD Study data. DG5Private Company senior decision-makers represent one of the most important groups in
the study, as they are the individuals who will have to be convinced to take their
companies public in far greater numbers if the phenomenon of public company decline is
to be arrested. We have already discussed the biggest concerns in Q20 amongst all the
respondents, but in which specific areas are the DG-Private Company respondents more
concerned than their public company counterparts? The above list gives us clear
direction that the heightened concerns, unique to private company senior business
decision-makers, principally relate to the perceived distractions and time commitments
required of public company executives. They are significantly more worried than other
subgroups that pursuing an IPO will prevent them from devoting sufficient time to
focusing on the core business growth.
Group II- Public Markets Influencers
It has already been discussed that the position of Q20-22 (pressures of meeting quarterly
analyst targets) at the top overall ranking of most important negative factors associated
with being public in the PCD Study is largely attributable to the contributions of the DG-
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6 Lawyers, DG8- Investment Bankers and DG9- Private Equity subgroups, each of which
ranked that particular factor as highest of the 31.
It was also discussed that the DG7- Auditors subgroup still ranked the pressure of
meeting quarterly analyst targets as relatively important, but gave it the lowest ranking of
any subgroup in the PCD Study as the 5th most important factor.

Nobody will be

surprised to find out that D7- Auditors ranked Q20-7 (increasing compliance cost) as the
most important factor.
Beyond the top rankings, the four subgroups of public markets influencers evidenced a
surprising degree of consistency throughout their rankings of the 31 downside factors in
Q20. The only material differences in opinion were reflected by DG8- Investment
bankers on the specific factors of Q20-4 (executive compensation disclosure), Q20-10
(trading volume concerns) and Q20-11 (analyst coverage concerns), each of which they
ranked materially higher than the other three public markets influencer subgroups.
Group I- Company Size: SME's vs. Non-SME's
These two subgroups were largely consistent in their rankings of the downside factors in
Q20, with the exception that DG10-SME's evidenced a materially higher ranking on Q2027 (responding to uninformed shareholders) and Q20-30 (management overall public
company fatigue) than DG11- Non-SME's.
As previously noted, DG10-SME's were the subgroup with the higher average mean
throughout Q20. 448 The fact that they ranked the downside factors the highest on an
absolute basis is consistent with the greater aversion to the public market that senior
decision-makers of SME's have exhibited throughout the PCD Study analysis compared
to senior decision-makers of larger companies. The specific public market challenges
faced by SME's are well-documented in the literature.

448

Excluding the Atlantic Provinces, which had a slightly higher mean, but at N=16 is below the minimum
target subgroup size for general statistical analysis purposes.
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Group I- Industry
Again, these subgroups were relatively consistent in their Q20 rankings with a couple of
exceptions. First, DG13- Mining ranked Q20-10 (liquidity concerns) as being materially
more important than the non-mining respondents, placing it as the 5th most important
factor. One would assume that this is a reflection of the reduced liquidity in mining
stocks generally over the past few years during the commodity downcycle, although
DG12- Oil & Gas only ranked liquidity concerns as the 12th most important.
The DG12- Oil & Gas subgroup differed materially from the other two industry-linked
subgroups in ranking of two different factors: Q20-10 (general regulatory overreach) and
Q20-31 (lack of access to follow-on financing). The outcome on Q20-10 is consistent
with the earlier discussions on this topic in the analysis of Q16-7, where it was disclosed
that DG12- Oil & Gas expressed the highest level of support for the regulatory overreach
proposition of all the 25 demographic subgroups considered in the PCD Study. The
response on Q20-31 is also consistent with expectations, as the lack of access to followon financings in the public markets has been a common complaint from senior oil & gas
executives over the past several years due to the historically poor stretch for Canadian
energy producers.
Other Linked Demographic Subgroups
There are no observations arising from the other demographic subgroups defined by
geography, career experience, or public company experience that are particularly
noteworthy on Q20.

7.16- Question 20: Ranking Potential Upside Opportunities in
IPOs
Q20- In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how
important are each of following potential upside opportunities
associated with pursuing the TSX IPO in your analysis?
The inclusion of Q21 in the PCD Study may appear unusual at first glance, particularly
because it is the only element in the PCD Study that focuses on the perceived upsides
associated with taking a company public. While this is outside the apparent core scope of
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the PCD Study, it was included for a specific purpose. In the next section, positive and
negative correlations between the various questions in the PCD Study will be analyzed.
In addition to understanding what particular negative factors associated with the public
markets are correlated with an increased or decreased willingness to consider taking a
company public, there is value in understanding what particular positive factors also can
be linked to specific outcomes.
Second, one of the core goals in undertaking the research project on public company
decline is to come up with as much helpful data as possible to support the ongoing
regulatory reform processes and, potentially, substantiate the need for more aggressive
intervention at higher levels of government to preserve robust capital markets in Canada
in the years to come. Ultimately, the desire is not to discourage those currently involved
in the regulatory streamlining initiatives by pointing out that their efforts are unlikely to
stem the inexorable tide of public company decline, but rather to supply them with as
much valuable data as possible in order to position them to adopt the most effective
outcomes within the range of options available to them.
Unlike the topic of public company decline in which there has been a complete lack of
empirical data collected prior to the PCD Study, there have been a couple of different
studies in which the motivations of the senior decision-makers of companies pursuing
IPOs have been assessed. These include the two surveys discussed earlier in the
literature review section of this Dissertation. 449 However, none of these studies have
considered the situation in Canada or been completed in recent years. The opportunity
cost of adding in Q21 to provide an update and Canadian-specific information relating to
the perception of the respondent group on the perceived upsides associated with the
public markets was small, and the potential accretive benefit of having access to this
information in the Canadian context is significant.
Having gone to the effort of collecting the data in Q21 primarily for the purpose of

449

Supra notes 87 and 91.
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conducting the correlation analysis included later in this Dissertation, the analysis of the
data in this section will be at a more summary level than the analysis undertaken on the
mirror image questions earlier in Q20. Additional analysis of the Q21 data, along with a
more detailed comparison of the data collected on motivations for going public in the
PCD Study to the results reported in the two studies previously completed focusing on
the U.S. and Europe, is identified as a topic for further research and analysis in a different
format. 450
Similar to Q20, the most obvious framework for extracting meaning from the PCD Study
Data at a macro level is by considering the rank order of the factors according to a
grouping determined by topical categories. The categories identified for analysis of the
14 potential upside factors associated with the public markets and the rank order of each
factor across all participants in the PCD Study are as follows:
Table 22, Overall Ranking and Breakdown of Factors by Categories- Upside Factors

Upside Category
Liquidity/
Stock as Currency/
Access to Capital

Q#
21- Specific Upside Fact
3 Quicker access to capital in follow-on
4
5
6
8

Public Company
Credibility/
Visibility

Public Company

450

Ibid.

1
2
6
9

Increased public visibility with potential
customers
Enhanced credibility with suppliers
Enhanced credibility with potential
investors
Increased personal profile

10
8

7

Stronger management control by large
shareholders

11

13

Diluting minority shareholder positions

14

9
11
12

Control

financings
Ability to use stock for future acquisitions
Liquidity option for founding shareholders
Stock options to recruit and retain key
employees

Rank Order
(by DG1)
4

1

Higher pre-money valuation in IPO

12

5
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Upside Category
Valuation Premium

Q#
21- Specific Upside Fact
2 Higher post-money valuation in IPO

Challenge / Opportunity
to Grow Business

10
14

Rank Order
(by DG1)
3

Enjoy public company challenges
Opportunity to grow the business further

13
7

Unlike in the earlier analysis of the downside factors in Q20, the data from the PCD
Study relating to the upside factors in Q21 discloses a clear hierarchy based on the
categories defined in the preceding table. The most highly ranked upside factors in
Q21were the factors relating to liquidity, the ability to use public stock as currency and
access to growth capital. All four of the factors in this category ranked in the top six in
overall importance. Q21-4 (ability to use company stock as currency for acquisitions)
was rated as the single most important factor by both DG-2- Group I respondents and
DG3- Group II respondents. Q21-5 (liquidity option for founding shareholders) was
rated as the 2nd most important factor. Q21-3 (quicker access to capital in follow-on
financings) was ranked 3rd most important, and Q21-6 (easier use of stock options to
recruit and retain key employees) was the 4th highest ranked factor.
The clear implication throughout Q21 is that the prime motivation for taking a business
public in Canada, at this point in time amongst the respondents in the PCD Study, is the
desire to leverage the opportunities associated with having publicly traded securities
available to use as currency for growing the business through acquisition, and also
providing existing shareholders liquidity at the time, and on the terms, of their choosing.
This outcome is notably consistent with the findings by Brau and Fawcett back in 2006
discussed in the literature review section of this Dissertation. 451 However, the factors of
increased prestige and recognition, cited as being critical in Bancel and Mitoo in
European IPOs, do not rate highly in the PCD Study. 452

451

Supra note 87.

452

Supra note 91.
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The second category of upside factors that was ranked highly in the PCD Study was the
anticipation of higher valuations for the company during the IPO and afterwards
compared to what would be expected from private equity alternatives. Ultimately, how
decisive these valuation-based factors are in motivating senior decision-makers to pursue
an IPO may well depend on the level of comfort that the expected valuation premium will
actually be realized.
All of the other categories identified above place well behind those first two categories in
terms of the rank order. In particular, the factors related to increasing company
credibility / visibility or using the public markets to retain negative control of the
company business by avoiding the influential shareholder positions associated with
private equity investment, rated near the bottom in the ranking of importance. Clearly,
these potential upside benefits are viewed as ancillary by the respondents and not highly
motivating in terms of pushing decision-makers towards the IPO option.
The ultimate rankings and the breakdown on the responses in Q21are summarized as
follows:
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Figure 67, Q21- Rank Order of IPO / Public Upsides, All Respondents

The next two pages summarize the means and rank order based on the 25 demographic
subgroups.
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DG5- Group I- Private Companeis

DG- Group II- Securities Lawyers

DG7- Group II_ Accountants / Auditors

DG8- Group II- Investment Bankers

DG9- Group II- Private Equity

DG10- Group I- Company Size- SME's

DG11- Group I- Company Size- Non SME's

DG12- Group I- Industry- Oil & Gas

DG13- Group I- Industry- Mining

DG14- Group I- Industry- Non Resources

3.68

3.47

3.86

3.52

3.40

3.93

3.71

3.70

4.02

3.47

3.44

3.31

3.43

3.51

2. Higher post-money valuation in IPO

3.81

3.66

3.94

3.71

3.60

4.02

3.76

3.89

4.04

3.59

3.71

3.66

3.73

3.62

3. Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings

3.78

3.72

3.83

3.87

3.52

3.93

3.71

4.05

3.67

3.62

3.77

3.53

4.10

3.60

4. Ability to use stock for future acquisitions

4.01

4.01

4.02

4.22

3.71

4.02

3.89

4.45

3.75

3.86

4.11

4.13

4.20

3.88

5. Liquidity option for founding shareholders

3.94

3.85

4.01

3.71

4.05

4.12

4.16

3.82

3.96

4.09

3.64

3.78

3.77

3.92

6. Stock options to recruit and retain key employees

3.67

3.63

3.70

3.56

3.73

3.88

3.71

3.93

3.37

3.76

3.54

3.59

3.60

3.65

7. Stronger management control by large shareholders

2.88

2.90

2.87

2.78

3.06

2.88

3.29

2.57

2.81

2.95

2.92

2.72

2.93

2.99

8. Increased public visibility with potential customers

3.12

3.05

3.18

3.09

2.98

3.33

3.11

3.34

2.98

3.00

3.10

2.81

3.13

3.04

9. Enhanced credibility with suppliers

2.89

2.94

2.85

3.00

2.85

3.26

2.68

3.11

2.44

2.79

3.08

2.94

3.00

2.88

10. Enjoy public company challenges

2.26

2.37

2.17

2.49

2.21

2.43

2.11

2.27

1.93

2.24

2.49

2.09

2.57

2.40
3.20

DG4- Group I- TSX Listed Companies

DG3- Group II- Public Market Influencers

1. Higher pre-money valuation in IPO

NOTE: In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row are
highlighted in white;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on reach row are
highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor

DG2 - Group I- Senior Decision Makers

Potential Public Company / IPO Upside

DG1- All Respondents

Table 23, Q21- Mean Analysis of IPO / Public Company Upsides by Demographic Subgroup

3.26

3.44

3.19

3.67

2.26

2.52

2.15

1.94

2.33

2.36

13. Diluting minority shareholder positions

2.19

2.22

2.17

2.08

2.40

2.48

2.13

1.93

2.16

2.28

2.19

2.13

2.23

2.26

14. Opportunity to grow the business further

3.66

3.68

3.64

3.66

3.71

3.83

3.50

3.75

3.49

3.47

3.83

3.63

3.67

3.68

1. Higher pre-money valuation in IPO

3.68

3.38

3.81

3.62

4.19

3.89

3.79

3.62

3.69

3.65

3.58

2. Higher post-money valuation in IPO

3.81

3.58

3.80

3.83

4.13

4.00

3.89

3.83

3.77

3.80

3.77

3. Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings

3.78

3.60

3.72

3.78

4.13

4.11

3.82

3.70

3.83

3.43

4.01

4. Ability to use stock for future acquisitions

4.01

3.83

4.04

4.06

3.88

4.00

3.77

4.12

4.04

3.74

3.96

5. Liquidity option for founding shareholders

3.94

3.80

4.16

3.84

3.81

4.00

4.09

3.86

3.93

4.00

4.01

6. Stock options to recruit and retain key employees

3.67

3.73

3.65

3.62

3.88

3.74

3.50

3.68

3.71

3.48

3.69

7. Stronger management control by large shareholders

2.88

2.90

2.77

2.87

3.25

3.21

2.95

2.89

2.84

2.96

2.98

8. Increased public visibility with potential customers

3.12

3.17

2.80

3.14

3.88

3.74

3.29

3.42

2.84

3.03

3.21

9. Enhanced credibility with suppliers

2.89

2.77

2.68

2.89

3.44

3.58

3.05

3.03

2.73

2.68

3.14

10. Enjoy public company challenges

2.26

2.45

2.03

2.28

2.56

2.47

2.21

2.25

2.28

2.06

2.25

11. Enhanced credibility with potential investors

3.28

3.25

3.14

3.22

3.81

4.00

3.30

3.32

3.24

3.10

3.42

12. Increased personal profile

2.38

2.17

2.17

2.39

2.94

3.37

2.70

2.60

2.11

2.47

2.49

13. Diluting minority shareholder positions

2.19

2.00

2.06

2.20

2.75

2.63

2.36

2.17

2.14

2.33

2.24

DG24- Pubco Experience- 6 to 15
Years

Potential Public Company / IPO Upside

DG23- Pubco Experience- 0 to 5 Years

2.95

2.36

DG22- Career Stage- > 25 Years

3.25

2.42

DG21- Career Stage- 16-25 Years

3.24

2.88

DG20- Career Stage 0-15 Years

3.60

2.42

DG19- Maritimes

3.10

2.17

DG18- Quebec

3.50

2.46

DG17- Ontario

3.23

2.28

DG16- Prairies

3.33

2.38

DG15- British Columbia

3.28

12. Increased personal profile

DG1- All Respondents

11. Enhanced credibility with potential investors
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DG- Group II- Securities Lawyers

DG7- Group II_ Accountants / Auditors

DG8- Group II- Investment Bankers

DG9- Group II- Private Equity

DG10- Group I- Company Size- SME's

DG11- Group I- Company Size- Non SME's

DG12- Group I- Industry- Oil & Gas

DG13- Group I- Industry- Mining

DG14- Group I- Industry- Non Resources

4

7

7

4

4

7

2

6

7

7

8

7

5

3

3

5

2

3

4

1

5

4

3

4

5

3. Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings

4

3

5

2

6

5

5

2

5

4

3

6

2

6

4. Ability to use stock for future acquisitions

1

1

1

1

3

3

2

1

4

2

1

1

1

2

5. Liquidity option for founding shareholders

2

2

2

4

1

1

1

5

3

1

5

2

3

1

6. Stock options to recruit and retain key employees

6

6

6

6

2

6

6

3

7

3

6

5

7

4

7. Stronger management control by large shareholders

11

11

10

11

9

11

8

11

10

10

11

11

11

10

8. Increased public visibility with potential customers

9

9

9

9

10

9

10

8

8

9

9

10

9

9

9. Enhanced credibility with suppliers

10

10

11

10

11

10

11

10

11

11

10

9

10

11

10. Enjoy public company challenges

13

12

13

13

14

14

14

13

14

14

12

13

12

12

8

8

8

8

8

8

9

9

9

8

8

8

5

8

12. Increased personal profile

12

13

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

12

14

14

13

13

13. Diluting minority shareholder positions

14

14

14

14

13

13

13

14

13

13

13

12

14

14

7

4

7

5

4

7

7

6

6

7

2

4

6

3

DG17- Ontario

DG18- Quebec

DG19- Maritimes

DG20- Career Stage 0-15 Years

DG21- Career Stage- 16-25 Years

DG22- Career Stage- > 25 Years

DG23- Pubco Experience- 0 to 5 Years

DG24- Pubco Experience- 6 to 15 Years

DG25- Pubco Experience- > 15 Years

1. Higher pre-money valuation in IPO

DG16- Prairies

Potential Public Company / IPO Upside

DG15- British Columbia

14. Opportunity to grow the business further

DG1- All Respondents

11. Enhanced credibility with potential investors

DG4- Group I- TSX Listed Companies

7

3

DG3- Group II- Public Market Influencers

5

2. Higher post-money valuation in IPO

Potential Public Company / IPO Upside

DG2 - Group I- Senior Decision Makers

1. Higher pre-money valuation in IPO

NOTE: In this chart:
-the Top 5 (plus ties) DG's on each row are highlighted
in white;
-the Bottom 5 (plus ties) DG's on reach row are
highlighted in black;
-grey cells indicate that the DG does not rank
in the Top 5 or Bottom 5 on this factor

DG1- All Respondents

DG5- Group I- Private Companeis

Table 24, Q21- Rank Analysis (Rank 1-14) Analysis by Demographic Subgroup

5

6

3

6

1

6

4

6

7

4

7

6

2. Higher post-money valuation in IPO

3

5

4

3

2

2

2

3

4

2

4

3

3. Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings

4

4

5

4

3

1

3

4

3

7

1

2

4. Ability to use stock for future acquisitions

1

1

2

1

4

3

5

1

1

3

3

1

5. Liquidity option for founding shareholders

2

2

1

2

7

4

1

2

2

1

2

4

6. Stock options to recruit and retain key employees

6

3

6

7

5

8

6

5

6

6

5

5

7. Stronger management control by large shareholders

11

10

10

11

11

12

11

11

9

10

11

11

8. Increased public visibility with potential customers

9

9

9

9

6

9

9

8

10

9

9

9

9. Enhanced credibility with suppliers

10

11

11

10

10

10

10

10

11

11

10

10

10. Enjoy public company challenges

13

12

14

13

14

14

14

13

12

14

13

12

8

8

8

8

8

5

8

9

8

8

8

8

11. Enhanced credibility with potential investors
12. Increased personal profile

12

13

12

12

12

11

12

12

14

12

12

13

13. Diluting minority shareholder positions

14

14

13

14

13

13

13

14

13

13

14

14

7

7

7

5

9

7

7

7

5

5

6

7

14. Opportunity to grow the business further
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Referring to the data in Table 24 above, it is apparent that there is a material degree of
consistency in the rank order of the 14 upside factors across the 25 demographic groups.
As in Q20, the rank order between DG2-Group II and DG3- Group II demonstrate that
the perceptions of senior-decision makers and public market influencers are very much
aligned on Q21.
With respect to the linked demographic subgroup analysis, there are only a few variations
within the linked subgroups that are worthy of note. Between DG4-TSX and DG5
Private Company, the senior decision-makers of TSX-listed companies rank the ability of
using public equity to raise financing on an expedited basis (Q21-3) more highly than
their counterparts in private companies. However, DG5 Private Company respondents
placed a higher importance on both liquidity for founding shareholders (Q21-5) and the
ability to use stock options to recruit and retain key employees (Q21-6). One could argue
that the difference on Q21-5 is attributable to the fact that the respondents from DG4TSX are less likely to be founding shareholders of the company compared to the
respondents from DG5- Private Company, so therefore underestimate the value of this
potential upside for founding shareholders. With respect to Q21-6 (ability to use stock
options to recruit and retain employees), one might question whether the DG4-TSX
respondents take this opportunity for granted, with the DG5- Private Company
respondents better able to appreciate the value of this factor as it is something that they
do not have access to as private companies. 453
With respect to the subgroups of public markets influencers, it appears that the DG-8
Investment Banker subgroup places less importance on liquidity for founding
shareholders than the other subgroups. It is unclear what influences this outcome, but
some may perceive that as relating to the challenges of raising funds for IPOs where a
significant portion of the proceeds are being used to provide liquidity for founders as
opposed to grow the business.

453

Obviously, stock options, or synthetic equivalents thereto, can be used in private companies. However,
they are more significantly complex to manage on an ongoing basis without a public market to provide
liquidity for the sale of shares obtained on exercise of the stock options.
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Finally, it appears that those with limited experience in public markets (i.e., DG23) place
less value on the quicker access to follow on financings available to public companies
(Q21-3). This is a consistent outcome with the outcomes observed with the overlapping
subgroup DG4- TSX respondents. On the whole, the trendline shows that increased
public company exposure increases one's appreciation for the ability to complete followon financings quickly and also to use public stock as currency for acquisitions.
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Correlation in PCD Study Data
8.1- Overview of Approach to Correlation Analysis
It has been stated repeatedly throughout this Dissertation that the PCD Study is not
designed to establish statistical causation relating to the root causes of public company
decline. Nowhere in the literature has anyone yet even suggested a credible research plan
that can reach such an outcome.
Rather, this Dissertation has been consistent in stating that the PCD Study was designed
primarily to determine which of the various factors, posited in the literature as
contributing the phenomenon of public company decline, are most important to the key
business decision-makers and influencers in Canada. Although not determined to be
causal, the downside factors validated in the PCD Study as being the most important to
the key decision-makers and influencers can be inferred to have a material degree of
relevance to the study of public company decline.
The PCD Study was designed to include the following four specific questions testing the
general attitudes and predisposition of the survey respondents towards public capital
markets in Canada and the relative merits of pursuing IPOs versus private equity
alternatives.
Question 16-1: Taking a company public offers more long-term advantages than
disadvantages.
Question 16-2: Companies should consider an IPO to finance growth only when private
equity funding is not readily available.
Question 18-1: How likely are you to recommend the IPO option as ABC's preferred
course of action?
Question 18-2: How likely are you to recommend the IPO option as ABC's preferred
course of action?

The attitudes and predispositions of each respondent on these questions are obviously
influenced by their personal experiences in the business world as well as by the
experiences of their friends, family and business associates. The logical inference
connecting the PCD Study (and, particularly, the hypothetical fact pattern involving the
decision to recommend an IPO alternative or a private equity financing alternative for
ABC used in Q18, Q19, Q20 and Q21) to the real world phenomenon of public company
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decline is as follows: the more favorably disposed a respondent is towards taking a
company public as evidenced by their positions on the four questions above, the more
likely that same respondent will be to consider supporting an IPO option in their
professional or business roles. Likewise, if a respondent exhibits a significant aversion to
the public capital markets in the PCD Study, they are more likely to recommend avoiding
an IPO and pursuing private equity alternatives in their professional or business roles.
In this final section of analysis of the PCD Study results, the positive and negative
correlations between each of the four core questions and the remainder of the Likert Scale
questions will be assessed. A strong positive or negative correlation does not determine
that a causal relationship exists between the two factors. It simply defines a significant
linkage between the factors. Correlations do not take into account the impact of other
dependent and independent factors on the relationship. A strong correlation between two
items can exist without a causal relationship, but a causal relationship cannot exist
without some degree of correlation. As such, identifying the most statistically significant
positive and negative correlation relationships in the PCD Study data is an important
starting point for any further research into causality in the future.
Finally, for the readers without significant statistics background, two statistics will be
reported with respect to the correlation analysis. The first statistic is the P-value, which
once again is the calculated probability of concluding that there is no relationship
between two variables when a relationship does, in fact, exist. Related to the P-value is
the confidence level, which is met if the P-value is less than alpha (i.e., the probability of
making a Type 1 error). As with all the other statistical tests used previously in this
Dissertation, the lower the p-value, the higher the level of confidence that a correlation
exists. The second statistic is the correlation coefficient, or the size of the correlation
effect observed. Spearman rank correlation coefficients (for which the symbol rs is used
interchangeably in this Dissertation) can range from 1 (representing perfect positive
correlation) to -1 (representing perfect negative correlation). A correlation coefficient of
0 evidences that there is no effect whatsoever. The further away a correlation coefficient
is from 0, the larger the size of the effect observed.
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In order to focus on the most important elements, generally only those relationships that
are most significant (i.e., generate the lowest p-values and highest correlation
coefficients) will be highlighted in this portion of the analysis.
Second, the focus of the correlation analysis will be on the relationships between the four
general predisposition questions (Q16-1, Q16-2, Q18-1 and Q18-2) on the one hand and:
(i) the other propositions stated in Question 16; (ii) the 31 downside factors associated
with being public in Question 20; and (iii) the 14 upside factors associated with being
public in Question 21.
Most of the analysis in this section was calculated based on the PCD Study data for all
respondents together and not broken down by the 25 demographic subgroups. It was
considered whether there is additional value in discussing the degree to which the
specific subgroup perceptions of DG-4 TSX respondents and DG5- Private Company
respondents differ from each other, and from the DG3- Group II public markets
influencers, leading to different correlation statistics for each group. Correlations
statistics based on the specific responses of each of these three key subgroups have been
assessed and compared to the correlations produced for DG1- All Respondents.
Ultimately, this comparison demonstrated that there is little value in complicating the
analysis here by reporting the correlation coefficients broken down according to the four
subgroups. First, the correlation statistics were very similar irrespective of which of the
four demographic subgroups are considered. Second, sample size has a greater impact on
P-values for the Spearman Rank Correlation Test, so it is more difficult to validate the
existence of correlations at the 99% confidence level for the smaller subgroups
(specifically DG5- Private Company) than it is for DG1- All Respondents. The value of
reporting similar statistics at less significant P-values seems dubious, so the decision was
made to focus the bulk of the correlation analysis at the all-inclusive level of DG-1 All
Respondents.

8.2- Spearman Rank Correlation as Internal Validity Check and
as Between the General Disposition Questions
As discussed in the Question 18 analysis earlier, the Spearman Rank Correlation Test can

365

be used to run an internal validity check on PCD Study Responses. There are certain
questions which by their nature should demonstrate very strong positive or negative
correlations if the respondents are answering consistently throughout the PCD Study.
Running a check on these particular questions validates that the respondents are indeed
answering with an appropriate degree of consistency (i.e., they are thinking through the
questions and not answering randomly) as well as validating that compilation error has
not occurred during the extensive data manipulation processes occurring between the
situs of the original data on the Qualtrics online survey platform and the final Spearman
Rank Correlation spreadsheets compiled to support this element of the analysis.
Since multiple imports, exports and data manipulations occur between the source
locations and the final output of these tables, running the internal validity checks on the
questions where the anticipated correlations are obvious serves a valuable check function.
As discussed previously in the Question 18 analysis section, it is an obviosity that there
should be a very low P-value and a very high negative correlation coefficient between
Q18-1 and Q18-2, even for the smaller subgroups. Indeed, the following table
demonstrates that the P-values and correlation coefficients do indeed meet these
expectations, passing the internal validation tests for each subgroup.
Table 25- Internal PCD Study Validity Check- Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients and P-values

DG1 All Respondents
Q18_2
Q18_1-P
4.23493E-45
-0.665467422
Q18_1-RS

DG4 -TSX
Q18_1-P
Q18_1-RS

Q18_2
9.22E-17
-0.73894767

DG3 -Group II
Q18_1-P
Q18_1-RS

DG5-Private Company
Q18_1-P
Q18_1-RS

Q18_2
3.43824E-07
-0.57579224

Q18_2
1.802E-22
-0.637276635

Looking next at the relationships between the four core questions testing general
disposition toward the public markets, it is clear that the PCD Study data should disclose
a positive correlation between Q16-1 and Q18-1, and a negative correlation between
Q16-1 and Q18-2. This inference is based on the logic that, the higher the level of
support for the proposition tested in Q16-1 (i.e., taking a company public offers more
long-term advantages than disadvantages), the more likely the same respondent will be to
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recommend the IPO option in Q18-1 and the less likely to recommend the private equity
alternative in Q18-2. It is also anticipated that a negative correlation between Q16-2 and
Q18-1 should be observed along with an accompanying positive correlation between
Q16-2 and Q18-2. Again, this inference is based on expectation that the higher the level
of support for the proposition tested in Q16-1 (i.e., taking a company public offers more
long-term advantages than disadvantages), the more likely the same respondent will be to
recommend the IPO option in Q18-1 and less likely to recommend the private equity
alternative in Q18-2. Looking to the Spearman Rank Correlation outputs, we see that
these inferences are indeed reflected in the PCD Study data.
The P-value for the correlation between Q16-1 and Q18-2 is 3.68E-13 with RS=0.380 for
DG1- All Respondents. This is statistically significant beyond 99.99%. A similar
correlation is confirmed for DG3-Group II, DG4-TSX and DG5-Private Company. The
highest RS value for the correlation between Q16-1 and Q18-1 amongst the four
demographic subgroups is RS=0.505 for DG-5 with a P-value of less than 0.001. From
this statistic, we observe that there is a very strong positive relationship between the
belief in the net benefit of taking a company public and the willingness to recommend an
IPO option for senior decision-makers of private companies.
For the correlation between Q16-1 and 18-2 for DG1- All Respondents, the P-value is
less than 0.001 with RS=-0.230. A significant correlation between Q16-1 and Q18-2 is
also confirmed for DG3- Group II respondents (P-value=0.0072, RS =-0.197). The
correlation is still significant, but only for confidence level of 90% for DG4-TSX (Pvalue=0.0585, RS=-0.200).
For DG5- Private Company respondents, the P-values are not sufficiently high to meet
the threshold of statistical significance. A portion of this outcome on DG5- Private
Company is attributable to the smaller sample size; however, the effect size is also lower,
indicating that the underlying correlation is less strong here than for the other subgroups.
This outcome is not unexpected, as DG5- Private Company respondents evidence a
greater aversion to pursuing IPO options than most other demographic subgroups
throughout the PCD Study. Even a belief that the net long-term benefits of being public
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outweigh the costs is insufficient to fully overcome the inherent aversion of this group to
recommending an IPO alternative.
The correlation between Q16-2 and both Q18-1 (negative correlation) and Q18-2
(positive correlation) are also very strong for DG1- All Respondents and DG3-Group II
(P-values below 0.001) and significant (P-values below 0.05) for DG4- TSX and DG5Private Company respondents. This outcome was anticipated because Q16-2 specifically
seeks the opinion of respondents on the preferred outcome in the IPO / private equity
decision, similar to Q18-1 and Q18-2.
In summary, the correlation analyses between the general disposition questions of 16-1,
16-2, 18-1 and 18-2 demonstrate the anticipated correlation relationships at sufficient
levels of statistical strength to serve as general validation of the consistency of responses
of the PCD Study respondents.

8.3- General Observations on Correlations in the PCD Study
It is interesting to make certain general observations on the Spearman Rank correlation
data from the PCD Study when comparing the summaries of the calculations for the four
related general disposition questions to the independent questions. Before looking at the
data, one would expect that Q16-1 and Q18-1 would generally evidence a negative
correlation to most of the public company downside factors in Q20 and a positive
correlation to most of the public company upside factors in Q21. Conversely, one would
anticipate that Q16-2 and Q18-2 would demonstrate the opposite correlative relationship.
When looking at the output data from the Spearman Rank correlation calculations, it is
noted that the 31 potential downside factors in Q20 do indeed evidence a consistent
negative correlation relationship to both Q16-1 and Q18-1, and an accompanying
consistent positive correlation to Q16-2 and Q18-2. 454 Certainly, not all of those

454

The sole outlier in 200 different Spearman Rank correlation calculations is the relationship between
Q16-1 and the downside factor in Q20-18 (financial statement certification) which produces a miniscule
positive correlation coefficient, but a P-value of 0.929, clearly demonstrating that particular calculation
cannot be said to reflect any correlation at all.
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correlations are strong, and few of the P-values associated are sufficient to report those
observations as statistically significant, but it is nevertheless interesting to point out the
consistency of the outputs. The data demonstrates that, the more concerned a respondent
is about the 31 downside factors, the less likely that the same respondent will be willing
to recommend the IPO option as the preferred alternative. The same respondent will be
more likely to support the private equity options, and also more likely to believe that
taking a company public is a net long-term detriment. On the flip-side, the less
concerned that a respondent is about the 31 downside factors in Q20, the more likely the
same respondent is to be willing to recommend the IPO option. The same respondent
will be less likely to recommend the private equity option and the more likely to support
that taking a company public is a net long-term benefit.
As expected, with reference to Q16-1 and Q18-1, the 14 upside factors are positively
correlated to the upside factors in Q21, 455 but the strength is less than what is observed
with respect to the negative correlations relating to Q20. The negative correlation
between the 14 upside factors in Q21 and Q16-2 and Q18-2 is even weaker, and there are
only a couple of items that meet the minimum levels in order to be classified as
statistically significant. However, those specific outcomes are worth noting as they
provide an empirical basis to indicate where marketing efforts to sell the benefits of a
public listing should be focused. The details are discussed later in this correlation
analysis section.
With respect to the propositions in Q16-3 to Q16-7, there are only a couple of correlation
outputs of sufficient strength to be worth noting. Most interesting of these observations
is that Q16-7 (the regulatory overreach statement) does not meet the threshold of
significance for a correlation with Q16-1 (P-value=0.191, RS=-0.069). Q16-7 does,
however, demonstrate a weakly significant negative correlation with Q18-1 (P-value=
0.0151, RS=-0.131), and a stronger positive correlation with Q16-2 (P-value=0.0001,

455

Subject only to a single outlier (Q21-5) relating to going public in order to get liquidity for founding
shareholders.
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RS=0.205) and Q18-2 (P-value>0.001, RS=0.914).
The Spearman Rank correlation statistics on Q16-7 are particularly surprising, and
somewhat ominous for the ability of the ongoing OSC and CSA burden reduction process
to meaningfully impact the health of the public markets. Although we have discussed
previously that there is a material level of support for the regulatory overreach
proposition amongst the PCD Study respondents, the negative correlation between that
proposition and Q16-1 and Q18-1 simply does not appear in the data to the degree one
would have expected.
The observed outcome here is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides a
measure of defense for all of those regulators in Canada who have been blamed by
libertarians and laissez-faire marketeers as being principally responsible for public
company decline. On the other hand, however, it fails to provide much hope that
reversing any perceived regulatory overreach in Canada, through the ongoing burden
reduction process of the CSA and OSC, offers the prospect of pushing senior business
decision-makers in Canada back towards the public markets in significant numbers. 456 As
such, there may be a strong belief that regulatory overreach has occurred in Canada
amongst the PCD Study respondents, but that belief appears to operate independently of
people's aversion to taking companies public in the current environment.

8.4- Identifying the Most Significant Correlations in the PCD
Study
The number of Spearman Rank correlation calculations available from the PCD Study
makes the task of summarizing and analyzing the outcomes almost overwhelming. It is
extremely easy to get too deep into weeds and lose the big picture on how the correlation
data should be presented to the readers to keep the focus on the most important items.
After combing through the data carefully and looking at a multitude of options, the

456

The Spearman Rank data for the DG5- Private Company subgroup data does not indicate that senior
decision-makers of private companies evidence any greater correlation between Q16-7 and the four
disposition questions.
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conclusion was reached that the most important correlations to highlight in this portion of
the analysis are the correlations between the two major questions relating to general
perceptions on the relative merits of the public markets: Q16-1- Degree of support for the
proposition that taking a company public offers net long-term advantages; and Q18-1Likelihood of recommending the IPO option as the preferred alternative in the
hypothetical fact pattern. Ultimately, of the four general disposition questions discussed
above, these two particular items are the most logically connected to the outcome of the
public / private decision-making process.
The following correlation charts exclude correlations amongst the four general
disposition questions previously discussed (Q16-1, Q16-2, Q18-1 and Q18-2) because of
the conceptual overlap between those questions. What is being sought in the following
correlation analysis is identification of the most statistically strong relationships between
the general disposition questions in Q16-1 and Q18-1 and the intuitively independent
propositions in Q16-3 to Q16-7, the potential downside factors associated with the public
markets in Q20-1 to Q20-31 and the upside factors associated with the public markets in
Q21-1 to Q21-14.
The analysis begins with consideration of which factors are correlated most strongly with
Q18-1 (likelihood of recommending the IPO option in the hypothetical as the preferred
option). The following table includes the top 20 strongest correlations on the Spearman
Rank correlation test in descending order of correlation strength. Negative correlations
are displayed on a white background and positive correlations are on a grey background.
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Table 26- Top 20 Spearman Rank Correlations for Q18-1
Q20-Q21 Spearman
Rank
Strength
Order
Ranking
4
9
14
7
3
6
2
10
5
4
20
1
11
13
22
26
30
1
21
23

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q#

Q20_5
Q20_24
Q20_30
Q20_2
Q20_6
Q20_19
Q20_7
Q20_1
Q20_3
Q21_3
Q20_27
Q21_4
Q20_9
Q21_10
Q20_21
Q20_17
Q20_20
Q20_22
Q20_12
Q20_4

Q18-1, DG1
All Respondents
Factor

General management distractions
Redundancy of filing requirements
Management overall public company fatigue
Management effort to complete IPO
Increasing compliance complexity
Inability to focus on core business
Increasing compliance cost
Time to complete IPO
Cost of IPO
Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings
Responding to uniformed shareholders
Ability to use stock for future acquisitions
Increased litigation risk
Enjoy public company challenges
Reputational risk
Business Acquisition Reports
Public disclosure of shares and income
Pressures of meeting quarterly targets
General regulatory overreach
Executive comp disclosure

P-value

5.42E-12
5.03E-11
6.26E-10
1.16E-09
7.9E-09
8.78E-09
1.44E-08
2.29E-08
3.13E-08
1.27E-06
1.83E-06
4.64E-06
1.04E-05
2.37E-05
4.96E-05
7.16E-05
0.000118
0.000125
0.000188
0.000261

RS

-0.368
-0.352
-0.332
-0.327
-0.311
-0.310
-0.306
-0.302
-0.299
0.265
-0.259
0.251
-0.240
0.232
-0.222
-0.217
-0.210
-0.210
-0.204
-0.200

Notably, all of the top 20 factors in the preceding table exhibit a Spearman Rank
correlation coefficient greater than 0.20 and a P-value that is statistically significant at a
level of at least 99.9%. For correlations on 5-Point Likert Scale responses, these all
qualify as strongly significant correlations.
Also, it is apparent that the Q20 downside factors overall are more highly correlated to
Q18-1 than the Q21 upside factors. 17 of the 20 strongest correlations to Q18-1 come
from the list of factors in Q20, and only 3 from Q21. The implication of this observation
is that the strength of negative perceptions is a stronger influence on our ultimate actions
than strength of our positive perceptions.
Completely absent from this list are any of the Q16-3 to Q16-7 propositions,
demonstrating that respondents' dispositions on those specific propositions are not linked
to inclination to recommend the IPO option as are the upside and downside factors. That
is not entirely surprising; the statements in Q16-3 to Q16-7 are propositions summarizing
alternative theories of public company decline.
In interpreting the Spearman Rank correlation data, it is essential that one understands the
difference between the strength of correlation and the overall importance of the factor as
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ranked by the PCD Study respondents. Q20 and Q21 both asked the respondents to rank
which of the upside or downside factors are most important in their decision-making
process in deciding what to recommend. The outcome of those rankings has been
previously discussed in this Dissertation. The highest rankings in terms of overall
importance to the decision-making process likely represent a significant consistency
amongst the respondents in their perceptions.
In the correlation analysis, however, the more significant results are the ones that
evidence the highest linkage between one item and another item. Once again, a high
level of correlation does not imply causality, as other factors may be more responsible for
causing an outcome. Likewise, an item may evidence a high degree of correlation
strength to Q18-1, but may also have ranked as relatively unimportant in the rank order of
Q-20 factors. For example, Q20-27 (responding to uninformed shareholders) rates as
having the 11th strongest correlation overall to Q18-1 amongst the 50 factors tested, but
only ranked as the 20th most important downside factor in the Q20 rank order. This
implies that the significant correlation strength associated with this factor is likely not
indicative of causality.
In the chart in Table 26 above, we observe that nearly all of the top Q20 downside factors
in terms of the strength of their Spearman Rank correlation to Q18-1 also were in the top
10 in rank order of importance in the Q18-1 analysis. 457 Once again, these factors are
drawn from a variety of different categories, demonstrating that the phenomenon of
public company decline is multifactorial, interrelated and highly complex.
The highest proportion of factors that demonstrated both a strong statistical negative

457

The only factor that did not meet this criteria is Q20-30 (management overall public company fatigue).
The fact that this factor ranked in middle of the rank order on perceived importance but demonstrates a
high correlation coefficient to Q18-1 leads one to consider whether the question was not worded
sufficiently clearly in the PCD Study. Did it rank lower than it should have because the respondents did
not connect with some element of the wording, such as the specific use of the word "fatigue" instead of an
alternative like "frustration". This is particularly the case since the other four downside factors falling
within the category of Time / Distraction / Effort of Going and Being Public that are in the top 10 in
correlation strength all ranked in the top 10 in the Q20 importance rank order.

373

correlation to Q18-1 and a high rank order in the Q20 importance rankings relate to the
following categories: the time / distraction associated with being public that prevents
management from focusing on the core business; compliance complexity and
redundancy; and public company costs. As such, the collective evidence indicates that
these are the specific areas with the highest likelihood of being linked to public decline
causation and therefore merit heightened attention in further research efforts.
Turning now to the correlations on Q16-1 (taking a company public offers net long-term
benefits), we see that the strength of the correlations is slightly less here than for Q18-1
generally. However, the data evidences a number of relatively strong correlations
between Q16-1 and the downside factors in Q20, as well as the upside factors in Q21.
There are 13 factors which evidence Spearman Rank correlation P-values supporting a
confidence level of 99.9% and an RS value stronger than 0.20 in reference to Q16-1.
Table 27- Top 20 Spearman Rank Correlations for Q16-1
Q20-Q21 Spearman
Rank
Strength
Order
Ranking
4
4
3
6
2
10
14
9
1
13
10
12
11
5
31
9
7
10
30
14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Q#

Q20_5
Q21_3
Q20_6
Q20_19
Q20_7
Q21_11
Q20_30
Q20_24
Q20_22
Q21_10
Q21_9
Q20_31
Q20_9
Q20_3
Q20_17
Q21_8
Q21_14
Q20_1
Q20_20
Q20_2

16-1, DG1
All Respondents
Factor

P-value

General management distractions
8.52E-08
Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings 1.12E-07
Increasing compliance complexity
4.96E-07
Inability to focus on core business
6.68E-07
Increasing compliance cost
1.74E-06
Enhanced credibility with potential investors
3.51E-06
Management overall public company fatigue
4.88E-06
Redundancy of filing requirements
1.06E-05
Pressures of meeting quarterly targets
4.72E-05
9.46E-05
Enjoy public company challenges
0.000106
Enhanced credibility with suppliers
Lack of surety of access to follow-on financing
0.00011
Increased litigation risk
0.000174
Cost of IPO
0.000263
0.000485
Financial statement certification
Increased public visibility with potential custome 0.000837
Opportunity to grow the business further
0.000897
Time to complete IPO
0.001159
Public disclosure of shares and income
0.001372
Management effort to complete IPO
0.001815

RS

-0.289
0.288
-0.272
-0.269
-0.259
0.253
-0.248
-0.240
-0.221
0.214
0.212
-0.211
-0.205
-0.199
-0.191
0.184
0.183
-0.178
-0.175
-0.171

Notably, the upside factors in Q21 are more prominent in this table than they were with
respect to Q18-1, indicating that there is a stronger linkage between the strength of
perception on the upside factors and the belief that taking a company public represents a
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net long-term advantage. This suggests placing a higher importance on the upside factors
associated with being a public company may be linked to higher overall positivity
towards being a public company, but that the increased positivity is not sufficient as a
motivating factor to increase the likelihood of recommending the IPO as the preferred
option in the PCD Study hypothetical fact pattern.
Turning briefly to the significant correlations for Q16-2 and Q18-2, the PCD Study data
only produces two correlations for each that meet the minimum threshold of evidencing
both a P-value below 0.01 and a correlation coefficient close to 0.20. Both of those
relationships exhibit a negative correlation with the upside factors in Q21, and the two
significant relationships to Q16-2 and Q16-1 are the same upside factors in both cases.
Table 28, Q16-2 & Q18-2 Significant Correlations

DG1
All Respondents
Q#
Q21_3
Q21_4

Q16_2-P-value Q16_2-RS
0.00002
-0.231
0.00011
-0.212

DG1
All Respondents
Column1 Q18_2-P-value Q18_2-RS
Q21_3
0.00012
-0.212
Q21_4
0.00029
-0.199

Moreover, the two upside factors were also the two strongest factors from Q20 in
correlation to Q18-1, and Q21-3 was the strongest factor from Q20 in correlation to Q161. The combination of those results points to these two factors being the two most
important of all the Q20 factors in terms of correlation to the four general disposition
questions.
What is particularly noteworthy is that these two factors have a common focus. Q21-3
(quicker access to capital in follow-on financings) and 21-4 (ability to use stock for future
acquisition) both focus on the unique benefits that accrue to public companies as a result
of being able to use their shares as currency to complete transactions more quickly than is
available from private equity basis. It has been previously discussed that these two
factors also rank first and fourth in the overall rank order of importance on Q20.
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It is interesting to note than neither of these factors is highlighted as a benefit of going
public by the TSX in their summary marketing materials. 458 It may be useful for the
TSX listing staff and other public markets proponents to take note of this particular
outcome of the PCD Study, and begin to highlight the public benefit of having a listed
stock available to use as currency on short turnaround for follow-on financings and
acquisitions. At least the PCD Study demonstrates that belief has a significant correlation
to increased likelihood to consider an IPO transaction.
Returning to the big picture on the correlation analysis for both Q18-1 and Q16-1 to
conclude this part of the analysis, it is apparent that a number of statistically significant
correlations exist. The majority of the strongest correlations are between Q18-1 and the
downside factors in Q20. However, there are also significant correlations to the upside
factors in Q21, particularly when calculated in reference to Q16-1.
What correlation defines in the PCD Study data is only a starting point to consider which
particular items may in fact be causally-linked to other factors. Before any conclusions
can be reached on causality, however, the analysis must continue on to effectively isolate
the potential impact of all other correlated factors. This is beyond the scope of the PCD
Study data and the analysis in this Dissertation and, in fact, the methodology for doing so
on a practical basis has not yet been suggested anywhere in the literature. Yet, where the
factors in the PCD Study data are identified as combining both a high standing in the rank
order analysis, along with a strong correlation to both Q18-1 and Q16-1, this outcome
provides a strong clue that the particular factor should be a priority area in any further
research seeking to take the next steps in establishing statistical causality of the public
company decline phenomenon.

458

TMX Website, "Benefits of Going Public", accessed August 2, 2019, online:< https://www.tsx.com/
listings/listing-with-us/listing-guides.
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Summary of Key Findings and Observations of PCD
Study
9.1- Summary of Rankings of Groups of Factors and Ability to
Address Factors Through Securities Regulatory Reform
In Chapter 1 of this Dissertation, ten different categories of factors posited in the
literature as potential factors contributing to public company decline in Canada were
outlined. The following table reviews the ten categories of factors with reference to what
has been observed in the PCD Study data, the importance of those factors in the go public
/ stay private decision-making process (and therefore relating to the bigger issue of public
company decline) and the ability to address those factors through regulatory reform.
Category of
Factors
Regulatory
Overreach
& Cost of
Ongoing Public
Company
Compliance

Relative Importance of Factors as
Indicated by PCD Study
High Importance
-Q17- Cited by large numbers of
respondents on an unprompted basis in
the text responses Q17.
Q16-7: Evidences an overriding belief
that regulators have unfairly tilted the
capital markets playing field against
reporting issuers, a position particularly
strongly held by Group I senior decisionmakers.
-Q20-7: Increasing compliance costs cited
as 2nd most important factor of downsides
associated with capital markets.
-Q20-6: Increasing regulatory complexity
cited as the 3rd most important factor in
downsides associated with capital
markets.
-Q20-7: Costs of IPO cited as 5th most
important factor of downsides associated
with capital markets.

Ability to Address Factors Through
Securities Regulatory Reform
High
This is the category of factors that
links directly to increased securities
regulation, so therefore is the category
of factors that can be most directly
addressed by securities reform.
Requires a strong mandate to the
securities regulators from government
empowering the securities regulators
to implement unpopular reforms,
along with potential refinement of the
traditional regulatory reform
methodology. However, such a
mandate also raises by necessity
issues associated with the
independence of the securities
regulators.
Cautionary Note- Current regulatory
consultation process relying on
voluntary responses to requests for
comments is wholly inadequate in
securing sufficient representation
from the critical population of senior
business decision-makers in Canada.
This population is also the group that
supports the Regulatory Overreach
proposition most strongly in Canada.
As such, securities regulators in
Canadas should consider modifying
their current consultation processes to
remedy this defect.
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Category of
Factors
Private Capital
Proliferation

Relative Importance of Factors as
Indicated by PCD Study
High Importance
-Q17: Cited by large numbers of
respondents.
-Q16-4 & Q16-6: Strong support for the
proposition that easier access to private
capital is widely recognized as being
important factor in public company
decline.

Ability to Address Factors Through
Securities Regulatory Reform
Low
-Private capital proliferation
represents a systemic change in the
markets over a period of time.
Restricting access by placing
regulatory impediments in the way of
private capital would be unpopular
and counter-productive.

General Public
Company
Distraction
Fatigue

High Importance
Q20-5: General management distractions
ranked 4th out of 31 factors.
Q20-19: Inability to focus on core
business ranked 6th out of 31 factors.
Q20-30: Overall public company
management fatigue ranked 14th of 31
factors.
Other related factors ranked lower, but the
above factors demonstrate that the
distraction topic is an important
impediment to IPOs.

Low
This has always been a fundamental
challenge of being a senior executive
of a public company and will always
be thus. However, the increased
availability of private alternatives now
makes this more important because
other choices to IPOs are more
accessible. The only thing that can be
managed is the degree of distraction
by burden reduction.

Litigation Risk

Moderate Importance
Q20-9: Legal risk is cited as the 11th
most important factor of downsides
associated with capital markets. This was
higher than anticipated given the low
number of Canadian securities class
actions. Demonstrates fear of litigation
may be higher than actual litigation risk,
but still ranks as a moderate deterrent to
IPOs.

High
-Historically, Canadian legal system
inherently less plaintiff-friendly than
US system. Securities class-actions
have become a reality in Canada since
regulatory changes were introduced in
2005, but all cases have been settled
prior to judgment since that time.
Legislation preventing class actions
for civil liability on
misrepresentations could be
introduced, but not without serious
opposition of the securities classaction bar and shareholder rights
lobby.

Lack of SME
Analyst
Coverage

Moderate Importance
Q20-10: trading volume concerns ranked
8th of 31 factors; Q20-11 analyst coverage
concerns ranked 16th of 31 factors;
Q20-31: lack of access to follow-on
financings ranked 12th of 31 factors;
Combined, these factors evidence that
liquidity, analyst coverage and resulting
valuations are a moderate deterrent to
IPOs.

Low
-Results from systemic changes in the
public markets ecosphere, particularly
worsening economics for brokerdealers at all sizes. Recent failed U.S.
pilot on tick-sizes demonstrates
challenges of coming up with
effective regulatory policy.

Shareholder
Short-Termism

Moderate Importance
Q17: Short-termism issues brought up
more frequently than anticipated.

Low
The underlying shift in attention span,
day-trading and institutional trading
make the move to short-termism
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Category of
Factors

Relative Importance of Factors as
Indicated by PCD Study
Q20-15: Shareholder short-termism
ranked 15th in list of 31 factors.
Q20-25: Short-sellers ranked 25th of 31
factors.

Ability to Address Factors Through
Securities Regulatory Reform
systemic and unfixable without
serious intervention (i.e., such as
providing tax breaks on capital gains
for stocks held over a certain length or
providing enhanced voting rights for
long-term shareholders such as
implemented in France in 2014 under
the Florange Act, which doubles
voting rights after a two-year hold
period).

Fundamental
Economic
Change
Hypothesis

Moderate Importance
Q16-5: evidenced a moderate level of
support (mean=3.27) for the summary of
the fundamental economic change
hypothesis

Quarterly
Target
Perseveration

High Importance
Q20-22: Pressure of meeting analyst
targets ranked 1st of list of 31 factors.

Low
Reflects a systemic change with no
obvious regulatory fixes. Can only be
addressed by making IPOs more
economically attractive compared to
trade sales.
Moderate
The pressures of quarterly analyst
targets can be addressed somewhat by
simply moving to semi-annual
reporting. However, the tension
between managing for long term
growth vs. meeting targets still
remains.

Public
Disclosure
Disadvantage

Low to Moderate Importance
Q16-3: Proposition not highly supported
by respondents (mean=2.58)
Q20-16: Competitive disclosure ranked
13th of 31 factors, but was more important
to SME’s and private company decisionmakers.
Q20-4: Executive compensation
disclosure ranked 23rd out of 31 factors.
Q20-8: Insider reporting requirements
ranked 28th of out 31 factors.
Q20-20: Disclosure of shareholdings and
income from trading ranked 30th out of 31
factors.
Q20-21: Reputational risk ranked 21st out
of 31 factors.

Moderate
Lessening the requirements for
disclosure and allowing public
companies to keep more secrets in
order to better compete in the markets
is conceptually simple, but practically
very difficult. Would face stiff
opposition from shareholder rights
lobby. Would also be a practical
impossibility unless these changes
were coordinated with similar U.S.
initiatives due to the large number of
interlistings.

9.2- Recurrent Themes Observed in the PCD Study Data
Strong Overall Negative Bias Towards the Public Markets Exists in
Canada
Overall, there is a strong negative bias towards the public markets in Canada amongst the
PCD Study survey participants. The responses to Q16-1, Q16-2, Q18-1 and Q18-2
collectively demonstrate that the number of senior business decision-makers and public
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company influencers who believe that taking a company public is normally in the best
interests of the organization is significantly smaller than the number of individuals who
believe that remaining private is generally a preferable alternative. As such, there are
likely to be more negative opinions expressed than positive opinions around the
boardroom table during the discussion process leading up to a potential IPO.
In order for the pro-IPO position to ultimately win the day, the IPO supporters need to be
strong advocates arguing on behalf of the merits of pursuing an IPO in order to offset the
more numerous voices that are likely to be expressed opposing the IPO alternative. With
the PCD Study demonstrating that the number of individuals who strongly support IPOs
is very small, 459 the likelihood of developing a senior management team consensus in
favour of an IPO is very low.
Multifactorial Complexity of the Phenomenon of Public Company
Decline
There is no single factor, or even category of factors, that dominates the PCD Study and
stands above all others in terms of importance to senior decision-makers in the IPO / stay
private decision-making process.
However, there are certainly different tiers of factor categories, with the top tier in terms
of importance comprised of: regulation and reporting challenges (complexity,
redundancy, regulatory overreach); excessive public company costs resulting from the
regulation and reporting challenges; and increased access to private capital (and the
resulting increase in private company valuations and improved investment terms due to
competition amongst private investors for good deals).
The second tier of factors in importance include: liquidity and public valuation concerns;
public markets short-termism; and the additional management time and effort required to
manage public companies.

459

The percentage of respondents strongly supporting the merits of IPOs on the four general disposition
questions in Q16-1, Q16-2, Q18-1 and Q18-2 of the PCD Study averages less than 5%.
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The third tier of factors in importance include: concerns over the ability to access capital
in the public markets, competitive disclosure disadvantages for public companies,
increased legal risk in the public markets, reputational risks associated with the public
markets, systemic market shift towards larger acquiring companies offering quick exits at
the pre-IPO stage and resource-sector specific challenges.
Beyond the third tier are a number of other categories of factors which retain some
degree of importance in the IPO / stay private decision-making process, but are
significantly below the categories of factors covered in the first three tiers.
On the whole, the PCD Study clearly demonstrates that the phenomenon of public
company decline is, without question, multifactorial in nature, interrelated and highly
complex. There is no single factor, or group of factors, that can be singled out as a target
for reform offering a realistic hope that addressing the factor will remediate the malaise
in the Canadian IPO market.
Any regulatory reform attempt that offers a reasonable prospect of actually reversing
public company decline must consider the wide breadth of factors that all have a
meaningful impact on the go public / stay private decision. Such a broad regulatory
reform effort must necessarily engage the federal and provincial governments working in
concert with the securities regulators and using novel inducements to realign the
fundamental economic calculation that has shifted to favour private financing
alternatives.
The Opinions of Senior Business Decision-Makers Vary Materially in
Key Areas from the Opinions of Public Markets Influencers
The PCD Study data repeatedly evidences important topics in which the opinions of
senior business decision-makers in Canada vary materially from the opinions of public
markets influencers. The current regulatory consultation process relying on voluntary
responses to requests for comments from the regulators as the key method of securing
public feedback is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. The recent processes have failed to
secure an appropriate level of participation from the key population of senior business
decision-makers in Canada. As such, securities regulators need to modify their current
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consultation processes, being proactive in the recruitment of feedback from the critical
population of senior business decision-makers and directing more time and resources to
securing feedback that appropriately incorporates the various constituencies whose
opinions matter on the initiatives.
The Surprising Prominence of the Factor of Increased Availability of
Private Financing Alternatives
The prominence of the increased availability of private financing alternatives as a factor
rating in the first tier was surprising, due to the limited focus given to this factor in the
literature (up to the last couple of years where only de Fontenay, Ewens and FarreMensas have focused on the topic). Both the open text responses and the quantitative
response questions demonstrate that this issue is one of the most important factors
embedded in the phenomenon of public company decline.
The recent stream of literature that points to an increase in private financing alternatives
as a major factor in the U.S. should receive further attention. However, the tendency of
that stream of literature to discuss the factor of private capital availability to the exclusion
of all others fails to properly account for the complexity and number of factors that are
relevant to the phenomenon.
Increased Public Markets Experience Correlates to Improved
Dispositions Toward the Net Benefits of the Public Markets
Respondents with a higher level of exposure to public companies in their careers are
more favorably disposed to view the public markets in a positive light across all
questions.
Increased Public Markets Experience Correlates to an Increased
Perception that Regulatory Overreach has Occurred
Even though increased public markets experience correlates with an overall improved
perception of the public markets in terms of the net benefits offered by being public, it
also correlates positively with an increased belief that securities regulators in Canada
have overreached and tilted the capital markets playing field too far in favour of investor
protection and against public company interests. Since this is the subgroup that has the
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greatest direct experience dealing with the Canadian regulatory landscape, this outcome
should be especially pertinent for Canadian securities regulators.
SME’s Are More Negative on the Canadian Public Markets than
Larger Companies
Respondents who are decision-makers of SME's are more negatively disposed with
respect to public markets than decision-makers of the larger non-SME's. This supports
the thread in the literature that SME’s bear a disproportionate regulatory burden without
the financial depth to offset the regulatory costs. As such, expanding the streamlined
reporting regulations in Canada beyond venture issuers to TSX SME’s should be a
priority item in the regulatory reform agenda.
Auditors / Accountants are More Negative on Public Markets than
Other Public Market Influencers
Surprisingly, the DG7- Auditors subgroup proved to be the group of Public Markets
Influencers that were the most negative of the subgroups of public markets influencers on
the public capital markets. The accountants and auditors anecdotally expressed a
particularly high level of dissatisfaction with recent pronouncements of the Canadian
Accounting Standards Board. They also repeatedly expressed the sentiment that the legal
and professional risk associated with public company audits is no longer worth the
economic reward. Public company audits are being provided as a service to long-term
public company clients, but several accounting firms indicated that they are not focusing
on recruiting new public company audit clients because of the professional risks
associated with those files.
Management Distractions / Time Commitment Associated with Going
Public and Being Public are a Major Concern
All four of the downside risk factors tested in Q20 relating to management distractions
and the time required to manage a public company ranked in the top 10 out of the 31
factors. Clearly, the hassles and distractions of going public, and managing a public
company, are a significant impediment to attracting more companies to the public
markets.
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The Overall Trend of Public Company Decline in Canada Shows
No Signs of Abating
All of the data collected in the PCD Study points to continued public decline in the future
absent meaningful reform that goes beyond the scope of public company burden
reduction initiated by the securities commissions. There is currently no momentum
whatsoever towards future IPOs, as evidenced by the complete void of TSX-eligible
private companies from the PCD Study indicating that they are working towards an IPO
alternative in Canada. Although there is extensive literature demonstrating that IPO
volumes have been historically cyclical, this lack of momentum (excluding blockchain
and cannabis) has lasted for too long to reasonably believe that we are simply
experiencing any type of cyclical downturn.
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Implications of PCD Study for Regulatory
Reform Initiatives
One of the fundamental questions for consideration at the end of the PCD Study analysis
is the following: What are the implications of the PCD Study in terms of the ability of
regulatory reform initiatives to meaningfully impact the phenomenon of public company
decline in Canada? In other words, based on the empirical evidence gathered from the
PCD Study, is it reasonable to expect that regulatory reform alone will be able to
significantly stem the tide of public company decline?
The quick answer to these questions is that the PCD Study data demonstrates that there
are a multitude of different factors that can be inferred as being meaningfully connected
to the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada. Some of these factors can
intuitively be addressed through securities regulatory reform and streamlining initiatives,
while others cannot. The number and importance of factors considered in the PCD Study
that cannot obviously be addressed through securities regulatory reform are several,
leading to the conclusion that securities regulatory reform alone cannot be realistically
relied on to stem the tide of further reduction in the number of Operating Companies
listed on Canadian stock exchanges.
However, the PCD Study Data also evidences that the contributing factors that can be
addressed through securities regulatory reform are also numerous and of significant
importance to the phenomenon of public company decline. As such, securities regulatory
reform initiatives focused on streamlining processes and reducing the overall reporting
burdens on public companies need to be elevated to an even higher priority in provincial
securities commissions in Canada, and the securities commissions need to be empowered
by clear governmental mandates to undertake aggressive reforms, even if those reforms
are unpopular with certain constituencies who can be relied on to oppose any meaningful
changes that favour reporting issuers. However, the securities commission reform
imperative should only be one prong of the intervention initiative; the federal and
provincial governments need to simultaneously launch significant interventions that
fundamentally improve the relative attractiveness of accessing the public markets in
Canada. In doing so, the federal and provincial governments should consider accessing
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the most powerful tools that only they possess, namely the power of the public purse
through tax policy.
This Dissertation has sought to collect meaningful empirical data as to the perceptions of
senior business decision makers and key public markets influencers in Canada on a host
of potential factors posited in the literature as potentially contributing to public company
decline. Analysis of the PCD Study data demonstrates that there is overriding perception,
across all the demographics groups tracked in the PCD Study, that securities regulators
have been too aggressive in bringing in regulatory reforms that have complicated and
increased the expense associated with ongoing regulatory compliance for public
companies. This belief in regulatory overreach is particularly high amongst the critical
subgroups of DG4- TSX decision-makers, DG5- Private Company decision-makers and
DG10- SME decision-makers.
Given the general negativity towards the public markets, every reasonable action that can
be undertaken to improve perception of the public markets should be pursued as a priority
as quickly as possible. Streamlining securities regulation and reducing the burden for
public companies are certainly worthwhile initiatives. This is one obvious area where
overall perceptions towards the public markets can be improved at a limited financial cost
to society. Certainly, investor rights groups will object to every proposal to reduce the
burden of regulatory compliance, but that is inevitable. With respect, the investor rights
groups may not possess sufficient context on the broader challenges of public company
decline to fully appreciate the possible linkages between the positions for which they are
advocating, and the phenomenon of public company decline. Ultimately, continued
public decline is certainly not in the best interests of any constituency, including the
investor rights groups.
The process summarized in the OSC Burden Reduction Report evidences that the OSC, at
least, has begun to undertake some measure of reform designed to alleviate the types of
concerns identified in the PCD Study. However, as previously pointed out, many of the
most aggressive and potentially impactful reform proposals from CP 51-404 have not
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made it forward to the implementation phase as described in the OSC Burden Reduction
Report.
The following is a summary of each the 23 decisions and reform proposals from the OSC
Burden Reduction Report that are relevant to public Operating Companies.
Decision or Recommendation
A-1

A-3
A-4
A-5

Recommend an amendment to the Securities Act to obtain authority to
make exemptive relief orders applicable to multiple market participants
(“blanket orders”) to avoid the costs associated with filing multiple
separate exemptive relief applications.
Adopt and publish service standards that cover more processes, particularly
compliance reviews, and establish a framework for performance
measurement and continuous improvement.
In consultation with stakeholders, review compliance processes to improve
focus on materiality, clarity, consistency, efficiency of interactions with
staff and increased reliance on the principal regulator.
Enhance regulatory impact analysis for rule-making.

A-6

Improve clarity and consistency in drafting OSC rules, policies and
guidance

A-7

Work with the CSA to improve clarity and consistency in drafting CSA
rules, policies and guidance.

A-9

Engage in targeted consultations with market participants on how to better
combine and balance principles-based rules, prescriptive rules and
guidance.
Engage in targeted consultations to further understand and address
stakeholders’ concerns that staff guidance is being applied as rules.

A-10

Redevelop the OSC website format and content, prioritizing the posting of
updated consolidated rules and better access to staff contact information.

A-8

A-12

Evaluate the extent to which improvements to local filing systems can be
made given the scope, resource and timing implications for existing local
project work and SEDAR.
Consider improvements to existing outreach programs (e.g., checklists,
guides, in-person outreach, and channels of delivery).

A-13

Review the terms of engagement with advisory committees to increase
their value as a source of input.

A-14

Evaluate existing service standards for OSC stakeholders and establish a
framework for determination, measurement and continuous improvement.

A-11
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C-1

Develop a process for mining issuers to request confidential staff review of
publicly-filed mining disclosure prior to commencing an offering.

C-2

Develop a process for issuers to request confidential staff review of an
entire prospectus prior to announcing an offering.

C-4

Publish guidance about issues that staff would raise during prospectus
reviews that may impact the structure of an offering or where there may be
questions regarding the interpretation of certain requirements.
Harmonize the requirements for financial statements to be included in a
long form prospectus relating to an issuer’s primary business.

C-5

Review options for extending the filing deadline for exempt distributions,
and engage in public consultation.

C-6

Cease-Trade Orders: Provide clearer information on the OSC website on
an issuer’s CTO status.

C-3

C-7

C-8

Cease- Trade Orders: Where applicable, include additional information,
such as CUSIP numbers or more details regarding individual officers and
directors subject to a CTO, in published orders to better identify which
securities are covered by the CTO.
Harmonize the crowdfunding exemption and publish proposed
amendments for public consultation.

C-12

Amend the rules to reduce the number of instances when financial
statements are required to be filed for significant acquisitions in business
acquisition reports (BARs) and other disclosure.
Amend the disclosure required in the Annual Information Form (AIF) and
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) to avoid duplicative or
unnecessary disclosure.
Develop a comprehensive approach to modernizing delivery requirements
for corporate issuer documents and publish a concept paper for
consultation.
Develop and publish proposals to make it more cost-effective for issuers to
conduct a prospectus offering

C-13

Amend the rules so that at-the-market (ATM) offerings can be conducted
without having to obtain prior exemptive relief

C-9
C-10
C-11

Do these proposals individually and collectively go far enough based on the PCD Study
Data? It has already been stated that some of the most innovative and aggressive reform
proposals in CP 51-404 (ex. biannual reporting of financial statements) have not survived
the cut and made it into the OSC collection of decisions and proposals above. Most of
the proposals above fall into the category of streamlining processes, reducing duplication,
reducing compliance costs and reducing complexity. The PCD Study certainly
demonstrates that each of these major topics has some degree of relevance to the topic of
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public company decline. Each proposal in the list above therefore also individually
represents a positive step.
However, there is little evidence in the PCD Study Data on which to base a realistic hope
that the successful completion and implementation of all of the reforms proposed by the
OSC above will have any significant impact on stemming the tide of public company
decline.
Only one of the specific proposals in the OSC Burden Reduction Survey deals with a
subject matter that was individually of sufficient importance such that it was identified in
the literature and included in the list of 31 downside factors considered in Q20 of the
PCD Study; namely, the requirement to file a Business Acquisition Report. The Business
Acquisition Report topic placed 26th out of the 31 factors in ranking of importance to the
public decision-making process. Several of the other OSC proposals do relate to the
broader topics of public company compliance costs, filing complexity and redundancy of
filing requirements, which collectively rated higher in importance in the PCD Study.
However, none of the individual proposals is sufficiently ambitious, or addresses a big
enough underlying concern, such that any realistic observer would expect that the
implementation of the proposal would have a meaningful impact on overall regulatory
burden, complexity or cost.
Certainly, each proposal in the OSC Burden Reduction Survey addresses a narrow
subject area that is individually worthwhile to pursue. However, all of the proposals
together only represent a change in a small fraction of the overall compliance costs and
disclosure obligations faced by public companies. There are dozens of such individual
elements beyond those topics addressed in the OSC Burden Reduction Survey that are
embedded in the broader topics of regulatory complexity, regulatory redundancy and
compliance costs tested in the PCD Study, and the OSC proposals only deal with a few of
these factors. None of the proposed reforms in the OSC Burden Reduction Survey are
sufficiently big-picture or impactful in scope that would be expected to individually move
the needle on overall compliance costs or complexity. Only time will tell whether the
collective effect of a number of minor reforms has any meaningful impact, but the OSC
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has missed out on the opportunity to support the adoption of more ambitious and farreaching reform proposals at this juncture.
Also apparent from the consultation responses in both CP 51-404 and OSC 11-784 is the
heightened concern with the traditional CSA/OSC processes in which few public
Operating Companies perspectives are represented, compared to the numerous
submissions from public markets influencers and financial markets advocacy groups.
Underlying this concern is the data from the PCD Study demonstrating that the Group I
decision-makers feel materially stronger about regulatory overreach than Group II
participants, but that their views are not sufficiently represented in the totality of the
consultation process.
It has been discussed repeatedly in this Dissertation that the current securities regulatory
reform processes in Canada are wholly inadequate in securing the participation of
representative samples of the specific senior business decision-maker population which is
so critical to the Canadian capital markets landscape. With the evidence clearly
demonstrating that the opinions of the senior business decision-makers in Canada
materially vary from the opinions of public markets influencers on key topics, it is
imperative that regulators modify their consultation processes. This includes dedicating
additional resources to proactively soliciting the opinions of senior decision-makers
during the consultation processes. It should also extend to prioritizing the collection and
analysis of empirical data related to prospective regulatory reforms much earlier in the
process as advocated by legal commentators such as Roberta Romano and Robert Clark,
as discussed in chapter 3 of this Dissertation.
Securities regulators will likely respond by stating that they simply do not have the
budget to devote additional resources to improving the breadth and quality of the data
that they collect by proactively soliciting participation of senior business decision-makers
during the consultation process. However, the obvious rebuttal to this argument is that it
is not a matter of budget, but simply a matter of prioritization of resources. It is clear
from the OSC Burden Reduction Report that significant financial and personnel resources
have been allocated to the overall burden reduction process. Those allocations have not,
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however, prioritized collecting empirical data from decision-makers of Operating
Companies in Canada.
As an example, a single researcher completed the entire enrollment effort for the PCD
Study during a four-month intensive process, with a limited financial budget to support
the enrollment effort. Also, the PCD Study data-gathering effort did not have the
inherent credibility advantage or the database access that would be available to a data
gathering initiative working under the auspices of a provincial securities commission or
the CSA. With approximately 500 full-time employees, it is hard to imagine that the
OSC cannot repurpose individuals to focus on securing responses from a broader group
of market participants on proposed regulatory reform initiatives such that their analysis is
being undertaken with better empirical data and broader participation from senior
business decision makers of both public and private companies.
At a macro level, the PCD Study data evidences that there is a widely-held belief
amongst Canadian business leaders that taking a company public in Canada is a net
disadvantage in the long term. This negative perception plagues the Canadian public
markets at this point in time. In order to stem the tide of further public company decline,
it is clear that immediate and aggressive regulatory reform is needed to combat the
overall negative perception towards the Canadian public markets evidenced in the PCD
Study, focusing on improving both the perception and the reality of the public company
experience in Canada.
It is submitted that there are many tools within the reach of Canadian securities regulators
from a regulatory reform perspective that would significantly improve the overall public
perception towards the capital markets. Many of the innovative and ambitious ideas,
offering the prospect of material burden reduction, were included in the original 33
suggestions put forth for consideration by the CSA in CP 51-404. However, the most
ambitious and promising ideas were abandoned in the follow-on CSA 51-353 instrument
and the OSC Burden Reduction Report after pushback from the investor rights lobby in
the consultation process.
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Without question, the watered-down list of proposed reforms ultimately recommended in
CSA 51-353 and the OSC Burden Reduction still include some worthwhile elements.
However, it is submitted that these reform suggestions in CSA 51-353 and the OSC
Burden Reduction Report go nowhere near far enough in addressing foundational issues
currently manifested in the Canadian capital markets. Nor do they provide a sufficiently
strong clear signal to the Canadian business community that the securities regulators are
willing to commit themselves to fostering meaningful public capital markets growth. A
much more robust regulatory response, akin to adopting all of the original burden
reduction ideas floated in CP 51-404, is necessary in order to reverse the general
negativity towards the capital markets displayed in the PCD Study. With respect, CP 51404 demonstrates that current securities regulatory reform initiatives are not failing due to
a lack of ideas on ways to streamline regulation and reduce the overall reporting burden
for public companies; what is lacking in these initiatives is the willingness of the
securities regulatory authority leadership driving the agenda to push forward the most
ambitious, and controversial, ideas in the face of opposition from the shareholder rights
lobby.
The PCD Study, as a whole, demonstrates that the phenomenon of public company
decline is unquestionably multi-factorial in nature, interrelated and extremely complex.
Considering the specific nature of the factors that the PCD Study indicates are significant
contributing factors to public company decline, it appears highly unlikely that any
package of aggressive regulatory reforms will be sufficient, in and of themselves, to stem
further erosion in the number of Operating Companies listed in Canada.
Yet, it is equally clear from the PCD Study Data that the factors of regulatory overreach
and increasing regulatory compliance cost are important negative factors in the minds of
key public markets decision-makers and influencers in the Canadian market. As such,
there is no chance of a public markets recovery without an aggressive package of
regulatory reforms that deliver material burden reduction for Operating Companies. That
package of regulatory reforms should begin with the most aggressive and far-reaching of
the 33 discussion points initially put forth in CP 51-404 as a starting point, and then
continue building on those initiatives.
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As stated in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter, aggressive intervention of the
provincial securities regulators to reduce the public company burden is an absolutely
essential element to stemming the tide of further public company decline; however, the
PCD Study data indicates that no amount of regulatory reform from securities regulators
can be expected to single-handedly reverse the decline and result in an actual recovery of
the public capital markets in Canada.
Ultimately, the quandary of public company decline in Canada is something that should
not be left to the securities regulators alone to fix if the federal and provincial
governments in Canada accept the position that maintaining robust public capital markets
is an important policy objective. Although the securities regulators may bear some
degree of blame for contributing to the phenomenon through regulatory overreach in the
past number of years, the blame does not extend so far as to support a conclusion that the
regulators are solely, or even primarily, responsible for the occurrence of the
phenomenon. It is clear that the malaise surrounding the IPO market at this point in time
in Canada is the result of multiple contributing factors that have evolved to collectively
conspire against the competitive position of the public capital markets, many of which
operate completely independent of the actions of the provincial securities regulators or
any other governmental bodies. Specifically, the federal and provincial governments
should consider implementing co-ordinated policy initiatives in which the comparative
economic benefits in the private / public calculation are readjusted.
Beyond the critical intervention from the securities regulators to reduce public company
burden, then, what other avenues exist in Canada to regain momentum in the public
markets? If the securities regulators cannot achieve this result through burden reduction
alone, then the inevitable conclusion is that the cause of the public markets must be taken
up by higher levels of government in Canada with additional policy tools at their
disposal. 460

460

How? The answer is beyond the scope of this Dissertation. However, there are certain prospects that are
immediately obvious. One such alternative is the creation of material financial incentives that are directly
either at the Operating Companies or at the public investor level, such as providing benefits similar to flow-
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However, it should also be acknowledged that government intervention also involves
risk, and not every government initiative can be expected to be successful in its realworld implementation. The failure of the SEC pilot program operated by FINRA on the
imposition of artificial tick sizes, discussed earlier in this Dissertation in Chapter 2, is a
prime example of a failed legislative initiative in the U.S. directed at reversing public
company decline. Yet, it should be noted that the entire SEC pilot initiative was based on
the erroneous assumption that the primary driver of public company decline in the U.S.
was the deterioration of the support ecosystem of research and market-makers due to the
decimalization of the trading function.
The U.S. initiative on tick sizes serves as a warning for potential Canadian governmental
interventions. The U.S. initiative failed because it was based on an over-simplified belief
that public company decline was a relatively straight-forward phenomenon. It was also
implemented without any solid empirical research backing the design of the legislative
program. The failure of this program again underlines the importance of undertaking
solid empirical research to inform prospective regulatory intervention before the
implementation of the new programs. Failing to have done so, the U.S. initiative of ticksizes targeted only a single root cause of a phenomenon that the PCD Study has
demonstrated is multi-factorial and extremely complex, with the inevitable result that the
initiative failed to achieve its goals of increasing liquidity for the piloted companies.
While still laudable in that the U.S. government has actually tried something to reverse

through shares for investors who invest directly in IPOs. Another alternative would be providing a 3-5 year
tax horizon after completion of an IPO in which newly-listed public companies are eligible to pay lower
taxes on active business income, possibly determined by the number of full-time Canadian-based
employees that are hired during that period and/or investment in research and development. A third
alternative would be to tax capital gains on public shares at a lower rate than gains on private investments.
Without doubt, if you have access to tax policy as a tool to fix the public company decline problem, the
nature of the incentives that can be identified is extensive. Moreover, the benefits of tax policy changes
can be apportioned between the companies and investors with a focus on job creation and research
investment, thereby aligning public company incentives with other government priorities.
The flow-through tax program in the mining industry is a prime example of a government intervention for
the benefit of business that has had major impact in preserving mining finance as a viable industry in
Canada. Absent the flow-through tax incentives, there is a broad consensus in mining finance that the
junior exploration side of the mining industry in Canada would have atrophied to a much greater extent
during the numerous down-cycles that it has faced over the past three decades.
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the tide of public company decline (including both the tick-size pilot and the JOBS Act),
unlike Canada (where nothing has yet been attempted), it demonstrates the risk of
attempting narrowly-focused interventions in this area.
One way or another, the Canadian federal and provincial governments are going to have
to step up and take a true leadership role in protecting the public markets if they believe
that maintaining robust public markets is of significant value to the economy. This may
entail revising the regulations that dictate the current public consultation methodologies
mandated for the securities commissions, thereby adopting new engagement procedures
specifically designed to bring more voices from the Operating Company constituency to
the table. It should also involve bringing empirical evidence to the analysis much earlier
in the process, preferably before the reforms are enacted.
Perhaps the most ominous of the conclusions to be drawn from the PCD Study is that, if
the governments continue to avoid direct intervention and push the mandate for stemming
public company decline down to the securities commissions alone, it appears inevitable
that the public capital markets will be further reduced to a mere shadow of their historical
position as key drivers of growth in the Canadian economy.
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Indications for Further Research
The following are items that have been identified through the course of the PCD Study as
being issues on which further research and analysis is warranted:
A. Junior Capital Markets Analysis- The PCD Study was limited in scope to public
companies listed on the TSX or private companies eligible for listing on the TSX. The
rationale for this limitation was discussed in the research methodology portion of the
Dissertation as being linked to the unique issues facing junior stock exchange-listed
companies in Canadas. However, it is clear that the public company decline phenomenon
is most severe in the case of SME’s, and that SME senior business decision-makers are
more negatively disposed towards the public markets at a whole. In Canada particularly,
the junior markets have traditionally played a critical role as incubators for companies
that graduate to the TSX and the health of the junior capital markets is clearly a matter of
priority. As such, additional empirical research focusing on senior business decisionmakers of companies listed on the Canadian junior stock exchanges (TSXV and CSE) is
indicated, comparing the perceptions and experiences for the junior companies to the data
gathered in the PCD Study.
B.

Voluntary vs. Forced IPOs- In light of the significant overall negative perception

towards the public markets reported in the PCD Study, it would be valuable to understand
what portion of the IPOs completed in Canada (and in the U.S.) over the past decade have
been undertaken voluntarily by management and controlling shareholders of the
companies compared to those that are forced on the companies due to registration rights
granted to private equity investors. This would provide clarity as to how many, of the
very limited number of IPOs that have been completed, are pursued as being the optimal
strategic option for the company instead of being pursued because of the contractual
liquidity rights previously granted to a shareholder.
C.

Potential Impairment of IPO Capital Sources Due to Passive Fund Flows- This

item deals with a recurring theme that was brought up in live presentations to investment
banks in Canada during the course of the PCD Study; i.e., that the flow of funds from
actively-managed funds to passively-managed funds in Canada serves as a potential
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threat to IPO financing sources in the future. Further analysis is required to determine to
what extent the flow of capital from actively-managed investment funds into passively
managed ETF’s and closed-end funds might constrain the ability of investment banks to
support an increased volume of IPOs. Although the PCD Study has demonstrated that
this issue has not been a historical cause of public company decline thus far, certain
participants in the PCD Study indicated their concern that the issue may prove to be a
bottleneck in the future, if and when the desire of companies to pursue IPOs increases.
The additional research should seek to quantify the degree to which actively-managed
funds retain sufficient liquidity to invest in future IPOs.
D.

Quantifying the Growth of Private Equity in Canada- Perhaps most critical in

understanding the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada, additional research
is indicated in terms of quantifying how much easier and quicker it has become to access
private equity in Canada over the past 25 years. This research should focus on the overall
growth of the private equity financing targeted to Canadian companies, but should also
include a mechanism for determining the ease with which such capital can be accessed.
This should focus on both ease of access, timing to close of private equity transactions
and valuations. Intuitively, increased dry powder should lead to increased competition
for the best private deals, thereby reducing timing and streamlining processes to close
private equity financings.
E.

Pre-Money Valuation Delta Between Public and Private Deals- Further analysis

is required to determine how the average pre-money valuation of transactions in the
private markets has evolved over the past 25 years, specifically compared to evolution of
pre-money valuation in the public markets. Has this gap narrowed to the degree
indicated by many individuals who participated in the PCD Study? Indeed, has the gap
actually become inverted as expressed by some PCD Study participants (i.e., where
private transactions are securing higher valuations than public market valuations?). How
does the actual difference between the private and public valuations in the current market
compare to the minimum premium specified by the respondents in Q19 of the PCD
Study?
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F.

Follow-Up on Question 16-7- Question 16-7 of the PCD Study demonstrated that

increased exposure to the public markets correlates positively with an increased support
for the regulatory overreach hypothesis. This is an important finding in terms of its
ramifications for provincial securities regulators, and therefore additional empirical
research is warranted to determine why increased exposure in the public markets is
correlated to a higher acceptance of regulatory overreach. However, increased familiarity
with public markets also was found to correlate with an overall increased belief in the
value of the public markets for the long-term benefit of companies. The implication of
these findings is that regulatory overreach is a real phenomenon, yet improved education
of senior business decision-makers of private companies offers the prospect of increasing
IPO volumes to at least some degree. Further research focusing on these two particular
findings should seek to validate these two perceptions from the PCD Study, both of
which are important in instructing future strategy to combat further public company
decline.
G.

Replicating the PCD Study in the U.S. and Europe- Consideration should be given

to replicating the PCD Study in the United States and in Europe, comparing the results to
the Canadian data. Important information can be gleaned by comparing how the
Canadian data compares to these other countries, which data would be particularly useful
in determining how to combat public company decline in Canada. The comparative data
would also be instructive in the United States and Europe, as those jurisdictions seek to
craft their own strategies to combat further public company decline. Research
methodology lessons learned from the Canadian study should be instructive in the design
and implementation of the U.S. and European surveys. Ultimately, the goal will be to
determine: what factors are similar in importance between the Canadian, U.S. and
European studies; and what factors are materially different?
H.

Replicate the PCD Study in Countries Not Yet Evidencing Public Company

Decline- Consideration should be given to repeating the PCD Study in key Asian markets
such as Singapore and Hong Kong in order to gain comparative data from capital markets
in regions that have not yet gone through a period of decline. Is future public company
decline in these markets inevitable once they reach a comparative stage of maturity to the
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western markets? Is there something fundamentally different in the public markets in
Asia that would indicate that public company decline is an issue endemic only to the
western developed democracies? Comparing the perceptions of senior business decisionmakers and public markets influencers operating in key Asian markets to the opinions
expressed in the western industrialized democracies should provide some indication as to
whether there is something systemically different between the capital markets systems in
the east and the west that works in favour of the eastern public markets, or is future
capital markets decline in the east an inevitability.
I.

Completion of Ordinal Regression Analysis- Using the data already gathered in

the PCD Study, an ordinal regression analysis should be undertaken to strengthen our
understanding of the correlation data and determine what predictions can be made, with
various degrees of confidence, as to the disposition of respondents on certain factors
based on their answers on other factors.
J.

Further Analysis of Question 21 Data- Upside Factors Associated with Being

Public- The PCD collected data on the upside benefits associated with being public in
Question 21, but detailed analysis of this data and comparison of the study data to
previous studies undertaken in the U.S. and Europe was not prioritized in the Dissertation
analysis. As the data has been collected and is accessible for further analysis, it is an area
meriting further consideration in the format of a follow-on paper.
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Appendix 1Excerpt of Decisions and Recommendations Relevant to
Operating Companies from the OSC Burden Reduction Report
DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IMPACTING ALL ISSUERS
Number

Description

Start

Target Date
(from start)

A-1

Recommend an amendment to the Securities
Act to obtain authority to make exemptive
relief orders applicable to multiple
market participants (“blanket orders”)
to avoid the costs associated with filing
multiple separate exemptive relief
applications

Completed

Completed

Complet Reduced red tape
ed

A-2

Evaluate whether to recommend relocating
various provisions found in the Securities Act
into National Instruments to harmonize the
placement of OSC requirements with those of
other Canadian jurisdictions

Summer
2019

24 months

In
Harmonization
progress

A-3

Adopt and publish service

Summer
2019

12 months

In
Better and more
progress accessible
information

standards that cover more processes,
particularly compliance reviews,

Status

Benefits

More timely and
focused reviews

and establish a framework for performance
measurement and continuous improvement
12 months

In
More timely and
progress focused reviews

A-4

In consultation with stakeholders, review
compliance processes to improve focus on
materiality, clarity, consistency, efficiency of
interactions with staff and increased
reliance on the principal regulator

A-5

Enhance regulatory impact analysis for rulemaking

Summer
2019

12 months

In
More tailored
progress and flexible
regulation

A-6

Improve clarity and consistency in drafting
OSC rules, policies and guidance

Summer
2019

12 months

In
Better and more
progress accessible
information

Summer
2019

415

Number

Description

A-7

Work with the CSA to improve clarity and
consistency in drafting CSA rules, policies and
guidance**

A-8

A-9

Start

Summer
2019

Target Date
(from start)

Status

Benefits

TBD

In
Better and more
progress accessible
information

Summer
Engage in targeted consultations with market
participants on how to better combine and balance
2019
principles-based rules, prescriptive rules and guidance

24 months

In
More tailored
progress and flexible
regulation

Engage in targeted consultations to further
understand and address stakeholders’ concerns
that staff guidance is being applied as rules

12 months

In
More timely and
progress focused reviews

Summer
2019

Better and more
accessible
information
12 months

In
Better and more
progress accessible
information

A-10

Summer
Redevelop the OSC website format and content,
2019
prioritizing the posting of updated consolidated
rules and better access to staff contact information

A-11

Evaluate the extent to which improvements to
local filing systems can be made given the scope,
resource and timing implications for existing
local project work and SEDAR+

Summer
2019

24
months

In
Reduced red tape
progress

A-12

Consider improvements to existing outreach
programs (e.g., checklists, guides, in-person
outreach, and
channels of delivery)

Summer
2019

24
months

In
Better and more
progress accessible
information

A-13

Review the terms of engagement with advisory
committees to increase their value as a source of
input

Summer
2019

24
months

In
Better and more
progress accessible
information

A-14

Evaluate existing service standards for OSC
stakeholders and establish a framework for
determination, measurement and
continuous
improvement

January
2020

24
months

Plannin
g

Better and more
accessible
information

416

Decisions and Recommendations Impacting Companies

Number

Description

Start

Target Date
(from start)

C-1

Develop a process for mining issuers to
request confidential staff review of
publicly-filed mining disclosure prior to
commencing an offering

Completed

C-2

Develop a process for issuers to
request confidential staff review of an
entire prospectus prior to announcing an
offering**

C-3

Status

Benefits

Completed

Completed.
See OSC Staff
Notice 43-706
Pre-filing
Review of
Mining
Technical
Disclosure

More timely and
focused reviews

Summer
2019

12 months

In progress

More timely and
focused reviews

Publish guidance about issues that staff
would raise during prospectus reviews
that may impact the structure of an
offering or where there may be questions
regarding the interpretation of certain
requirements

Fall 2019

12 months

In progress

Better and more
accessible
information

C-4

Harmonize the requirements for
financial statements to be included in a
long form prospectus relating to an
issuer’s primary business**

Fall 2018

24 months

In progress

Harmonization

C-5

Review options for extending the filing
deadline for exempt distributions, and
engage in public consultation **

Summer
2019

24 months

In progress

More tailored
and flexible
regulation

C-6

Cease-Trade Orders: Provide clearer
information on the OSC website on an
issuer’s CTO status

Summer
2019

18 months

In progress

Better and more
accessible
information

C-7

Cease- Trade Orders: Where applicable,
include additional information, such as
CUSIP numbers or more details regarding
individual officers and directors subject

Summer
2019

18 months

In progress

Better and more
accessible
information

to a CTO, in published orders to better
identify which securities are covered by the
CTO

417

Number

C-8

C-9

Description

Harmonize the crowdfunding
exemption and publish proposed
amendments for public consultation**
Amend the rules to reduce the

Start

Target Date
(from start)

Status

Benefits

24 months

In progress

Harmonization

Fall 2018

24 months

In progress.
Proposed
amendments
were
published in
August 2019

Reduced red
tape

Fall 2018

24 months

In progress

Reduced red
tape

Fall 2018

number of instances when financial
statements are required to be
filed for significant acquisitions in business
acquisition reports (BARs) and other
disclosure**
C-10

Amend the disclosure required in the
Annual Information Form (AIF) and
Management Discussion and
Analysis (MD&A) to avoid duplicative or
unnecessary disclosure**

C-11

Develop a comprehensive approach to
modernizing delivery requirements for
corporate issuer documents and publish a
concept paper for consultation**

Fall 2018

18 months

In progress

Reduced red
tape

C-12

Develop and publish proposals to make it
more cost-effective for issuers to conduct a
prospectus offering**

Fall 2018

24 months

In progress

More tailored
and flexible
regulation

C-13

Amend the rules so that at-the-market
(ATM) offerings can be conducted without
having to obtain prior exemptive relief **

Fall 2018

24 months

In progress.
Proposed
amendments
were
published in
May 2019

Reduced red
tape
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Appendix 2Excerpt of 33 Consultation Questions in CP 51-404
General consultation questions
1. Of the potential options identified in Part 2:
(a) Which meaningfully reduce the regulatory burden on reporting issuers while
preserving investor protection?
(b) Which should be prioritized and why?
2. Which of the issues identified in Part 2 could be addressed in the short-term or
medium-term?
3. Are there any other options that are not identified in Part 2 which may offer
opportunities to
meaningfully reduce the regulatory burden on reporting issuers or others while preserving
investor protection? If so, please explain the nature and extent of the issues in detail and
whether these options should constitute a short-term or medium-term priority for the
CSA. [p.4]
Consultation questions
4. Would a size-based distinction between categories of reporting issuers be preferable to
the current distinction based on exchange listing? Why or why not?
5. If we were to adopt a size-based distinction:
(a) What metric or criteria should be used and why? What threshold would be
appropriate and why?
(b) What measures could be used to prevent reporting issuers from being required
to report under different regimes from year to year?
(c) What measures could be used to ensure that there is sufficient transparency to
investors regarding the disclosure regime to which the reporting issuer is subject?
(d) How could we assist investors in understanding the distinction made and the
requirements applicable to each category of reporting issuer?
6. If the current distinction for venture issuers is maintained, should we extend certain
less onerous venture issuer regulatory requirements to non-venture issuers? Which ones
and why? [p.5]
Consultation questions
7. Is it appropriate to extend the eligibility criteria for the provision of two years of
financial statements to issuers that intend to become non-venture issuers? If so:
(a) How would this amendment assist in efficient capital raising in the public
market?
(b) How would having less historical financial information on non-venture issuers
impact
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investors?
(c) Should we consider a threshold, such as pre-IPO revenues, in determining
whether two years of financial statements are required? Why or why not?
(d) If a threshold is appropriate, what threshold should be applied to determine
whether two years of financial statements are required, and why?
8. How important is the ability to perform a three-year trend analysis? [p.6]
Consultation questions
9. Should auditor review of interim financial statements continue to be required in a
prospectus? Why or why not?
10. Should other prospectus disclosure requirements be removed or modified, and why?
[p.7]”
Consultation questions
11. Is the current short form prospectus system achieving the appropriate balance (i.e.,
between facilitating efficient capital raising for reporting issuers and investor protection)?
If not, please identify potential short form prospectus disclosure requirements which
could be eliminated or modified in order to reduce regulatory burden on reporting issuers,
without impacting investor protection, including providing specific reasons why such
requirements are not necessary.
12. Should we extend the availability of the short form prospectus offering system to
more reporting issuers? If so, please explain for which issuers, and why this would be
appropriate.” [p.7]
Consultation questions
“13. Are conditions right to propose a type of alternative prospectus model for reporting
issuers? If an alternative prospectus model is utilized for reporting issuers:
(a) What should the key features and disclosure requirements of any proposed
alternative prospectus model be?
(b) What types of investor protections should be included under such a model (for
example, rights of rescission)?
(c) Should an alternative offering model be made available to all reporting
issuers? If not, what should the eligibility criteria be?” [p.9]
Consultation questions
14. What rule amendments or other measures could we adopt to further streamline the
process for ATM offerings by reporting issuers? Are there any current limitations or
requirements imposed on ATM offerings which we could modify or eliminate without
compromising investor protection or the integrity of the capital markets?
15. Which elements of the exemptive relief granted for ATM offerings should be codified
in securities legislation to further facilitate such offerings? [p.10
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Consultation questions
16. Are there rule amendments and/or processes we could adopt to further streamline the
process for cross-border prospectus offerings, without compromising investor protection,
by: (i) Canadian issuers and (ii) foreign issuers?
17. As noted in Appendix B, in 2013 a number of amendments were made to liberalize
the premarketing/ marketing regime in Canada. Are there rule amendments and/or
processes we could adopt to further liberalize the prospectus pre-marketing and
marketing regime in Canada, without compromising investor protection, for: (i) existing
reporting issuers and (ii) issuers planning an IPO, and if so in what way? [p.10]
Consultation questions
18. Does the BAR disclosure, in particular the financial statements of the business
acquired and the pro forma financial statements, provide relevant and timely information
for an investor to make an investment decision? In what situations does the BAR not
provide relevant and timely information?
19. Are there certain BAR requirements that are more onerous or problematic than
others?
20. If the BAR provides relevant and timely information to investors:
(a) Are each of the current significance tests required to ensure that significant
acquisitions are
captured by the BAR requirements?
(b) To what level could the significance thresholds be increased for non-venture
issuers while still providing an investor with sufficient information with which to
make an investment decision?
(c) What alternative tests would be most relevant for a particular industry and
why?
(d) Do you think that the disclosure requirements for a significant acquisition
under Item 14.2 of 51-102F5 (information circular) should be modified to align
with those required in a BAR, instead of prospectus-level disclosure? Why or why
not? [p.11]
Consultation questions
21. Are there disclosure requirements for annual and interim filing documents that are
overly burdensome for reporting issuers to prepare? Would the removal of these
requirements deprive investors of any relevant information required to make an
investment decision? Why or why not?
22. Are there disclosure requirements for which we could provide more guidance or
clarity? For example, we could clarify that discussion of only significant trends and risks
is required, or that the filing of immaterial amendments to material contracts is not
required under NI 51-102. [p.12]
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Consultation questions
23. What are the benefits of quarterly reporting for reporting issuers? What are the
potential problems, concerns or burdens associated with quarterly reporting?
24. Should semi-annual reporting be an option provided to reporting issuers and if so
under what
circumstances? Should this option be limited to smaller reporting issuers?
25. Would semi-annual reporting provide sufficiently frequent disclosure to investors and
analysts who may prefer to receive more timely information?
26. Similar to venture issuers, should non-venture issuers have the option to replace
interim MD&A with quarterly highlights? [p.13]
Consultation questions
27. Would modifying any of the above areas in the MD&A form requirements result in a
loss of significant information to an investor? Why or why not?
28. Are there other areas where the MD&A form requirements overlap with existing
IFRS requirements?
29. Should we consolidate the MD&A, AIF (if applicable) and financial statements into
one document? Why or why not?
30. Are there other areas of overlap in continuous disclosure rules? Please indicate how
we could remove overlap while ensuring that disclosure is complete, relevant, clear, and
understandable for investors. [p.14]
31. Are there any aspects of the guidance provided in NP 11-201 which are unclear or
misaligned with market practice?
32. The following consultation questions pertain to the “notice-and-access” model under
securities legislation and consideration of potential changes to this model:
(a) Since the adoption of the “notice-and-access” amendments, what aspects of
delivering paper copies represent a significant burden for issuers, if any? Are
there a significant number of investors that continue to prefer paper delivery of
proxy materials, financial statements and MD&A?
(b) Do you think it is appropriate for a reporting issuer to satisfy the delivery
requirements under securities legislation by making proxy materials, financial
statements and MD&A publicly available electronically without prior notice or
consent and only deliver paper copies of these documents if an investor
specifically requests paper delivery? If so, for which of the documents required to
be delivered to beneficial owners should this option be made available?
(c) Would changes to the “notice-and-access” model as described in question (b)
above pose a significant risk of undermining the protection of investors under
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securities legislation, even though an investor may request to receive paper
copies?
(d) Are there other rule amendments that could be made in NI 54-101 or NI 51102 to improve the current “notice-and-access” options available for reporting
issuers?
33. Are there other ways electronic delivery of documents could be further enhanced
through securities legislation? [p.15]
2.1- Extending the application of streamlined rules to smaller reporting issuers
Under Canadian securities legislation, venture issuers are permitted to comply with
continuous disclosure requirements that are generally less onerous than those imposed on
other reporting issuers. For example, venture issuers have:
• longer filing deadlines for annual and interim financial statements
• a higher threshold for significant acquisition reporting
• no requirement to file an annual information form (AIF)
• ability to file a quarterly highlights document to meet interim management’s
discussion and
analysis (MD&A) requirements
• different corporate governance requirements
• reduced certification requirements
We currently distinguish venture issuers from non-venture issuers based on their
exchange listings. A reporting issuer generally qualifies as a venture issuer as long as it
does not have securities listed or quoted on what we consider senior securities exchanges
or most foreign exchanges (a Non-Venture Exchange). Some of the reasons for the
current delineation between venture and non-venture issuers were stability and
transparency.” [p.4]

423

Appendix 3Letter of Information for Main Study

424

425

426

427

Appendix 4
Western NMREB Approval Certificate

Date: 7 December 2018
To: Professor Christopher Nicholls
Project ID: 112912
Study Title: Can Regulatory Reform Reverse the Decline of Public Markets in Canada? Assessing the Factors Impacting Decisions
by Corporate Leaders to Avoid Canadian Public Listings
Application Type: NMREB Initial Application
Review Type: Delegated
Full Board Reporting Date: January 11 2019
Date Approval Issued: 07/Dec/2018
REB Approval Expiry Date: 07/Dec/2019

Dear Professor Christopher Nicholls
The Western University Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (NMREB) has reviewed and approved the WREM application form for
the above mentioned study, as of the date noted above. NMREB approval for this study remains valid until the expiry date noted
above, conditional to timely submission and acceptance of NMREB Continuing Ethics Review.
This research study is to be conducted by the investigator noted above. All other required institutional approvals must also be
obtained prior to the conduct of the study.
Documents Approved:
Document Name

Document Type

Document
Date

Document
Version

Conference Table Poster-Main Study

Recruitment Materials 05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Email Recruitment Script- Preliminary Study

Recruitment Materials 16/Nov/2018

2

Email Recruitment Script-Main Study

Recruitment Materials 16/Nov/2018

2

Email Reminder Recruitment Script-Main Study

Recruitment Materials 16/Nov/2018

2

Implied Consent Excerpt from Online Survey

Implied
Consent/Assent

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Letter of Information-Main Study

Written
Consent/Assent

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Letter of Information-Preliminary Study

Written
Consent/Assent

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Online Survey Form

Online Survey

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Paper Survey-Version 1 (Public Company Decision-Makers)

Paper Survey

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

428

Paper Survey-Version 2 (Private Company Decision Makers) Paper Survey

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Paper Survey-Version 3 (Gone-Private Company Decision
Makers)

Paper Survey

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Paper Survey-Version 4 (Public Markets Influencers)

Paper Survey

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Phone Script-Main Study

Recruitment Materials 16/Nov/2018

2

Semi-Structured Intervew Guide

Interview Guide

05/Dec/2018

5 Dec 18

Survey Protocol - Research Plan. Final

Protocol

16/Nov/2018

2

Verbal Recruitment Script-Main Study

Oral Script

16/Nov/2018

2

Screening Question Excerpts

Screening Form/Questionnaire

16/Nov/2018

2

No deviations from, or changes to the protocol should be initiated without prior written approval from the NMREB, except when
necessary to eliminate immediate hazard(s) to study participants or when the change(s) involves only administrative or
logistical aspects of the trial.
The Western University NMREB operates in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement Ethical Conduct for Research
Involving Humans (TCPS2), the Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA, 2004), and the applicable laws and
regulations of Ontario. Members of the NMREB who are named as Investigators in research studies do not participate in
discussions related to, nor vote on such studies when they are presented to the REB. The NMREB is registered with the U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00000941.
Please do not hesitate to contact us
if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Kelly Patterson, Research Ethics Officer on behalf of Dr. Riley Hinson, NMREB Vice-Chair
Note: This correspondence includes an electronic signature (validation and approval via an online system that is
compliant with all regulations).

429

Appendix 5
Online Survey Format- Main Survey
QUESTION 1- Project Title:

Can Regulatory Reform Reverse the Decline of Public Markets in
Canada? Assessing the Factors Impacting Decisions by Corporate Leaders to
Avoid Canadian Public Listings
Principal Investigator: Christopher Nicholls
W. Geoff Beattie Chair in Corporate Law, Western University, Faculty of Law
Email: [redacted]
Phone: [redacted]
Co-Investigator: L. Daniel Wilson, JD, LLM, PhD (Candidate)
Doctoral Graduate Student, Western University, Faculty of Law
Email: [redacted]
Cell Phone: [redacted]
Office: [redacted]
Letter of Information & Consent

Introduction:
You are being invited to participate in this research study concerning the factors
contributing to operating public company decline in Canada because of your experience
and knowledge as either a senior business decision-maker or a public markets
influencer. The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information required for you to
make an informed decision regarding participation in this research.
Purpose of the Study:
The purpose of this study is to address a significant gap in the existing academic
knowledge on the factors contributing to operating public company decline in
Canada. The study will seek to establish which of the various potential factors
suggested as contributing to operating public company decline are indeed the most
significant for business decision-makers in Canada and public markets influencers.
Procedures and Duration:
This study is restricted to individuals who currently live in Canada and work for
Canadian-based businesses. Two different groups of people are eligible to participate in
the study: (i) Senior Business Decision-Makers and (ii) Public Markets Influencers.
Senior Business Decision-Makers include C-suite executives, directors and controlling
shareholders of public companies, private companies that are eligible to pursue an IPO
on the TSX and private companies that have completed a going-private
transaction. Public Markets Influencers in this study include corporate/securities
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lawyers, auditors/accountants, investment bankers, private equity investors and
securities regulators/stock exchange employees.
The first group of questions in the survey confirm your eligibility and ask limited
questions on your vocation to gather information enabling us to properly categorize you
within the various classes of sub-group participants. The second group of questions in
the survey ask how you feel about pursuing public company status and being involved in
a company public company on an ongoing basis.
Potential Risks and Discomforts:
There are no known or anticipated risks or discomforts associated with participating in
this study.
Benefits:
No financial remuneration is being offered for completion of the survey. You may not
directly benefit from participating in this study, but information gathered is expected to
provide benefits to society as a whole in terms of understanding which factors are most
important in the phenomenon of public company decline in Canada and what can be
done from a regulatory reform perspective to combat that decline.
Participation and Withdrawal:
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate, refuse to answer
any questions, or quit the online survey at any time with no effect on you
whatsoever. Participants will be able to withdraw their participation and have their data
removed prior to completion of the survey. After completion of the survey, it is
impractical to remove individual responses. Since no data are being collected to identify
participants, it is impossible to scrub individual data as responses cannot be tracked to
specific individuals.
Confidentiality:
We have designed this study to provide the highest level of confidentiality and
anonymity. No personal identifying personal information beyond the special eligibility
questions contained in the survey will be collected or recorded anywhere in the survey
process.
Your study information will be combined with information from other people taking part in
the study. The researcher will keep all data obtained in the study in a secure and
confidential location for 7 years, at which point it will be confidentially destroyed.
The results of the study will be included and analyzed in the Principal Investigator’s PhD
Dissertation and may be included in follow-on publications or presentations. If the
results are published, no information that you provide that could reasonably be expected
to allow others to realistically make guesses as to your identity will be included in the
publication.
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Representatives of the University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics
Board may require access to your study-related records to monitor the conduct of the
research.
Compensation for Participation:
You will not be compensated for your participation in this study.
Rights of Research Participants:
If you choose not to participate or to leave the study at any time it will have no effect on
you in any way. You do not waive any legal right by consenting to participate.
Who to Contact with Questions:
If you require any further information regarding this research project or your participation
in the study you may contact the Principal Investigator, Christopher Nicholls, Western
University, Faculty of Law, at [redacted] or via email [redacted] or the Co-Investigator, L.
Daniel Wilson at [redacted] or via email at [redacted]. If you have any questions about
your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this study, you may contact The
Office of Human Research Ethics [redacted] or [redacted], email: [redacted]
If you would like to receive a copy of any potential study results, please contact Chris
Nicholls or L. Daniel Wilson at the email addresses shown above.
CONSENT
Completion of this survey is indication of your consent to participate.
If you would like to receive a copy of any potential study results, please contact L. Daniel
Wilson at the email address shown above.
This letter is yours to keep for future reference. Please print it now or contact the
Principal Investigator or Co-Investigator for a copy.
I agree I have read the Letter of Information, have had any all questions answered,
and consent to participate.

O Yes
O No

Skip To: End of Survey If Project Title: Can Regulatory Reform Reverse the Decline of Public
Markets in Canada? Assessing... = No

Page Break
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QUESTION 2- Welcome to the Survey on Factors Influencing the Going Public /

Staying Private Decision in Canadian Business!

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey.
In the past decade the number of operating companies in Canada choosing to access
the public markets has decreased significantly. In fact, the number of operating public
companies listed on the TSX has declined by nearly 1/3 since the start of
2008. Maintaining the health of public markets is an important issue for the Canadian
economy. Obtaining your input as corporate decision-makers and public markets
influencers will be valuable in instructing future policy initiatives.
Your participation in this survey is essential in allowing us to make the proper
analysis and recommendations.
We realize that your time is very valuable and we have kept this survey as streamlined
as possible to minimize the time required to respond.
However, it will take an estimated fifteen minutes to complete this survey in full.
If you get disrupted during the process, you can stop the survey at any time and
complete at a later time. You have the option not to answer any question in the
survey. For questions that are mandatory for validation of survey eligibility, declining to
answer may prevent your survey from being valid for the purposes of analysis. You will
be notified during the course of the survey if this is the case.

Page Break
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QUESTION 3- Target Survey Participants: This survey seeks input from two main
groups of individuals whose opinions and perceptions are critical to study of factors
contributing to the decline of the number of operating public companies in Canada:

Group I- Senior Business Decision-Makers, including:
• C-suite Executives (Executive Chairperson, Chief Executive Office,
President, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer or other senior
officer titles with equivalent decision-making responsibility);
• Corporate Directors; and
• Major Shareholders (shareholders holding at least 20% of the voting equity
of a company)
Group II- Public Markets Influencers, including:
• Corporate and Securities Lawyers
• Accountants and Auditors
• Investment Bankers
• Private Equity Investors
•
Which of the two major categories of individuals listed above (Group I or Group
II) do you fit into? (Note: If you fit into both Group I and Group II, please select the
category that you consider to be your principal occupation.)

O
O
O
O

Group I: Senior Business Decision-Maker
Group II: Public Markets Influencer
None of the Above
I Choose Not to Answer

Skip To: Q14 If Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. Since 2000, the number
of operating... = Group II: Public Markets Influencer
Skip To: Q25 If Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. Since 2000, the number
of operating... = None of the Above
Skip To: Q26 If Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. Since 2000, the number
of operating... = I Choose Not to Answer

Page Break

QUESTION 4- Of the three types of Senior Business Decision-Makers discussed

outline in the previous question, which describes you? (Note: If more than one
applies, select each category that is accurate.)

O C-Suite Executive
O Corporation Director
O Major Shareholder
O None of the above

Skip To: Q25 If Of the three types of Senior Business Decision-Makers discussed outline in the
previous question,... = None of the above
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Page Break

QUESTION 5- You have indicated that you are Senior Decision-Maker. Before going
further, we need to confirm a couple of quick survey eligibility questions.

First, please note that this research study is limited to Senior Decision-Makers who
currently live in Canada and work for Canadian-based companies. A Canadian-based
company is a company with its headquarters in Canada that is not a subsidiary of a
foreign company.
Do you live in Canada and work for a Canadian-based company?

O Yes
O No
O I Choose Not to Answer

Skip To: Q25 If You have indicated that you are Senior Decision-Maker. Before going further, we
need to confirm... = No
Skip To: Q26 If You have indicated that you are Senior Decision-Maker. Before going further, we
need to confirm... = I Choose Not to Answer

Page Break

QUESTION 6- Second, this research study is limited to Senior Decision-Makers

who work with operating companies as defined below. "Operating Company"An operating company is a business that directly produces a product or delivers a
service to customers, or else owns a subsidiary that directly produces a product or
delivers a service to customers. Note: Mutual Funds, ETF's and REITS are not
considered operating companies.
Is your company an Operating Company?

O Yes
O No
O I Choose Not to Answer

Skip To: Q25 If Second, this research study is limited to Senior Decision-Makers who work with
operating companies... = No
Skip To: Q26 If Second, this research study is limited to Senior Decision-Makers who work with
operating companies... = I Choose Not to Answer

Page Break
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QUESTION 7- What is the approximate size of your company based on employee

count and total revenue?

A. Employees (including full-time contract personnel)

O Less than 25
O Between 25 and 50
O Between 50 and 100
O Between 100 and 250
O Between 250 and 500
O More than 500
O I choose not to answer this question

QUESTION 8- B. Total Annual Revenue

O Less than $10 million
O Between $10 million and $25 million
O Between $25 million and $50 million
O Between $50 million and $100 million
O Between $100 million and $250 million
O Between $250 million and $500 million
O Between $500 million and $1 billion
O More than $1 billion
O I choose not to answer this question
Page Break
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QUESTION 9- For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need

to come from one the following three different types of operating Canadian
companies:
• Private companies that have never been public.
• Private companies that were previously listed on the TSX, but have completed a
going-private transaction in the past ten years.
• Public companies currently listed on the TSX.
Which of these categories describes your company?

O Public operating company currently listed on the TSX.
O Private operating company that has never been public.
O Private company previously traded on the TSX which has gone private.
O None of the above.
O I Choose Not to Answer.
Skip To: Q25 If For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need to come from
one the following thre... = None of the above
Skip To: Q11 If For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need to come from
one the following thre... = Private operating company that has never been public.
Skip To: Q13 If For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need to come from
one the following thre... = Private company previously traded on the TSX which has gone private
Skip To: Q26 If For our survey purposes, Senior Business Decision-Makers need to come from
one the following thre... = I Choose Not to Answer

Page Break

QUESTION 10- You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker of
a TSX-listed company. Has your public company considered going private?

O No, we are satisfied remaining as a public company.
O Yes, we have considered going private and decided not to.
O Yes, we have considered going private and no final decision has been made.
O Yes, we plan to go private a future time.
O I choose not to answer this question.
Skip To: Q13 If You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker of a TSXlisted company. Has you...(Yes, we have considered going private and no final decision has been
made.) Is Displayed
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Page Break

QUESTION 11- You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker in
a private operating company.

We would like to confirm one final eligibility criteria for participation in this survey, namely
the size and stage of development of your company. We are looking for Senior
Decision-Makers of private companies that are are of a sufficient size and stage of
development that they would be eligible to pursue a TSX listing if they chose to.
Does your private operating company meet all the criteria in at least one of the
following categories?
Category A- Profitable Companies
• Minimum of $10,000,000 in annual revenue;
• Minimum of $2,000,000 in pre-tax cash flow; and
• Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $10,000,000.
Category B- Technology Companies and R&D Companies Not Yet Profitable
• Company owns proprietary technology that is close to being ready
for commercialization or is already at the commercialization stage;
• Company has at least two years of development history in developing its
technology;
• Company has spent a minimum of $5,000,000 in developing its technology to
date; and
• Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $20,000,000.
Category C- Resource Companies Not Yet Profitable
• Company owns a resource property which is already in production or else has an
independent technical report confirming commerciality;
• Company has spent at least $5,000,0000 on the acquisition and development of
the property; and
• Company has an estimated fair market enterprise value above $20,000,000.
My private operating company meets all of the criteria of at least one category
listed above.

O Yes
O No

O I Choose Not to Answer
Skip To: Q25 If You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker in a private
operating company. ... = No
Skip To: Q26 If You have indicated that you are a Senior Business Decision-Maker in a private
operating company. ... = I Choose Not to Answer
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QUESTION 12- Has your private company considered going public? Select the
answer that best applies:

O No, we have not yet considered going public.
O Yes, we have considered going public and decided not to.
O Yes, we have considered going public and no final decision has been made.
O Yes, we plan to go public.
O I choose not to answer this question
Page Break

QUESTION 13- Which industry category most accurately describes your
company’s main business?

(Note: If more than one applies, select each applicable category.)

O Agricultural
O Chemicals
O Computers & Information Technology
O Construction
O Education
O Energy
O Entertainment
O Food Services
Skip To: Q16 If Q13 Is Displayed

Page Break

O Health Care
O Hospitality
O Manufacturing
O Media
O Mining
O Transport
O Other (Please specify below)
_________________________________
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QUESTION 14- You have indicated that you are a public markets influencer.
Our survey is limited to individuals currently living and working in Canada.
Do you currently live and work in Canada?

O Yes
O No
O Choose Not to Answer
Skip To: Q25 If You have indicated that you are a public markets influencer. Our survey is
limited to individua... = No
Skip To: Q26 If You have indicated that you are a public markets influencer. Our survey is
limited to individua... = I Choose Not to Answer

Page Break

QUESTION 15- Which group of public markets influencer do you fit in?

O Corporate and/or Securities Lawyer
O Accountant and/or Auditor
O Investment Banker
O Private Equity Investor
O I Choose Not to Answer
Skip To: Q26 If Which group of public markets influencer do you fit in? = I Choose Not to Answer

Page Break
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Question 16How do you feel about each of the following statements?
Strongly
Disagree

Taking a company public offers more longterm advantages than disadvantages.
Companies should consider an IPO to finance
growth only when private equity funding is not
readily available.
Technological advancements making public
company information more readily accessible
have made it harder for public companies to
compete with private companies.
Private equity financing to fund company
growth in Canada is significantly easier to
access now than it used to be.
The rapid pace of technological change has
made it more attractive for private companies
to sell out to huge corporations rather than
purse their own IPO.
The decline in IPO volume is primarily
attributable to the increased availability of
private equity as an alternative.
Securities regulators in Canada have been too
aggressive in protecting public shareholder
interests at the expense of public companies.

1

2

Neither
Agree or
Disagree

3

4

Strongly
Agree

5
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QUESTION 17-

The decline in the number of operating public companies listed on the TSX over
the past number of years is significant, and a similar trend has been observed in
the public markets of the U.S., Europe and Australia.
Why do you think fewer senior business decision-makers are choosing to take
their companies public?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Page Break

QUESTION 18Imagine that you are the key decision-maker in ABC Inc., a highly
successful private company based in Canada that now needs to access
significant equity capital in order to finance its ambitious international
expansion plans.
In answering the questions, please draw on the knowledge and beliefs that
you have gained through your real-life experiences.
A very short background on ABC's status is as follows:
•

ABC has been repeatedly approached by several investment banks offering
to raise the necessary funds by sponsoring ABC in a TSX IPO.

•

ABC has also been repeatedly approached by several private equity
firms offering to give ABC the necessary funds by investing in ABC
privately.

The entire management team of ABC is waiting for you to decide whether ABC will
pursue an IPO or take investment from private equity. The strategy decision that
will define the future of ABC is yours alone!
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How likely are you to
recommend the IPO option
as ABC's preferred course of
action?

Extremely
Unlikely
1

2

Neutral
3

4

Extremely
Likely
5

How likely are you
to recommend the private
equity option as ABC's
preferred course of action?

Page Break

QUESTION 19
How much would the pre-money valuation premium offered to ABC by an investment
bank with respect to an IPO transaction need to exceed the pre-money valuation offered
to ABC with respect to a private equity transaction in order to make the two
alternatives equally attractive to you?

O The IPO transaction is equally attractive without any premium
O I don't have an opinion on this question
O The IPO transaction would need to be at a premium of the following percentage to
be equally attractive:

________________________________________%

Page Break
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QUESTION 20
In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are each of the
following potential downside risks associated with pursuing the TSX IPO in your
analysis?
Not at All
Important

The time required to complete an IPO
The management effort required to complete an
IPO
The cost that it takes to complete an IPO
Executive compensation disclosure of public
companies being overly invasive for management
Running a public company creating too many
distractions for management
The complexity of continuous disclosure
obligations arising from regulatory changes
The increased cost of continuous disclosure
obligations due to regulatory changes
The requirement to file insider reports so that
everyone is aware of management trading
activities
The increased litigation risk associated with being
public
Concern the company will be able to generate
sufficient trading volume to keep shareholders
happy
Concern as to ability of company to maintain
sufficient analyst coverage

1

2

Moderately
Important

3

4

Extremely
Important

5
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QUESTION 20
In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are each of the
following potential downside risks associated with pursuing the TSX IPO in your
analysis?
Not at All
Important

Belief that the current regulatory environment
favors minority investor protection above the
interest of the public company
The hassle of dealing with proxy advisory firms
Fear that special interest groups will use public
status to exert pressure on the company to adopt
their agendas
The hassle of short-term traders looking for quick
profits
The challenges of competing against private
companies that don't have to disclose any secrets
Challenges for public companies to complete
acquisitions efficiently due to Business Acquisition
Report requirements
The requirement of financial statement
certifications by senior executives
Concern that being public leaves too little time for
management to focus on the core business of the
company
Inability in a public company to keep personal
income and shareholdings secret from family,
friends and acquaintances.
Increased risk to personal reputation being
associated with a public company if things go bad
The pressures of meeting quarterly analyst targets

1

2

Moderately
Important

3

4

Extremely
Important

5
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QUESTION 20
In making your decision on the future direction of ABC, how important are each of the
following potential downside risks associated with pursuing the TSX IPO in your
analysis?
Not at All
Important

Restrictions resulting from public conflict-of-interest
regulations for related party transactions
Redundancy of filing requirements for public
companies
An increase in short-sellers in the public markets
The risk of proxy battles initiated by activist
shareholder groups
Having to listen and respond to the opinions of
uninformed shareholders
The requirement to adopt corporate governance
best practices that are continuously evolving
Risk of a hostile take-over
Overall fatigue arising from being a senior
executive in a public company

1

2

Moderately
Important

3

4

Extremely
Important

5
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QUESTION 21

In making your decision on the future direction of
ABC, how important are each of the following
potential upside benefits associated with pursuing
the TSX IPO in your analysis?
Higher pre-money valuation in an IPO than in a private
equity financing
Anticipated higher valuation post-IPO
Quicker access to capital in follow-on financings
Easier ability to use public stock as currency for future
acquisitions
Opportunity for founding shareholders to obtain
liquidity for a portion of their investment
Increased ability to use stock options to recruit and
retain key employees
Ability for the largest shareholders to keep stronger
management control of ABC as a public company
Increased public visibility as a public company with
potential customers
Enhanced credibility as a public company with
suppliers
You look forward to the challenges associated with
managing a public company

Enhanced credibility with potential investors
Opportunity to increase your personal profile as a
leader of a public company
Opportunity to increase effective voting control by
diluting minority shareholder positions
Opportunity to grow the business further rather than
selling to a third party

Not at All
Important

1

2

Moderately
Important

3

4

Extremely
Important

5
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QUESTION 22- Please help us understand your professional background better.
Please move the sliding scales to reflect the correct number. (Note: If you have
more than 30 years’ experience, choose "30")
0

5

10

15

20

25

Total number of years work experience
Number of years working at the
company / firm where currently
employed
Number of years working for or advising
public companies
Number of years working for or advising
private companies

Page Break

QUESTION 23- In which province or territory do you currently work?
O British Columbia
O New Brunswick

O
O
O
O
O

Page Break

Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
Quebec

O
O
O
O

Prince Edward Island
Nova Scotia
Newfoundland

Yukon, Northwest Territories or
Nunavat

30
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QUESTION 24- Thank you for the time you have spent completing this survey. It
is greatly appreciated!

From your knowledge and experiences, do you have any final thoughts that you
would like to share with us on the topic of public company decline in Canada, the
content or format of this survey or anything else that you would like to convey?
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
Skip To: End of Survey If Thank you for the time you have spent completing this survey. It is
greatly appreciated! From... Is Displayed

Page Break

QUESTION 25- We are sorry! Based on your responses, you appear to be outside of

the specific sub-groups that we are targeting for this survey. If you made an input
mistake, you can hit “go back” and correct the mistake that led you to this screen.
Otherwise, thank you for your time in engaging with the survey to this point,
which is greatly appreciated!

Skip To: End of Survey If We are sorry! Based on your responses, you appear to be outside of
the specific sub-groups that...() Is Displayed

Page Break
Q26 You have selected "I Choose Not to Answer" on a question that is mission
critical for us to have an answer in order to use your contribution in our survey
analysis.
You have the complete freedom to do so and we fully respect your decision!
However, we cannot use your input for this survey without knowing that you meet our
target criteria.
If you wish to participate further, you can select "Go Back" from this screen and
complete the question.
Otherwise, thank you taking for the time to participate in this survey.
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Appendix 6MANCOVA CALCULATIONS,
ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY TABLES
Introduction to MANCOVA Analysis
As discussed in the body of the Dissertation, the use of MANCOVA analysis for Likert-scale
data is not universally embraced amongst statisticians coming from the “traditionalist” camp of
statistical analysis and, therefore, the use of MANCOVA calculations for analysis of the PCD
Study data has been consolidated in this Appendix. The MANCOVA calculations are helpful in
attaining a high-level overview of the variability in responses attributable to demographic
characteristics without resorting to the volumes of data generated by the PCD Study data.
In the ensuing MANCOVA analysis, five different sets of independent variables were defined
and assessed, all of which are defined by demographic characterstics of the PCD Study
respondents. These five different independent variables were selected based on an assessment of
which specific demographic factors were thought most likely to be responsible for material
variation in the responses to the critical PCD Study Likert-scale survey questions. The five
independent variables tested under the MANCOVA analysis include:
1.

Group I (Senior Business Decision-Makers) vs. Group II (Public Markets
Influencers);

2.

Senior Business Decision-Makers of SME Companies vs. Non-SME Companies;

3.

Senior Business Decision-Makers of TSX-listed Companies vs. Private TSX-Eligible
Companies;

4.

Group II Public Markets Influencers (Lawyers vs. Auditors/Accountants vs. iBankers
vs. Private Equity Investors); and

5.

All Six Major Demographics Groups (Senior Business Decision-Makers of TSXlisted Companies vs. Private TSX-Eligible Companies Lawyers vs. Auditors /
Accountants vs. iBankers vs. Private Equity Investors).
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The specific dependent variables utilized in the MANCOVA calculations were selected based on
what were considered as the most important and enlightening quantitative questions in the PCD
Study: ie., Question 16, Question 18, Question 20 and Question 21. The qualitative questions
(Question 17 and Question 24) cannot be analyzed effectively using MANCOVA calculations.
Question 19 was excluded due to the non-response issues and the other specific limiting factors
associated with Question 19 discussed in the body of the Dissertation.
The covariates utilized in the MANCOVA calculations are those specific confounding variables
for which we seek to remove their impact in order to then focus on the variation specifically
attributable to the independent variables. In the MANCOVA analysis of the PCD Study data,
four different covariates were used throughout the analysis: ie., industry, geography, public
company experience and total career experience. A fifth covariate, SME vs. Non-SME status,
was used as a covariate only for the MANCOVA calculations in which the independent variable
was TSX-listed companies vs. Private TSX-eligible companies, since it does not apply to the
other independent variables.
All covariates found to be insignificant in the initial MANCOVA calculations were removed,
with the MANCOVA calculation re-run a second time in order to increase the degrees of
freedom (ie., to increase the power of the MANCOVA test). If a particular covariate was
marginally significant in the first MANCOVA test, but determined to be insignificant in the
second MANCOVA calculation once other insignificant covariates were removed, then the
MANCOVA test was run a third time to ensure that only significant covariates (ie., covariates
with a P-value below 0.05) were included in the final analysis. To prevent this Appendix 6 from
being any longer than necessary, only the final MANCOVA calculations are included.
All MANCOVA calculations were completed utilizing the open-source R software program. R
runs the four common MANCOVA tests: Pillai’s Trace, Wilks’ Lambda, Hotelling’s Trace and
Roy’s Largest Root. Pillai’s Trace is considered to be the most robust of the four MANCOVA
tests for departures from the MANCOVA assumptions, particularly for violations of the
assumption that there are equal numbers of responses in the within-cell covariance matrix (equal
number of Group 1 and Prairies, as Group 2 and BC, as Group 1 and BC, as Group 2 and
Prairies, etc.).
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When the dependent variable consists of two categories (ex., Group I v Group II or SME v NonSME), then all four MANCOVA test statistics will give the same results. When the independent
variable contains more than two categories (as occurs with our fourth and fifth set of
MANCOVA tests), Pillai’s Trace is considered as the least powerful of the tests. In certain
instances (which in our particular calcuations only occurred with respect to the MANCOVA
calculation where the six major demographic groups were used as our independent variable),
complexity of the calculation results in irreconcilable errors for certain of the MANCOVA tests
and only Roy’s Largest Root calculations can be completed.
It should be noted that the picture graphs included in the ensuing MANCOVA analysis are
simple summary tables that do not show the effect of removal of the covariates. These picture
graphs simply show the mean response for the particular dependent variable element, with
confidence interval bars demonstrating the upper and lower parameters of the 95% confidence
interval. The picture graphs are limited to those dependent variable elements calculated as being
significant. The actual MANCOVA calculations, including the effect of removal of the
covariates, are included after the MANCOVA picture graphs in each instance.
For the purposes of the MANCOVA calculations, a single confidence level has been used in
determining what is statistically significant in predicting variations. In all of the MANCOVA
caclulations, statistical outputs with a P-Value below 0.05 (representing a 95% confidence level)
have been determined to be significant. Those covariates with a P-Value above 0.05 have been
classified as insignificant and eliminated from the MANCOVA cacluations. Note that this is a
different P-value for minimum significance than the P-Value of 0.10 that was applied in the
ordinal-specific statistical tests in the analysis portion of the body of the Dissertation. The lower
minimum P-value of 0.05 is considered appropriate here because of the limited application of the
MANCOVA tests for summary purposes in this Appendix 6.
Although only a single confidence level of 95% has been used in determining significance,
materially lower P-Values (leading to correspondingly higher confidence levels) are recognized
and denoted throughout the ensuing tables, with a notation of “*” indicating a P-Value between
0.05 and 0.01, a notation of “**” indicating a P-Value between 0.01 and 0.001, and a notation of
“***” indicating a P-Value lower than 0.001. In other words, the more stars, the higher the
confidence level assoicated with the statistical output.

452

MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
Three of the four covariates tested are determined to be significant in the first MANCVOA
calculation.
After re-running the MANCOVA tests and factoring away the impact of the three significant
covariates, we observe a significant difference remaining between Group I and Group II
participants in the responses to the following three sub-questions within Question 16: Q16-2,
Q16-4 and Q16-7.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1A (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable:
Group I v. Group II
Pillai's Trace
0.1112
4.95
7
277
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.889
4.95
7
277
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.1251
4.95
7
277
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.1251
4.95
7
277
< .001 ***
Significant Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
0.0961
4.21
7
277
< .001
Wilks' Lambda
0.904
4.21
7
277
< .001
Hotelling's Trace
0.1063
4.21
7
277
< .001
Roy's Largest Root
0.1063
4.21
7
277
< .001
Geography
Pillai's Trace
0.0579
2.43
7
277
0.020
Wilks' Lambda
0.942
2.43
7
277
0.020
Hotelling's Trace
0.0615
2.43
7
277
0.020
Roy's Largest Root
0.0615
2.43
7
277
0.020
Pubco Experience
Pillai's Trace
0.1114
4.96
7
277
< .001
Wilks' Lambda
0.889
4.96
7
277
< .001
Hotelling's Trace
0.1254
4.96
7
277
< .001
Roy's Largest Root
0.1254
4.96
7
277
< .001
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: Insignificant covariate removed in calculation is Total Career Experience (p=0.378)

***
***
***
***
*
*
*
*
***
***
***
***
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1A (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares
df Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Group I v. Group II
Q16_1
1.73593
1
1.73593
1.92111
0.167
Q16_2
10.40564
1
10.40564
7.96389
0.005 **
Q16_3
2.20008
1
2.20008
2.30181
0.130
Q16_4
16.29854
1
16.29854
14.78220
< .001 ***
Q16_5
6.89e-4
1
6.89e-4
6.59e-4
0.980
Q16_6
3.99717
1
3.99717
3.67236
0.056
Q16_7
13.17858
1
13.17858
10.26870
0.002 **
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Industry
Q16_1
4.45661
1
4.45661
4.93202
0.027 *
Q16_2
4.46369
1
4.46369
3.41626
0.066
Q16_3
0.08561
1
0.08561
0.08957
0.765
Q16_4
7.80375
1
7.80375
7.07772
0.008 **
Q16_5
2.24713
1
2.24713
2.14988
0.144
Q16_6
23.21538
1
23.21538
21.32888
< .001 ***
Q16_7
0.03590
1
0.03590
0.02797
0.867
Geography
Q16_1
Q16_2
Q16_3
Q16_4
Q16_5
Q16_6
Q16_7

1.79472
0.04698
0.00224
0.26230
5.08e-4
5.81406
12.08519

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1.79472
0.04698
0.00224
0.26230
5.08e-4
5.81406
12.08519

1.98617
0.03595
0.00235
0.23790
4.86e-4
5.34160
9.41674

0.160
0.850
0.961
0.626
0.982
0.022 *
0.002 **

Pubco Experience
Q16_1
Q16_2
Q16_3
Q16_4
Q16_5
Q16_6
Q16_7

10.94436
5.92613
10.32984
4.01871
1.72714
3.10571
0.47449

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

10.94436
5.92613
10.32984
4.01871
1.72714
3.10571
0.47449

12.11184
4.53552
10.80745
3.64483
1.65239
2.85334
0.36972

< .001 ***
0.034 *
0.001 **
0.057
0.200
0.092
0.544

Residuals
Q16_1
Q16_2
Q16_3
Q16_4
Q16_5
Q16_6
Q16_7

255.72115
369.76866
270.49334
312.02990
295.80231
308.03087
363.19459

283
283
283
283
283
283
283

0.90361
1.30660
0.95581
1.10258
1.04524
1.08845
1.28337
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1B
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
Running the MANCOVA tests the first time, we observe that the Group I and Group II
dichotomy is not significant as a predictor of variation in Question 18. As such, we can
conclude that the factor of respondents being Senior Business Decision-makers vs. Public
Markets Influencers is not a significant predictor of difference in the responses to Question 18.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
Group I v. Group II
Pillai's Trace
9.48e-4
0.133
2
280
0.876
Wilks' Lambda
0.999
0.133
2
280
0.876
Hotelling's Trace
9.49e-4
0.133
2
280
0.876
Roy's Largest Root
9.49e-4
0.133
2
280
0.876
Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0332
0.967
0.0343
0.0343

4.804
4.804
4.804
4.804

2
2
2
2

280
280
280
280

0.009
0.009
0.009
0.009

Geography
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0120
0.988
0.0122
0.0122

1.706
1.706
1.706
1.706

2
2
2
2

280
280
280
280

0.183
0.183
0.183
0.183

Pubco Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0959
0.904
0.1061
0.1061

14.856
14.856
14.856
14.856

2
2
2
2

280
280
280
280

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Total Career Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0175
0.982
0.0179
0.0179

2.500
2.500
2.500
2.500

2
2
2
2

280
280
280
280

0.084
0.084
0.084
0.084

**
**
**
**

***
***
***
***

456

MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1C
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary:
Our first MANCOVA calculation discloses that all four covariates tested are significant. After
factoring away the impact of the four significant covariates, we observe a significant difference
remaining in the responses to the following seven factors tested in Question 20. As such, we
conclude that the Group I v. Group II dichotomy is a significant factor in predicting variability in
these seven different downside factors associated with being a public company.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
Group I v. Group II
Pillai's Trace
0.224
2.31
31
248
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.776
2.31
31
248
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.289
2.31
31
248
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.289
2.31
31
248
< .001 ***
Significant Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.179
0.821
0.218
0.218

1.75
1.75
1.75
1.75

31
31
31
31

248
248
248
248

0.011
0.011
0.011
0.011

*
*
*
*

Geography
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.162
0.838
0.194
0.194

1.55
1.55
1.55
1.55

31
31
31
31

248
248
248
248

0.037
0.037
0.037
0.037

*
*
*
*

Pubco Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.247
0.753
0.328
0.328

2.62
2.62
2.62
2.62

31
31
31
31

248
248
248
248

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

***
***
***
***

Total Career Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.160
0.840
0.190
0.190

1.52
1.52
1.52
1.52

31
31
31
31

248
248
248
248

0.044
0.044
0.044
0.044

*
*
*
*
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares
df Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Group I v. Group II
Q20_1
1.45698
1
1.45698
1.27093
0.261
Q20_2
0.45037
1
0.45037
0.37009
0.543
Q20_3
0.10005
1
0.10005
0.09385
0.760
Q20_4
2.57584
1
2.57584
1.95433
0.163
Q20_5
0.52573
1
0.52573
0.58684
0.444
Q20_6
0.13158
1
0.13158
0.13143
0.717
Q20_7
3.73310
1
3.73310
4.43397
0.036 *
Q20_8
3.94457
1
3.94457
3.09868
0.079
Q20_9
10.72663
1
10.72663
9.73361 0.002 **
Q20_10
1.57650
1
1.57650
1.27814
0.259
Q20_11
0.54470
1
0.54470
0.44988
0.503
Q20_12
12.69203
1
12.69203
10.52165 0.001 **
Q20_13
5.64753
1
5.64753
4.31119
0.039 *
Q20_14
0.04917
1
0.04917
0.03975
0.842
Q20_15
0.14022
1
0.14022
0.11087
0.739
Q20_16
0.93085
1
0.93085
0.64498
0.423
Q20_17
3.01770
1
3.01770
2.56550
0.110
Q20_18
3.34903
1
3.34903
2.60475
0.108
Q20_19
0.00619
1
0.00619
0.00564
0.940
Q20_20
2.05824
1
2.05824
1.54305
0.215
Q20_21
2.01050
1
2.01050
1.33898
0.248
Q20_22
7.62979
1
7.62979
7.74973
0.006 **
Q20_23
0.70652
1
0.70652
0.61744
0.433
Q20_24
2.29899
1
2.29899
1.72726
0.190
Q20_25
0.25081
1
0.25081
0.22223
0.638
Q20_26
1.42e-5
1
1.42e-5
1.30e-5
0.997
Q20_27
8.06576
1
8.06576
5.74735
0.017 *
Q20_28
7.00741
1
7.00741
5.17162
0.024 *
Q20_29
3.17823
1
3.17823
2.57723
0.110
Q20_30
1.03876
1
1.03876
0.75299
0.386
Q20_31
0.59007
1
0.59007
0.44562
0.505
___________________________________________________________________________________
Industry
Q20_1
0.51063
1
0.51063
0.44542
0.505
Q20_2
10.18230
1
10.18230
8.36731 0.004 **
Q20_3
0.78689
1
0.78689
0.73812
0.391
Q20_4
5.53749
1
5.53749
4.20138
0.041
Q20_5
0.07347
1
0.07347
0.08201
0.775
Q20_6
10.10383
1
10.10383
10.09244 0.002 **
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Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21
Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31
Geography
Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3
Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21

4.49059
12.94232
4.80935
0.37948
8.96311
0.11900
1.51791
0.80889
3.74150
3.64678
5.59563
7.68443
0.20780
8.96311
0.52838
3.74150
3.64678
0.72268
2.76639
4.43852
2.84897
1.77049
4.70188
0.03415
0.30738

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

4.49059
12.94232
4.80935
0.37948
8.96311
0.11900
1.51791
0.80889
3.74150
3.64678
5.59563
7.68443
0.20780
8.96311
0.52838
3.74150
3.64678
0.72268
2.76639
4.43852
2.84897
1.77049
4.70188
0.03415
0.30738

5.33368
10.16691
4.36412
0.30766
7.40279
0.09865
1.15874
0.65388
2.95841
2.52685
4.75713
5.97667
0.18937
6.71958
0.35190
3.80032
3.18702
0.54296
2.45108
4.06300
2.03006
1.30666
3.81277
0.02476
0.23213

0.022
0.002
0.038
0.580
0.007
0.754
0.283
0.419
0.087
0.113
0.030
0.015
0.664
0.010
0.554
0.052
0.075
0.462
0.119
0.045
0.155
0.254
0.052
0.875
0.630

0.23672
0.33087
0.18290
0.34103
0.08029
0.03421
0.60259
0.12589
2.61967
0.05520
1.77682
0.49039
2.28124
0.37226
0.76211
0.00315
0.00123
0.01355
3.74455
0.02513
3.37746

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.23672
0.33087
0.18290
0.34103
0.08029
0.03421
0.60259
0.12589
2.61967
0.05520
1.77682
0.49039
2.28124
0.37226
0.76211
0.00315
0.00123
0.01355
3.74455
0.02513
3.37746

0.20649
0.27190
0.17156
0.25875
0.08962
0.03417
0.71572
0.09889
2.37716
0.04475
1.46750
0.40653
1.74144
0.30093
0.60260
0.00218
0.00104
0.01054
3.41238
0.01884
2.24936

0.650
0.602
0.679
0.611
0.765
0.853
0.398
0.753
0.124
0.833
0.227
0.524
0.188
0.584
0.438
0.963
0.974
0.918
0.066
0.891
0.135

*
**
*
**

*
*
*

*
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Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31
Pubco Experience
Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3
Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21
Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31
Total Career Experience
Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3

4.30812
2.30534
4.43556
2.79221
2.46184
1.29652
2.79971
0.10594
0.49877
1.98410

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

4.30812
2.30534
4.43556
2.79221
2.46184
1.29652
2.79971
0.10594
0.49877
1.98410

4.37584
2.01470
3.33249
2.47395
2.25355
0.92385
2.06625
0.08591
0.36155
1.49839

0.037
0.157
0.069
0.117
0.134
0.337
0.152
0.770
0.548
0.222

5.11728
19.33595
8.63488
3.79911
18.13361
5.11269
3.02684
26.91566
6.84356
3.17914
0.11417
9.95226
1.55916
2.41466
0.74319
1.99406
9.57820
5.69327
21.80478
19.12443
5.56473
11.07357
7.25882
7.85002
4.17466
12.55546
28.34639
2.01920
3.07487
22.04155
0.34809

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

5.11728
19.33595
8.63488
3.79911
18.13361
5.11269
3.02684
26.91566
6.84356
3.17914
0.11417
9.95226
1.55916
2.41466
0.74319
1.99406
9.57820
5.69327
21.80478
19.12443
5.56473
11.07357
7.25882
7.85002
4.17466
12.55546
28.34639
2.01920
3.07487
22.04155
0.34809

4.46382
0.036 *
15.88933 < .001 ***
8.09972
0.005 **
2.88245
0.091
20.24158 < .001 ***
5.10693
0.025 *
3.59511
0.059
21.14375 < .001 ***
6.21002
0.013 *
2.57748
0.110
0.09430
0.759
8.25039
0.004 **
1.19023
0.276
1.95193
0.163
0.58765
0.444
1.38168
0.241
8.14291
0.005 **
4.42801
0.036 *
19.87057 < .001 ***
14.33745 < .001 ***
3.70607
0.055
11.24764 < .001 ***
6.34368
0.012 *
5.89781
0.016 *
3.69883
0.055
11.49319 < .001 ***
20.19855 < .001 ***
1.49021
0.223
2.49342
0.115
15.97771 < .001 ***
0.26288
0.609

9.20363
0.27162
2.85711

1
1
1

9.20363
0.27162
2.85711

8.02835
0.22320
2.68003

0.005 **
0.637
0.103
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Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21
Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31
Residuals
Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3
Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18

3.92939
2.26121
1.32876
2.92098
0.22065
0.55470
3.05353
0.39997
0.84848
0.82253
1.00047
0.21988
0.16925
1.76411
0.76818
0.10565
7.97880
0.23341
1.19745
0.94646
0.50403
0.29229
0.57855
1.24426
6.43533
0.00950
4.45821
1.44426

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

318.69660
338.30212
296.36776
366.40868
249.04894
278.31358
234.05690
353.88964
306.36157
342.89349
336.59559
335.34502
364.17163
343.90383
351.58675
401.21365
327.00088
357.43520

278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278

3.92939
2.26121
1.32876
2.92098
0.22065
0.55470
3.05353
0.39997
0.84848
0.82253
1.00047
0.21988
0.16925
1.76411
0.76818
0.10565
7.97880
0.23341
1.19745
0.94646
0.50403
0.29229
0.57855
1.24426
6.43533
0.00950
4.45821
1.44426
1.14639
1.21691
1.06607
1.31802
0.89586
1.00113
0.84193
1.27298
1.10202
1.23343
1.21078
1.20628
1.30997
1.23706
1.26470
1.44321
1.17626
1.28574

2.98129
2.52406
1.32726
3.46938
0.17334
0.50335
2.47564
0.33034
0.70339
0.62790
0.80875
0.17386
0.11727
1.49976
0.59746
0.09628
5.98165
0.15545
1.21627
0.82714
0.37868
0.25897
0.52960
0.88661
4.74942
0.00770
3.23172
1.09071

0.085
0.113
0.250
0.064
0.677
0.479
0.117
0.566
0.402
0.429
0.369
0.677
0.732
0.222
0.440
0.757
0.015 *
0.694
0.271
0.364
0.539
0.611
0.467
0.347
0.030 *
0.930
0.073
0.297
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Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21
Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31

305.06061
370.81859
417.42283
273.69746
318.10438
370.01970
313.76237
303.69448
390.14177
376.68265
342.82748
383.50602
368.11483

278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278
278

1.09734
1.33388
1.50152
0.98452
1.14426
1.33101
1.12864
1.09243
1.40339
1.35497
1.23319
1.37952
1.32415
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1D
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the Group I / Group II dichotomy is a
significant predictor of variation in Question 21. However, only one of the four covariates tested
in the first calculation (ie., public company experience) is significant. After removing the three
insignificant covariates and re-running the MANCOVA with the single significant covariate, we
observe a significant difference remaining in the responses to the following two factors tested in
Question 21. As such, we conclude that the Group I / Group II dichotomy is a significant
predictor of variability in the responses to these two upside factors associated with being public.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 1D (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: GROUP I V. GROUP II
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
Group I v. Group II
Pillai's Trace
0.0879
2.13
14
309
0.010 **
Wilks' Lambda
0.912
2.13
14
309
0.010 **
Hotelling's Trace
0.0964
2.13
14
309
0.010 **
Roy's Largest Root
0.0964
2.13
14
309
0.010 **
Significant Covariates
Pubco Experience
Pillai's Trace
0.1523
3.97
14
309
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.848
3.97
14
309
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.1797
3.97
14
309
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.1797
3.97
14
309
< .001 ***
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: The following three covariates have been determined to be insignificant and removed from the
above MANCOVA calculation: Total Career Experience (P=0.322), Industry (P=0.081) and Geography
(P=0.370).
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares df Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Group I v. Group II
Q21_1
10.99119
1
10.99119
10.33892 0.001 **
Q21_2
6.35003
1
6.35003
6.92735
0.009 **
Q21_3
0.81685
1
0.81685
0.84448
0.359
Q21_4
2.31e-5
1
2.31e-5
2.89e-5
0.996
Q21_5
2.28871
1
2.28871
2.33039
0.128
Q21_6
0.31512
1
0.31512
0.32746
0.568
Q21_7
0.00480
1
0.00480
0.00387
0.950
Q21_8
1.37629
1
1.37629
1.12930
0.289
Q21_9
0.72238
1
0.72238
0.55417
0.457
Q21_10
3.51634
1
3.51634
3.04019
0.082
Q21_11
1.03435
1
1.03435
0.91075
0.341
Q21_12
3.47017
1
3.47017
2.49837
0.115
Q21_13
0.05736
1
0.05736
0.06484
0.799
Q21_14
0.11703
1
0.11703
0.11229
0.738
Pubco Experience
Q21_1

1.05104

1

1.05104

0.98866

0.321
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Q21_2
Q21_3
Q21_4
Q21_5
Q21_6
Q21_7
Q21_8
Q21_9
Q21_10
Q21_11
Q21_12
Q21_13
Q21_14
Residuals
Q21_1
Q21_2
Q21_3
Q21_4
Q21_5
Q21_6
Q21_7
Q21_8
Q21_9
Q21_10
Q21_11
Q21_12
Q21_13
Q21_14

0.03576
9.20609
15.48867
1.11322
6.26395
3.42754
0.51971
0.33247
4.82178
0.78720
3.96962
5.26314
2.05142

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

342.31469
295.16498
311.46629
257.26208
316.24114
309.86401
399.35535
392.42401
419.73284
372.43111
365.69845
447.24944
284.85181
335.60385

322
322
322
322
322
322
322
322
322
322
322
322
322
322

0.03576
9.20609
15.48867
1.11322
6.26395
3.42754
0.51971
0.33247
4.82178
0.78720
3.96962
5.26314
2.05142
1.06309
0.91666
0.96729
0.79895
0.98212
0.96231
1.24023
1.21871
1.30352
1.15662
1.13571
1.38897
0.88463
1.04225

0.03901
9.51744
19.38626
1.13349
6.50928
2.76363
0.42644
0.25506
4.16886
0.69314
2.85795
5.94951
1.96827

0.844
0.002
< .001
0.288
0.011
0.097
0.514
0.614
0.042
0.406
0.092
0.015
0.162

**
***
*

*
*
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 2A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SME vs. NON-SME
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the breakdown of the senior business
decision-makers into those affiliated with SME companies vs. non-SME companies is not
significant as a predictor of variation in Question 16 (falling just below our minimum threshold
of a 95% confidence level). As such, additional MANCOVA tests removing the insignficiant
variables were not run.

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
SME / Non-SME
Pillai's Trace
0.1056
2.02
7
120
0.057
Wilks' Lambda
0.894
2.02
7
120
0.057
Hotelling's Trace
0.1181
2.02
7
120
0.057
Roy's Largest Root
0.1181
2.02
7
120
0.057
Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.1984
0.802
0.2476
0.2476

4.24
4.24
4.24
4.24

7
7
7
7

120
120
120
120

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Geography
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0594
0.941
0.0631
0.0631

1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08

7
7
7
7

120
120
120
120

0.379
0.379
0.379
0.379

Pubco Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.1487
0.851
0.1747
0.1747

2.99
2.99
2.99
2.99

7
7
7
7

120
120
120
120

0.006
0.006
0.006
0.006

**
**
**
**

Total Career Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.1337
0.866
0.1544
0.1544

2.65
2.65
2.65
2.65

7
7
7
7

120
120
120
120

0.014
0.014
0.014
0.014

*
*
*
*

***
***
***
***
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 2B
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SME vs. NON-SME
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the breakdown of the senior business
decision-makers into those affiliated with SME companies vs. non-SME companies is not
significant as a predictor of variation in Question 18. As such, additional MANCOVA tests
removing the insignficiant variables were not run.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
SME v. Non-SME
Pillai's Trace
0.0267
1.729
2
126
0.182
Wilks' Lambda
0.973
1.729
2
126
0.182
Hotelling's Trace
0.0274
1.729
2
126
0.182
Roy's Largest Root
0.0274
1.729
2
126
0.182
Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0748
0.925
0.0809
0.0809

5.094
5.094
5.094
5.094

2
2
2
2

126
126
126
126

0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007

Geography
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0385
0.962
0.0400
0.0400

2.520
2.520
2.520
2.520

2
2
2
2

126
126
126
126

0.085
0.085
0.085
0.085

Pubco Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0649
0.935
0.0694
0.0694

4.369
4.369
4.369
4.369

2
2
2
2

126
126
126
126

0.015
0.015
0.015
0.015

Total Career Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0122
0.988
0.0124
0.0124

0.780
0.780
0.780
0.780

2
2
2
2

126
126
126
126

0.461
0.461
0.461
0.461

**
**
**
**

*
*
*
*
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 2C
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SME vs. NON-SME
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the breakdown of the senior business
decision-makers into those affiliated with SME companies vs. non-SME companies is not
significant as a predictor of variation in Question 20. As such, additional MANCOVA tests
removing the insignficiant variables were not run.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
SME v Non-SME
Pillai's Trace
0.271
1.19
31
99
0.258
Wilks' Lambda
0.729
1.19
31
99
0.258
Hotelling's Trace
0.372
1.19
31
99
0.258
Roy's Largest Root
0.372
1.19
31
99
0.258
Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.335
0.665
0.504
0.504

1.61
1.61
1.61
1.61

31
31
31
31

99
99
99
99

0.041
0.041
0.041
0.041

Geography
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.277
0.723
0.384
0.384

1.23
1.23
1.23
1.23

31
31
31
31

99
99
99
99

0.223
0.223
0.223
0.223

Pubco Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.326
0.674
0.483
0.483

1.54
1.54
1.54
1.54

31
31
31
31

99
99
99
99

0.056
0.056
0.056
0.056

Total Career Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.255
0.745
0.341
0.341

1.09
1.09
1.09
1.09

31
31
31
31

99
99
99
99

0.364
0.364
0.364
0.364

*
*
*
*
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 2D
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SME vs. NON-SME
DEPENDENT VARIABLEQUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSSESSED)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the breakdown of the senior business
decision-makers into those affiliated with SME companies vs. non-SME companies is not
significant as a predictor of variation in Question 21. As such, additional MANCOVA tests
removing the insignficiant variables were not run.
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
SME vs. Non-SME
Pillai's Trace
0.1438
1.380
14
115
0.174
Wilks' Lambda
0.856
1.380
14
115
0.174
Hotelling's Trace
0.168
1.380
14
115
0.174
Roy's Largest Root
0.168
1.380
14
115
0.174
Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.1828
0.817
0.224
0.224

1.837
1.837
1.837
1.837

14
14
14
14

115
115
115
115

0.041
0.041
0.041
0.041

Geography
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.1173
0.883
0.133
0.133

1.091
1.091
1.091
1.091

14
14
14
14

115
115
115
115

0.373
0.373
0.373
0.373

Pubco Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.1286
0.871
0.148
0.148

1.213
1.213
1.213
1.213

14
14
14
14

115
115
115
115

0.276
0.276
0.276
0.276

Total Career Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.0948
0.905
0.105
0.105

0.860
0.860
0.860
0.860

14
14
14
14

115
115
115
115

0.604
0.604
0.604
0.604

*
*
*
*
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the TSX-listed company v. Private TSXeligible company dichotomy is a significant predictor of variation in Question 16. Also, two out
of the five covariates tested in the first calculation are significant. After removing the three
insignificant covariates and re-running the MANCOVA with the the two significant covariates,
we observe a significant difference remaining in the responses to three sub-questions within
Question 16. As such, we concluded that the TSX vs. Private dichotomy is a significant
predictor of variation in these three sub-questions within Question 16.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3A (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
TSX-Listed vs. Private Company
Pillai's Trace
0.253
6.20
7
128
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.747
6.20
7
128
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.339
6.20
7
128
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.339
6.20
7
128
< .001 ***
Significant Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root
Total Career Experience
Pillai's Trace
Wilks' Lambda
Hotelling's Trace
Roy's Largest Root

0.129
0.871
0.148
0.148

2.70
2.70
2.70
2.70

7
7
7
7

128
128
128
128

0.012
0.012
0.012
0.012

*
*
*
*

0.130
0.870
0.149
0.149

2.73
2.73
2.73
2.73

7
7
7
7

128
128
128
128

0.011
0.011
0.011
0.011

*
*
*
*

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: The following three covariates have been determined to be insignificant and removed from the
above MANCOVA calculation: Public Company Experience (P=0.280), Geography (P=0.392), and SME v.
Non-SME (P=0.379).
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3A (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares df Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
TSX-Listed vs. Private Company
Q16_1
21.80173
1
21.80173
26.19691 < .001 **
Q16_2
5.28117
1
5.28117
4.51704
0.035 *
Q16_3
2.62928
1
2.62928
3.11923
0.080
Q16_4
0.41612
1
0.41612
0.39713
0.530
Q16_5
1.58738
1
1.58738
1.68536
0.196
Q16_6
11.65786
1
11.65786
10.31716 0.002 **
Q16_7
0.25271
1
0.25271
0.20406
0.652
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Industry
Q16_1
0.07985
1
0.07985
0.09595
0.757
Q16_2
0.13256
1
0.13256
0.11338
0.737
Q16_3
0.29732
1
0.29732
0.35273
0.554
Q16_4
10.66592
1
10.66592
10.17921 0.002
Q16_5
2.84432
1
2.84432
3.01990
0.085
Q16_6
11.98766
1
11.98766
10.60903 0.001
Q16_7
0.00993
1
0.00993
0.00802
0.929
Career Experience
Q16_1
0.13647
1
0.13647
0.16398
0.686
Q16_2
2.87479
1
2.87479
2.45884
0.119
Q16_3
0.27355
1
0.27355
0.32452
0.570
Q16_4
4.65577
1
4.65577
4.44332
0.037
Q16_5
7.93876
1
7.93876
8.42881
0.004
Q16_6
0.04287
1
0.04287
0.03794
0.846
Q16_7
0.02541
1
0.02541
0.02051
0.886
Residuals
Q16_1
111.51819
134
0.83223
Q16_2
156.66801
134
1.16916
Q16_3
112.95202
134
0.84293
Q16_4
140.40711
134
1.04781
Q16_5
126.20925
134
0.94186
Q16_6
151.41306
134
1.12995
Q16_7
165.95108
134
1.23844

473

MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3B
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the TSX-listed company v. Private TSXeligible company dichotomy is a significant predictor of variation in Question 18.
However, all five of the five covariates tested in the first MANCOVA calculation are determined
to be insignificant. After removing the five insignificant covariates and re-running the
MANCOVA with only the independent variable left (which essentially becomes an MANOVA
calculation), we observe a significant difference remaining in the responses to both of the subquestions within tested in Question 18. As such, we conclude that the TSX vs. Private
dichotomy is a significant predictor of variability in Question 18.

474

MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3B (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
TSX-Listed vs. Private Company
Pillai's Trace
0.0973
8.03
2
149
< .001
Wilks' Lambda
0.903
8.03
2
149
< .001
Hotelling's Trace
0.108
8.03
2
149
< .001
Roy's Largest Root
0.108
8.03
2
149
< .001
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: All five covariates were determined to be insignificant in the first MANCOVA calculation and were
removed from the second MANCOVA calculation above: Career Experience (P=0.726), Public Company
Experience (P=0.247), Geography (P=0.177), SME v. Non-SME (P=0.414), and Industry (P=0.277)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable Sum of Squares
df Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
TSX-Listed vs. Private Company
Q18_1
18.5
1
18.489
15.7
< .001 ***
Q18_2
10.1
1
10.094
10.7
0.001 **
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Residuals Q18_1
176.8
150
1.178
Q18_2
141.5
150
0.944
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we observe that the TSX-listed company v. Private TSXeligible company dichotomy is a significant predictor of variation in Question 20. However,
only one of the five covariates tested in the first MANOVA calculation are determed to be
significant (ie., industry).
After removing the four insignificant covariates and re-running the MANCOVA with the
independent variable and the sole significant covariate, we observe a significant difference
remaining in the following 15 out of the 31 downside factors tested in Question 20. As such, we
conclude that the TSX vs. Private dichotomy is a significant predictor of variability in responses
for 15 of the 31 downside factors associated with being a public company tested in the PCD
Study.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)

478

MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
TSX-Listed vs. Private Company
Pillai's Trace
0.353
1.97
31
112
0.005 **
Wilks' Lambda
0.647
1.97
31
112
0.005 **
Hotelling's Trace
0.545
1.97
31
112
0.005 **
Roy's Largest Root
0.545
1.97
31
112
0.005 **
Significant Covariate
Industry
Pillai's Trace
0.302
1.57
31
112
0.047 *
Wilks' Lambda
0.698
1.57
31
112
0.047 *
Hotelling's Trace
0.434
1.57
31
112
0.047 *
Roy's Largest Root
0.434
1.57
31
112
0.047 *
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: The following four covariates have been determined to be insignificant and removed from the
above MANCOVA calculation: Public Company Experience (P=0.328), Total Career Experience (P=0.444),
Geography (P=0.249) and SME v. Non-SME (P=0.484)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
TSX-Listed vs. Private Company
Q20_1
6.9931
1
6.9931
6.1319
0.014 *
Q20_2
10.5931
1
10.5931
7.9107
0.006 **
Q20_3
0.0931
1
0.0931
0.0902
0.764
Q20_4
1.5736
1
1.5736
1.2142
0.272
Q20_5
15.4667
1
15.4667
15.6922
< .001 ***
Q20_6
5.4724
1
5.4724
5.1153
0.025 *
Q20_7
0.4598
1
0.4598
0.5421
0.463
Q20_8
10.5931
1
10.5931
6.9848
0.009 **
Q20_9
13.4069
1
13.4069
12.3451
< .001 ***
Q20_10
0.1655
1
0.1655
0.1424
0.706
Q20_11
0.1149
1
0.1149
0.0953
0.758
Q20_12
9.3103
1
9.3103
7.4135
0.007 **
Q20_13
2.9897
1
2.9897
2.2085
0.139
Q20_14
3.2287
1
3.2287
2.5435
0.113
Q20_15
2.9897
1
2.9897
2.3984
0.124
Q20_16
0.3322
1
0.3322
0.2353
0.628
Q20_17
3.6046
1
3.6046
3.2352
0.074
Q20_18
9.5184
1
9.5184
6.3896
0.013 *
Q20_19
21.2598
1
21.2598
20.4812
< .001 ***
Q20_20
13.6563
1
13.6563
8.6073
0.004 **
Q20_21
2.3276
1
2.3276
1.4227
0.235
Q20_22
9.3103
1
9.3103
8.5716
0.004 **
Q20_23
6.9931
1
6.9931
5.5716
0.020 *
Q20_24
0.4149
1
0.4149
0.3118
0.577
Q20_25
0.9667
1
0.9667
0.8939
0.346
Q20_26
6.4655
1
6.4655
5.7659
0.018 *
Q20_27
20.0276
1
20.0276
12.9335
< .001 ***
Q20_28
1.0345
1
1.0345
0.6806
0.411
Q20_29
3.1080
1
3.1080
2.8516
0.093
Q20_30
13.4069
1
13.4069
10.3067
0.002 **
Q20_31
3.2287
1
3.2287
2.7213
0.101
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Industry
Q20_1
0.1255
1
0.1255
0.1101
0.741
Q20_2
3.5051
1
3.5051
2.6176
0.108
Q20_3
0.6196
1
0.6196
0.6000
0.440
Q20_4
2.2938
1
2.2938
1.7700
0.186
Q20_5
2.6154
1
2.6154
2.6535
0.106
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Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21
Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31
Residuals
Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3
Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21

7.5510
4.4228
4.2995
1.3727
0.6615
11.9430
0.1494
0.7598
1.1658
1.5629
2.9258
3.7401
3.1981
1.4525
1.6410
0.1770
0.2453
0.6680
0.6238
2.4762
1.6136
0.1117
0.3599
3.5303
0.9415
1.6307

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

7.5510
4.4228
4.2995
1.3727
0.6615
11.9430
0.1494
0.7598
1.1658
1.5629
2.9258
3.7401
3.1981
1.4525
1.6410
0.1770
0.2453
0.6680
0.6238
2.4762
1.6136
0.1117
0.3599
3.5303
0.9415
1.6307

161.9434
190.1500
146.6390
184.0223
139.9593
151.9145
120.4278
215.3557
154.2135
165.0627
171.1835
178.3334
192.2229
180.2538
177.0061
200.4938
158.2139
211.5318
147.3981
225.2958
232.3230

142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142

1.1404
1.3391
1.0327
1.2959
0.9856
1.0698
0.8481
1.5166
1.0860
1.1624
1.2055
1.2559
1.3537
1.2694
1.2465
1.4119
1.1142
1.4897
1.0380
1.5866
1.6361

7.0582
5.2150
2.8350
1.2640
0.5690
9.9069
0.1190
0.5613
0.9184
1.2538
2.0722
3.3568
2.1469
1.3993
1.0343
0.1082
0.2258
0.5322
0.4687
2.2897
1.4390
0.0721
0.2368
3.2391
0.7238
1.3744

0.009
0.024
0.094
0.263
0.452
0.002
0.731
0.455
0.340
0.265
0.152
0.069
0.145
0.239
0.311
0.743
0.635
0.467
0.495
0.132
0.232
0.789
0.627
0.074
0.396
0.243
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Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31

154.2375
178.2285
189.0026
153.5640
159.2312
219.8883
215.8470
154.7685
184.7136
168.4785

142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142
142

1.0862
1.2551
1.3310
1.0814
1.1213
1.5485
1.5200
1.0899
1.3008
1.1865

482

MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3D
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX-ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary:
Running the first MANCOVA test, we once again observe that the TSX-listed company v.
Private TSX-eligible company dichotomy is a significant predictor of variation in Question 21.
However, as was the case with MANCOVA analysis 3B, all five of the five covariates tested in
the first calculation are insignificant. After removing the five insignificant covariates and rerunning the MANCOVA with only the independent variable left (essentially an MANOVA
calculation), we observe a significant difference remaining in the responses to both of the subquestions within tested in Question 18. As such, we conclude that the TSX vs. Private
dichotomy is a significant predictor of variability for these two factors associated with the
upsides of being a public company.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3D (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX- ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
TSX-Listed vs. Private Company
Pillai's Trace
0.225
2.64
14
127
0.002 **
Wilks' Lambda
0.775
2.64
14
127
0.002 **
Hotelling's Trace
0.291
2.64
14
127
0.002 **
Roy's Largest Root
0.291
2.64
14
127
0.002 **
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: All five covariates were determined to be insignificant in the first MANCOVA calculation and
were removed from the second calculation above: Total Career Experience (P=0.494), Public Company
Experience (P=0.961), Geography (P=0.473), SME v. Non-SME (P=0.176), and Industry (P=0.460)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 3D (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: TSX-LISTED COMPANY VS.
PRIVATE TSX- ELIGIBLE COMPANY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:
QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable Sum of Squares df Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
TSX-Listed vs. Private Company
Q21_1
1.23561
1
1.23561
1.06722
0.303
Q21_2
0.40829
1
0.40829
0.37763
0.540
Q21_3
6.36731
1
6.36731
7.33009
0.008
Q21_4
10.36192
1
10.36192
15.49696 < .001 ***
Q21_5
2.60992
1
2.60992
2.52638
0.114
Q21_6
0.35471
1
0.35471
0.34591
0.557
Q21_7
1.44770
1
1.44770
1.03547
0.311
Q21_8
1.27886
1
1.27886
0.95945
0.329
Q21_9
1.19573
1
1.19573
0.83188
0.363
Q21_10
3.46507
1
3.46507
2.76428
0.099
Q21_11
7.94524
1
7.94524
7.55901
0.007 **
Q21_12
1.03784
1
1.03784
0.75153
0.387
Q21_13
2.14924
1
2.14924
2.16330
0.144
Q21_14
0.00633
1
0.00633
0.00647
0.936
Residuals Q21_1
Q21_2
Q21_3
Q21_4
Q21_5
Q21_6
Q21_7
Q21_8
Q21_9
Q21_10
Q21_11
Q21_12
Q21_13
Q21_14

162.08834
151.36636
121.61156
93.60991
144.62951
143.56078
195.73540
186.60846
201.23385
175.49267
147.15335
193.33540
139.09020
137.09226

140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140
140

1.15777
1.08119
0.86865
0.66864
1.03307
1.02543
1.39811
1.33292
1.43738
1.25352
1.05110
1.38097
0.99350
0.97923
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
In all of the MANCOVA calculations run on the four types of public markets influencers, we
have only three initial covariates in the calculation: geography, total career experience and public
company experience. SME vs. Non-SME and Industry have no use here as they apply only to
Group I respondents.
On the initial MANCOVA calculation, with Question 16 as the dependent variable, only one
covariate tested was determined to be significant (ie., geography). After re-running the
MANCOVA test and factoring out the impact of geography, we observe a significant difference
remaining amongst the responses of the 4 different Group II constituents to the following three
sub-questions within Question 16: Q16-1, Q16-2 and Q16-6.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4A (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers
Pillai's Trace
0.324
2.51
21
435
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.707
2.51
21
411
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.372
2.51
21
425
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.200
4.15
7
145
< .001 ***
Significant Covariates
Geography
Pillai's Trace
0.116
2.68
7
143
0.012 *
Wilks' Lambda
0.884
2.68
7
143
0.012 *
Hotelling's Trace
0.131
2.68
7
143
0.012 *
Roy's Largest Root
0.131
2.68
7
143
0.012 *
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: Insignificant covariates removed in the above MANCOVA calculation are Total Career Experience
(P=0.311) and Pubco Experience (P=0.054)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4A (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares df
Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers
Q16_1
17.0725
3
5.6908
6.8606
< .001 ***
Q16_2
11.5140
3
3.8380
2.8581
0.039 *
Q16_3
3.8298
3
1.2766
1.2150
0.306
Q16_4
5.4952
3
1.8317
1.7211
0.165
Q16_5
7.5890
3
2.5297
2.3228
0.077
Q16_6
8.9867
3
2.9956
2.7561
0.045 *
Q16_7
2.6610
3
0.8870
0.6573
0.580
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Geography
Q16_1
2.1898
1
2.1898
2.6399
0.106
Q16_2
3.0271
1
3.0271
2.2542
0.135
Q16_3
0.0123
1
0.0123
0.0117
0.914
Q16_4
0.6127
1
0.6127
0.5757
0.449
Q16_5
0.6373
1
0.6373
0.5852
0.445
Q16_6
5.4031
1
5.4031
4.9711
0.027 *
Q16_7
8.9329
1
8.9329
6.6199
0.011 *
Residuals Q16_1
123.5949
149
0.8295
Q16_2
200.0823
149
1.3428
Q16_3
156.5541
149
1.0507
Q16_4
158.5739
149
1.0643
Q16_5
162.2672
149
1.0890
Q16_6
161.9478
149
1.0869
Q16_7
201.0619
149
1.3494
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4B
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
In all of the MANCOVA calculations run on the four types of public markets influencers, we
have only three initial covariates in the calculation: geography, total career experience and public
company experience. SME vs. Non-SME and Industry have no use here as they apply only to
Group I respondents.
On the initial MANCOVA calculation with Question 18 as the dependent variable, none of the
three covariates tested was determined to be significant. After re-running the test without the
covariates (ie., a MANOVA test), we observe a significant difference amongst the responses of
the 4 different Group II constituents to both Question 18-1 and 18-2. As such, we conclude that
the type of public markets influencer is a significant predictor of variability in Question 18.

489

MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4B (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers
Pillai's Trace
0.151
4.94
6
362
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.851
5.03
6
360
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.172
5.13
6
358
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.153
9.24
3
181
< .001 ***
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: Insignificant covariates removed in the above MANCOVA calculation are Geography (P=0.351),
Total Career Experience (P=0.179), Pubco Experience (P=0.092)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers
Q18_1
16.7
3
5.576
6.81
< .001 ***
Q18_2
18.0
3
5.985
8.07
< .001 ***
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Residuals
Q18_1
148.2
181
0.819
Q18_2
134.2
181
0.742
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary:
In all of the MANCOVA calculations run on the four types of public markets influencers, we
have only three initial covariates in the calculation: geography, total career experience and public
company experience. SME vs. Non-SME and Industry have no use here as they apply only to
Group I respondents.
On the initial MANCOVA calculation with Question 20 as the dependent variable, only
geography proves to be significant as a covariate. In the first MANCOVA analysis, the type of
public markets influencer as an independent variable falls right on the boundary of minimum
significance we have established (ie., 95% confidence level) for Pillai’s Trace and is significant
for the other three MANCOVA tests. After re-running the MANCOVA test and factoring out
the impact of the significant covariate (geography), however, we observe that the type of public
markets influencer as an independent variable falls just outside our minimum level of
significance on three out of the four alternative MANCOVA tests. It is only utilizing Roy’s
Largest Root as a test that significance is retained at the 95% confidence level.
However, because the other three MANCOVA tests evidence a confidence level falling just
outside the 95% confidence level established as the minimum and remain significant under
Roy’s Largest Root, the summary tables are still shown below for the 11 downside factors in
Question 20 that are determined to be significant in the follow-on MANCOVA analysis.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers
Pillai's Trace
0.768
1.29
93
348
0.055
Wilks' Lambda
0.406
1.29
93
342
0.053
Hotelling's Trace
1.069
1.29
93
338
0.052
Roy's Largest Root
0.491
1.84
31
116
0.011 *
Significant Covariates
Geography
Pillai's Trace
0.312
1.67
31
114
Wilks' Lambda
0.688
1.67
31
114
Hotelling's Trace
0.454
1.67
31
114
Roy's Largest Root
0.454
1.67
31
114
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

0.027
0.027
0.027
0.027

*
*
*
*

Note: Insignificant covariates removed in the above MANCOVA calculation are Industry (P=0.351), Total
Career Experience (P=0.179), Pubco Experience (P=0.092)

494

MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares df
Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers
Q20_1
9.45675
3
3.15225
2.70378
0.048 *
Q20_2
11.95638
3
3.98546
3.64926
0.014 *
Q20_3
6.40660
3
2.13553
1.87486
0.136
Q20_4
1.84841
3
0.61614
0.45725
0.713
Q20_5
11.33676
3
3.77892
4.93536
0.003 **
Q20_6
9.91909
3
3.30636
3.78076
0.012 *
Q20_7
11.51471
3
3.83824
4.86740
0.003 **
Q20_8
4.37990
3
1.45997
1.22193
0.304
Q20_9
1.99264
3
0.66421
0.57373
0.633
Q20_10
8.68692
3
2.89564
2.26212
0.084
Q20_11
10.25015
3
3.41672
2.86090
0.039 *
Q20_12
2.41172
3
0.80391
0.71301
0.546
Q20_13
3.17258
3
1.05753
0.83963
0.474
Q20_14
10.88357
3
3.62786
2.99768
0.033 *
Q20_15
5.09522
3
1.69841
1.36123
0.257
Q20_16
1.39140
3
0.46380
0.31579
0.814
Q20_17
6.82096
3
2.27365
1.76044
0.157
Q20_18
10.80390
3
3.60130
3.20258
0.025 *
Q20_19
6.33809
3
2.11270
1.98871
0.118
Q20_20
3.11584
3
1.03861
0.86304
0.462
Q20_21
7.59603
3
2.53201
1.80049
0.150
Q20_22
11.06838
3
3.68946
4.31053
0.006 **
Q20_23
0.24446
3
0.08149
0.07228
0.975
Q20_24
15.89077
3
5.29692
4.30272
0.006 **
Q20_25
5.72255
3
1.90752
1.56484
0.201
Q20_26
7.31450
3
2.43817
2.23641
0.087
Q20_27
9.57829
3
3.19276
2.47641
0.064
Q20_28
2.76289
3
0.92096
0.72654
0.538
Q20_29
1.32621
3
0.44207
0.33910
0.797
Q20_30
16.40741
3
5.46914
3.93082
0.010 *
Q20_31
3.64797
3
1.21599
0.82605
0.482
Geography
Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3
Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6

0.49725
1.98534
0.00143
0.24764
1.14318
0.10933

1
1
1
1
1
1

0.49725
1.98534
0.00143
0.24764
1.14318
0.10933

0.42651
1.81787
0.00126
0.18378
1.49302
0.12502

0.515
0.180
0.972
0.669
0.224
0.724
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Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21
Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31
Residuals
Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3
Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21

0.06025
0.80347
3.40533
0.22032
3.22322
0.94777
0.77314
0.30764
0.36345
2.92816
0.20578
0.46289
3.63703
0.09880
0.03224
5.50475
0.46472
2.63475
0.93187
3.02325
2.23004
0.81117
0.00716
0.04389
0.17415

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.06025
0.80347
3.40533
0.22032
3.22322
0.94777
0.77314
0.30764
0.36345
2.92816
0.20578
0.46289
3.63703
0.09880
0.03224
5.50475
0.46472
2.63475
0.93187
3.02325
2.23004
0.81117
0.00716
0.04389
0.17415

167.88492
157.26633
164.02150
194.03817
110.25832
125.93131
113.55255
172.05153
166.70941
184.32766
171.97629
162.35863
181.36972
174.27188
179.66885
211.49253
185.97998
161.92785
152.97790
173.29543
202.50595

144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144
144

1.16587
1.09213
1.13904
1.34749
0.76568
0.87452
0.78856
1.19480
1.15770
1.28005
1.19428
1.12749
1.25951
1.21022
1.24770
1.46870
1.29153
1.12450
1.06235
1.20344
1.40629

0.07640
0.67247
2.94145
0.17212
2.69888
0.84060
0.61384
0.25420
0.29130
1.99371
0.15933
0.41164
3.42358
0.08210
0.02293
6.43139
0.41223
2.14023
0.76446
2.77307
1.72969
0.63993
0.00549
0.03154
0.11830

0.783
0.414
0.088
0.679
0.103
0.361
0.435
0.615
0.590
0.160
0.690
0.522
0.066
0.775
0.880
0.012
0.522
0.146
0.383
0.098
0.191
0.425
0.941
0.859
0.731
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Q20_22
123.25237
144
0.85592
Q20_23
162.33780
144
1.12735
Q20_24
177.27313
144
1.23106
Q20_25
175.53351
144
1.21898
Q20_26
156.99111
144
1.09022
Q20_27
185.65475
144
1.28927
Q20_28
182.53332
144
1.26759
Q20_29
187.72704
144
1.30366
Q20_30
200.35408
144
1.39135
Q20_31
211.97654
144
1.47206
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary: Four Types of Public Markets Influencers (ie., Group II)
In all of the MANCOVA calculations run on the four types of public markets influencers, we
have only three initial covariates in the calculation: geography, total career experience and public
company experience. SME vs. Non-SME and Industry have no use here as they apply only to
Group I respondents.
On the initial MANCOVA calculation with Question 21 as the dependent variable, only public
company experience proves to be significant as a covariate. After re-running the MANCOVA
tests and factoring out the impact of the sole significant covariate, we observe a significant
difference remaining between the four types of public markets influencers in the responses to 7
of the 14 upside public company factors within Question 21 summarized in the following graphs.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers
Pillai's Trace
0.409
1.84
42
489
0.001 **
Wilks' Lambda
0.640
1.85
42
478
0.001 **
Hotelling's Trace
0.490
1.86
42
479
0.001 **
Roy's Largest Root
0.277
3.22
14
163
< .001 ***
Significant Covariate
Public Company Experience
Pillai's Trace
0.215
3.15
14
161
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.785
3.15
14
161
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.274
3.15
14
161
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.274
3.15
14
161
< .001 ***
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: Insignificant covariates removed in the above MANCOVA calculation are Geography (P=0.402),
Total Career Experience (P=0.063).
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 4D (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: FOUR TYPES OF PUBLIC MARKETS INFLUENCERS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
4 Types of Public Markets Influencers
Q21_1
3.1720
3
1.0573
1.0758
0.361
Q21_2
2.1196
3
0.7065
0.8771
0.454
Q21_3
4.5723
3
1.5241
1.4579
0.228
Q21_4
11.9681
3
3.9894
4.7520
0.003 **
Q21_5
3.0072
3
1.0024
1.0708
0.363
Q21_6
10.2419
3
3.4140
4.0523
0.008 **
Q21_7
10.9303
3
3.6434
3.4298
0.018 *
Q21_8
3.9360
3
1.3120
1.2212
0.304
Q21_9
19.5775
3
6.5258
5.8675
< .001 ***
Q21_10
7.9172
3
2.6391
2.5491
0.057
Q21_11
9.7000
3
3.2333
2.9722
0.033 *
Q21_12
11.4293
3
3.8098
2.9758
0.033 *
Q21_13
7.3443
3
2.4481
3.1656
0.026 *
Q21_14
5.1654
3
1.7218
1.5789
0.196
Public Company Experience
Q21_1
Q21_2
Q21_3
Q21_4
Q21_5
Q21_6
Q21_7
Q21_8
Q21_9
Q21_10
Q21_11
Q21_12
Q21_13
Q21_14

0.7455
0.0415
3.1619
2.8155
0.0852
9.2679
0.7693
5.4001
2.5195
0.9148
4.6199
4.4435
2.3746
3.6104

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.7455
0.0415
3.1619
2.8155
0.0852
9.2679
0.7693
5.4001
2.5195
0.9148
4.6199
4.4435
2.3746
3.6104

Residuals
Q21_1
Q21_2
Q21_3
Q21_4
Q21_5
Q21_6
Q21_7

171.0099
140.1629
181.8971
146.0767
162.8853
146.5908
184.8367

174
174
174
174
174
174
174

0.9828
0.8055
1.0454
0.8395
0.9361
0.8425
1.0623

0.7585
0.0515
3.0246
3.3537
0.0910
11.0008
0.7242
5.0262
2.2653
0.8836
4.2468
3.4708
3.0706
3.3108

0.385
0.821
0.084
0.069
0.763
0.001 **
0.396
0.026 *
0.134
0.349
0.041 *
0.064
0.081
0.071
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Q21_8
186.9432
174
1.0744
Q21_9
193.5231
174
1.1122
Q21_10
180.1401
174
1.0353
Q21_11
189.2890
174
1.0879
Q21_12
222.7641
174
1.2803
Q21_13
134.5604
174
0.7733
Q21_14
189.7493
174
1.0905
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPS(PUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
The fifth independent variable represents all six of the major demographic respondent groups,
namely: (i) senior decision-makers of TSX-listed companies vs. (ii) senior decision-makers of
private TSX-eligible companies vs. (iii) securities lawyers vs. (iv) auditors / accountants vs. (v)
investment bankers vs. (vi) private equity investors.
All five of the covariates were also included in these MANCOVA calculations. However, given
the complexity of these calculations, out of the four MANCOVA tests normally run by R, the
only test that was able to properly calculate final outputs is Roy’s Largest Root. The output of
the other three MANCOVA tests failed and are excluded beyond the initial MANCOVA
calculations.
Two out of the the five covariates tested (total career experience and industry) are significant
when running the MANCOVA test the first time. After re-running the MANCOVA test
eliminating the three insignficiant covariates, Total Career Experience falls below the
significance threshold. Re-running the MANCOVA test a third time with the only remaining
significant covariate (ie., industry), we observe a significant difference remaining between the
six major respondent groups participants in the responses to the following five sub-questions
within Question 16: Q16-1, Q16-2, 16-4, Q16-6 and Q16-7.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5A
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5A (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
Six Major Respondent Groups
Pillai's Trace
0.3894
4.13
35
1710
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.661
4.20
35
1424
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.4398
4.23
35
1682
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.1687
8.24
7
342
< .001 ***
Significant Covariate
Geography
Pillai's Trace
0.0461
2.34
7
338
0.024 *
Wilks' Lambda
0.954
2.34
7
338
0.024 *
Hotelling's Trace
0.0484
2.34
7
338
0.024 *
Roy's Largest Root
0.0484
2.34
7
338
0.024 *
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: Insignificant covariates removed after the first MANCOVA calculation are Geography (P=0.392),
Pubco Experience (P=0.280) and SME vs. Non-SME (P=0.379). After running the MANCOVA calculation
again, Total Career Experience becomes insignificant and is also removed, leaving industry as the only
remaining significant covariate.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5A (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER / AUDITOR / IBANK /
PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 16 (WITH 7 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Note: Using only Roy’s Largest Root Below
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Six Major Respondent Groups
Q16_1
36.4009
5
7.2802
9.2100
< .001 ***
Q16_2
28.2853
5
5.6571
4.7548
< .001 ***
Q16_3
9.8420
5
1.9684
2.1281
0.062
Q16_4
33.8723
5
6.7745
6.3260
< .001 ***
Q16_5
10.5866
5
2.1173
2.0575
0.070
Q16_6
32.7303
5
6.5461
5.9684
< .001 ***
Q16_7
18.2759
5
3.6552
2.8707
0.015 *
Geography
Q16_1
Q16_2
Q16_3
Q16_4
Q16_5
Q16_6
Q16_7

0.0109
0.1814
0.2815
11.9349
1.6080
8.8201
0.0485

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.0109
0.1814
0.2815
11.9349
1.6080
8.8201
0.0485

0.0138
0.1525
0.3044
11.1449
1.5626
8.0418
0.0381

0.907
0.696
0.582
< .001 ***
0.212
0.005 **
0.845

Residuals
Q16_1
271.9187
344
0.7905
Q16_2
409.2769
344
1.1898
Q16_3
318.1841
344
0.9250
Q16_4
368.3865
344
1.0709
Q16_5
353.9992
344
1.0291
Q16_6
377.2929
344
1.0968
Q16_7
438.0061
344
1.2733
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5B
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS)
Summary:
Given the complexity of these calculations, out of the four MANCOVA tests normally run by R,
the only test that was able to properly calculate final outputs is Roy’s Largest Root. The output
of the other three MANCOVA tests failed and are excluded beyond the initial MANCOVA
calculations.
After running the MANCOVA test the first time, it is determined that none of the five covariates
are significant and they are all elminated in the running the MANCOVA test the second time
(which essentially becomes an MANOVA analysis). After running the second MANCOVA test,
we observe a significant difference remaining between the six major respondent groups
participants in the responses to Question 18. As such, we conclude the the six major
demographic groups are a significant predictor of variability in Question 18.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5B (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 18 (WITH 2 SUB-QUESTIONS)
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Independent Variable
Six Major Respondent Groups
Pillai's Trace
0.127
4.49
10
662
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.875
4.57
10
660
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.141
4.65
10
658
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.125
8.29
5
331
< .001 ***
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Note: Insignificant covariates removed after the first MANCOVA calculation are Industry (P=0.277)
Geography (P=0.177), Pubco Experience (P=0.247), Total Experience (P=0.726) and SME vs. Non-SME
(P=0.414).

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Six Major Respondent Groups
Q18_1
35.4
5
7.070
7.20
< .001 ***
Q18_2
28.1
5
5.616
6.74
< .001 ***
Residuals Q18_1
Q18_2

324.9
275.8

331
331

0.982
0.833
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary:
Given the complexity of these calculations, out of the four MANCOVA tests normally run by R,
the only test that was able to properly calculate final outputs is Roy’s Largest Root. The output
of the other three MANCOVA tests failed and are excluded beyond the initial MANCOVA
calculations.
After running the MANCOVA test the first time, it is determined that the only significant
covariate is industry and the other four covariates are all eliminated in running the MANCOVA
test the second time. After running the second MANCOVA test, we observe a significant
difference remaining between the six major respondent groups in the responses to 18 of the 31
different downside risk factors associated with being public tested in Question 21. As such, we
conclude the the six major respondent groups are a significany predictor of variability in 18 of
the 31 downside elements associated with being a public company tested in the PCD Study.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER / AUDITOR / IBANK /
PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Independent Variable
Six Major Respondent Groups
Pillai's Trace
0.797
1.77
155
1445
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.411
1.80
155
1415
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.998
1.83
155
1417
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.366
3.42
31
289
< .001 ***
Significant Covariates
Industry
Pillai's Trace
0.147
1.58
31
285
0.030
Wilks' Lambda
0.853
1.58
31
285
0.030
Hotelling's Trace
0.172
1.58
31
285
0.030
Roy's Largest Root
0.172
1.58
31
285
0.030
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

*
*
*
*

Note: Insignificant covariates removed after the first MANCOVA calculation are Geography (P=0.249),
Pubco Experience (P=0.328), Total Career Experience (P=0.444) and SME vs. Non-SME (P=0.484).
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5C (cont.)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER / AUDITOR / IBANK /
PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 20 (WITH 31 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Note: The following is run only with Roy’s Largest Root
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares
df
Mean Square
F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Six Major Respondent Groups
Q20_1
18.070
5
3.614
3.1717
0.008 **
Q20_2
25.224
5
5.045
4.2596
< .001 ***
Q20_3
8.328
5
1.666
1.5802
0.165
Q20_4
3.687
5
0.737
0.5821
0.714
Q20_5
27.501
5
5.500
6.4486
< .001 ***
Q20_6
19.993
5
3.999
4.1197
0.001 **
Q20_7
19.114
5
3.823
4.7303
< .001 ***
Q20_8
17.185
5
3.437
2.6180
0.024 *
Q20_9
27.541
5
5.508
4.9830
< .001 ***
Q20_10
7.497
5
1.499
1.2635
0.279
Q20_11
8.184
5
1.637
1.4007
0.224
Q20_12
27.862
5
5.572
4.8646
< .001 ***
Q20_13
13.831
5
2.766
2.1932
0.055
Q20_14
13.911
5
2.782
2.3111
0.044 *
Q20_15
9.586
5
1.917
1.5877
0.163
Q20_16
2.288
5
0.458
0.3152
0.904
Q20_17
17.538
5
3.508
2.8612
0.015 *
Q20_18
33.245
5
6.649
5.3049
< .001 ***
Q20_19
26.657
5
5.331
5.0791
< .001 ***
Q20_20
18.887
5
3.777
2.7848
0.018 *
Q20_21
7.766
5
1.553
1.0398
0.394
Q20_22
29.732
5
5.946
6.2225
< .001 ***
Q20_23
11.165
5
2.233
1.9110
0.092
Q20_24
21.291
5
4.258
3.3634
0.006 **
Q20_25
7.441
5
1.488
1.3242
0.253
Q20_26
13.506
5
2.701
2.4947
0.031 *
Q20_27
36.790
5
7.358
5.3392
< .001 ***
Q20_28
10.073
5
2.015
1.4983
0.190
Q20_29
10.029
5
2.006
1.7174
0.130
Q20_30
29.435
5
5.887
4.4864
< .001 ***
Q20_31
8.769
5
1.754
1.3277
0.252
Industry
Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3

0.126
3.505
0.620

1
1
1

0.126
3.505
0.620

0.1102
2.9595
0.5879

0.740
0.086
0.444
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Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19
Q20_20
Q20_21
Q20_22
Q20_23
Q20_24
Q20_25
Q20_26
Q20_27
Q20_28
Q20_29
Q20_30
Q20_31
Residuals Q20_1
Q20_2
Q20_3
Q20_4
Q20_5
Q20_6
Q20_7
Q20_8
Q20_9
Q20_10
Q20_11
Q20_12
Q20_13
Q20_14
Q20_15
Q20_16
Q20_17
Q20_18
Q20_19

2.294
2.615
7.551
4.423
4.299
1.373
0.661
11.943
0.149
0.760
1.166
1.563
2.926
3.740
3.198
1.452
1.641
0.177
0.245
0.668
0.624
2.476
1.614
0.112
0.360
3.530
0.942
1.631

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2.294
2.615
7.551
4.423
4.299
1.373
0.661
11.943
0.149
0.760
1.166
1.563
2.926
3.740
3.198
1.452
1.641
0.177
0.245
0.668
0.624
2.476
1.614
0.112
0.360
3.530
0.942
1.631

358.923
373.072
331.997
399.013
268.667
305.736
254.566
413.537
348.204
373.816
368.109
360.836
397.297
379.200
380.382
457.274
386.151
394.814
330.651

315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315
315

1.139
1.184
1.054
1.267
0.853
0.971
0.808
1.313
1.105
1.187
1.169
1.146
1.261
1.204
1.208
1.452
1.226
1.253
1.050

1.8109
3.0664
7.7798
5.4728
3.2750
1.2418
0.5574
10.2199
0.1304
0.6024
0.9684
1.2942
2.0154
3.0510
2.5516
1.3837
1.2098
0.1185
0.2566
0.5717
0.4927
2.2035
1.4902
0.0810
0.2677
3.0228
0.7175
1.2345

0.179
0.081
0.006 **
0.020 *
0.071
0.266
0.456
0.002 **
0.718
0.438
0.326
0.256
0.157
0.082
0.111
0.240
0.272
0.731
0.613
0.450
0.483
0.139
0.223
0.776
0.605
0.083
0.398
0.267
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Q20_20
427.273
315
1.356
Q20_21
470.532
315
1.494
Q20_22
301.020
315
0.956
Q20_23
368.056
315
1.168
Q20_24
398.797
315
1.266
Q20_25
353.984
315
1.124
Q20_26
341.091
315
1.083
Q20_27
434.096
315
1.378
Q20_28
423.554
315
1.345
Q20_29
367.885
315
1.168
Q20_30
413.338
315
1.312
Q20_31
416.088
315
1.321
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5D
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
Summary:
Given the complexity of these calculations, out of the four MANCOVA tests normally run by R,
the only test that was able to properly calculate final outputs is Roy’s Largest Root. The output
of the other three MANCOVA tests failed and are excluded beyond the initial MANCOVA
calculations.
After running the MANCOVA test the first time, it is determined that none of the five covariates
are significant and, as such, they are all eliminated in running the MANCOVA test the second
time through. After running the second MANCOVA test, we observe a significant difference
remaining between the six major respondent groups in the responses to 8 of the 14 different
downside risk factors associated with being public tested in Question 21. As such, we conclude
that reference to the six major demographic groups as an independent variable is a significant
predictor of variability in 8 of the 14 upside factors assessed in the Question 21 of the PCD
Study.
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5D
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5D
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)

─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
value
F
df1
df2
p
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Independent Variable
Six Major Respondent Groups
Pillai's Trace
0.431
2.06
70
1530
< .001 ***
Wilks' Lambda
0.630
2.10
70
1442
< .001 ***
Hotelling's Trace
0.495
2.13
70
1502
< .001 ***
Roy's Largest Root
0.241
5.27
14
306
< .001 ***
Note: Insignificant covariates removed after the first MANCOVA calculation are Industry (P=0.460),
Geography (P=0.473), Pubco Experience (P=0.961), Total Career Experience (P=0.494) and SME vs. NonSME (P=0.176).
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MANCOVA ANALYSIS: 5D
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SIX MAJOR RESPONDENT GROUPSPUBLIC / PRIVATE / LAWYER /
AUDITOR / IBANK / PRIVATE EQUITY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: QUESTION 21 (WITH 14 FACTORS ASSESSED)
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Dependent Variable
Sum of Squares df
Mean Square F
p
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Six Major Respondent Groups
Q21_1
16.11
5
3.221
3.039
0.011 *
Q21_2
8.58
5
1.717
1.855
0.102
Q21_3
12.27
5
2.454
2.521
0.030 *
Q21_4
22.35
5
4.469
5.805
< .001 ***
Q21_5
8.61
5
1.721
1.763
0.120
Q21_6
11.20
5
2.239
2.356
0.040 *
Q21_7
12.42
5
2.484
2.052
0.071
Q21_8
7.01
5
1.402
1.166
0.326
Q21_9
21.46
5
4.292
3.403
0.005 **
Q21_10
14.51
5
2.901
2.563
0.027 *
Q21_11
18.36
5
3.672
3.391
0.005 **
Q21_12
16.60
5
3.319
2.486
0.032 *
Q21_13
9.50
5
1.899
2.167
0.058
Q21_14
5.21
5
1.042
0.994
0.422
333.84
315
1.060
Residuals Q21_1
Q21_2
291.57
315
0.926
Q21_3
306.67
315
0.974
Q21_4
242.50
315
0.770
Q21_5
307.60
315
0.977
Q21_6
299.42
315
0.951
Q21_7
381.34
315
1.211
Q21_8
378.95
315
1.203
Q21_9
397.28
315
1.261
Q21_10
356.55
315
1.132
Q21_11
341.06
315
1.083
Q21_12
420.54
315
1.335
Q21_13
276.03
315
0.876
Q21_14
330.45
315
1.049
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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